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.'.!'.!~.~: Burgeonin~ Phenomenon .£!. Small Group ~ 
.~·-
There is no denying the phenomenon of the growing use of small group 
methods as the vehicle of learning and growth experiences. Popular articles 
referring directly or indirectly to "sensitivity training" and "encounter" 
groups have recently made their appearance in newspapers and national 
magazines (e.g. Anonymous, 1968; McLuhan, 1967; Williams, 1968), and for years 
now business leaders have been interested in small group laboratories as 
means of improving managerial skills, human relations acuity, and productivity 
in their organizations (Benne, 1964; Blake & Mouton, 1964, 1965; Campbell & 
Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967). The small group approach to problems in 
education (Fox & Lippitt, 1964) and in the wider community (Klein, 1965) is 
also on the rise. 
The overly enthusiastic are claiming that all things can oe done through 
groups. Individuals flock to sensitivity-training laboratories or "encounter" 
groups looking for a v~riety of self-actualization experiences, from hard-core 
psychotherapy to fellowship. Morton Lieberman is currently studying the small, 
self-actualization group phenomenon on the West coast. In one comparatively 
small city (population 50,000) he has discovered over 200 self-actualization 
groups of various kinds (private communication). It would also seem that 
we are witnessing merely the beginning of this phenomenon, for the idea of 
growth-through-groups has just begun to catch the public imagination. 
Organizations in toe turmoil of change are looking eagerly (or bele~~uredly) 
to sensitivity training for some sort of help, if not salvation. Practitioner. 
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arise all around, ·many of them with doubtful qualifications, and still the 
supply does not seem to approach the_ demand. Indeed, the professional 
community stands aghast at the number of non-professionals who have taken up 
the mantle of "trainer." House (1967) expresses his concern over what is 
taking place in business and industry: 
The issue is one of some concern at thi~ moment, because there are 
training directors, personnel managers, business consultants, and 
members of business school faculties not trained in psychological 
practice, who nevertheless engage in T-Group training. Are they 
perhaps getting beyond the area in which they are trained, and 
might they not evoke anxieties or problems which they are not 
capable of recognizing or handling? (pp. 26-27) 
The problem may oe even more acute outside business settings, for in these 
cases group experiences have an even greater similarity to group psychotherapy. 
Yet, despite the lack of qualified trainers, few professionals are engaged in 
the work of training trainers. This problem is not unlike the problem of 
"lay" therapists which. will be discussed more directly below. 
A striking amount of at least informal experimentation with small groups 
is going on, experimentation which is outside the pale of the group-dynamics 
sub-division of social psychology and which includes both "normal" and 
psychiatric populations--from the sensory awareness experiments at the Esalen 
· Institute (Gunther, 1968} and the self-actualization explorations of Herbert 
Otto and associates (19661 to Mowrer' s "Integrity-training" groups (1964, 
1968); from the molar experimentation of such psychotherapeutic communities as 
Daytop Village (Shelly & Bassin, 1965) and Synanon (Casriel, 1963; Maslow, 
1967; Yablonsky, 1962, 1965) doing pioneer work with "sociopathic personal-
itie's" to the more molecular experimentation with groups in university 
"laboratories"; from the organization-oriented laboratory approach delineated 
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in such works as ~Managerial .Q.!.!i (Blake & Mouton, 1964) to the human-
relations, personal-growth, connnunity-relations, higher-education, and 
conflict-management laboratories sponsored by the National Training 
Laboratories (Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964) and the more "self-actualization" 
exploration of Rogers (Hall, 1967; Rogers, 1967}, Bugental (1965), and 
Thomas (1964, 1967). 
~research ~P?blication ~· If one looks for it, there is a fairly 
extensive literature on small group laboratory learning (e.g. Blake & Mouton, 
1961, 1964; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Campbell & Dunnette, 1968; Craig 
& Bittel, 1967; House, 1967; Miles, 1959, 1964; Schein & Bennis, 1965b; 
Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961, to mention but a few). At least one 
journal covers the field more or less directly (The Journal E.!_ 'Applied 
Behavioral Science} and some articles are beginning to appear in other 
journals. But, with few exceptions, what has been published concerning 
laboratory learning in general and especially what has been written specif-
ically about sensitivity training has not yet made its way into the main-
stream of psychological thinking. The practice of sensitivity training has 
outrun both theoretical formulation and organized research, and the resulting 
turmoil has made many behavioral scientists look upon the whole field of 
laboratory learning with suspicion and the sub-specialty of sensitivity 
training with. outright hostility (a colleague of mine in counseling an 
undergraduate psychology major as to the advisability of counting a 
laboratory course in sensitivity training as part of his program remarked to 
the young man: ''We don't give credit for love-ins") • Despite the fact 
that Schein and Bennis (1965b) render "particular thanks to Leland Bradford 
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and Kenneth_ Benne whose efforts over the years to nurse the delicate child 
of laboratory training have now produced a robust viable adult" (p. viii), 
it seems that in many ways that we are still dealing with the problems of an 
.. ~-
infant offspring of an adolescent science. Indeed, one of the strongest 
motivations underlying the writing of this book is the desire to put some 
order into one particularly chaotic area of laboratory learning~the use of 
the small group as a vehicle of personal and interpersonal growth, or, if 
you wish, a kind of psychotherapy or self-actualization or growth experience 
for the relatively normal. This I call "sensitivity training." I do not 
think that the term "sensitivity training" is a particularly happy one, for 
it has too many negative connotations for some, while for others it means 
so many things that it means nothing. But, since the tei:m is with us for 
better or for worse, and since it will be used with some frequency in the 
pages that follow, it is essential to give it some kind of exact meaning. 
Toward !!.'Definition of Sensitivity Training 
The distinction between ~~boratory learning and sensitivity training. 
It is not my purpose here to present an extended treatment of laboratory 
training, for Bradford, Giob, and Benne (1964) and Schein and Bennis (1965b) 
have already provided us with excellent overviews of this field. However, 
since I define laboratory training or learning as a genus of which sensitivity 
training is a species, and since it is the purpose of this hook to delineate 
one particular approach to sensitivity training, it is necessary first briefly 
to point out the essentials of laboratory training and secondly to situate 
sensitivity training in this context. For it is only against such a back-
ground that it is possible to formulate a specific approach to sensitivity 
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training. 
,The 'g~m1~: 'l~i&otaton 't:Faining. Someone once said that it is better to 
feel compunction that to know how to define it. This sentiment, paraphrased 
and applied to laboratory learning, might read: it is easier to experience 
laboratory training than to describe it. Buchanan (1964) provides a rather 
compact statement describing the nature of laboratory training: 
Training approaches meriting the name of laboratory (or T-Group) 
utilize (1) a face-to-face, largely unstructured group as a 
primary vehicle for learning, (2) planned activities involving 
interaction between individuals and/or between groups, (3) system-
atic and frequent feedback and analysis of information regarding 
what happened in the here-and-now and what effect it had, 
(4) dilenunas or problems for which 'old ways' of behaving for 
most of the participants do not provide effective courses of 
action (and thus for which innovative or 'search' behavior is 
required), and (5} generalization, or reformulation of concepts 
and values based upon the analysis of direct experience (p. ). 
Schein and Bennis (1965c) outline some of the difficulties encountered in any 
attempt to write about it: 
Many attempts have been made to characterize the nature of 
laboratory training, but most of them have not been successful 
for several reasons: (l) laboratories vary tremendouslx in 
goals, training design, delegate population, length, setting, 
making it difficult to describe this experience in general; 
(2) laboratories attempt to provide a total and integrated 
learning experience for the participants, making it difficult 
to communicate in written words the interdependence of the many 
separate aspects of the laboratory training design; (3) labor-
atories intend to provide the opportunity for the participants 
to explore the interdependence of emotional and intellectual 
learning. It is difficult without observing the process first-
hand to describe and understand the nature of this emotional 
learning and its meaning to the learner (p. 10). 
With this caution, one may proceed to outline the elements which are common 
to most, if not all, laboratory experiences. 
(a) Learning through actual experience ~n the small sroup. In most 
laborator ex eriences the most im ortant learnin 1 ace thrN1gh 
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the interactions that take place in the small face-to-face, conversation group 
itself. Learning may also take place through side-reading, lectures or 
lecturettes, and various "exercises" which focus in on various aspects of 
.. --
the group experience, but this learning is adjunctive and is important to 
the degree that it leads to and enhances the quality of interactions in the 
t-group itself ("t" for "training"). The most important "input" during group 
sessions is the behavior of the participants themselves. Therefore, all 
laboratory experiences have a strong "here-and-now" flavor, and experiences 
outside the laboratory are considered valuable only to the degree that 
they can make some more or less direct contribution to the interactions 
taking place in the t-group. The participants are learning how to learn 
from the behavior that they themselves produce during group sessions. 
(b} A ciimate'of experimentation. Theoretically, if the group 
...---
experience is to have an impact on behavior outside the laboratory, if it is 
to make a difference in day-to-day living, then it must be different from 
day-to-day experience. Interactions must in some way dramatize the overlooked 
dimensions of the kinds of behavior that are the focus of the laboratory, e.g. 
managerial styles, group decision-making, interpersonal rela.ting, etc. 
Therefore, participants are encouraged to "experiment" with their behavior 
during the laboratory, that ·is, to attempt "new" forms of behavior, kinds 
of behavior that up to the present have not characterized a person's "style." 
Another way of putting this is to say that the laboratory possesses a degree 
of behavioral freedom which is not always found in real life situations 
outside the laboratory. The laboratory provides the participants a kind of 
"cultural permission" to engage in (hopefully responsible) forms of 
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behavior which the cons·truction of their "back-home" environment do not allow. 
In fact, some of the exercises introduced during the laboratory are designed 
to shake tlie participants out of routine ways of acting. Admittedly, all of 
this can arouse a certain degree of anxiety, but anxiety itself, if kept 
within limits, becomes a stimulus to new forms of behavior. 
(c) ·Group ~· The group has to be small enough to allow each 
participant the opportunity to contribute to the interaction of the group, but 
it must be large enough to allow the participants to "space" their contribu-
tions, not just according to the demands of the group, but also according to 
individual needs and capabilities. If the group is too small, each member 
is constantly "on call''; if the group is too large, then it is too easy for 
any one individual to hide in the crowd. It seems also that the group must 
be of a certain size if such factors as heterogeneity of contribution, 
diversity of opinion, coalition formation and other variables are to become 
optimally productive (in terms of learning}. Another way of viewing group 
size is to say that the group should be large enough so that the absence of 
one or two members does not debilitate the group and still small enough so 
that such absences are felt. In practice groups range in size from about 
eight to about twelve or fourteen members, but optimal size is determined to 
a large extent by the nature of the group and its goals. 
(d) Feedback. Group members not only engage in certain kinds of 
behavior, hut, at the same time, they, both individually and corporately, 
try to reflect on the behavior in which they are engaged. The behavior itself 
(e. g·. problem..,.solving work sessions, group decision-making conferences, 
lllanagerial planning sessions·, discussion of interpersonal problems, etc.) is 
--------------------------------·:-"'~····-~--~ 
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part of the "input'" of the laboratory experience. Given this behavioral 
input, the laboratory provides opportunities for both giving and receiving 
feedback with respect to "input" behavior, that is, the group "processes" its 
,.~-
own behavior as a group and the behavior of the individuals in the group. 
All behavior is subjected to scrutiny in terms of the group culture and the 
group's goals, but "process:" variables are subjected to particular scrutiny. 
'!Process" variaoles are such factors as: who speaks to whom and in what 
manner, the frequency of a person's contributions, what coalitions take place 
and how, whether the group atmosphere is one of cooperation, neutrality, or 
competition, who are the cooperators, the neutrals, the competitors, and 
other such variables. 
(e} Leader~!t:tp. In laboratory experiences the leader is usually called 
a "trainer" (though some prefer the term "facilitator") and acts as a resource 
person for the group rather than an authoritarian figure who imposes pre-
conceived goals and types of interaction on the group. Seashore (1968) puts 
it well when he says that the "staff person's role is to facilitate the 
examination and understanding of the experiences in the group. He helps 
participants to focus on the way the group is working, the style of the 
individual's participation, or the issues that are facing the group" (p. 1). 
As a participant..,-observer, the trainer attempts to reveal to the group its 
own dynamics as it moves through various stages of group life. In practice 
there is a wide variety of leadership styles; trainers differ quite markedly 
with respect to such variables as frequency of intervention, "directive" 
tend'encies, degree of self-involvement and self-revelation, depth of 
confrontation, etc. Jl'inally, one of the reasons he is called a "trainer" is 
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that he is "training" group members to participate in his role of participant-
observer; the participants, in one way or another, learn from him how to 
observe what is happening in the group. 
(f) Communication and emotion. In almost every laboratory, one of the 
principal emphases is the network of problems centering around intragroup 
communication processes. It is learned, often painfully, that it is 
impossible to deal with issues on a purely intellectual level, even though 
the laboratory might concern itself with a highly "intellectual" area such as 
problem-solving. As Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note, any attempt to ignore 
human relations issues is self-defeating: 
Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward 
group productivity as meeting problems posed by task-
environmental obstacles; in fact, because group members have 
a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interpersonal 
obstacles may be the major barrier to task effectiveness in 
many groups (p. 88). 
This does not mean that laboratory training is directly psychotherapeutic. 
Rather personal and interpersonal problems are dealt with insofar as they 
inhibit free communication within the group and stand in the way of the 
group's achieving its goals. In laboratory experiences, therefore, while 
emotional issues are not ordinarily the primary concern of the participants 
(though they may be}, neither are they ignored but rather dealt with to the 
extend called for by the goals of·the group. In the laboratory experience 
to be outlined in the following chapters, a laboratory experience in which 
self-actualization and interpersonal growth are the principal goals, emotional 
issues are one of the principal focuses of the group. 
(g) Support. A laboratory is an opportunity for the responsible 
lowerin of defenses which tend to rigidify the personality and distort 
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reality. But if the laboratory, directly or indirectly, calls for dealing 
with certain issues, e.g. emotional issues, it must also provide a climate of 
support conducive to dealing with these issues. This is one area in which 
many laboratories fail: they demand anxiety-arousing behavior from the 
participants and yet do not provide adequate security measures. This 
problem will be dealt with below in the chapter on supportive behavior. 
(h) Ambiguity. The average laboratory experience possesses a good 
deal of built-in ambiguity. The articulated goals of the laboratory are 
usually so general that one of the major perceptions of the participants is 
what Benne (1964) calls a "perception of goallessness" (p. 217), and, since 
the trainer, true to his non-directive approach, does little to clarify either 
goals or procedure, the participants, amid mounting anxiety, thrash around 
looking for viable ways of interacting with one another. Schein and Bennis 
(1965c) picture the situation in these terms: "The goals are unclear, the 
training staff provides minimal cues •••• The general absence of expectations 
creates an unstructured, i.e., ambiguous situation. This serves to upset old 
routines and behavioral grooves and to open up new possibilities for the 
delegates" (p. 44). In the opinion of Schein and Bennis, "the ambiguous and 
unstructured situation creates a need to define and organize the environment" 
(p. 31). Each laboratory will possess its own degree of ambiguity, which 
will be marked or minimal in keeping with the nature of the laboratory and its 
goals. There seems to be a tendency in the literature to consider a rather 
high degree of ambiguity as essential to laboratory learning. However, in my 
opinion, excessive ambiguity often works counter to the principal goals ~f 
some laboratories and should, therefore, be mitigated or eliminated. Again, 
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this question will be dealt with separately below. 
(i) ~ seneral goals .£!. laboratory training. Since there are many 
different kinds of laboratories, the specific goals of laboratory training 
.. ~-
will also differ. However, certain general goals which would apply to most 
laboratory experiences lll8.Y be outlined, although the literature is slow to 
speak in any extended way about even .the general goals of laboratory learning 
(e.g. Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964). Schein and Bennis (1965a), however, 
claim that there "seems to be general agreement about the goals of laboratory 
training," and suggest the following: "(l) self-insight, or some variation of 
learning related to increased self-knowledge, (2) understanding the conditions 
which inhibit or facilitate group functioning, (3) understanding interpersonal 
operations in groups, and (4) developing skills for diagnosing individual, 
group, and organizational behavior" (p. 35). Most professionals engaged in 
laboratory training would probably maintain that all goals, both general and 
specific, must remain flexible and that it is of the essence of laboratory 
learning to allow the group to create its own goals and to move in fruitful, 
though perhaps unexpected, directions. 
(j) Exercises. Different kinds of exercises are used in most 
laboratories to stimulate participation, introduce "missing" elements into 
the group experience, and highlight different aspects of participant behavior. 
For instance, individual members might be given a problem to solve. Once 
they have reached an answer and have indicated the degree of . 1· : ·: nty they 
have with respect to the answer, they are placed in small groups (e.g. in 
threes) in which members have different answers. They then discuss the 
problem and must eventually come up with a single answer. Finally, once the 
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nnswer has been presented, the members discuss how they worked toward 
achieving consensus in.the group, what emotional problems arose, etc. 
F.xercises may be either verbal or non-verbal. In groups which focus on self-
actualization processes and emotional issues there is a tendency to rely more 
heavily on non-verbal exercises. These will be discussed in greater detail 
below in Chapter VII. 
(k) Laboratory populations. For the most part, participants are drawn 
from normal rather than psychiatric populations. However, special laboratory 
techniques have been used with psychiatric populations (Morton, 1965) and 
with a good deal of success (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle and Moyer, 
1965). Mowrer's (1967, 1968) and Mainord's (1967) approaches to group 
psychotherapy have laboratory features and undoubtedly further explorations 
in the use of laboratory methods with psychiatric populations will take 
place. 
(1) Differences in laboratory experiences. Given the unstructured 
nature of laboratory experiences, it is not strange to note that even among 
laboratories with the same specific goals there are great differences. It is 
quite obvious that the focus of learning for a group of executives or manager-
ial personnel from the same organization engaged in a laboratory dealing with 
managerial styles and their relationship to the interaction between intra-
organizational human relations variables and productivity will be quite 
different from the focus of learning in a university laboratory course in 
group dynamics in which the participants are interested in learning about 
the nature and dynamics of small groups by actually becoming a group. What 
is not quite so obvious is the fact that strikingly different kinds of growth 
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and learning can take place in similar groups participating in similar 
laboratories in the same residential center. Exactly what is learned or what 
kind of growth takes place depends on the style of leadership, the peculiar 
nature of each group, and the goals that it creates for itself as it moves 
through the laboratory experience. Investigations of molar activity have 
always been difficult for the behavioral sciences, but research in the area 
of laboratory training is even more difficult because of the diversities 
outlined here. 
Sensitivity training: !!. species of laboratory learning. The distinction 
about to be made is not current or at least not emphasized, to the best of my 
knowledge, in the literature, but it governs the use of the terms "laboratory 
learning" and "sensitivity training" throughout this book. I am aware that 
some will find the definition of "sensitivity-training" used here too 
restrictive, but I believe that the term must be defined and "restricted" if 
it is to be used in any technical way. Sensitivity training, as understood 
here, is a particular kind of laboratory learning in which intrapersonal and 
interpersonal issues ~the direct focus of the group. Other goals, such as 
learning about group processes and developing skills for diagnosing group and 
organizational behavior, are not eliminated, but they are incidental and, 
therefore, subordinated to the goal of dealing with personal and interpersonal 
deficiencies and potentialities. Frankly, I prefer other terms to describe 
this kind of laboratory experience--e.g. a self-actualization and inter-
personal-growth experience, a laboratory in basic human relations, a laboratory 
in interpersonal relations. Since these terms are less "loaded," I will fre-
quently use them instead of "sensitivity training." 
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A sensitivity laboratory provides its members with a unique opportunity 
for responsible learning about themselves on intrapsychic and interpersonal 
levels. Admittedly, 111ost laboratory experiences, whatever their specific goals 
have "sensitivity" dimensions, that is, while the principal focus may be 
learning about the dynamics of an organization, managerial styles, or group 
processes, still the climate is such as to sustain and even demand a certain 
amount of examination of personal and interpersonal issues, especially insofar 
as such issues are interrelated with other aspects of the laboratory. House 
(1967) points to this interrelationship as one of the reasons why trainers 
should be competent in the area of clinical psychology: 
Many of the T~Group properties deal with complex psychological 
and sociological variables. The T-Group is designed to induce 
anxieties and to stimulate interpersonal feedback, introspection, 
and self-evaluation. Although some may claim that the T-Group 
is not therapeutic, within the latit~de of T-Group emphasis are 
methods which closely approximate methods utilized in overtly 
therapeutic processes. This being the case, I believe it is 
imperative that T-Group leaders have psychological training equi-
valent to that required for professional clinical psychology (p. 26). 
What Schein and Bennis (l965a) conceptualize as "meta-goals" of laboratory 
training "rarely articulated by the trainer"--such goals as a spirit of inquiry 
(especially into oneself and one's interpersonal living), expanded conscious-
ness and choi.ce, authenticity in interpersonal relations, collaboration with 
other group members, and conflict resolution through rational means--these I 
see as more direct goals of sensitivity training and see no reason why they 
should not be suggested or in some way "articulated" by the trainer. One of 
the purposes of this study is to show how the elements of laboratory learning 
outlined above apply to sensitivity training in genernl and particularlv to 
the contract approach to interpersonal growth formulated here. 
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~sychotherapy i£E ~Normal? 
If sensitivity training in the strict sense deals directly with such 
intrapersonal and interpersonal issues as personal and interpersonal 
deficiencies and potentialities and only indirectly with group process and 
organization variables, then how does sensitivity training, so defined, differ 
from group psychotherapy? This is certainly a valid, although complex 
question, but some of its complexities must be dealt with in order to provide 
a meaningful context and rationale for any kind of sensitivity training. 
There is a!!!. facto demand among "normals" for sensitivity experiences, and 
this demand seems to be growing. In order to understand this phenomenon 
(if it is not just a fad), it is necessary to investigate the whole question 
of unused human potential. 
~ "psychopathology£!.~ average." Early in the history of modern 
psychology William James remarked that few men bring to bear more than about 
ten percent of their human potential on the problems and challenges of human 
living. Others since Ja111es have in one way or another said substantially the 
same thing, and, amazingly enough, few if any, have challenged these statements 
"Unused human potential" has even become the war cry of "humanistic" 
psychologists and humanistically oriented behavioral scientists and philoso-
phers (e.g. Allport, 1955; Buber, 1937; Jourard, 1963, 1964, 1968; Laing, 1960; 
Maslow, 1968; May, 1958, 1960; Moustakes, 1956; Mowrer, 1964; Murphy, 1958; 
Otto, 1966; Rogers, 1961; Van Kaam, 1960; Wheelis, 1958, 1960, to mention but 
a few). It is contended here that the problem of unused human potential 
" . outweighs" the problem of emotional disorder, even though elsewhere it has 
been rightly claimed that in terms of social welfare and national economy 
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r.cntal illness is our most serious public health problem (Schofield, 1964). 
The problem of unused human resources. is not as dramatic as the problem of 
emotional disorder and it is not a "public health" problem, but, while it 
... -
docs not have the same visibility as mental health problems, it certainly is 
one of the major problems of public welfare and moreover it is much more 
pervasive than the problem of "mental illness." The problem of unused human 
potential is one that affects every man. 
Maslow (1968) remarks that "what we call 'normal' in psychology is 
really a psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread 
that we don't even notice it ordinarily" (p. 16). Perhaps too much energy 
has been poured into the task of moving men from a state of "mental illness" 
to a state of "mental health," while not nearly enough energy has been 
expended on the task of moving the "mentally healthy" in the direction of 
self-actualization. Mental health, if it is understood in an analogy with 
physical health, is like air-conditioning. Air-conditioning does not cause 
pleasure (except by initial contrast or as a status symbol). It gives 
relief. It renders a person's environment neutral and thus allows him the 
opportunity to make better use of his human potentiality, if he so desires. 
Traditionally the task of devising ways of developing a "normal" man's 
potentialities is the province of education in the broadest sense. Despite 
the theoretical importance of education, however, there is evidence to suggest 
that formal education has failed to serve the function of unfettering human 
potentiality (e.g. Jacob, 1957; Miles, 1964; Rogers, 1961, Chapter 13). For 
example, creativity among students, far from being encouraged, is often seen 
(or rather felt) as the proverbial thorn (Guilford, 1962; Holland, 1'961). In 
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fact, some advance the thesis that education, at least as it exists on 
primary and secondary levels in this.country, is primarily an instrument of 
conformity rather than liberation (Friedenburg, 1963). 
The problem of the "psychopathology of the average" must be attacked at 
its roots if there is to be any widespread success in dealing with it. 
Limbacher (1967a, 1967b) has suggested a training program in mental health 
for grammar school students. While this program has a preventive-mental-
health orientation rather than one of self-actualization, he at least realizes 
that emotional education simply must accompany intellectual education in the 
school system itself. Limbacher's program, as it stands now, seems too 
didactic and overly insight-oriented. Laboratory-learning approaches and 
sensitivity-like experiences would seem more suited to children of that age. 
Steinzor (1968) looks forward to the day when "the. curriculum of our public 
and private institutions, from the earliest grades on, will have made the 
language of honest, warm dialogue a required part of general education" (p. 9). 
Full interpersonal living depends upon a person's ability to involve himself 
effectively, even creatively, with others, but this does not "just happen," 
nor is it a question of some having the "gift" of creativity in human 
relationships while others are devoid of it. People have to learn how to 
become present to others in more fully human ways. ·But strangely enough, until 
recently at least, people have not thought it worthwhile to teach children 
(and adults) how to involve themselves with others. Our school system is 
strange in this regard: children spend an enormous amount of time doing things 
next' to, instead of with, others. Our society teems with this kind of 
"parallel" learning just as it does with "parallel" living. Therefore, it is 
\ 
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essential to find ways, from the earliest years of education of putting people 
into more effective human contact with one another. Interpersonal growth 
experiences such as sensitivity-training laboratories are showing us that 
people can actually learn how to live with themselves and with others more 
effectively. Human relations learning is perhaps the most important kind 
of learning that can take place, but, paradoxically, it is the most neglected. 
I imagine that it has been presumed that such learning occurs more or less 
"naturally" outside the.more formal classroom situation, whereas most often 
it does not, or if it does, not to such an extent that we can claim that the 
~ajority of persons reaching adulthood can be considered self-actualized on 
:m interpersonal level. 
D-needs, M-needs, and B-needs. Maslow (1968) sees the origin of neurosis 
in a person's ''being deprived of certain satisfactions which I called needs in 
the same sense that water and amino acids and calcium are needs, namely that 
their absence produces illness" (p. 21). Some of these basic needs are needs 
for "safety, for belongingness and identification, for close love relationships 
and for respect and prestige" (p. 21). These are D-needs ("D" for "defic-
iency"). Such needs, if, unfulfilled, stand in the way of further human 
growth. Counter to D-needs are the B-needs ("B" for "_Being") of the person 
whose D-needs have been more or les~ adequately satisfied but who still feels 
within himself a drive toward further self-actualization, For instance, a 
person can feel within himself a need for B-love rather than D-love. D-love 
is "deficiency-love, love need, selfish love" (p. 42); it is possessive and. 
always characterized by a rather marked degree of anxiety-hostility. B-love, 
on the other hand, is "love for the Being of another person, uneeding love, 
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unselfish love" (p. 42); it is non-possessive, can never be sated, and 
possesses a minimum (almost non-existent) degree of anxiety-hostility. "B-
lovers are more independent of each other, more autonomous, less jealous and 
threatened, less needful, more individual, more disinterested, but also 
simultaneously more eager to help the other toward self-actualization, more 
proud of his triumphs, more altruistic, generous and fostering" (p. 43). 
I believe, however, that another category, M-needs ("M" for "mainte-
nance"), might be added to Maslow' s schema. While many men might not be 
grappling with marked D-problems, they still have not moved on to any 
significant pursuit of B-values, at least in certain key areas of life such 
as interpersonal relating. Rather most of their energies are poured into 
"maintenance" functions. Such men work adequately, but more of ten than not 
it is at uninteresting jobs; their home lives are rather "neutral," neither 
hotbeds of neurotic interaction nor centers of interpersonal stimulation; 
they profess certain religious values, but these values are ritualistic and 
restraining, holding them back for "doing wrong" rather than impelling them 
to involve themselves more creatively in their communities. Such men exhd us t 
their energies in M-functions, and there is relatively ~othing left over for 
B-functions. Perhaps Phillips (1956) would include those who spend a dispro-
portionate amount of time carrying out "M-functions in the term "normally 
,unadjusted adults" in whom, as he notes, the avoidance gradient (preoccupation 
With defense mechanisms) is not the primary concern, but rather the approach 
gradient (the inertia that keeps them from the work of self-actualization). 
Sensitivity-training populations versus psychiatric populations. It 
would be simple to state that sensitivity training is not group psychotherapy 
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since the laboratory population is a "normal" rather than a "diseased" one 
(although, as noted above, laboratory methods are beginning to be applied to 
group psychotherapy) • This, however, would overlook certain important issues • 
... -
First of all, it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish with 
complete accuracy between "normal" and "psychiatric" populations. Burton 
(1965) points out that studies of the "non-diseased" offer 
the possibly novel thesis ••• that the psychically diseased and 
the non-diseased are not such polar opposites as we had formerly 
believed--that the existence of th~ diseased and non-diseased is 
fundamentally the same and differs only in the mode of being-in-
the-world, i.e., in the expression of their humanness. Both 
have similar problems of being man, feel despair the same way •••• 
Possibly only the crucial intensity of existence in each differs 
from time to time, and the historical and contemporaneous way 
in which the human condition is met (p. 384-:385). 
Schofield (1964) would certainly sympathize with such a thesis, for he believes 
that the "psychiatrist has frequently expanded the· domain of mental illness to 
include all degrees and kinds of psychological distress, failing to appreciate 
that the human suffers some pains not because he is sick but because he is 
human" (p. 146). 
Hendin, Gaylin, and Carr (1965) in a study of the "non-patient" also · 
find difficulty with traditional ways of categorizing the "mentally ill" 
.:J.nd the "men tally well" ; 
It is apparent that the distinction between patient and non-
patient is not the same as between sick and well. The 
discrepancy between how these individuals [the subjects of the 
study] and any textbook description of 'healthy' or 'ideal' 
adjustment is striking. The interesting question then arises 
as to what integrative forces permit individuals to function, 
often with purpose and adaptation, constructively and 
.Productively, in spite of underlying difficulties •..• It is 
somewhat disconcerting that in the present study the nurse 
whom the interviewer described as one of the most disturbed 
girls was also described as 'dramatic and engaging,' while 
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the 'colorlessness' of one of the most normal of the group led 
the interviewer to speculate on how depressing it would be if 
this is what constitutes 'normality' (pp. 105-106). 
Maslow (1962) and Rogers (1961, 1963) have also been studying "normal" groups 
... -
in an effort to establish a baseline for psychotherapeutic treatment. 
A total re-evaluation of the fruitfulness of the "medical model" in 
dealing with problems of living is taking place (e.g. Ellis, 1967; Kanfer and 
Saslow, 1965; Sarbin, 1967; Scheff, 1966; Szasz, 1960, 1961; Werry, 1968). 
As Schofield (1964) notes, "the total case load of those who are mentally and 
emotionally diseased is composed primarily of persons who are neither in need 
of, nor responsive to, specific medication, surgery, hospitalization, or other 
physical regiments" (p. 1) • Given such turmoil in the "healing guild," it 
would seem unwise to characterize any kind of sensitivity training as a 
"psychotherapy" for the "normal," even though there are definite similarities 
between the two experiences. Even though many people stand in aware of or 
are afraid of the term "psychotherapy," there is nothing mystic about it. 
Psychotherapy is a human growth experience that usually takes place in some 
kind of relational context (just as a laboratory in interpersonal relations 
is a human growth experience that takes place in a relational context). The 
therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy, 
responsible confrontation, concreteness) and patient variables (e.g. openness, 
a willingness to experiment with self-exploration and other forms of growthful 
behavior) that characterize good psychotherapy do not differ dramatically from 
the trainer and participant variables that characterize a good laboratory in 
interpersonal relations. However, the purpose of sensitivity training may 
be explained in terms of the D-, M-, and B-needs of relatively "normal" 
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populations (the application of sensitivity procedures to psychiatric 
populations defined as such is another question). 
Sensitivity training in terms of D-, M-, and B-needs. It is unrealistic 
to suppose that participants in sensitivity training experiences should be 
limited to those in whom D-needs are no longer active factors and.whose ener-
gies are not tied up in M-functions, so that the laboratory might center 
around B-needs, B-values, and B-functions exclusively. Bugental (1965) 
attempted to set up such a laboratory, terming it "Advanced Sensitivity 
Training." Members were chosen because of "functional excellence" in vocation, 
marriage, and friendship relations, because they manifested an observing and. 
curious ego, because they gave evidence of possessing adequate tolerance for 
psychic stress arising from ambiguity, intrapsychic conflict, interpersonal 
conflict and uncertainty and risk, and finally because they were highly 
motivated for group interaction. But, while everything looked fine on paper, 
things did not work out as well in practice: 
Our hope to selection a group freer than usual of the deterrents 
of psychic disturbance was in vain. The group was a fairly 
typical selection of twelve functional, reasonably socially 
effective people who nevertheness were beset by a clear range 
of emotional interferences with their functioning. 
We, as trainers, were seveJEi.y handicapped in attempting to 
give primary emphasis to positive forces in the participants' 
personalities by our own unresolved neurotic components and by 
our years of training and experience which have been largely 
in the frame of reference of psychopathology and dealing with 
deficiency motivations. Time and again we found ourselves 
most active in the familiar ways of pointing to interferences 
and distortions and least effective in facilitating growth, 
venturing, and creativity. 
The participants, as faithful products of their culture and 
personal histories, seemed to be more ready to recognize and deal 
with that which was negative and pathologic within themselves 
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and unsure and self-conscious about the positive and creative (p. 112). 
sensitivity training purports to deal with the whole man, and every man, it 
would seem, even those most engaged in B-functions, must grapple to some 
extent with D-needs and the proportion of his life taken up with M-functions, 
and this is a lifelong task. 
If a sensitivity laboratory were composed principally of participants 
with unresolved D-needs, then such a group would be much more similiar to a 
traditional outpatient psychotherapy group than to the groups envisioned in 
this book. Slater (1966) even claims that "members of groups with which I am 
familiar benefit in inverse proportion to their therapeutic need 11 (p. 253) , 
though it would be difficult to validate such a statement given the difficul-
ties involved in measuring both 11benefit" and 11 therapeutic need." Be that as 
it may, sensitivity groups, as dealt with in the literature and here, are 
usually made up of participants with a mixture of D-problems, various degrees 
of M-function over-involvement, and B-aspirations and skills. For very few 
of the participants, however, are D-needs the over-riding interactional 
concern during group sessions; still, on the other hand, few, if any, of the 
participants express no D-concerns. Therefore, in almost all sensitivity 
?roups some time is spent in hunting down the sources of intrapersonal and 
interpersonal "noise-in-the-system. 1' Or, as Bugental (1965) puts it, ''much 
of the typical sensitivity-training program and most of psychotherapy have 
been concerned with exposing and (hopefully) overcoming those forces within 
individuals which limit their abilities to fully realize their potentialities" 
(p. 107). 
A more important focus in sensitivity groups is M-involvernent, or rather 
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M-over-involvement. In fact, it is principally the person who is overcommitted 
to M-operations in his personal and interpersonal living who is the victim 
of the "psychopathology of the average." In a laboratory in interpersonal 
relations, the participants can expect to be challenged to move beyond mere 
M-concerns in their interpersonal living. 
And so, the sensitivity-training laboratory concerns itself with the 
o-, M-, and B-concerns of its participants, but the proportion of time and 
energy spent on each set of concerns, whether in the case of an individual 
participant or the group as a whole, depends on the composition of the group 
and the directions in which the group moves. Also, it must be recognized that 
D-, M-, and B-concerns are interactive. For instance, over-involvement in 
M-activity might lead to frustration and D-reactions •. Or a participant might 
discover that experimentation with some kind of B-activity, such as practicing 
new ways of being responsibly present to the other members of the group, might 
eliminate some D-symptom such as psychosomatic distress. 
~Contract-Interpersonal-Growth-Group 
It is against the somewhat confused and ill-defined background of 
laboratory learning and sensitivity training that this study is written, a 
! study that purports to establish a methodology for a particular kind of 
sensitivity-training group, called, somewhat ungracefully, a "contract-inter-
personal-growth group." 
Ways in which the "contract-group" differs from "traditional" sensitivitv 
!raining. The contract-group has a much higher degree of structure and a 
much' higher degree of "visibility" (the opposite of ambiguity) than do 
traditional sensitivity-training groups. First of all, prospective partici-
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pants realize what kind of experience they are about to undergo, for the major 
features of the contract-experience are outlined for them, either by lecture 
or in writing (e.g. a pamphlet explaining the experience more or less fully), 
.. ·-
before or at the time they enter the group. Once they have an understanding 
of the principal features of the proposed laboratory, they are free to enter 
the experience or not, but if they do enter, they realize that the laboratory 
is going to be conducted as stated in the outline. Another way of putting 
this is that entry into the group takes place "by contract," the description 
of the sensitivity experience being the "contract" to which participants 
subscribe. In practice I have found that if the participants freely choose 
to participate in a sensitivity-training experience, the contract need not 
be explicitly chosen but rather may be "imposed" as the defining structure of 
the experience. For good or ill, this eliminates a good deal of the ambiguity 
that is usually associated with the initial stages of the laboratory and also 
eliminates the anxiety that results from this ambiguity. Anxiety, however, 
is by no means entirely eliminated, rather its source and focus change. Once 
the participants realize, even in some general way, just what is expected of 
them, their anxiety centers around their willingness and their ability to 
fulfill the contract. 
Secondly, the contract (chapter 2) provides a certain degree of structure · 
for the laboratory; it establishes definite goals (chapter 3) and definite 
interactional means to achieve these goals (chapter 6-9); it defines the 
kind of leadership that is to characterize the group experience (chapter 5) 
and the general "laboratory" orientation of the group (chapter 4); finally, 
it points out the principal ways in which participnnts take fli~ht from 
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sensitivity experiences and suggests ways in which members might take a stance 
against such flight (chapter 10). The kinds of interaction that are seen as 
facilitating growth are self-dis_closure (chapter 6), total human expressing, 
including honest expression of feeling and emotion and the non-cliche use 
of language to translate oneself to the other members of the group (chapter 
7), support (chapter 8), and responsible confrontation (chapter 9). At first 
glance, it might appear that the contract provides too much structure, but in 
practice the structure provided by the contract is seen as "facilitating" 
rather than "regulating" and provides ample opportunity for both individual 
and group initiative. Therefore, Chapter 2 explains in detail the reasons 
for sensitivity-training "by contract" and then subsequent chapters both 
explain the provisions of the contract and provide the rationale for 
including each provision. 
It is not suggested that the contract described here is the only viable 
sensitivity-training contract. Many different kinds of contract could be 
set up for laboratories in general and sensitivity training experience in 
particular. The contract g?:oup, therefore, is both a detailed account of a 
-- .• 
contract approach to one kind of laboratory experience and also a paradigm 
for a wide variety of group experiences. Contractual provisions for these 
experiences will differ, obviously, with differing goals. 
"High visibility" and the introduction of a good deal of structure (even 
to the definition of the modes of interaction demanded in the group) are 
actually rather radical departures from sensitivity-training theory and 
practice. Their potential value will be one of the principal emphases of 
this study. 
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The parentage of the contract-group: therapy and group dynamics. The 
sources of the kind of group process suggested here are many. Of the three 
models of man described by Allpor~ (1962)--man-as-reactive, man-as-reactive-
in-depth, and man-as-a-being-in-the-process-of-becoming--the last has been 
the most influential, though the others have not been excluded. The immediate 
stimulus to formulate a methodology for sensitivity training came from my 
attempts to puzzle out for myself the difference between "good" and "bad" 
group process during t-group meetings of staff members and in group psycho-
therapy sessions with patients at Galesburg State Research Hospital, Illinois. 
I have drawn on the theoreti.cal formulations and the research findings of 
a number of fields: individual and group psychotherapy, laboratory training, 
social psychology in general and group dynamics in particular. Theory and 
research in the area of psychotherapy is very helpful in formulating programs 
for laboratories in interpersonal relations for a very definite reason. The 
activities that take place in the context of psychotherapy belong there not 
because they are mysteriously identified with the process of therapy but 
because they are intense, growthful forms of relating. For instance, the 
client begins to trust the therapist because the latter is genuine, warm, and 
accepting. Because the patient trusts the therapist he is willing to disclose 
himself to him, perhaps at some of the deepest levels of his being. The 
therapist responds with understanding and support and perhaps even shares 
himself in terms of self-disclosure with the patient. This kind of relation-
ship is therapeutic because it is fully human, but because it is fully human, 
it i~ the kind of relationship that belongs first of all in ordinary human 
life and only "secondarily," as it were, perhaps in an intensified form, in 
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the context of therapy. Many of us are afraid of intimacy, of deep human 
relations, and we would gladly relegate them to the province of the therapist. 
Laboratories in interpersonal re!ations have come into being in order to re-
introduce men to deeper relationships, to challenge the fact that the deepest 
human relationships may exist only between a client and his therapist. Much 
of the research, then, being done in the area of psychotherapy tells us a 
great deal about how to form closer, more growthful relationships with others. 
Social psychology, in.that it deals with all forms of human relating, has 
much to tell the clinician. Unfortunately, few clinicians seem to read the 
social psychology literature. Those who reject a universal medical model in 
dealing with problems in human living desperately need to know how man relates 
to man in all areas of living. Clinicians frequently tend to see pathology 
everywhere because they do not have a sufficient feel for the wide range of 
human response found in the "normal" man or at least in the man afflicted only 
with the "psychopathology of the average." Reading in the literature of 
social psychology can help counteract this tendency. This literature is 
referred to from time to time in the following pages, but it is just a 
beginning. 
Since this study deals with groups, it seems only natural to refer to 
the group dynamics literature of social psychology. Even though Lott and 
Lott (1965) claim that "since applications of so-called group behavior 
principles are often urged in such fields as group psychotherapy, education, 
and connnunity relations, it is vital to distinguish beD~een validated and 
unvalidated hypotheses ••• " (p. 299, emphasis added), it strikes me that the 
failure to make adequate use of "group behavior principles" in the practice of 
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group psychotherapy is one of the foremost problems in this field. Many 
group psychotherapists do little more -than conduct individual therapy in 
front of an audience, completely failing to place the laws of group inter-
,.--
action at the service of the therapeutic process. Some psychotherapists, 
principally psychoanalysts, have resisted the application of_principles drawn 
from the study of group dynamics to group psychotherapy on certain theoretical 
grounds (e.g. Locke, 1961; Lowrey, 1944; Wolf & Schwartz, 1962), while others, 
also on theoretical grounds, urge such application (Bach, 1954; Goldstein, 
Heller, & Sechrest, 1966; Hunt, 1964; Lorr, 1963; Schneider, 1955). The 
literature on small group dynamics and the literature on group psychotherapy 
are the "twain" that have never really met; the group psychotherapist and 
the group dynamicist have not been reading each other's literature. In 
self-actualization and interpersonal-growth laboratories the two·fields 
converge in a most natural way. But the literature on sensitivity-training, 
even though it has grown out of an education and social psychology oriented 
background, still does not make sufficient use of group behavioral principles. 
Again, an attempt is made to do just this in the following pages, but it is 
only a beginning. One hope is that interpersonal-growth experiences with 
"normals" which utilize principles drawn from both individual and group 
psychotherapy, social psychology, and group dynamics will produce research 
data which will help clear up the spectacularly confused area of psychotherapy 
with the disturbed. 
! "theory of method." Rioch (1951) points out that most theories of 
psychotherapeutic process are really theories of method, not formulations of 
the nature of the process. The same could be said about most theories dealing 
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with the process involved in sensitivity or growth or basic encounter groups. 
While the present study is admittedly a "theory of method," it would not be 
untrue to say that throughout it there are glimpses of an underlying 
formulation of the nature of the "growth" process. Any attempt to provide 
a rationale for including certain interactional variables such as self-
disclosure and confrontation would have to make certain assumptions about the 
processes involved in interpersonal growth. 
Other contract groups •. The idea of growth-through-contract is hardly a 
widespread one. In the field of psychotherapy, both Mainord (1968) and 
Mowrer (1968) exact contracts from prospective patients for the group "growth 
experiences" that each conducts. Mowrer's contract contains three provisions: 
the prospective group member must agree (1) to be completely open about 
himself to the group with respect to both past and current behavior; (2) to 
take responsibility for himself once he enters the group (not to blame) 
others for his predicament); and (3) to get involved with the other members 
of the group. Mainord's contract is somewhat similar to Mowrer's. What is 
most noteworthy is the fact that these are some of the first attempts to 
introduce a high degree of "visibility" into the psychotherapeutic experience 
itself. In the area of sensitivity training, Bach (1966) has formulated a 
kind of contract for a "marathon" group experience. These "Ten Marathon 
Commandments" form a contract which is designed to make the "marathon" 
experience, which Bach describes as an "intensification and acceleration of 
transparency and genuine encounter by a deliberate instigation of group 
pressure focused on behavioral change" (p. 995), even more intense. Bach's 
"contract" will be discussed in the chapter on confrontation. 
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TI!! Question of Training Trainers 
The question of training effective trainers for laboratory groups and 
especially for sensitivity groups parallels a problem in the field of 
psychotherapy discussed by Schofield (1964). Schofield claims that many of 
the people flocking to mental health professionals do not suffer from 
traditional forms of mental disturbance (such as those delineated in the 
American Psychiatric Association's diagnostic manual), but rather from what he 
calls "philosophical neuroses" which are characterized not by specifically 
neurotic complaints but by an "absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning, 
of the need to search out personal, ultimate values, or of the need to live 
comfortably and meaningfully each· day in the face of final uncertainty" 
(p. 150). The "philosophically neurotic," frequently because they can afford 
to, monopolize too much of the time of mental health professionals. 
Therefore, Schofield calls for a way of increasing "the number of persons who 
are adequately skilled and appropriately competent to converse therapeutically" 
(p. 3) • 
Rioch, Elkes, Flint, Usdansky, Newman, and Silber (1963) took a step in 
this direction by training housewives as "mental health counselors." The 
theory is that extensive academic training leading to formal degrees is not 
necessary to produce effective counselors, especially when these counselors 
work in settings where they are supervised by professionals. A follow-up 
note (Anonymous, 1967) indicates that all of Rioch's trainees (except one who 
dropped out because of ~llness) are working successfully in individual therapy, 
counseling, or group therapy. Three have gone on to advanced study in 
psychology or social work. The same note indicates that other centers (e.g. 
---------------------------"'' 
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Johns Hopkins} are presently training non-professionals for work as therapists. 
The whole question of who should be doing therapy (and by implication, 
conducting laboratories in inter~~rsonal relations) is a thorny one: 
[I]n the field of psychotherapy, evidence suggests that the most 
important determinant of the therapist's effectiveness lies in 
his personality, his capacity to empathize with the patient and 
to a much lesser extent his actual experience working directly with 
patients (Truax & Carkhuff, 1964). It seems that the preclinical 
experience such as medical school, Ph.D., School of Social Work, 
and other intensive educational procedures are largely irrelevant 
in this sphere as currently practiced (Schofield, 1964). What is 
even more devastating, according to an informal study conducted 
by Meehl, a significant number of practicing psychotherapists, 
despite the most intensive of training, are judged by their 
colleagues as incompetent or ineffectual. Thus, we must assume 
that in the field of psychotherapy (perhaps excluding behavior 
therapy), the relevant sphere of knowledge is largely located in 
the area of common rather than scientific knowledge. This 
assumption is further buttressed by the fact that various studies 
suggest that people without the background of mental health 
professionals can, after a short period of clinical experience, 
achieve a facility in certain kinds of psychotherapy (taking 
account of the difficulty of making such evaluations) equals that 
of someone with as tortuous and expensive an educational background 
as the psychiatrist (Rioch et al., 1963; Poser, 1966) (Werry, 1968, 
p. 7). - -
In my experience it is the socially intelligent person, the person with a 
"feel" for his fellow human beings, that makes the best trainer. 
I would hope to see programs similar to training programs for lay 
t therapists instituted for training trainers for sensitivity work. In fact, 
;-
sensitivity training groups seem to be excellent fora in which the problems 
of the "philosophically" neurotic can be worked through, and, if this is the 
case, this would relieve some of the pressures under which mental health 
professionals are now working. While few universities have set up programs 
for training trainers fo'r laboratory work in general and sensi ti vi ty training 
in particular, such university centers would fill a serious lacuna in the 
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clinical sector of the behavioral science field. Not only could institutes 
be set up to train and perhaps to certify trainers (many groups looking for 
competent sensitivity trainers have no way of verifying the credentials of 
prospective trainers), but desperately needed research programs could also be 
established in these centers. Entrance into such programs should be controlled 
so that not just the academically competent but rather those who possess both 
academic and social c.ompetence would be accepted for training. Such programs 
could become excellent ways of making "increased use of 'peripheral' resources 
such as teachers, clergy, and others" (Schofield, 1964, p. 169). 
The Audience to Which This Study is Addressed 
At the time of this writing no book deals directly and exclusively with 
sensitivity training in the sense in which it has been defined here (a 
laboratory experience centering around intrapsychic and interpersonal concerns) 
Although the present study outlines a specific approach to a laboratory in 
human relations, it deals principally with those variables (self-disclosure, 
expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a 
response to responsible confrontation) which are found in any group experience 
in which self-actualization and interpersonal growth are goals. This study 
has been used as a text in a laboratory course in human relations and as an 
adjunctive text in courses in counseling and psychotherapy. It should be of 
interest to anyone who has already participated in or is about to participate 
in a laboratory experience with any kind of direct or indirect "sensi u / ~ ty" 
orientation. Finally, anyone interested in interpersonal growth might find 
food' for both reflection and action here, for much of what is discussed can 
be "experimented" with outside laboratory and group settings. 
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An Eclectic Approach. 
The "theory of method" outlined in this book is clearly eclectic. While 
many of the hypotheses suggesteclare derived from existing psychotherapeutic 
approaches, e.g., those of Rogers, London, Schofield, Mowrer, Truax, 
Berenson, Carkhuff, Laing, Beier, Ellis, and a number of others, still it is 
not a theory of psychotherapy that is elaborated here, but rather an approach 
to interpersonal growth designed for populations of normal subjects. Another 
rich source for hypotheses has been the literature in social psychology 
which deals with normal human interaction and human behavior in groups. While 
it is not the intent of the author to criticize psychoanalytic concepts or 
procedures, still the major psychoanalytic concepts were not considered 
germane to this specific approach to interpersonal growth. Therefore, such 
terms as the "unconscious," "libido," "transference," "repression," and the 
like are not treated here. This book focuses on h.uman communication and 
the ways in which communication affects other forms of human behavior. While 
it is assumed that learning plays an important part in the elaboration of 
behavior patterns, it is not assumed that learning provides an exclusive 
explanation of behavior. Still, a further assumption is that a great deal 








g_roups ~ ''Natural" ~-Groups as "Contractual" 
... -
~varieties of groups. The field of group dynamics is very broad. 
There are many different kinds of groups and many attempts have been made 
to classify them: 
Over the years, many different classificatory schemes have been 
proposed. A coimllon procedure has been to select a few properties 
and to define 'types' of groups on the basis of whether these 
properties are present or absent. Among the properties most 
often employed are: size (number of members), amount of physical 
interaction among members, degree of intimacy, level of solidarity, 
locus of control of group activities, extent of formalization of 
rules governing relations among members, and tendency of members 
to react to one another as individual persons or as occupant of 
roles. Although it would be possible to construct a large number 
of types of groups by combining these properties in various ways, 
usually only dichotomies have resulted: formal-informal, primary-
secondary, small-large, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, autonomous-
dependent, temporary-permanent, consensual-symbiotic. Sometimes a 
rather different procedure has been advocated in which groups.are 
classified according to their objectives or social settings. 
Accordingly, there are said to be work groups, therapy groups, 
committees, clubs, gangs, teams, coordinating groups, religious 
groups, and the like (Cartwright & Zander, 1968, p. 24). 
There is an extensive literature dealing with the interactions that take 
place within groups and between groups, but, as Cartwright and Zander note, 
"only beginnings have been made 11 (p. 25) • 
~conversation group. In many small groups, the participants come 
together in order to talk with one another, that is, conversation (social 
interaction) is either the principal goal of the group or it is one of the 
principal means of achieving some other goal. Conversation groups that meet 
by·design come together for a number of purposes--to negotiate a labor 
\ 
contract, to discuss community problems, to enjoy one another's company, 
to engage in group psychotherapy, to engage in a laboratory course in group 
dynamics, etc. These conversation groups may be highly structured with 
respect to purpose (for instance, to work out a labor contract) or the 
.. --
purpose might be vague by design (for instance, to learn about small groups 
by actually being a small group). The goals of the group are achieved 
principally through face-to-face conversation: it is through conversation 
(social interaction) that decisions are reached, that people get to know 
one another, that personal problems are handled, etc. This study deals 
with one kind of small, face-to-face conversation group. 
Contracts in conversation groups. In all small, face-to-face conver-
sation groups that come together by design, there is usually some kind of 
at least vague, implicit, minimal contract operative. That is, there is a 
series of "rules" which make the group operative and give it direction. The 
i members either explicitly or implicitly agree to follow these "rules" (more I or less) in order to achieve the purpose of the group. First of all, the· 











a bit from group to group). Secondly, they usually agree to engage in or 
at lea'!: listen to the conversation that takes place in the group. Sometimes 
they agree to talk about something quite specific--for instance, the 
provisions of a labor contract--while at other times there is a more vague 
contractual specificity--for instance, those who agree to participate in 
group psychotherapy sessions realize to a greater or lesser degree that they 
are agreeing to talk about their "problems" or themselves with some degree 
of openness. At other times the members of a group contract (vaguely, 
Perhaps) to "unstructured" conversation--for example, in academic labora-
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tories in group dynamics and in sensitivity-training laboratories. ·ordinarily 
in laboratory-training situations there is no predetermined topic of 
conversation. The point is this: if one were to examine different kinds of 
conversation groups, he would discover that these groups run according to a 
certain set of "rules."· These rules might well change as the group moves 
forward, but at any stage of the development of the group some set of rules 
governing what is done and what is not done in the group is operative. This 
set of rules is the contract which governs the group. Implicit in any 
group contract are the goals or the purposes of the group and the means the 
group utilizes in order to achieve these goals. 
Leader and member contracts in small groups. If the small group has a 
leader, there are at least two kinds of contract operative in the group: 
the leader-contract and the member-contract. The leader may be working 
under two different but related contracts: a "commercial" contract and a 
"process" contract. For instance, in a group psychotherapy situation the 
"connnercial" contract stipulates that the leader be paid, either by the 
patients directly or by some sponsor1ing agency, to operate as leader, that 
is, to use his professional skills in order to guide the participants to 
better levels of adjustment. The "commercial" contract usually assumes his 
professional competence and allows him to run the group as he sees fit. But 
the therapist himself usually has a specific way in which he approaches 
the therapeutic situation--he has goals in mind and some idea of the means 
that he wil-1 employ in order to reach these goals. That is to say, the 
thetapist himself operates within a "therapy process" contract which he has 








experience. However, if the therapist is also involved in a research 
project, then he might be operating under some kind of "therapy process" 
contract that :ts not entirely his own. Such a contract may have been 
... -
devised by a research team of therapists, and once designed, it is "imposed" 
on all the therapists working on the same project. Such a contract serves 
to standardize the therapeutic process for the sake of research. 
The provisions of a member-contract specify the ways in which the 
member should act during the small-group experience. For most small, face-
to-face conversations groups the member-contract is usually quite minimal 
and vague. For instance, when the faculty members of a high school come 
together to discuss the issues facing the institution, they operate under 
some kind of minimal contract, but the contract is practically never 
articulated. It is assumed (no matter how gratuitous an assumption this 
might be) that they know why they are at the meeting and what they are to 
do. In most laboratory-training situations, including laboratories in self-
actualization and interpersonal relations, the member-contract remains 
unarticulated. The participants realize that they are a group of "non-
patients" (Hendin, Gaylin, & Carr, 1965) or of "non-diseased" (Burton, 1965) 
individuals pursuing personal or interpersonal growth through the group 
Process. They realize they constit!ute some kind of "growth" group, but 
they have only the vaguest idea of how they should act in such a group. 
A similar statement could be made with respect to patients or clients 
entering psychotherapy: they realize that they are patients, but they 
usually have only.a vague idea of what is expected of them during the 
therapy sessions. 
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The contract-group differs from other kinds of laboratory-training or 
"growth" groups in that both the leader-contract (the "process" rather than 
the "commercial" contract} and the member-contract are spelled out in some 
detail before the group experience begins. Because both contracts are 
known by all participants from the beginning, the group is said to have "high 
vi!;ibility" or comparatively low ambiguity. 
"Natural" interactions versus "contractual" interactions in small 
~roups. A distinction can be made between two kinds of interaction that 
tnke place in small groups (a distinction which I have not seen elsewhere, 
but which is important to the understanding of the nature of contract-groups) 
--the distinction between N~interactions and C-interactions. N-interactions 
("N" for "natural"} take place in small, face-to-face groups precisely 
because they are just that--small, face-to-face groups pursuing some kind of 
goal principally through group conversation, that is, N-interactions are the 
kinds of interactions that are characteristic of small, face-to-face groups. 
In a certain sense group dynamics studies such as that of Hare, Borgatta, and 
Bales (1962) and Cartwright and Zander (1968) are attempts to get at and 
sunnnarize the "laws" operative in small groups. These studies deal with such 
topics as pressures to uniformity in groups, group cohesiveness, power and 
influence in groups, connnunication networks, equilibrium in small groups, 
role differentiation, leadership, motivational processes, and other variables 
that are operative merely because a number of people have come together for 
a certain purpose. C-interactions ("C" for "contractual"), on the other 
hand, take place because of the purpose of the group, that is, they arise 














or implicitly "subscribed." A couple of examples will help clarify the 
difference between N..-interactions and C-interactions. 
The first example refers to group psychotherapy. A person in group 
psychotherapy might (a) reveal something about himself, for instance, a 
personal problem (b} in order to please the therapist and his fellow group 
members. In this case, engaging in self-disclosure is a C-interaction, 
because talking about oneself and one's problems is vaguely implied in the 
member-contract to which the patients subscribe when they enter the group. 
Self-disclosure is considered one of the means leading to the goal,.construc-
tive personality change. The implicit contract includes both the goals of 
the groups and the means necessary in order to achieve these goals. The 
contract, then, determines what kind of interactions are appropriate in the 
group and these interactions are called C-interactions. However, the 
patient in question engaged in self-disclosure in order to please the 
therapist and his fellow group members. In small groups there is a tendency 
for low~status persons to engage in interactions which will please the 
leader and others who are considered higher in status (Collins & Guetzkow, 
1964, pp, 166~187). The patient's interaction, therefore, is both a 
contractual interaction and a natural (dependency) reaction, that is, he 
did the "right" thing, but his motivation for doing so was most likely a 
l 
reflection of his sense of inadequacy rather than his desire to grow. Given 
the status and power variables that are operative even in small groups, 
dependency and counter~ependency interactions are going to constitute a 
Part of the group process. 
Another example might illustrate the separability of N- and C-
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interactions. Let us say that a group of executives have met to air their 
feelings about a proposed merger with another company. No final decision is 
to be made at the meeting. The purpose of the meeting is "to clear the air," 
... -
and the (at least) implicit contract calls for the group members to be as 
honest as possible in expressing feelings about the merger. The members 
begin to speak. Mr. X waits until Mr. D, his immediate superior, speaks. 
Then Mr, X, instead of saying just what he feels, "colors" his own feelings 
with what he has heard from Mr. D. His N-interaction is a dependency-
interaction. But he has violated the member-contract. He has not said what 
he really thinks. There is no C-interaction in this case; there is only the 
I anti-C-interaction of dependency. If Mr. X had said what he really felt, 
f. 
even though he realized that this differed from what others, including his 
immediate superior, were saying, then his C-interaction would have been 
open-expression-of-feeling-to-the-group. However, if he expressed his 








nn N-interaction, namely, counter-dependency. But if he expressed his 
feelings because this was called for by the member-contract, and if the 
contract also warranted responsible confrontation, then his interaction 
would have been a C~interaction on two counts: (1) honest expression of 
feeling and (2) confrontation of the opinions of others. But if the implied 
member-contract calls for open expression of feeling but does not allow a 
subordinate to confront a superior, then the contract itself is deficient 
and needs more explicit definition. 
Dearth of C-interaction literature. There is an extensive literature 
dealing with group dynamics. Moreover, a good deal of this literature deals, 
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Jirectly or indirectly, with the verbal and emotional interactions that take 
place in the kind of small, face-to-face conversation groups which are of 
interest in this study (e.g., Bales, 1950, in press; Bion, 1961; Borgatta 
,..-
b Crowther, 1965; Bradford, Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; 
!!are, Borgatta, & Bales, 1962; Homans, 1950; Mann, 1967; Mills, 1964; Stock 
& Thelen, 1958; Whitaker & Lieberman, 1964). However, since none of this 
literature deals explicitly with the contracts underlying group membership 
and group behavior, it consequently has little or nothing to say about C-
interactions. As noted above, this literature studies groups principally as 
"natural" rather than as "contractual." Slater (1966), for instance, with 
extensive experience in academic laboratories in group dynamics, speaks of 
such things as the "theme of group murder," the "theme of autonomy," the 
"theme of cannabalism," and the "theme of the sacred king." He talks about 
the revolts against the leader that take place "naturally" in groups, but 
his discussion stops there. He does not, for instance, discuss ways of 
controlling or avoiding such "revolts" so that the group might be freer to 
pursue more conscious and explicit goals more effectively. Bion (1961) talks 
of the "flight-flight group," the "pairing group," and the "dependent group," 
but he does not discuss ways of relating such group cultures to the overall 
purposes of the group. The point is this: sometimes N-interactions facilitate 
the work and progress of the group, while at other times they stand in the 
way of such progress. If any particular group has a solid understanding 
(a) of the goals of the group and of the means proportioned to the fulfillment 
of these goals and (b) of the N-interactions which facilitate and impede the 
attaining of these goals, then such a group becomes master of its destiny in 
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a way unknown to groups which fail to differentiate between C-interactions and 
~;-interactions. 
~hypothesis concerning C- and N-interactions. The hypothesis is t~is: 
the more explicit both the member-contract and the leader-process contract 
.ire in any face-to-face group and the deeper the commitment of the participants 
to these contracts, the less crucial N-interactions become. If the member-
~ontract is vague and implicit, then variables such as pairing, flight-flight, 
and dependency characteristically multiply and occupy a disproportionate 
a::iount of the group's time and energy. However, if the member-contract and the 
leader-contract are clear, and, furthermore, if they are accepted by the 
~embers of the group as a condition of entry, then N-variables become less 









facilitate C-interactions will multiply, while non-facilitative N-interactions 
will decrease. Explicit and universally accepted contracts do not eliminate 
non-facilitative N-interactions (e.g. preoccupation with status within the 
group), but they do make non-facilitative N-interactions more apparent, they 
bring them out into the open where they can be dealt with more effectively. 
Obviously there has to be a prior decision as to whether the elimination 
or minimalization of N-interactions in the group is a value or not. If the 
purpose of the group is precisely to study N-variables through the group 
process (as it is in academic laboratories in group dynamics), then their 
Prior elimination or minimalization would be self-defeating. However, if 
increased C-interactions is the goal of the group, and if a condition for 
their increase is a strong member-contract and a strong leader-process-












is a positive value. In many laboratory-training situations .one of the precise 
goals of the group (though it may not· be articulated to the participants 
~eforehand) is to discover experientially and become enmeshed in both non-
... -
facilitative and facilitative N-interactions in order to get a real feeling 
for what makes groups move ·forward and what makes them grind to a halt. 
:!owever, since the focus of this study is a contract-approach to sensitivity-
training or interpersonal-growth groups, ways of minimizing N-phenomena that 
i~?ede C-interactions constitute an object of primary concern. 
'xerationalizing the Group 
The goal~ defining group process. The goals of a group give some kind 
of specificity to the kinds of interaction that take place in the group. 
Certain kinds of interaction move the group toward its goals while other kinds 
of interaction stand in the way of goal-fulfil?ment. The overriding goal of 
sensitivity-training (or at least of the kind of contract-group which is the 
focus of this study) is interpersonal growth ("interper13onal growth," an 
admittedly vague concept, will be defined operationally in the chapter on 
goals). Therefore, the problem is to provide a group experience which will 
facilitate interpersonal growth. Other goals, such as "learning how groups 
work," are not excluded from the total goal-structure of the contract-group, 
but they are secondary. It is hypothesized here that clear and explicit 
leader-contracts and member-contracts can help create a group climate which is 
conducive to interpersonal growth. The provisions of such contracts should be 
as detailed as is necessary to help achieve the goal of interpersonal growth. 
O_perationality. March and Simon (1958) make a distinction between 
" . 
operational" and "non-operational" goals in group process. A non-operational 
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1,:iJl is one that Cl} is quit~ general in itself (e.g. to raise the cultural 
!evcl of the connnunity) and (2) is not realized by a particular sequence of 
hroup activities. Therefore, in the contract-group the function of the 
~c~ber-contract and the leader-process-contract is to break the general group 
boal--interpersonal growth--down into more specific goals and to provide spec-
tfic group activities designed to realize these goals. 
Cartwright and Zander (1960) classify hypothesized determinants of group 
effectiveness under one or more of the following headings: 
1. the extent to which a clear goal is present 
2. the degree to which the group mobilizes energies of group members 
behind group activities 
3. the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning 
which one of several possible goals should control the activities 
of the group 
4. the degree to which there is conflict among members concerning 
means that the group should employ in reaching its goals 
5. the degree to which the activities of different members are 
coordinated in a manner required by the group's tasks 
6. the availability to the group of needed resources, whether they 
be economic, material, legal, intellectual, or other (p. 345). 
Contracts can do much to provide these determinants of group effectiveness. 
(1) The member-contract specifices both the superordinate goal (interpersonal 
growth) and certain subordinate goals (self-disclosure, expression of feeling, 
confrontation, self-exploration, support) which, when taken together, con-
stitute an operational definition of interpersonal growth. (2) Participants 
choose to enter sensitivity-training experiences because they want to grow 
interpersonally. The contract focuses or "mobilizes" the energies of tite 
group by delineating the kinds of interaction which lead to interpersonal 
growth. (3) The contract does not eliminate conflict lrom the group (conflict, 
[ too, can be growthful), but it does tend to eliminate m;~1ess "contract talk." . l _........_ ----------~-....J 
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~any participants find it much easier to argue about what the group should do 
than to engage in specific kinds of group interaction. The contract sets up 
.in "experiment" in interpersonal growth and invites the participants to 
engage in the experiment rather than argue about its merits. (4) The contract 
also specifies the means to be used in the experiment in order to achieve 
the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth. For instance, the contract 
suggests that such activities as responsible, self-involving confrontation 
lead to interpersonal growth. The participants are asked to engage in or 
"experiment" with such activities (without prejudging the experience) in 
order to discover whether such activities do deepen their ability to involve 
themselves with others. (5) The leader is present in the contract-group as 
hoth a coordinator and as a resource person. He both explains and models 
contractual behavior and encourages the other participants to engage in the 
experiment. The member-contract stipulates that there will be a leader and it 
spells out his functions in the group. (6) Most of the resources that are 
needed for interpersonal growth lie within the members of groups themselves. 
The leader brings with him such resources as a professional knowledge of 
group dynamics and experience as a member of groups. He places these resources 
at the service of the group. Ideally, his skills will become diffused among 
the members of the group. 
Raven and Rietsema (1957) found that group members with a clear picture 
of the group goal and the paths to that goal had a closer involvement with 
the group goal, more sympathy with group emotions, and a greater readiness to 
accept influence from the group than those who were unclear about goals and 





increase the aembers' involveiaent,. sympa.thy, and opemiu• to change. 
The member-contract is established, then, in order to introduce a high 
degree of "operationality" in the group from the very beginning. It is an 
.--
effort to make the group what Bion (1961) calls a "sophisticated" or "work" 
group from the start. · 
Eliminating wasteful design. ''Wasteful design" is not a stranger in the 
behavioral sciences. The reduplication of staff effort in arriving at a use-
less diagnosis and a treataept program that is frequently ignored anyway is 
all too common in many mental health settings. It is my impression that a good 
deal of wasteful design is too often associated with sensitivity-training 
laboratories. For instance, a great deal of time in such laboratories is spent 
hanunering out a viable contract to govern the interactions of the members. 
Sometimes almost the whole time is spent ln formulating and re-working this 
contract. Undoubtedly the participants leatu much about themselves and one 
another during such an experience and a good deal of interpersonal growth 
takes place. But often the members of such groups leave with a great deal 
I 
of frustration, because there is no time to implement the contract which has 
been hammered out, Both the member-contract and the leader-process-contract 
elilltl.nate a 800d deal of Wa&t•ful desip .froa the COQtract-interpersonal-
growth experience. The prospective member realizes just what kind of 
experience it is and what is expected of him if he chooses to enter. The 
time usually spent in the elaboration of the contract is spent rather in the 
pursuit of the goals specified by the contract. 
~Ychological Versus Mere Formal Membership!!!.!!!!.. Group 







the member-contract by those choosing to participate in the group experience 
goes far in solving the critical problem of differentiating between what 
Golembiewski (1962) calls "formal membership" and "psychological membership" 
.... -
(p. 67). It is a common experience in sensitivity groups to herald the 
"coming out" of a member. "John has finally joined the group" is a recogni-
tion that he has passed from just formal to psychological membership. Or 
perhaps it is rather that John has finally given some concrete sign that he 
is (and has been) a psychological member. Obviously the group operates more 
effectively if all of its members are "psychological" members from the start. 
Otherwise, instead of real group process, there is what Golembiewski (1962) 
calls "the behavior of individuals in an interpersonal situation" (p. 67). 
Tite contract, especially if it is freely chosen by the participants from the 
beginning, does much to elicit psychological participation from the outset 
of the group--at least this is the hypothesis. In thia atudy it is assumed 
that the members engage in the sensitivity-training experience because they 
want to and that they could stay away without recrimination. The behavior of 
those who are forced to take part in some kind of laboratory experi"'11ce 
(Howie [1967) discusses the ethics of such an ar-rangaent) is in a category 
by itself and is not the focua of thia atudy. tn th• contract-group the 
ordinary criterion used to determine "p.sychological" membership is simply 
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the contract. Given the nature of the 
contract as described in this paper, it is assumed that it would be quite 
difficult, if not impossible, for a participant to "fake" psychological member· 
I 
ship·. It is not assumed that everyone would be able to fulfill the contract. 




in the first place. ' · 
Participation in the ncoDDDOn sood." Any group which is more than a 
"group of individuals in a socia_~- situation" is so because in some way the 
group gives birth to a "common good" in which all of the members participate. 
Each member, as member, achieves his own individual good by participation in 
the common good. This "common-good" aspect of groups is one of the factors 
that make a group more than a collection of individuals. Slater (1966), 
however, claims that a group. (in context he seems to be referring directly 
to academic groups engaged in a laboratory in group dynamics) is also less 
than a group of individuals ,since only a "portion" of each individual is 
present. In the contract-group, however, the member-contract not only gives 
greater definition to the "common good" of the group, but entry-by-contract, 
it is assumed, increased the. size of the "portion" of each individual present. 
Ambiguity Versus Claritr,!n. Growth Experiences 
Ambiguity. Over the years any number of writers have sympathized with 
the plight of the person who feels that he must seek help in the form of 
psychotherapy. Curran (1944), for instance, describe• such a person's 
confusion: "A confused person ia likely to approach the first interview 
feeling a minimum of raaponaibility for himself and a maximum of fear, 
insecurity and defensiveness" (p. 189). It is not just that the person feels 
confused as he approaches the psychotherapeutic situation; his confusion of ten 
Persists because the therapist fails to provide any meaningful structuring: 
"Th e patient may at first feel that his task is unorganized and formless and 
that' there are no rules. Then he experiences a strange feeling of helplessness 
and dissatisfaction. It is as though the therapist did not care what he 
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talked about or how he spoke of it" (Ingham & Love, 1954, p. 81). The 
problem of the failure of the therapist to provide constructive structuring 
still persists, however, or at least it is still being discussed and investiga-
.... -
ted. Hoehn-Saric and his associates (1965), for example, believe that the 
problem needs further attention: 
Because of the diversity and ambiguities of public conceptions 
of mental illness and psychotherapy, psychiatric patients reach 
the psychiatrist's office with a wide variety of attitudes and 
expectations. Only the most sophisticated are perfectly clear 
about why they are there and what to expect. Less sophisticated 
patients may have unrealistic expectations for improvement: they 
may not understand their role in the therapeutic process and may 
be bewildered by a procedure that differs not only from usual 
medical treatment but from customery social interactions" (p. 267). 
To add to the confusion, even the "sophisticated" might find it difficult to 
say why the are sitting in.the waiting room of a psychiatrist rather than 
that of some non-medical therapist. 
There is some evidence that indicates that patients and therapists have 
quite different views of the same therapeutic experience. Truax and Carkhuff 
(1967) sununarize some of this evidence: 
Among the plethora of studies concluding, in effect, that 
therapists prefer 'better' patients, that is, those less sick 
and more sensitive, intelligent, and willing to talk about 
themselves and their problems, were a few studies showing the 
discrepant expectations of therapist and patient, particularly 
with regard to the length of treatment (Garfield & Wolpin, 1963): 
the therapist thinks in longer terms and the patient in shorter 
terms of treatment. Feifel and Eells (1963), using an open-
ended questionniare to get at differential assessments of therapy, 
found that therapists tended to stress changes in symptomatic relief 
and improvement in social relationships, whereas patients stressed 
self-understanding and self-confidence. In addition, the patient 
focused on the opportunity to talk over problems and emphasized 
the 'human' characteristics of the therapist, while the therapist 
·focused on therapeutic technique (p. 377). 
It is no wonder, then, that failure to structure the therapeutic relationship 
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leads to deleterious consequences including premature termination. Sherman 
(1945) found that leaving the client too much on his own resources early in 
the process of therapy resulted in strong resistance. Levitt (1966) found 
that patients enter therapy expecting some kind of therapist participation. 
The failure of the therapist to meet with this preconception reduces the 
probability that the experience will affect him. Failure to let the client 
know the rationale underlying therapy and to give him some idea of expected 
therapist and client behavio~ tends to make the therapeutic experience more 
manipulative than it should be. Ambiguity can also be a difficult factor for 
normals to handle in a task-oriented situation. Mann and Mann (1959) made a 
study of indefiniteness in a classroom situation. Classroom groups, meeting 
four times a week for one hour over a three-week period, were organized as 
task~oriented study groups to discuss assigned reading lists ~ as free 
discussion groups. Rati~S• of the members' desirability as friends increased 
in the former groups and decreased in the latter where, according to 
observers, the subjects were frustrated and angered by the indefiniteness of 
their situation. Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) express a certain 
degree of amazement at the fact that many or most therapists fail to tell 
there clients much about the therapeutic process: 
For whatever reasons, few therapists would seem to be anywhere 
near as explicit as the behavior therapists, either about the 
theories they hold or about the techniques they employ. But it 
is unclear whether patients are kept uninformed because (1) it 
is not believed that informing them would be of any value, 
(2) desirable results are obtained only when the learning is by 
self-discovery, or (3) it is believed that the value of the 
technique and treatment would be impaired by the knowledge of 
'the patient. We would call into question the second assumption 
and refer the reader to the cogent arguments given by Ausubel 
(1963) in refutation of the idea that really meaningful learning 
52 
must come through self-discovery (p. 246). 
It would be less than honest to imply -that no one sees ambiguity as a value 
in the therapeutic process. Rogers' {1951, 1961) approach to therapy involves 
... -
a good deal of ambiguity which he must see as facilitative and Frank {1961) 
suggests that ambiguity or unclarity tends to arouse unpleasant emotions such 
as anxiety and resentment which heighten the patient's desire for relief, 
thereby increasing his own influencibility. Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest 
(1965), however, comment on Rogers' position: 
'[R]eflection of feeling' as a technique in therapy is assuredly 
manipulative and intended to have some purpose. Even Rogers has 
admitted that all psychotherapists are in the business of in-
fluencing and controlling behavior {Rogers & Skinner, 1956) •••• 
[I]f the therapist told them {the patients) truthfully that by 
reflecting the feelings, rather than the content, of the patients' 
statements he hoped to have them come to a better understanding 
. of their feelings and themselves, it seems much less likely that 
any resistance at all would be aroused. Whether such a straight-
forward statement would decrease the effectiveness of reflection 
as a technique {assuming that it has some) is an empirical matter. 
(p. 247). 
Frank's statement souds too baldly manipulative. However, it is doubtful 
that the Rogers and Frank of 1961 are the Rogers and Frank of 1969. In fact, 
Frank is one of the co-authors of the Hoehn-Saric (1965) article mentioned 
above which urges "systematic preparation of pati~nts for psychotherapy." 
There is, then, growing dissatisfaction with the kind of ambiguity or 
secretiveness that characterizes approaches to the growth-experience called 
psychotherapy. Sensitivity-training experiences or laboratories in inter-
Personal relationships are also growth experiences. It would be unfair to 
like~ the participants in such experiences to patients or clients entering 
psychotherapeutic experiences. But, while the ambiguity that characterizes 
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the goals and processes of most sensitivyt-training laboratories might well 
stimulate or at least be the occasion for certain kinds of growthful activities 
on the part of the participants (e.g. setting goals, formulating a contract, 
• •rr-
etc.), still the evidence dealing with the deleterious effects of ambiguity 
in the psychotherapeutic process suggests, at the minimum, that ambiguity 
need not characterize all growth-experiences and that structuring a laboratory 
in interpersonal relations by means of a contract could well prove quite 
beneficial. There is no need, however, to become embroiled in meaningless 
arguments: laboratory experiences high in ambiguity and laboratory experiences 
high in clarity or "visibility" are different experiences. Each may well have 
its own positive and negative characteristics, but these remain to be 
demonstrated. 
Clarity. Since the contract-group is characterized by such ''high 
Visibility t II SOJnething Should be Said about itS potential adVaDt&geS • 
Goldstein, Heller, and Sechrest (1966) have reviewed a number of areas of 
psychological research, for instance, the psychology of learning and a number 
of areas of social psychology, with a view to applying the fruits of this 
research in the area of psychotherapy.· One of the hypotheses established by 
them is the following: 
Hypothesis 5.4a: Giving patients prior information about the 
nature of psychotherapy, the theories underlying it, and the 
techniques to be used will facilitate progress in psychotherapy. 
We find it remarkable that psychotherapists have apparently 
been unwilling to impart to their patients more than a little 
of the process of psychotherapy. Some writers have made general 
.suggestions about 'structuring' of psychotherapy (e.g. Fromm~ 
Reichmann, 1950; Holland, 1965; Rotter, 1954; Wolberg, 1954), but 
such suggestions have been rudimentary and sometimes even 
·evasive. Many, perhaps even most, other writers have ignored the 
whole question of just what patients should be told about 
psychotherapy. We believe that in many cases a fuller 
explication would be quite desirable (p. 245). 
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In truth, a number.of authors have discussed the value of structuring the 
~
psychotherapeutic encounter; the problem seems to be (though hard data is 
lacking} that few therapists have seen fit to introduce formal structuring 
techniques into their psychotherapeutic approach, especially to the extent 
that Goldstein, Heller; and Sechrest might deem advisable. As early as 1949 
Bixler reviewed the literature on structuring, but did so in terms of "the 
setting of limits." Ingham and Love (1954), on the other hand, took a more 
positive attitude toward structuring. They suggest six basic process values 
(all of them really patient variables) which should be co11DDunicated to the 
client both in structuring remarks and through basic attitudes: (1) that it 
is good for men to investigate themselves; (2) that it is better to 
investigate than to blame; (3) that emotion is to be regarded as a real and 
important thing; (4) that there must be relatively complete freedom of 
expression in the therapeutic situation; (5) that investigating the past may 
be useful in understanding the present; and (6) values centering around the 
client's present view of his world are important for the therapeutic process. 
More recently, Hoehn-Saric and hi.a associates (1965) have used the Role 
Induction Interview (RII) ~'to arouse or strengthen in the patient certain 
appropriate anticipations of the psychotherapeutic process, particularly with 
respect to patient and therapist roles" (p. 270). The RII, based on the 
Anticipatory Socialization Interview of Orne (referred to as "in preparation 
for 'publication" by Hoehn-Saric and his associates), consists of four com-
P0 nents: "(1) a general exposition of psychotherapy; (2) a description and 
SS 
explanation of the expected behavior of a patient and of a therapist; (3) a 
preparation for certain typical phenomena in the course of therapy (e.g. 
resistance); and (4) the induction of realistic expectation for improvement 
within four months of treatment" (p. 270). The research conclusion was that 
"RII had a favorable effect on certain aspects of patients' therapy behavior 
and improvement and, properly used, could be a valuable tool in psychotherapy" 
(p. 280). 
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) refer to a rather interesting way in which 
initial structuring in therapy might take place: 
[V]icarious therapy pre-training (VTP) ••• may be employed in 
either group or individual psychotherapy. It simply involves 
presentation to prospective patients of a 30-minute tape 
recording of excerpts of 'good' patient therapy behavior. The 
tape itself illustrates in a very concrete manner how clients 
often explore themselves and their feelings: it thus provides 
cognitive and experiential structuring of 'how to be a good 
patient.' In short, it allows for a vicarious experiencing of 
deep psychotherapy prior to the initiation of the psychothera-
peutic or counseling relationship. Recent research (Truax & 
Carkhuff, 1964) completed using VTP in group psychotherapy with 
both mental hospital and juvenile delinquent patients provides 
both clinical and research confirmation of its facilitative 
effect. It was found that early psychotherapy sessions from 
groups receiving VT~ showed significantly higher levels of self-
exploTation than non-VTP groups having the same number of 
sessions. Further, VTP resulted in significantly more successful 
outcomes in time-limited therapy as judged by a variety of 
objective outcome criteria (p. 373). 
The authors mention only patient behavior, but it seems only reasonable to 
hope that VTP would give the patient some idea of what to expect from a 
good therapist, too. 
~ contract !!! structuring the sensitivity-training experience. Since 
psychotherapy deals with human growth, it is m~ convinction that we should 
search through the literature on psychotherapy and borrow whatever seems to 
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be beneficial for a sensitivity-training experience. In the contract-group 
the contract to which the participants subscribe serves to structure the 
, . 
laboratory experience. Since, at least in this study, each of the provisions 
of the contract is throughly explained, the participant knows not only what 
he should do but also why. The idea of VTP is a most intriguing one. Even 
in laboratory groups that subscribe to a contract,/ there is much initial 
fumbling around trying to get started. Some groups, even late in the 
laboratory, take flight by claiming that they still do not understand what 
they are supposed to be doing. I would like to incorporate a videotape 
version of VTP as part of the structuring process at the beginning of a 
laboratory in interpersonal relations. The participants would first pre-read 
the contract and get some idea of what is expected of them (and of the leader) 
in the actual group situation. Then they would watch one or two videotapes · 
of "good" group sessions, that is sessions in which all of the major elements 
of contract behavior were illustrated. This would help make the contract 
much more concrete and eliminate some of the useless "contract talk" of early 
sessions. Someone might object, saying that viewing a "good" session might 
frighten some of the participants; the~ might think that they are not capable 
of such intensive interaction. On the other hand, however, it might show 
the participants that intensive interaction can be quite engaging and growth-
ful, and not destructive as some of the participants' fears would imagine it 
to be. 
These remarks deal with the problem of how much one should know about a 
" grawth-experience"--whether it be psychotherapy or a laboratory in inter-
Personal relltionships--before entering that experience. A claim for ''high 
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visibility" in all kinds of growth experiences is made. Or at least it is 
suggested that ''high visibility" approaches are just as valid as "ambiguous" 
approaches. These remarks, however do not touch on the question of the 
. .. -
therapeutic or non therapeutic nature of self-knowledge. Is it better for a 
"sick" or a "normal" man to know himself completely or is such knowledge, at 
least in certain cases, potentially destructive? This question will be dealt 
with in the chapter on self-disclosure. 
Minimizing Manipulation 
A number of authors have discussed the humanistic and ethical problems 
of deception and manipulation in psychological experimentation (e.g. Aronson 
& Carlsmith, 1968; Jourard, 1967; Kelman, 1967). Jourard, for instance, sees 
psychologists as too manipulating in their experimentation. He makes a plea 
for greater openness on the part of psychologists even in the area of 
experimentation, where deception and manipulation have been traditionally seen 
as both acceptable and necessary. "E" and "S," he says, should get to know 
each other on a more human level. Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), however, 
while encouraging a more humane treatment of experimental subjects, point out 
that it is not always possible to avoid subject distress: 
[M]any questions in social psychology can be answered only by 
designing experiments which cause subjects some psychological 
discomfort, such as anxiety, embarrassment, annoyance, insecurity, 
etc. One simply cannot investigate the effects of anxiety except 
in situations where people are being caused anxiety (p. 29). 
Manipula'tion and deception are even more suspect as values in therapeutic and 
other "growth" situations (e.g. sensitivity-training laboratories) in which 
..... 
the enhancing of responsible self-determination is a traditional goal. In the 
usual approach to sensitivity training, in which ambiguity is a value, the 
58 
trainer, whether justly or not, is sometimes seen as manipulative. After all, 
he has been through many such experiences and at least he knows what is 
happening and, in a sense, what is going to happen. Even his silence is seen, 
.. ~-
at times, as manipulative, for he watches as the participants "dance." Even 
the word "trainer" sounds ominous to some, for in their experience animals 
have trainers. This is not to say that ambiguity should not be a factor in 
sensitivity-training experiences. It does mean, however, that trainers should 
be aware of the impact that ambiguity can have on some participants and that 
ambiguity should never be used to manipulate. If there· is ambiguity in the 
contract-group, it does not stem from hidden dimensions of the experience 
itself. Individual participants may not be clear as to how to put the 
contract to work in their own interactions, but this is akin to the "beneficial 
uncertainty" which Beier (1966) sees as growthful in: therapeutic situations. 
It is hypothesized that both the member-contract and the leader-contract will 
serve as safeguards against deception and manipulation. 
Grou2. farticipants ~ "Therapists" ,.t2. One Another 
Patterson (1966) has discovered that one characteristic that unites 
therapists of widely differing approaches is commitment to a particular theory 
or method. The failure or inability of the therapist to commit himself to a 
definite approach apparently limits his effectiveness. This does not mean 
that a person has to identify himself definitively with a peculiar "school" 
of therapy, that is, he does not have to be a Freudian, a Jungian, or a 
follower of Rogers, but he should have a philosophy of therapy which can be 
translated into therapeutic interaction. Steinzer (1967)., when asked to what 
school he belongs, inevitably replies "Steinzorian." He explains himself: 
l 
I hasten to add that I.'m not about to establish still another 
organization, but that it is my whole being, in all my li.ved 
and dreamed-of lives--my 'voices of experience'--llzhi.ch infuses 
my interpretations, advice, actions, hopes and confrontations. 
If pressed far enough, I could add that my allegiance is 
American; my values are to-some an amalgam of my working-class 
background and my present economic level; my idea of progress 
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is affected by the Judaeo-Christian spirit of Western culture; 
my choice as the most significant person in modern psychotherapy 
is Freud; the teacher who has inspired me most is Carl Rogers; 
my latest enthusiasm and applause for authors in my field are 
directed to Jerome Frank and Thomas Szasz--and so on (pp. 1-2). 
Yet, though he eschews specific systems, he does have a very vital philosophy 
of therapy which he translates into therapeutic interaction. He maintains 
that therapy takes place when people meet and respond, that healing grows out 
of trust and affection. However, these are the conditions, not just of 
therapy, but of human growth itself. It is the purpose of the contract to 
help put people into growthful contact with one another. Each member becomes, 
as it were, a "therapist" to the others, that is, one concerned with the 
being and the growth of the other. The member-contract and the leader-process 
contract provide the therapist-members a definite theory of method to be 
used in the helping relationship. Acceptance of the contract is the commit-
ment that makes for such "therapist" efficacy. 
~Objections £2._ Growth-~-Contract 
A discussion of objections must deal with two questions: (1) Is the 
factor objected to really desirable (if it is absent) or undesirable (if it 
is present)? (2) Does the contract-group de ~ either eliminate or foster 
the factor in question? Obviously the second question cannot be answered 
aprioristically. Actual experience with contract-groups is necessary in 
order to determine the presence or absence of factors. 
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Objection: the contract makes what is usually_!. "cool" medium ''hot." 
ncLuhan (1964) makes an intriguing distinction between "hot" and "cool" 
communication media. "Hot" media are characterized by "high definition," 
.... -
a state of being well filled with data. The radio, he claims, is a "high-
definition" medium, while communication by telephone is low in definition. 
Low-definition media are "cool," for the participants have to "fill in the 
gaps" more and thus become more involved in the communication process. 
Listening to a tape playback of a group session is "hot," for there is high 
definition and experience would seem to indicate that involvement is dif f i-
cult. On the other hand, watching (and listening to) a videotape playback 
of a group session is quite "cool." The viewers are flooded with a new 
communication-dimension. They must interpret more (e.g., all the non-verbal 
communication taking place within the group); there are more "gaps" to be 
filled in. Involvement runs high. 
Small groups are usually quite "cool," that is, they are low in 
definition and thus deeplf involve the participants. Sensitivity-training 
and other forms of small group process have even been called "seductive." 
It is objected that a contract would make a group higher in definition and 
thus render a "cool" experience tepid• if not "hot. First of all, however, 
if a group is very low in definition, that is, if it is almost completely 
Without structure, it tends to die. The failure of a group to elaborate for 
itself some kind of viable contract leads to the "death" of the group. The 
members can no longer tolerate ambiguity and aimlessness. Ennui sets in; 
involvement disappears. There is nothing more agonizing than sitting through 










contract introduces structure or not, it is rather whether the degree of 
definition introduced by the contract is too high or not. Obviously this is 
a function of the particular kind of contract introduced. The contract must 
be facilitating rather than restrictive. The hypothesis in this study is 
that the kind of contract to be described in the following chapters is 
facilitating, that it introduces an optimal degree of definition, that it 
allows plenty of room for "member-movement," that it increases rather than 
decreases member participation, that it focuses the group on issues that in 
themselves exact participant involvement. It is the group that is filled 
with irrelevant interaction that is high in definition and, therefore, clogged 
with useless data. Whether these hypotheses are verified or not will depend 
upon research that is still to be done. 
Objection: the contract eliminates spontaneity, induces rigidity. In 
. 
the contract-group, group life is not as unprogranmed as in other forms of 
training- or growth-groups. Tlie plaintive "what-are-we-supposed-to-be-
doing?" is not heard or at least not with the same intensity and frequency. 
Slater (1966) claims that it is this being-unprogrammed that makes the 
members of the group face "questions dealing with the central dilenma of 
life itself." However, even the detailed contract to be presented below 
leaves the group unprogrammed to a great extent. The leader, while he does 
try to see to it that the contract is fulfilled, does not tell the members 
~ they are to fulfill it. He does not tell them in what "modalities" 
(see below) they must engage. If the members of the group confront one 
another when they engage in "flight" activity, this could be looked upon as 
"i nduced rigidity," but then the term "rigidity" begins to take on a rather 
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equivocal cast. The contract still leaves very many choices to be made 
by the participants, but the point is ·that these choices, because of the 
contract, are focused on much mo;~ central issues. It is contended that 
the contract-group is much more likely to deal with the key issues of life 
than is the group which must first hammer out its own contract. The 
contract provides structure or clarity or definition, but with plasticity. 
Definition with-plasticity seems to be an ideal condition for a group. 
Objection: the contract antecedently limits the freedom of group members 
Perhaps "guilty" is the best answer to this charge, but then it is necessary 
to ask whether such "limitation" is a value or not. Maritain (1951), in 
discussing world states, objects to the concept of "sovereignty." The body 
politic, he says, has a right to autonomy, both internal and external. But 
sovereignty adds another note to autonomy: the transcendentally supreme 
character od independence and power. If nations are to work together for the 
common good of the world, he claims, they must, while retaining their autonomy 
surrender their sovereignty. The member-contract in the growth-group may be 
looked upon, analogously, as a surrender-of-sovereignty. Effective inter-
personal involvement demands a surrender of sovereignty, at leat in the 
negative sense outlined by Maritain. Freedom is curtailed, if such a word 
should be used, in the name of an experience which is designed to make the 
group participants more "free" in their interpersonal living. 
Objection: entry !!Y-contract introduces .!. limit~ng "selectivity-factor" 
.!.!!.~group experience. Some kind of "selectivity-factor" is always at work 
in both therapeutic laboratory•training situations. 'lberapists often limit 
themselves to those who are considered "good candidates"( 'truax & Carkhuff, 
-
63 
1967, p. 377). Candidates for therapy select themselves according to a 
number of criteria: e.g., the ability -to afford time off work, the de3ire 
to change, financial considerations, degree of psychic pain, the desire to 
please others, etc. Analogous self-selection criteria are considered to be 
operative to all groups. The objection here is that the contract introduces 
an added selectivity-factor, so that, for example, a person who might be 
interested in sensitivity-training would not attempt a contract-experience. 
The contract might attract an elite. On the other hand, it might attract 
those who are desperately trying to improve the quality of their interpersonal 
living. 
In order to discuss this question reasonably, it would be necessary to 
have the kind of "hard data" that simply are not available. It will certainly 
be interesting to see what kind of clientele the contract-group draws. 
Anecdotal evidence seems to indicate the contract group populations do not 
differ significantly from populations engaged in more "traditional" 
sensitivity-training experiences. However, a desire for interpersonal growth 
seems to characterize both the interpersonal "haves" and the interpersonal 
"have-nots." It is hypothesized that those interested in "sensitivity-
training" would also be interested in a contract-group experience. In my 
own experience over the past two-and-a half years, no one has refused to 
enter a sensitivity-training laboratory because of the contract. It is 
also hypothesized that those who actually engage in some kind of sensitivity-
training experience and ~ind it valuable would like to move on to a contract-
group-growth-experience. 
Bugental and Tannenbaum (1965) describe the experience of a group of 
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people who, having found an initial sensitivity-training experience so 
fruitful, wanted to engage in a more high-powered "festival of growth." 
The participants chosen for the .. experience were an "elite," that is, a number 
of people who were considered to have moved beyond stagnated involvement 
with D-needs and M needs. However, they found the experience somewhat 
disappointing. They either could not recapture the spirit of their previous 
experience or the second experience was too much like the first. One view 
of their plight (though it is not suggested by the authors) mtght be this: 
they were eager, they were open, but they were without a feasible contract. 
~ew contractual provisions had not been built into the second experience, and 
therefore it resembled tb.e first too closely. Those who sponsored the second 
experience could have designed a laboratory with different or more intensive 
features and then these features could have become the provisions of a 
structuring contract. It is difficult to say whether such an approach would 
have worked, but it seems that a high powered contract-experience would have 
been ideal for such a group. 
Objection: ~ contract makes the risk of failure greater. This might 
well be true, but greater risk of failure is not seen as a negative factor. 
11Failure11 is an analogous, if not an equi\tocal, term when used to describe 
both physical and psychic healing. If a physical agent is used to try to 
stem the spread of gangrene, failure means something quite specific. The 
battle is lost and the foot or leg must be amputated. "Failure" in 
psychotherapy is much more nebulous, because the criteria for success and 
failure are not clear. In one sense 1 psychotherapy does not "fail," rather 
it is "terminated." One of the reasons that therapy cannot besaid to "fail" 
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is the low "operationality" of the go~ls of therapy. But, while low 
operationality prevents clearly defined failure experiences, especially in 
the mind of the patient, it also ~~ems to stand in the way of effective 
therapy. The contract introduces a much higher degree of operationality 
than is usually found in either therapy or in other kinds of growth-
experiences. In a contract group it is difficult for a person to say to 
himself or to the group that lie is "getting something out of it," if he is 
not. He is not getting out of it what he should if he is not fulfilling the 
contract. .And it is quite evident whether he is fulfilling the contract or 
not. If he tries to rationalize away his failure, his attempts ("lhese 
contract things don't work," "It was too contrived to get anything done," 
"We really didn't have the freedom to move, 0 etc.) should be more transparent 
and hollow because of the contract. Ordinarily, then, such a person will 
have to take responsibility for the failure himself, for it was be who did 
not engage in the "modalities" contracted for, it was he who fled group 
process. Because the contract was clear, he can see exactly~ he fled the 
group experience. Even his failure is "diagnostic." 'lbe contract-group, 
because it more clearly defines success and outlines the activities of a 
"successful" experience. also heightens the risk of failure ("success" being 
defined here as contract-fulfillment). 'J.'his is good, for it is good to know 
~ one has failed and why one has failed. 
the contract reduces "productive" anJdetz.. 
• 
Objection: !here are those 
who are concerned about the anxiety factor in labotatory experiences: 
3. Can the candidate tolerate the anxiety involved in the T~Group 
2rocess? Most T-Group participants are adults, already settled in 





adolescence and early adulthood. They have well-established 
behavior pattern~, habits, responses, values, emotional reactions 
and defense mechanisms--all of which have now become meaningful to 
them, and which allow them to operate in their own environment. 
The T-Group ts a very soul~searching process. It requires the 
individual to introspect, to look at his own values and his own 
emotions, to ask himself whether and why he likes them, and 
whether he wishes to live the way he has. After a person is 
established in his way of life, two things must be considered: 
a) Does he have the general ability to tolerate the anxiety involved 
in this kind of soul-searching? and b) Is he at this time going 
through some other stress experience such as adjusting to the 
change of life on the part of himself or other members of his 
family, or meeting difficult financial obligations? 
To prevent avoidable emotional disturbances, admission to T-
Groups should be based on a careful screening process designed 
to ensure that participants are able to withstand and profit 
from the anxiety induced in the T-Group process (House, 1967, 
pp. 25-26)., 
These concerns are very real, especially in the context in which House reviews 
the literature on laboratory training. He is tallting about the application 
of T-Group.methoda in business and other organizational settings. Sometimes 
entire organizations or entire departments are subjected to laboratory 
training without being asked and without being given the freedom to attend 
or not attend. But in the present stud~ it is assumed that the individual 
freely chooses to engage in the laboratory experience and in some way reflects 
upon his ability to profit from it. Indeed, in a contract-situation the 
prospective participant can make a more intelligent decision whether to 
attend or not attend in that the contract clearly delineates the nature of 
the experience. 
Participation in growth-group experiences is an approach-avoidance 
situation. Group process is both seductive and anxtety-arousing. It offers 
a fresh source of relatedness, but it demands a certain degree of self-
I 
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ilDJllOlation. There is the lure of fushion and the terror of it, the hope of. 
greater individuation and the despair of it. Usually, the anxiety aroused as 
one approaches or begins a group experience is considered to be 11 anxiety 
at the service of the ego" (Kris, 1952). It is intimately associated with 
the pursuit of self-identity t.ilich implies beth separateness and relatedness. 
Schofield (1964) claims that our society has tended to over-dramatize 
anxiety: 
If this is the Age of Anxiety it is not so simply as a function of 
absolute increase in the things which man is fearful. Rather it 
is because ~ have taught .!!!!!_ to be anxious about his anxiety. 
We have created a distorted image of anxiety. We have attriouted 
to anxiety and to the efforts to escape anxiety all of man's 
neurotic ills. We have sensitized ourselves to recognize the 
signs of anxiety, and we have been encouraged to the fallacious 
value of a total avoidance of anxiety as a goal of life; we have 
been led to believe that a complete freedom from anxiety would be 
the distinguishing characteristic of an adjusted life (p. 152). 
Anxiety is a part of life. It is up to man to control and use it. Schachter 
(1959) showed that a state of anxiety leads to the arousal of af filiative 
tendencies. Man seeks out his fellow man when he is afraid. Need the 
resultant contact be any less growthful because it was sought in order to 
reduce anxiety? 
The Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908) states that the relation-
ship between fear or anxiety and learning is curvilinear. The level of 
anxiety or drive which stimulates optimal performance lies somewhere in the 
middle: it must be neither too high nor too low. There has been some 
confirmation of this "law" from more recent studies (e.g., Matarazzo, Ulett, 
& Sa~low, 1955; Stennett, 1957). It is assumed that this "law" is also 
operative in growth or therapeutic experiences. The ambiguous group 
initiates sensit· it -trainin eriences roduce"' relative! 
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high levels of drive. The laboratorr is deai.gned to produce anxiety-drive. 
It is also assumed that there are "optimal" levels of anxiety for 
effective group process in contract-interpersonal-growth-groups. The 
.. --
member-contract doe& not eliminate anxiety; it is rather one of the sources 
of it. However, since the contract gtyes a fairly clear picture of the 
kind of group experience ;!nto which the members are entering, ambiguity and 
the "unknown" in general are not the primary sources of anxiety (it is 
assumed in the major writings on sensitivity-training !e.g., Bradford, 
Gibb, & Benne, 1964] that ambiguity in terms of "goallessness" and "planned 
ambiguity" is a primary source of anxiety in laboratory groups). While it 
is true that contract-group participants may never have been engaged in a 
sensitivity-training experience before, they still have some idea of the 
meaning of the contract vartables (self-disclosure and the like). Anxiety 
arises from tl!e provisions of the contract and one's abilit1 to fulfill the 
contract. 1he contract calls for self-disclosure, confrontation, and a 
willingnes11 to express human feeling. These q;eem to be more autlientic 
sources of anxiety than ambiguity; they are more related to real life 
concerns. Or rather the ambiguity that arises in a person when he views 
the contract is related to real life concerns: how open can I be? what 
will 1 do when challenged? how can I start expressing my feelings now? 
Anxiety in the contract group does not 'tjust happen." It is part of 
the contract. It i& explained to prospective participants that in accepting 
the contract, they are subs:cribing to a certain amount of anxiety •. It is 
explained that anxi.ety can be debilitating or that it can be an "energizer." 
This more rational approach does not eliminate anxiety. But it does prepare 
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the participant to expect anxiety, to recognize it for what it is, and to 
use it to "energize" group activity. 
If there is such a thing as an optimal level or range of anxiety for 
participation in laboratory experiences, then a problem arises. There are 
relatively great individual differences in both state (situational, transient) 
and trait (part of the personaltty make-up, relatively permanent) anxiety 
(see Levitt 1966). Participants come to sensitivity-training laboratories, 
then, with varying degrees-of anxiety. It is very important for the trainer 
or leader to be aware of this. For instance, while some exercises might not 
stir one participant, they might tend to immobilize another. The function 
of the laborator1 is not directly to make people anxious, but to utilize 
anxiety that does arise as a drive. Sometimes, however, it is quite difficult 
to determine which participants are relatively calm, which are quite anxious, 
and which are even too anxtous. The contract calls for openness on the part 
of the participants, and disclosure of one's state of anxiety (especially 
if the participant feels that it is excessi'Ve or debilitating) should take 
place relatively early in the group. Therefore, while the contract itself 
might well be a potent source of anxiety, it also demands the kind of 
openness that allows anxiety to surface and to be dealt with in the inter-
action of the group. The contract, then, viewed in different ways, can both 
elicit and help to control anxiety. The contract both provides a structure 
which increases the psychological safety of the experience (e.g. by building 
support into the experience, by demanding growtliful rather than punitive 
confrontation, etc.) and acts as a stimulus to taking growthful risks (e.g. 
self disclosure, expression of feeling, etc.l in the group. 
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A Variety .2.f,Contracts 
- . 
'!his study will delineate one general kind of contract-experience. But 
there can be an almost endless va~!ety of such experiences. Once the goals 
of a group are determined, then the means that are assumed to lead up to 
these goals can be elaborated. Finally, both goals and means can be made part 
of the contract. The use of a variety of contract-groups in various kinds of 
experimentation seems to be one of their most promising features. The 
variables of the group experience can be spelled out in detail, and fulfill-
ment or non~fulfillment of contract is relatively easy to determine. 
Any contract can be purposefully rigid or flexible. In experimental 
situations it seems that a certain "rigidity" of contract is called for. The 
purpose of the experiment is to see what effects'this contract has. So the 
---
fulfillment or non-fulfillment of this contract is important. However, in 
"growth" experiences it is possible to allow for the re-working or re-
formulation of the contract. In such groups the goals are more important 
than the contract itself. If the contract has to be changed in order to 
provide a more profitable group experience, then it should be changed. 
However, the reformulation of the contract is a relatively drastic step. 
Blaming the contract for group or personal failure can be a type o.f flight 
from group process. Responsible contract reformulation can be undertaken 
only after responsible efforts have been made to fulfill the provisions of 
the contract. 
In both contract-experiences and in laboratories characterized by 
"planned ambiguity" and "goallessness" it is possible to introduce "focused" 
contracts in the form of exercises. In a sense all exercises introduced to 
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the group are contractual, that is, the exercise is generally imposed on the 
group and the participants are usually expected to follow the rules laid 
down for the exercise. For instance, in a contract-group in which self 
. .. -
disclosure is one of the contractual variables it is possible to define the 
topic of disclosure by means of a "focused" contract. It is assumed that 
there would be some reason for specifying the topic of area of disclosure and 
that the participants are more or less willing to have such a sub-contract 
imposed on them. 
! Sample Contract .!!!_~Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations 
Lest the notion "contract" remain too abstract, a sample contract for 
a laboratory in interpersonal relations is given below. However concise 
or extended a contract might be, it should provide prospective members to get 
some kind of "feel" for the group experience they are about to enter. This 
means that all the major variables that will ultimately given definition to 
the kinds of interaction expected in the group should be spelled out adequate-
ly. The provisions for the contract below have been chosen because it is 
believed that these are til.e major varialiles in and de f act:o do take place in 
sensitivity-training laboratories in which self-actualization and interper~ 
sonal growth are tlie superordinate goals. 
A CONTRACT 
FOR A LABORATORY 
IN INTERPERSONAL GROWTH 






to a contract. The purpose of the contract is to provide a facilitating 
structure for the group experience and to let you know the nature of the 
experience you are about to enter. Please read the following contract care-
fully and then decide whether you would like to participate or not in the 
kind of experience described in the contract. If you want to participate 
in the group, you must subscribe to the contract. 
1. The Goals of the Group. The overriding goal•;_of the group is, of course, 
interpersonal growth. Interpersonal growth involves discovering "new ways 
of being present to others. Personal growth, too, is a goal of the group, 
but it is assumed that all that is good in personal growth (e.g. reduction 
of anxiety, enhanced feelings of self-worth, a keen sense of self-identity) 
must be placed at the service of interpersonal relationships. Man is a 
relational being and the height of his growth lies in his relationships 
with others. 
2. Leadership in the Group. The group will have a leader, but since he is 
not a leader in the traditional sense of that term, he is sometimes referred 
to by different titles, such as "trainer" or "facilitator." The name is 
not important, but his function is. He is skilled in group dynamics and has 
had a good deal of experience participating in and working with groups. 
However, he is in the group because he, too, is interested in growing 
interpersonally. Therefore, he subscribes to the same contract that you do, 
that is, he is a leader-member. As leader, his functiQn is to put his 
knowledge of groups and his e:Kperience in groups at the service of your 
group. He is a resource person, not a super-member. He is someone like you, 
interested in increasing his interpersonal effectiveness by involving himself 
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with you. If certain provisions of the contract are not clear, he will 
explain them to you, but he is not in .the group as teacher, at least in the 
traditional sense. In fact, a good teacher is one who likes to get together 
.--
with others in order to learn. 
The ideal is that the leadership qualities he demonstrates become 
diffused among the members of the group so that, in a sense, the group might 
act as its own leader. He will work for that diffusion. What are some of 
the specific things he will do. He will tell you about some of the difficul-
ties that face most beginning laboratory groups. For instance, aome groups 
spend a good deal of time "dealing with the leader," that is, they make him 
a father-figure" and try to work out authority problems with him. However, 
in this group the leader is not meant to be an authority figure. It is not 
that the participants may not work through authority problems, but there are 
other ways of doing this besides focusing on the group leader. If too much 
time is spent "dealing with the leader," this can prove detrimental to the 
over-riding goal of the group. In this group "interpersonal growth" means 
that the members are to spend a good deal of time involving themselves with 
one another (including the leader-member) •. 
. From the beginning the leader-member will "model" the kinds of behavior 
called for by the contract. Again, he does so not because he is completely 
self.actualized in the area of interpersonal relating but because the sooner 
the group begins to engage in contractual behavior the better. 
3. ~Laboratory Nature of the Group Experience. The experience you are 
about to enter is called a "laboratory" for a number of reasons. Part of the 
contract is to accept the experience as a laboratory. This i~ what a 
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laboratory entails: 
(a) Learning £I. doing. You will learn how to relate to others more 
effectively by actually relating •.. You will see yourself in action, as it 
.. -
were, and you will talk about the ways in which you relate to the other 
members of the group. 
(b) A climate_of experimentation. The term laboratory implies experi-
mentation. You will experiment with your own behavior, attempting to relate 
to others in "new ways." This does not mean that the group will invent new 
ways of acting. Rather you will try to deal with others in ways that you do 
not ordinarily use in your day-to-day contacts. For instance, if you are 
usually quiet and reserved, you may experiment with "speaking up" in the 
group. For you, this is a "new way" of being present to others. 
(c) No prejudging the experiment. The person who comes to the 
laboratory convinced that the "experiment" will not wrk usually leaves it 
feeling quite self-satisfied. His prophecy has been self-fulfilling. You 
are asked not to prejudge the experience but rather to reserve your judgment. 
The only way you will ever know whether the experiment "works" or not is to 
give yourself as completely as possible to it. 
ld) Feedback. Your own behavior is the major "input" in the laboratory. 
But trying "new ways" of behaving is somewhat useless unless it is possible 
to determine how this behavior strikes others. Therefore, you are asked not 
only to react to others but to tell others how their behavior strikes you. 
You, too, will receive feedback from the other participants. Br means of 
such feedback you should come to a better understanding of your own 
interpersonal abilities and limitations. 
75 
Try to get a feeling for your ability to involve yourself to make contact 
with others. All of us have strong points and all of us have areas of 
deficit in our interpersonal li"Vi:ug. Use the group in order to get a feeling 
for both. 
4, Rules of Innnediacy. If the laboratory experience is to be intensive, it 
must be as innnediate as possible. Certain "rules" facilitate a climate of 
immediacy in the group. 
(a) The here-and-now. Deal with the here-and-now rather than the 
there-and-then. Your interactions with one another are the most important 
part of the laboratory. When you do talk about _things that have happened or 
are happening outside the group, do so ih such a way so to make them relevant 
to what is happening in the group. If you keep talking about things outside 
the group, people and situations unfamiliar to tµe other participants, you 
will lose their interest. Make the outside and the past somehow "present" 
to your fellow group members. Talking about people and things outside the 
group is sometimes a way of fleeing from more intensive group interaction. 
(b) Cooperation. Your goals can be reached only if you cooperate with 
one another. This does not mean at all that there will not be disagreements, 
but interpersonal growth is much more likely to take place in an atmosphere 
of cooperation rather than one of competition or conspiracy. This does not 
mean that you have to be "nice" for the sake of being nice: a cooperative 
group structure does not exclude strong feeling and confrontation. But there 
is little immediacy unless you move toward the other person in an effort to 
involve yourself with bim. The contract provides a structure for cooperation. 






you are cooperating with the other participants. 
(c) Avoid generalities. When ·you speak, try to be concrete and specific. 
for instance, when speaking abo.ut yourself, use "I." Do not use ''you" when 
"I II you mean • In fact, try to avoid using general words to refer to people 
such as "you," "one," "people," "men," "they," ''we," and the like. Do not 
say: "There are some people in the group with whom I get along better, but 
rather: "I seem to get along better with John and Mary than with any of the 
other members of the group," Finally, do not make speeches to the whole 
group: even if you want to address the whole group, try to address the group 
through another member. For instance, say: "John, you were not really 
listening to me this morning; in fact, this seems to be a group problem: we 
don't really listen to one another." If you address yourself always to the 
whole group, the other members will often sit there and listen respectfully 
to you, but no one will respond to you. Speeches addressed to everybody tend 
to be addressed to nobody. In summary, use "I" when you mean "I"; be concrete, 
avoiding vagueness and generalities; try to address individuals in the group, 
even when you are addressing the entire group (in a way, you are always 
addressing the entire group whenever you speak). 
(d) Do not "siphon off" issues of concern to the group. Sometimes 
group members get together in twos and threes outside the group and work 
through issues that have arisen within the group. lbere is nothing wrong 
with this providing you summarize to the group what has taken place outside 
the group. If the issues come up within the group, then, in some sense, they 
belong to the group. If these issues, then, are settled outside the group, 
some of the life of the group is "siphoned off," and the group becomes 
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somewhat anemic because of it, that is, it loses a degree of immediacy. 
5. The elements of dialogue: emotion, language, and the fusion of the two. 
You will contact one another pr~~cipally by talking to one another. Language, 
then, and the expression of feeling are crucial factors for this experiment. 
(a) Emotion. Try to let reality have an emotional impact on you, 
especially the lli!llity of the other members of the group. Let yourself feel 
various emotions; feel what it feels like to experience these emotions. 
Secondly, let yourself react as constructively as possible to what you 
experience. Do not try to hide the emotional dimensions of yourself. Do not 
be overly intellectual: ideas are certainly important, but in laboratories 
in interpersonal relations, emotions are equally as important. Tell others, 
then, not just how you think about things, but how you feel about them. 
Sometimes our ideas and our emotions do not coincide. It is good to be able 
to recognize this division within yourself. 
(b) Human language. Get a new feeling for the power of human language. 
How do you translate yourself into language? Find out whether your language 
gives expression to the deep you or only to the superficial you. If you 
tend to use an exsanguinated language in your day-to-day contacts, experiment 
with a more forceful us' of language in the group. Try to avoid cliches; use 
words that have more "power" than the words you ordinarily use. Language can 
be a form of contact or it can be a barrier between you and the other; try 
to make your language as "contactive" as possible. If you speak in cliches 
and generalities, this might well reflect an unwillingness on your part to 
make deeper contacts with others. 
(c) Poetry: welding feeling~ language and language ~feeling. Try 
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to let your feelings find expression in language and let your language be 
colored by feeling. Some of us experience things deeply, but we cannot 
translate our experiencing into __ ..language. The laboratory is an opportunity 
to make attempts to do just that. When you succeed, your language will be, 
in one of the deepest senses, "poetry," for it will be an integrated express-
ion of the person you are. 
6. The Core Interactions 
The heart of this contract and therefore of the group experience itself 
are the kinds of interaction in which you will engage. You are asked to 
experiment with the kinds of interaction listed below. They are ways of 
contacting others, of involving yourself with others, and therefore offer 
possibilities of growing with others. You are asked, then, to engage in the 
following kinds of activity in the group: 
(a) Self-disclosure. You are asked to be open about yourself. This 
means that you are to talk about yourself in such a way as to get the 
"real-you" (rather than a facade) across to others. In one sense, facts 
about yourself are not important in themselves; the fact that through them 
you "translate" yourself to others in the group is important. You are not 
asked to reveal your past life or your darkest secrets. You are important, 
not your secrets. What you say about yourself should encourage others to 
"come in," that is, self-disclosure should constitute a kind of invitation 
to others to involve themselves with you. 
It is up to you to determine how you will talk about yourself and what 
you will say. This sounds very abstract right now, and it will be easier to 
determine in the give-and~take of the group interaction. There are various 
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"levels" of self-disclosure: the more personal something is the deeper it 
is. The general "level" of self-revalation is generally determined by the 
group itself and depends on a ~Jllllber of factors--for instance, the willingness 
of individuals to take risks and the level of trust in the group. The point 
is that the group members and not the contract determine the level at which 
they will work. You will undoubtedly reveal yourself at a level at which 
you feel comfortable, or perhaps a little beyond (that is, you will "risk" 
talking about yourself). A moderate degree of anxiety in the group is 
generally a sign that you are working at least a little beyond the "level of 
comfort," and such anxiety, if controlled, can be a help rather than a hind-
rance. Self-disclosure, if it is authentic, if it is really a "translation" 
of yourself, tends to create intimacy. If you have difficulty talking about 
yourself, if you become too anxious, it might well be that you fear rejection 
but it is also possible that you are afraid of the intimacy to which self-
revelation leads. 
Self-disclosure must be in keeping with the "here-and-now" rule. If you 
talk about your past, you should do so because it tells something about the 
kind of person you are here and now in this group. If you talk about how you 
are outside the group, this, too, should be made relevant to the "you" that 
is in the group. That is, self-disclosure should stimulate interaction with 
others. Never just talk on about yourself to a passive audience. In keeping 
with the "here-and-now" rule, one area of self-disclosure is most important: 
You should talk about what is happening to you in the group. For instance, 
if you are anxious, let others know that you are anxious: others want to 
deal with you as you are, but this is impossible if you hide yo:·~ feelings. 
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If you are bored, let others know immediately. It is deadly to wait an hour 
and then tell others that you have been bored. In a sense, you are responsibl 
for your own boredom if you do ~Qt speak up. 
Finally, although it was said above that you do not have to talk about 
your deepest secrets, you may speak as deeply about yourself as you wish. 
'!be point is that you will not be forced to do so. Sometimes if someone else 
speaks rather personally about himself, you will find it easier to talk about 
yourself (but you should remember that this works the other way around also). 
(b) The manner of expressing feeling. Above you were encouraged to let 
emotion be part of the group experience. Too often we either swallow our 
feelings (for instance, our anger) only to let them filter out in rather 
unproductive ways (we become cold or uncooperative, we make snide remarks or 
remain silent, etc.). There is another possibility however: speak frankly 
to one another about your emotion-laden contacts with one another. For 
instance, if you are angry, instead of just "blowing up" or "swallowing" 
your anger, let the other know that you are angry and would like to work it 
through: "John, I'm really angry with what you said, but I'd like to tell 
you why and get some response from you. If possible, I want to work this out 
with you here. 11 Perhaps such frankness coupled with a desire to work things 
/ through would constitute for you a "new way" of being present to another. I (c) Listening. It is amazing to discover how poorly we tend to listen 
to others. The contract asks you to examine your ability to listen. 
Listening does not mean just hearing words and sentences and understanding 
their meaning, rather it means "reaching out" for what another has to say, 




the cues that othars emit, including both verbal and nonverbal cues, is part 
of listening. Facial expressions, gestures, a shrug of the shoulders, 
bodily positions--all of these. __ jlre sources of communication. Often, too, 
when we communicate with one another, we embed "surplus-messages" in our 
overt connnunications by the way we say things. You are asked to become 
sensitive to the "surplus-message" aspects of communication also. 
(d) Support. It is difficult for people to "put themselves on the 
line," that is, to engage in meaningful self-disclosure and to express 
feelings responsibly. Wh.en you and the other members of the group do make 
sincere attempts to fulfill the contract, then you need support. It is 
assumed that you are basically supportive, that is, that you have some kind 
of bas·ic acceptance of others simply because they !.!!.; otherwise you would 
not want to engage in an experience the goal of which is interpersonal 
growth. Still, you can acc~pt others, and sincerely ao, without always 
approving of everything they do. It may be, for instance, that you may 
reveal things about yourself which you yourself do not approve. Obviously, 
then, though you would expect others to support you in your self-disclosure, 
you would hardly expect them to approve of the things that you disapprove of 
in yourself. 
Support has two phases. The antecedent phase consists in encouraging 
others to fulfill the contract. Fo~ instance, one of the best ways of 
encouraging others to fulfill the contract is to fulfill it yourself. lbe 
l ! leader-member will try· to do just this by "modeling" the behavior called 
I 
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vill express their feelings. Support then means giving some kind of recogni-
tion that the other has fulfilled the contract, that he has "done a good 
thing." Support means being res_p_onsive to the behavior of others. Again, 
engaging in contractual behavior is an excellent way of giving phase-two 
support. For instance, if one of the members engages in responsible self-
disclosure, you may give him a good deal of support by revealing something 
about yourself in the same area, something that responds to his concern. 
Although support is absolutely necessary for effective group operation, 
it is also perhaps one of the most difficult of the contractual provisions. 
When someone "invites you in" by being open about himself, you may feel 
gauche and find it difficult to respond to him. When someone speaks 
feelingly about himself, it is too easy to ignore his feelings (for this may 
be an uncomfortable aspect of his communication) and to try to deal with him 
on an intellectual level, for instance, by asking him a lot of questions. 
Because of our discomfort we try to intellectualize the whole process. How-
ever, if you are made uncomfortable by what another says, if you are unable 
to respond in what you think would be a meaningful way, do not pretend that 
you can. Counterfeit support, expressed in such cliches as "I understand," 
and "I know how you feel," deadens group process. Perhaps your best response 
is to admit that you are uncomfortable, that you are at a loss for a response. 
This can be supportive in itself, because it is honest. Do not try to show 
"conventional" sympathy to others merely because you think that you should 
say something. Support is the gift of one's person and not the fulfillment 
of a convention. Learning to be present to others in meaningful support is 





(e) Confronting others. Sometimes you will find it impossible to agree 
with what another person is saying or doing. If this is true, tell him so as 
honestly as you can, and tell hi.JD why. This is confrontation. Confrontation 
is basically an invitation to another to examine or reflect upon his behavior 
"in community," that is, in the context of the group. For instance, perhaps 
another person in the group is simply not fulfilling the provisions of the 
contract at all (if he is silent all the time, he could not be). If you 
tell him this and ask him to examine his behavior, then you are confronting 
him. The way you confront, however, is very important: the cardinal rule 
is that you should confront another because you are concerned about him and 
want to involve yourself with him. Confrontation is not just irresponsible 
"telling a person off." Responsible confrontation is an invitation to self-
examination, not an act of punishment. If you are merely punishing another, 
you might find some relief (for instance, from your anger), but you are doing 
little to set up interpersonal contact between yourself and the other. 
Undeniably confrontation will almost always have some kind of punitive side 
effects (none of us like to be challenged because of allegedly negative forms 
of behavior), but punishment cannot constitute the rationale of confrontation. 
Sometimes it is not easy to confront without making punishment the primary 
purpose of the act. Confrontation, then, is something you must experiment 
with in the group. 
{f) Responding to confrontation. If confrontation is responsible, 
that is, if it really is an invitation to self-examination, then obviously 
the best response .!!_self-examination. However, when we are confronted, even 
when it is done by someone who is concerned for us and wants to involve 
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himBelf with us, our instinctive response is often twofold: to defend 
ourselves and to attack the confronter. That is, we respond to the punitive 
side effects of confrontation i~~tead of to the confrontation itself. 
Therefore, try to listen to what the one confronting is saying and not just 
to the feelings he is evoking in you. If what he says is true and if, in 
addition, he wants to involve himself with you, then it is to your advantage 
to listen, to examine yourself, and to respond to him. This is difficult, 
but frequently rewarding. 
Self-disclosure, expression of feeling, listening, support, confrontation 
and response to confrontati.on--these, then, are the forms of interpersonal 
behavior with which you are asked to experiment. The ability to engage 
freely and responsibly in such behaviors is interpersonal growth. 
7. ! Stance against Flight. Engaging in the kinds of interactions described 
above is not easy, and therefore we find ways of running away from group 
process. We tend to run away because we get anxious, because we prefer 
not to know the truth about ourselves, because it is painful, perhaps, to be 
the object of another's concern. You are asked, then, to take a stance 
against all the different forms of flight from inimate group interaction: 
e.g. calling upon humor whenever things get "too" serious, keeping one's 
feelings to oneself, spending a good deal of time on intellectualized 
interpretations of the behavior of others. You must become sensitive to the 
ways you flee group process and to the different ways in which the group as 
a whole tends to flee (e.g. by "tacitly" deciding not to talk about certain 
subjects). Confronting modes of flight in yourself and in the group is 
essential to the li,ee of the group. One JDOde of flight is extremely 
85 
~estructive: cyniciSIO about the experience even before one enters into it. 
nie person who comes to the group believing that he will get nothing from it 
.,,.111 leave having fulfilled his o~ prophecy. Try not to flee from your 
11nxiety by employing all sorts of defenses. Rather handle your anxiety by 
dealing with it in the group. It is obvious by now that the contract demands 
t!iat you be active in the group. Silence and withdrawal are types of flight. 
f'erhaps in other groups the non-active member profits even though he adds 
little more than his presence. Th.is cannot be the case in the contract-group. 
8. Freedom. This contract is not meant to put you in constraints; it is 
meant to help you channel your freedom. It says, for instance, that self-
disclosure is a value in this group, but it does not say what you must talk 
about nor does it dictate the level of disclosure. Th.is is something that 
you must work out yourself in the give-and-take of group interaction. You 
must choose the kinds of interaction that are most meaningful to you. Some 
of the experiments you engage in in the group will be successes and some 
failures, but this is a reflection of life itself. Try not to expect too 
much from the group nor too little. The only way you can really learn about 
the possibilities of the group experience is by giving yourself to it. 
The contract, then, is a certain attempt to use cognitive input at the 
beginning of the group experience in order, hopefully, to promise inter-
personal-affective learning. If the cognitive input, to a greater or lesser 
extent becomes a reality of interpersonal function, then the group experience 
has been'successful." 
The elements in the above contract are the elements found in any 
-. ~ 
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sensitivity-training group the goal of which is interpersonal growth. The 
contract provides a certain degree of what Boy and Pine (1963) call 
"structured permissiveness"; th~_contract is both a stimulus and a safeguard: 
it moves the participants toward intensive interaction, but it lays down 
certain ground rules to insure that this interaction will be growthful. It 
facilitates the formation of a "cultural island" in which the participants 
are given a good deal of "cultural permission" to investigate the possibilitie 
of intimacy with one another; risk-taking is not eliminated but it is 
controlled. 
The term "contract group" will be used frequently in the pages that 
follow. However, when it is said that something happens or should happen in 
the contract group, this means that this "something" is part of the contract-
ual experience and ~ that it does not or could not happen in other kinds 
of sensitivity~training experiences. For instance, it is stated explicitly 
in the contract that constructive confrontation is an expressed value in the 
contract group, it mus: be remembered that confrontation constitutes an 
essential element in any kind of laboratory experience in which personal and 
interpersonal growth are overriding concerns. 
The Focused Contract 
Contracts can be comprehensive--they may cover all the major facets of 
the group experience--or they can be "focused"--they may refer specific 
facets of the training experience. The "focused" contract, for instance, can 
be introduced as an exercise in the group. It may be that the participants 
have made a "tacit decisi.on" not to talk about sex, even though it is an 






~::uddying" the interaction. The trainer under the circumstances might 
introduce a focused contract which will enable the participants to deal with 
the issue under relatively low-risk conditions. A sample contract might 
read something like this: 
1. The general topic of the next meeting will be sex. 
2. The purpose of the meeting is not to have individual participants 
disclose their sex lives but to examine the reasons why this 
group has completely avoided the topic of sex. 
3. What are some of the fears you personally would have in discussing 
sexual issues here? 
4. What are some of the advantages that would accrue to you 
personally from a more open discussion of sexual issues? 
5. If you do talk about yourself, feel free to "bracket" any areas 
you find too uncomfortable to discuss. 
Such a focused contract gives the participants a certain degree of cultural 
permission to deal with sexual issues. It stimulates but does not force. It 
l is admittedly contrived, but so is the entire laboratory experience. Its 
I advantage lies in the fact that it uses structure to rescind a possibly non-
growthful "tacit decision"; it gives the group the freedom to face an issue 
or to decide openly to "bracket" an area in future discussions. The variety 
of such focused contracts is limited only by the imaginative resources of 
the group. 
~ Impsed Versus .!h,!. Freely Chosen Contract 
It has been suggested above that the contract be given to prospective 
participants before the training experience begins so that they may decide 
whether or not they want to participate in such a laboratory. If this is 
the case, then the contract can be pursued with a good deal of vehemence 
(see Bach, 1966), but even then it should be remembered that the contract 












pursuit of a contract should exclude mechanical rigidity and inflexibility. 
However, the more usual case is that the participants enter a laboratory 
experience with only general ideaa about the nature of the experience. The 
question is: Can a contract be imposed on such participants? The answer, I 
believe, is yes. The participants come expecting some kind of experiment 
in interpersonal intimacy. The contract merely gives form to the experience. 
It does not exist in order to manipulate the participants in some kind of 
inhuman way; it is there to channel their energies. I have "imposed" both 
general and focused contracts on groups with good effect. On occasion there 
has been too much talk about the contract and its provisions during the 
interaction, but this relatively mild form of flight is easily handled. It 
would be another question were a leader to impose a sensitivity-training 
contract on a discussion group. Since the participants had not opted for 
such an experience even in a general way, to impose such a contract would be 
to impose on their freedom. Finally, if imposition-of-contract rather than 
entry-by-contract characterizes a laboratory-training group, the interaction 
will tend to be somewhat less intense. 
Cautions l:!l Contractual Approaches 
~ myths ~ ~. ideal contract. The contract delineated in this 
chapter, while it does not include many of the factors that are relevant to 
all interpersonal~growth-oriented laboratory experiences, is not necessarily 
an ideal that should be imitated. As noted above, contracts should be 
fitted to the needs and the goals of the participants: it is not a goal in 
itself. Furthermore, while the contract may both stimulate and channel 
the energies of the group, it has no J1111gic in itself nor is it a substitute 
l 
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(or work. Dozens of different contracts, both comprehensive and focused, 
could be elaborated, but they are valuable only if they serve the needs of 
the group. If they do not, they ~hould be discarded. However, they should 
not be discarded before they are given a fair trial, for this would merely 
condone the flight tendencies of the group. 
The myth of the ideal participant. The contract is an ideal in at least 
two senses. First of all, it is an abstraction that becomes concrete only in 
the lives of tha participants. However, if it is to be meaningful, it must 
be adapted to the needs of the individual participant. Since individual 
participants differ greatly from one another, the contract is not to be 
rigidly applied to all participants in a univocal way. The contract (for 
instance, the contract outlined in this chapter) calls for experimentation 
with certain kinds of behavior (self-disclosure, confrontation, etc.), but 
the individual hinlself in the context of the give~d-take of the group 
interaction must determine what behaviors are most meaningful to him and 
the degree to which he thinks that he should engage in them. He may be 
asked to experiment with. selt~disclosure, but he is not asked to engage in 
as much self~disclosure as participant A nor aa little as participant B, nor 
does he have to discuss the same areas that participant C does. In order to 
become more deeply himself, the participant has to make choices, but his 
. 
choices should be based on his own interpersonal-growth needs rather than 
arbitrary "ideals," whether these ideals are set forth in a contract or 
elaborated by the group itself. While the individual participant should 
become as aware as possible of his own resistance to growth and come to 
realize that this resistance can manifest itself in his inventing reasons 
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why he should not engage in contractual behavior, still he should retain his 
autonomy throughout the group experience and not allow it merely to carry 
him along. The hypothesis is that if he both fails to take risks and fails 
to make choices, the group experience will not benefit him. 
The contract is an ideal in a second sense. The contractual behaviors 
outlined in the contract above and explained in the following chapters are 
not easy to engag~ in, and success is not measured by the participants 
ability to engage in every one of them perfectly. The contract is primarily 
a stimulus and a guide for behavior, not some absolute measure of growth 
or a device by which one participant may be compared with another. The 
j contract is an ideal in the sense that it sets goals, but it does not (and I cannot) delineate idiosyncratic pursuit and poasesaion of such goals. 
Growth is direction: in some sense of the term it means "moving forward," 
but it also encompasses such notions as "regressions," "plateaus," and 
"limits." The contract-group participant is expected to ''move forward" with 
the contract as a stimulus and a guide, but since different participants 
have different interpersonal potentialities and since there are a variety 
of starting points, "success" in contract-fulfillment must be defined 
idiosyncratically. As Bunker (1965) puts it, there is "no standard learning 
outcome and no stereotyped ideal toward which conformity is induced" (p. 42). 
Boyd and Elli.as (1962), too, argue that no particular pattern can be regarded 
as typical training outcome. The entire laboratory experience, including 
the contract, is at the service of the individual. 
Fulfilling ~ contract. There is, then, no "perfect" way of fulfilling 
the contract. One person's approach might be global, that is, he gets some 
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t idea of the spirit underlying the provisions of the contract and tries to 
' experiment in some global way with contractual behaviors that seem meaningful 
to him. Another person's approach might-be more studied, that is, he might 
carefully consider each contractual provision and try to see what each means 
for his interpersonal behavior. Neither of these extremes or anything in 
between is the way of implementing the contract. It is certainly assumed 
that every participant will "violate" the contract in one way or another from 
time to time, but he can learn as much about himself through recognized 
violations as through strict observance. 
The contract as contrived. Some might say that contracts are too 
rational, that life runs on as a mixture of the rational and the irrational, 
and that people cannot be expected to do violence to their life style in order 
to follow the provisions of a contract. A training laboratory is a place 
where people come in order to examine their life styles. If a person's life 
is governed too closely by reason, the contract gives him an opportunity to 
experiment with the affective dimensions of life; if a person's emotional 
life is too labile, the contract gives him an opportunity to experiment with 
j growthful controls. The question is not whether the laboratory is contrived 
I or not but whether it has a growthful impact on the participant's real life I or not. The laboratory is not real life nor is it a substitute for it, but 
f it can enrich it. 
I 
~ Contract and Research Possibilities 
Research with training laboratories, especially laboratories in inter-
Personal relations, is minimal. The purpose of this short section is not 
to indicate what research should be done (Campbell and Dunnette [1968, 
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?P· 99~101] do point out major areas of needed research) but to suggest what 
contributions contract approaches might make to research in this area. They 
1eem to be principally two: con,;ro 1 and provocation. 
Control. Golembiewski (1962) divides small groups into three "designa-
tions" for the purpose of research. "Designation I" means that the group: 
1. Consists of a small number of individuals in more or less 
interdependent status and role relations who 
2. Have an indigenous set of values or norms which regulate 
the behavior of members at least in matters of concern to 
the group (p. 35). 
He quotes Bales (1950) in defining "Designation II": "any number of persons 
engaged in a single face-to-face meeting or series of meetings in which each 
member receives some impression of the others as a distinct person even 
though it was only to recall that the other was present" (Bales, 1950, p. 33). 
"Designation III" refers to groups in a simple aggregative sense: "Thus one 
study dealt with a 'relatively stable group of college students.' 'Stable' 
was defined as lack of newcomers or dropouts. The group was a formal one of 
forty-two girls taking the same course of study" (Golembiewski, 1962, p. 36) • 
Golembiewski complains that it is difficult to determine whether the exper-
!mental collectivities in any "laboratory" situation are really small groups 
in the sense of "Designation I." And yet, he says, this question becomes 
crucial in the analysis pf experimental results with such groups. The 
contract-group offers a possible answer to the problem of membership 
(psychological rather than just formal). It is certainly a group in the 
sense of "Designation I." Research with contract-groups seems to be quite 
feasible, for the contract not only gives greater assurance of the kind of 
ns i also eliminntes a number 
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~t uncontrolled variables (e.g., it reduces the number of goals in the minds 
J! group members) and provides a definite set of variables amenable to 
•tatistical analysis. 
---
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) recommend as a research model for psychotherapy 
the general linear equation. The outcome desired is constructive personality 
c!iange (CPC). The variables which lead to this outcome and which are to 
be placed in the linear equation are therapist variables (e.g. non-possessive 
~annth), patient variables (e.g. self-exploration), situational or contextual 
\'ariables (e.g. vicarious therapy pre-training), and interaction or process 
variables (e.g. the therapist's approach to hostile responses on the part of 
the client). The same linear model is applicable to laboratory-training 
situations also. The contract controls the variables which go into the 
training situation: leader variables, participant variables, situational 
variables, and interaction variables. Since the researcher can also 
determine whether the contract had been fulfilled or not, he can more easily 
relate training variables to outcomes. 
Provocation. Weick (1968} defines the observational method in research 
as "the selection, provocation, recording, and encoding of that set of 
behaviors and settings concerning organisms 'in situ' which is consistent 
~ith empirical aims" (p. 360). With respect to provocation he says: 
For the moment it is sufficient to note that settings and behaviors 
are robust and that interventions do not necessarily affect the 
ways in whi.ch they unfold. As was pointed out, it is· 'provocation' 
.which tends, more than any other term, to blur the distinction 
between experimental and naturalistic methodology. We contend that 
such blurring is beneficial (p. 361). 




-c.1reful choice. and/or lDOdification of a situation can enable observers to 
c·:oke behaviors that are of interest" (p •. 377}. The contract, then, is used 
t.J provoke or stimulate behaviors "of interest." It is assumed here that 
training situations are "robust," that is, that the addition of the contract 
\ 
• does not radically alter the nature of the training group. The laboratory 
~ 
s itself is contrived and it would seem that the contrived nature of the contrac 
i 
is not antithetical to the nature or purposes of the laboratory. ! Scoring systems. There are many different ways in which interactions 





They go from the relatively simple to that of Katz (1964) which has 56 
categories. In the contract-group the contract itself provides the scoring 
categories. For instance, I have used a rather simple scoring system in some 
informal research. The scoring unit used was the "remark" (Snoek, 1962): 
a series of phrases or sentences, uttered wi.thout interruption, about p. 
single topic. "Remarks" were scored (+) if they were contractual, (-) if they 
were non-contractual, and 0t) if they were questions or remarks which 
merely sustained the interaction without adding to it in a contractual way. 
lbe (+}'sand the (:-l's were also rated on a three-point scale to give some 
indication of how "good" or how "poor" the "remark" was. Participant profiles 
~egan to emerge. For instance, one young man's profile consisted almost 
entirely of ()c)'s, that is, he had become a kind of leader in his own right, 
but not a leader-member, for he contributed little in the way of contractual 
behavior. "Remarks" can also be broken down into other categories. For 
instance, (+)'scan be scored according to the kind of contractual behavior 
l engaged in (self~disclosure, responsible confrontation, self-exploration as a 
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response to confrontation, etc.). In the same way, (-)'scan be scored in 
such a way as to indicate the kind of flight involved (defensiveness, 
counterattack, actuarial self-disclosure, punitive confrontation, etc.). Such 
.. ;-
scoring leads to more elaborate and more useful profiles. 
Concluding Remarks 
How detailed a contract? How detailed a contract should be given to 
participants in a contract training laboratory? Only research can answer such 
a question. One hypothesis would be that the relationship between the 
definition (detailed nature) of the contract and group productivity is 
curvilinear: contracts both too high and too low in definition will result 
in low productivity, while a contract of moderate definition indicating clear 
goals and flexible means will result in high productivity. In high-definition 
conditions the participants become too embroiled in the technicalities.of the 
contract itself; in low~definition conditions ambiguity is high and many 
energies remain unchanneled. 
Maintenance versus effective synergy. Cattell (1951) calls the sum 
total of the energy which any group can command and expend "synergy." 
"Maintenance synergy" is the energy used up in the machinery which keeps the 
group in existence and "effective synergy" is the residual energy available 
to carry out the purposes for which the group explicitly exists. One of 
the primary functions of the contract is to cut down on maintenance synergy 
and maximize effective synergy. If the group has pre-established goals, then 
the contract can do just that. For groups whose primary goal is to create 
their goals it is another question • 
.!h!:_ chapters which follow. The rest of the book is a study in some 
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~cpth of the provi.si.ons of the contract outlined in this. chapter. Since the 
~ontract variables suggested here are· those associated with any sensitivity-
training experience designed to ~-~imulate interpersonal growth, the following 













! :it roduc tion 
.-- . 
Campbell and Dunnette (1968) in a review article summarize some of the 
~oals of laboratory training: 
1. Increased self-insight or self-awareness concerning one's own 
behavior and its meaning in a social context •••• 
2. Increased sensitivity to the behavior of others •••• It refers 
first, to the development of an increased awareness of the full 
range of communicative stimuli emitted by other persons ••• and second, 
to the development of the ability to infer accurately the emotional 
or noncognitive bases for interpersonal communications •••• 
3. Increased awareness and understanding of the types of processes 
that facilitate or inhibit group functioning and the interactions 
between different groups--specifically, why do some members 
participate actively while others retire to the background? Why 
do sub-groups form and wage war against each other? ••• 
4. Heightened diagnostic skill in social, interpersonal, and 
intergroup situations ••• 
5. Increased action skill •••• [I]t ••• refers to a person's ability 
to intervene successfully so as to increase member satisfactions, 
effectiveness, or output. The goal of increased action skill is~ 
toward intervention at the interpersonal rather than simply the 
technological level. 
6. Learning how to learn. This does not refer to an individual's 
cognitive approach to the world, but rather his ability to analyze 
continually his own interpersonal behavior for the purpose of 
helping himself and others achieve more effective and satisfying 
interpersonal relationships. 
Differential emphasis among the above objectives constitutes one of 
the most important dimensions for distiriguishing among variations 
in T groups (p. 75). 
The overall emphasis depends principally on the unit of society which is the 
focus of the laboratory. Laboratories may focus on individuals, groups, or 
organizations or on any combination of the three. A key question in any 
laborato~y is whether the participants at the beginning of the laboratory 
have a clear idea of the purpose of the laboratory or not. 
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pevelopmental sequence·!!!_ training groups. Another way of getting a 
feeling for the general goals of training groups is to see what actually takes 
place over time in such groups. __ Tuckman (1965), in reviewing developmental 
sequence in small groups in general, distinguishes between the interpersonal 
stages of group development and task behaviors manifested in the group. He 
calls the pattern of interpersonal relationships the "group structure," 
while the content of interaction as related to the task at hand is called the 
"task activity." This distinction is somewhat difficult to maintain in therap 
and training groups, however, since the task is a personal and interpersonal 
one: "the group exists to help the individuals deal with themselves and 
others" (p. 385). The proposed developmental sequence in training groups 
is as follows: 
Stage .!_. Group structure: testing and dependence. In this initial 
stage there is a good deal of testing and dependency behavior, the latter 
~e!=.g predominant. Participants express, in one way or another, strong 
:ependency needs toward the trainer. There is a tendency toward quick 
acceptance of structure and arbitrary norms • 
. stage .!.· Task activity: orientation. There is a good deal of talk 
a!x>ut what is to be accomplished (goals) and how (means). 
Stage .?_. Group structure: intragroup conflict. Polarization takes 
place in the group. For instance, those who favor a more active, less 
defensive approach vie with those who remain defensive and try to find safety 
in structure. Anxiety, threat, and resistance characterize this stage. 
There are also struggles for leadership. 

















,·xpress themselves freely and engage :in experimental aggressiveness and 
:iostility. The task is to remove blocks to learning about themselves, to 
reduce anxiety, and to express re.~l reactions to one another. 
Stage 1.· Group structure: development of group cohesion. "All the 
relevant T-group development studies see the stage of conflict and polariza-
tion as being followed by a stage characterized by the reduction of conflict 
resolution of the polarized issues, and establishment of group harmony in 
the place of disruption. It is a 'patching-up' phase in which group norms 
and values emerge" (Tuckman, p. 392) • 
Stage l· Task activity: discussing oneself and others. ''While the 
social function of the third stage is to cause a unique and cohesive group 
structure to emerge, the task function is to attempt to use this new 
structure as a vehicle for discovering personal relations and emotions by 
conununicating heretofore private feelings" (p. 392). 
Stage !±_. Group structure: functional role-relatedness. The members 
coalesce into a work organization which has strong but flexible norms; 
members provide one another support and mutual acceptance. 
Stage!±_. ·Task activity: insight. The participants discover things 
about themsleves and provide one another with growthful feedback. 
If, then, the development sequence of a training group gives any 
indication of the sequence of desirable goals, the following goal-pattern 
emerges: (l} The expression of dependency needs and the need for structure; 
(2) discussion of goals and means; (3) experimentation with aggressiveness 
and hostility; (4) declaring where one stands with respect to proposed goals; 
(5) attempts to reduce defensiveness and anxiety; (6) reduction of conflict. 
100 




~intain an organization of support and mutual acceptance; (9) deepening of 
communication, intimacy, responsible feedback • 
.. ~-
~mbiguity Versus Clarity of Goals in Laboratory Training 
I Confusion in face-to-face groups. In most small, face-to-face groups--
whatever tneir nature: laboratories in group dynamics, T-Groups, psycho-
therapy groups--the members undergo a good deal of at least initial confusion, 
anxiety, and discomfort because they have no clear knowledge of group goals. 
Obviously their knowledge of the means to achieve nebulous goals is even 
less distinct. For instance, the patient in a group psychotherapy setting 
realizes that he is in the group "to get better," and he either has a vague 
idea himself or he is told that "getting better" is contingent upon his 
talking about his problems in the group. But the patient often wonders why 
he is being "cured" in a group. Many patients see the group--and often this 
is a true perception of what is actually happening--as a place wh~e a number 
of individual therapy sessions are conducted at the same time. 
The novice T-Group member is traditionally "at sea" during the early 
sessions of the group. He may be told of the general "contract" that exists 
between trainer and group, but both the contract and the goals are implied 
in it, if remembered at all, remain vague. Benne (1964), for example, tells 
his groups that he is a resource person who is there to help them learn 
about groups and membership in groups. He indi.cates that there are two 
sources of data for learning about groups: (1) the knowledge that members 
already have about groups because of membership in other groups, and (2) the 














that emerge. in the T-Group itself, as the members interact with one another. 
Hennis (1964} spells out the goals of a human relations laboratory: 
There are two major goals of .. .the T-Group which can be 
indivisible in operation: (1) that group members become more 
aware of the enabling and disabling factors in decision-making 
in groups and of their own behavior and feelings in groups; 
(2) that group members utilize the group as a crucible for 
increasing their own repertoire of skills in managing group 
processes and their own behavior in groups (p. 272). 
But, despite these adumbrations of some kind of operational goals, early-
session confusion is almost universal: 
If we were to interview members of a T-Group during its 
early sessions concerning the then current goal of the group, 
we would find two modal perceptions. One is the perception 
of goallessness--•••• The other is that the group goal is what 
"I" (that is, the group leader) and a few other members have 
stated it should be and that most of the other members are 
aimlessly (or willfully) wandering from this goal (Benne, 1964, 
p. 217). 
Such ambiguity, goallessness, and division are beneficial in laboratories in 
which the participants are to leam "group fomative processes" (Benne, 1964) 
by immersing themselves in group process. Bennis (1964) sees this initial 
groping for goals, not primarily as a search for a viable goal-structure, 
but rather as dependency plea: "The group's pretense of a fruitless search 
for goals is a plea for hiJU (the leader) to tell the group what to do" 
(p. 254). The leader is presumed to know what the goals are or ought to be. 
But, according to Bennis, initial dependency gives way to something more 
solid: "Without any particular structure or clear-cut goals to begin with, 
the group must develop its own muscles and structure; and this demands 
sophistication about the group formative processes, as well as sensitivity 









must start goalless because one of the principal goals or functions of the 
-
group is to create its own goals. The interactions involved in this creative 
process contribute also to the __ _l!ersonal and interpersonal growth of the 
participants. Gibb (1964) distinguishes between "natural" groups and 
!-Groups precisely in terms of goals; T-Groups are forced by the very nature 
of the "social contract" to both create and scrutinize goals. 
In groups in which the participants must create their own goals there 
is bound to be a good deal of frustration and division. French (1941) 
showed that the attractiveness of a group is lessened when the members 
disagree over the way to solve a group problem (e.g., the establishment of 
goals). He notes that withdrawal is most likely to occur when the members 
are disagreeing over the method they should use in solving the problem. 
Indeed, in a residential laboratory there is usually a good deal of talk 
about "getting out of here" because of the disorder, confusion, and hostility 
that characterize the goal-setting phase of the laboratory. However, since 
it is a laboratory and since goal-setting is part of the experiment, few if 
any participants actually do leave (many more would probably leave if this 
were a "real life" situation). Undoubtedly there is must to be learned from 
such a process. The group both feels and later reflects on the frustrations 
and divisions that go into a group decision'""11laking process. The individual, 
because of the behavior he emits and the feedback he gets, learns a great 
deal about himself on an interpersonal level. There are undoubtedly other 
advantages to engaging in such goal-creating activity. For instance, Lorge 
and his associates (19581 note increased productivity on the part of groups 
which have had a hand in setting goals for themselves. 
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In the typical T-Group, the members come with such a variety of personal 
goals that the trainer must be oriented toward a "meta-goal," namely, 
"establishing the group conditi~t\..P which are necessary for maximally meeting 
the needs of the various members who enter with discrepant individual goals" 
(Horwitz, 1964, pp. 365-366). Therefore, in the early sessions at least, 
even though group leaders or trainers have a more panoramic view of the group 
process and where it is going, the members remain confused. But, again, this 
is understandable if one of the principal reasons for their being there is 
the "creation" of their own goals. One problem is that group members sense 
that the leader has some idea of what goals will be formulated and of the 
developmental sequence that will take place. A plausible hypothesis would 
be that such differential knowledge the so-called authority- or leader-
problem on the part of the members. 
In academic laboratories in which students get together with a leader-
" 
teacher to study the formation and processes of small groups, the goals 
again are purposefully vague. The members are "supposed" to experience 
periods of ennui and drifting, to have "hang-ups" with the leader and to rise 
up against him in revolt, to experience group inertia with respect to the 
formulation and execution of goals--for this is one of the most effective 
ways to study the "nature" of small groups (Slater, 1966). 
Not all of the confusion concerning goals, however, stems from the 
practical necessity of creating goals for the group. Much of the "goal-
disturbance" (intolerance of "goal-ambiguity") is both a manifestation of and 
a defense against anxiety. The implication of goal-confusion is: "If I knew 
the goals of this group, if the leader would not insist on hiding them, then 
h II I would pursue t em. 
104 
Actually such statements as "I don't know what the 
goals are" can often be translated: "I am afraid," "I don't want to move too 
fast," "I want in, but I am not sure_ that I can pay the price," or "I have 
decided not to invest myself yet; it is too early for me." 
Goallessness as a value. The danger is to assume that the "purposeful 
goallessness" that characterizes so many different kinds of groups--whether 
by design or by accident--is a value in itself, a value that must characterize 
all kinds of laboratory-training groups, a value so central that other group 
values must be subordinated to it. It is undeniable that group participants 
learn much about group dynamics as they participate in the of ten agonizing 
process of "working out" a· viable contract for the group. Too often, however, 
grinding out the contract becomes a goal in itself, an absolute value, 
because it engenders a kind and degree of learning about group process 
impossible to duplicate in a didactic classroom situation. The formulation 
of the contract becomes the absolute value, or rather learning about group 
process is the absolute value and this is achieved by working out a contract. 
This absolute value is surrounded by satellite values such as the members' 
"working through" their feelings about one another and becoming more aware 
of their own interpersonal strengths and limitations. If it is undeniable, 
however, that there are groups in which the creation of goals and/or the 
formulation of an operational contract are the prime values, it is also true 
that such groups often end with just that, a formulated contract which cannot 
be implemented because time has run out. In such groups frustration often 
runs high, no matter how much has been learned about "group formative 
processes." 
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~in the contract group. Although "goallessness" and "planned 
.i::higuity" characterize most of the sensitivity-training paradigms to be 
found in the literature and in the one followed by Tuckman (1965) in 
elaborating his developmental-sequence model for training groups, this need 
not be the case. In fact, there has been an almost unwarranted acceptance 
of goallessness as a value, for there is no empirical evidence demonstrating 
the superiority of goallessness in all training groups. While the value of 
goallessness and planned ambiguity in many training situations is not 
denied, it is suggested here that clear-cut goals and "high visibility" 
:.ay also be values in certain training situations. Ambiguity and goallessness 
are of special value in situations in which learning about group formative 
processes is a primary goal. This is not the case in the contract group. 
TI1e primary goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth. The contract, 
then, provides structures which enable the participants to make intimate 
contact with one another as quickly as possible. The contract delineates 
specific goals in order to make the group more operational from the beginning. 
Goallessness, ambiguity concerning goals, differential knowledge concerning 
goals in leader (panoramic vision of developmental sequence) and in group 
members (goal confusion}, creation of principal goals, contract-talk, 
formulation of contract, goal-disturbance, and similar factors are not values 
in the contract group. While the benefits of "working through" goal conflicts 
may be lost, other benefits take their place--for instance, there is more 
time for intimate interpersonal contact. Contact fulfillment takes the 
Place of contract formulation. This does not mean that such factors as goal 




! "natural" even while it is contractual. These variables, however, are 
::!nimized. When a member, despite the contract, is uncertain about group 
,;Jals, this is "diagnostic" and must be worked through in the group. This 
~-;-
ls a far cry, however, from "developmental" goallessness and ambiguity. 
finally, even though interpersonal growth is the overriding goal of the 
' I contract groups described in these pages, this is not to say that little is 
I 
I j learned about group process in such groups. Indeed, much is learned about 
l I group process, even though such leaming is secondary. 
J y_arieties of Goals in Group Process 
Research has shown that goals become "operational" to the degree that 
they are clear and to the degree that the steps or means leading to goal-
achievement are made clear (March & Simon, 1958; Raven & Rietsema, 1957). 
In one kind of laboratory experience, then, one of the first objectives• is 
to establish and clarify goals and goal-facilitating structures. The members 
of a contract group, however, should have a clear understanding of goals 
from the start so that energy can be channeled into pursuing instead of 
clarifying goals. 
An example. Let us say that a group member makes the following 
statement: ''You know, at home my wife and I don't really talk to each other 
very much any more, thatis, there is little or no serious talk. And lately 
I have been finding excuses to stay late at work so that when I come home 
the kids are already in bed. I am withdrawing from them. It seems that I 
have a need not to be with people, at least in any very close way. And I 
know that it has been affecting my participation here. I speak only when 
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right here in the group, as if I were not a part of the whole operation." 
This example illustrates different kinds of goals found in the contract 
group: 
(1) Contract goals. This is a generic term and refers to all of the 
provisions of the contract. In the kind of contract group under discussion 
interpersonal growth is the superordinate or overriding goal. This is the 
key contract goal and hypothetically all other contract goals are subordinate 
to and subserve this goal. For instance, in the example cited above, the 
participant is engaging in self-disclosure. Self-disclosure is a contract 
goal, for it is seen as one of the ways of establishing the kind of intimacy 
that is at the heart of interpersonal growth. By engaging in responsible 
self-disclosure (a ''means"), the participant is by that very fact pursuing 
the superordinate goal of interpersonal growth. He reveals the kind of 
person he is both within and outside the group and through this revelation 
makes contact with his fellow participants. All the provisions of the 
contract are contract goals. 
(2) Interaction goals. The contract specifies certain kinds of 
interaction, specifically, self-disclosure, expression of feeling, support, 
responsible confrontation, and self-exploration as a response to responsible 
confrontation. In the example above, self-disclosure is the predominant 
interaction. The contract also "forbids" certain kinds of interaction, for 
instance, long-winded, intellectualized interpretations of the behavior of 
others and defensive, self-excusing behavior. In the example above, the 
Participant reveals an area of deficit factually without trying to rationalize 













4 negative sense, also an interaction goal. Interaction goals are the heart 
.if the contract experience. 
(3) Process goals. Since it is a qu~stion of group process, one set of 
goals indicates the kinds of activities that are necessary in order to 
establish effective group process. These goals are essential to any group 
desiring to handle its business as a group rather than as a collection of 
lndividuals in a social setting. One of the process goals illustrated in the 
example above is dealing with the "here-and-now." Whatever a group member 
talks about must be made relevant to these people (his fellow group members) 
in this situation (the give-and-take of group interaction). The participant 
quoted above does just that: while he talks about an interpersonal problem 
that he has at home, he realizes that this problem in some way defines an 
aspect of his personality make-up and influences the quality of his partici-
pation in the group experience. He deals with the here-and-now relevance of 
a there-and-then problem. In doing so, he makes contact with or "engages" 
the group. Process goals are species of contract goals. Their purpose is 
to make the group run more efficiently and with greater inunediacy. 
(4) Content goals. Content refers to the specific subjects or topics 
discussed by group members. A contract may or may not specify the topics to 
be discussed by group members (although the contract described in these 
pages does not). If the contract does specify areas of discussion, then con-
tent goals become contract goals. This may be the case with "focused" 
contracts that take place within the laboratory experience. For instance, 
the leader may suggest an exercise which involves discussing a specific 
topic (for example, one's relationship to authority). In the example above, 
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.: participant talks about his tendency to withdraw from people. However, 
~. not the contract, specifies the area of self-revelation. While authentic 
,elf-disclosure is specified by the contract, _talking about alienation is not. 
;lie participant himself chooses the subject matter of his act of self-
disclosure. 
(5) Need goals. Each participant enters the group with a variety of 
pi:rsonal needs and. a tendency to use the group in order to achieve these 
needs. Horwitz (1964) indicates possible conflicts between personal needs 
and group goals: 
Although certainly there are unstructured features of a T Group, 
the T Group does generate a group goal which, however, will 
ordinarily differ from the individual goals with which trainees 
enter the group. Frustration arises from the goal's being difficult 
to define and exceedingly difficult to attain. 
The trainee may be oriented toward reaching a more or less specific 
goal--X', e.g., to deal more effectively with persons in authority. 
A second trainee may be oriented toward reaching a specific goal--
X' ',e.g., to work better with subordinates. By contract, the 
trainer is oriented toward what might be called the meta-goal--X, 
namely, establishing the group conditions which are necessary for 
maximally meeting the needs of the various members who enter the 
group with discrepant individual goals. This goal is enforced upon 
members by the particular characteristics of T-Group interaction. 
The underlying task of the T Group is to develop a social system 
which enables maximal satisfaction for each of its members (pp. 365-
366). 
In the contract group, too, need goals must be integrated with contract goals. 
Certain needs may be antithetical to the goals of the group, e.g., the need 
to Withdraw, the need to dominate others, the need to monopolize conversation, 
While other needs, e.g. the need for affiliation, may be more readily inte-
grated with contract goals. In a sense, it is not whether individual need 















above, the participant is acting counter to his need to withdraw; if he finds 
affiliation safe, growthful, and rewarding, this may reduce or eliminate his 
need to flee. At any rate, his first attempt to deal with this need is to 
reveal it, to get it "into community" where it can be dealt with more 
effectively. 
If the group is to run smoothly, there must be some kind of goal-harmony. 
Since goal-harmony and goal-clarity are considered so important in the 
contract group, each kind of goal will now be taken up separately. 
Contract Goals 
Contract goals include not only the overriding goal of the group, inter-
personal growth, but also those interaction, process, and sometimes content 
goals that are seen as means of achieving interpersonal growth. Interaction, 
process, and content goals will be dealt with separately. In this section 
the emphasis is on the superordinate goal of the contract group--interpersonal 
growth. 
Interpersonal growth.!!_ the overrriding ~superordinate goal. "Inter-
personal growth" as a superordinate goal is too general and must be defined 
operationally. Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of 
both process and interaction goals. More concretely, one who engages in 
authentic self-disclosure, responsible expression of feeling, concerned 
confrontation, non-defensive self-exploration, and realistic support (all of 
these are described in the chapters that follow) and does so by effectively 
contributing to and utilizing group resources (process goals) ~, by hypothe-
sis, growing interpersonally. Operationally, these activities constitute 
interpersonal growth. 
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Growth in interpersonal effectiveness is considered to take place 
through practice in establishing a responsible and viable dialogue of word 
and feeling among the members of the group. The participant is expected to 
learn and put into practice new ways of being-present-to-the-other and new 
ways of allowing the other to be present to himself. If a participant is 
"shy," and this keeps him from interacting with others, he is considered to 
be irresponsibly out-of-conununity. He must try new ways of getting into 
community; he must risk embarrassment, discomfort, and anxiety in involving 
himself with the 0th.er participants. If, on the other hand, a participant 
is a "manipulator," then he is considered to be irresponsibly in-connnunity. 
He, too, has to learn new ways of being present to the other members of the 
group. The "interactional" provisions of the contract--that is, interactions 
such as self-disclosure, confronting others responsibly, accepting confron-
tation, giving effective support, etc., all of which are called for by the 
contract--present general guidelines for formulating "new ways" of being 
present to others. !f a participant usually never talks about himself, if 
he never lets others know what he is like "inside" in any way, the kind of 
person he is--then self-disclosure will be a "new way" of being present to 
others. 
Interpersonal rather than personal growth. While it would be fruitless 
to introduce here a meaningless dic~otomy between personal and interpersonal 
growth, still the goal of the group is stated as interpersonal rather than 
personal growth. Ego-centered and other-centered goals are conceived of as a 
dynamically interrelated system. A healthy egocentricity (loving oneself) 
even has a kind of existential priority over involvement with others (loving 
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others). Fronnn-Reichmann (1950) believed that any display of lack of self-
respect was inevitably accompanied by a reduction of one's rspect for others. 
Sullivan (1940), too, found that:.-one respects others only to the extent that 
one respects himself. Erikson (1959) sees true engagement with others as 
both the result and the test of firm self-delineation. According to Erikson, 
when a person who has not achieved a sense of self-identity attempts to en-
gage in interpersonal realtions, he experiences a "tense inner reservation, 
a caution in connnitment" (1959, p. 125). Such a person engages in only 
stereotyped interpersonal relations. He does not really encounter the other, 
but deals in desperate attempts at clarifying what Erikson calls the "fuzzy 
outlines" of his own identity. The other is not the "other, 11 but a kind of 
narcissistic mirror. His relationships with others, then, involve "fusion" 
rather than growthful involvement and result in a loss of identity. 
Lynd (1958) emphasizes the relatedness of personal and interpersonal 
growth: 
Openness to relatedness with other persons and the search for 
self-identity are not two problems but one dialectical process; 
as one finds more relatedness to other persons one discovers 
more of oneself; as the sense of one's own identity becomes 
clearer and more firmly rooted one can more completely go out to 
others. It is not a loss of oneself, an 'impoverishment,' but 
a way of finding more of oneself when one means most to others 
whom one has chosen. Nor must complete finding of oneself, as Fromm 
and others sometimes seem to imply, precede finding oneself in and 
through other persons. Identity is never wholly realized. Love 
is never perfect. Strength to apprehend love that is beyond 
anxiety, beyond the need to use other persons for one's own 
security, beyond desire for power over others is never complete, but 
may grow throughout life. Like identity and mutuality with others 
it is a lifetime process of discovery (p. 241, emphasis added). 
While this is true and some kind of understanding of it is cardinal to psych---











is a pre-eminent goal of human living,, and, as such, superordinate to 
individualistic or ego-centered goals, e.g., personal psychic comfort. While 
self-identity has its "antecedent" priority in human living, responsible 
.. --
interpersonal involvement has a "subsequent" or ultimate priority. That is, 
ultimate self-actualization can take place only through effective in-
community involvement, and self-actualization-in-connnunity becomes the 
composite goal of human living. These, at any rate, are the assumptions 
underlying the present dilineation of group goals. 
The contract group is to serve as a means of getting its members more 
effectively into community. This means both dyadic connnunity, the community 
of the small group, and the wider comm.unity. If Buber (1937) is right and 
a person does not effectively become an authentic "I" until he has worked 
at transforming another from object to "Thou," then it is also true that a 
person is not fully a social or societal or community "I" until the community 
or the communities to which he belongs becomes "Thous" in his life. Studies 
(Jacob, 1957; Allport, 1961) describe the average American college student 
as quite conformist and quite disinterested in wider comm.unity concerns. 
Jacob's study showed the average student to be "gloriously contented" and 
"unabashedly Self-centered. II Though they discharge the Obligations demanded 
of them by the government, they will not voluntarily contribute to public 
welfare. Nor do they particularly desire an influential voice in public 
Policy. They vote, but otherwise they abdicate the citizen's role in the 
Political process. Though they predict another war, international problems 
are the least of their concerns. Although pouring one's energies into 
various forms of concern for the wider connnunity may be a way of avoiding 
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intimacy on a more personal level, still disinterest in the larger connn.unity 
can also reflect a general disinterest in others. 
The reason for making something of the distinction between personal and 
.. ·-
interpersonal growth is this. It is amazing how many people come to group 
experiences--and this seems to be especially (if obviously) true of psycho-
therapy groups--"to get something out of it for myself." The contention here 
is that many people enter groups intending to grow in some way, but without 
any special realization that the condition of growing is the coming-together. 
Too few fail to realize that the experience is taking place in a group, not 
just because others have something to contribute to one's own personal 
growth, but because the culmination of personal growth lies in the ability 
to involve oneself responsibly with others. In the contract group, the 
members come together in order to grow together. 
Berne (1966) doubts that authentic intimacy, as described here, can take 
place in groups. At least in psychotherapy groups, all that can be expected 
is a kind of "pseudo-intimacy." "Affective expression is encouraged without 
careful assessment of its authenticity •••• The affective expression is 
largely socially (externally) programmed, and it is usually part of a game 
in which the patient compliantly participates" (pp. 231-232). I disagree. 
The "game" structure that is evident in Berne's psychotherapeutic method, 
seems, at least partially, to be imposed upon the psychotherapeutic situation 
rather than to grow out of it. As Coles (1967) points out, "the cynicism, 
the cult of self, the lack of any philosophical, historical or religious 
perspective found in Berne are "thoroughly contemporary, thoroughly American, 
and awful" (p. 17). The contract group is anti-game," even while admitting 
that many do engage in games in order to avoid intimacy. 
Interaction Goals 
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Little more will be said he~ about interaction goals because these are 
studied in some depth in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX. They constitute, 
however, the heart of the contract. The participant agrees to experiment 
with: 
(1) the elements of dialogue: 
(a} freer experiencing and responsible expression of feelings and 
emotions; 
(b) the value of language as a means of translating oneself to 
others; 
(c) the recognition and use of non-verbal channels of commtmication; 
(2) self-disclosure: revealing to the other members, in some way, the 
person inside"; 
(3) support: listening effectively to others; encouraging others to 
fulfill the provisions of the contract; giving others recognition 
and help when they do engage in contractual behavior; reacting responsi-
bly when others present themselves emotionally in the group; 
(4) confrontation: inviting others to fulfill the contract, if they are 
not doing so; inviting others to examine aspects of their behavior which, 
it seems, they have not sufficiently examined; 
(5) accepting confrontation: responding to responsible confrontation, 
not by defensiveness and attack, but by engaging in self-exploration; 
(6) taking~ stance against flight: refusing to engage in interactions 
antithetical to the interactions listed above; refusing to withdraw 
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from the interaction; trying to minimize flight in oneself and in others. 
Process Goals 
Process goals refer to the way in which any goal in the group is pursued. 
Their purpose is to regulate and give definition to the interactional process 
itself. They provide cautions and structures which make the group a more 
cf ficient and effective organization. In the contract group these pragmatic 
rules are also contract goals. 
The distinction between self-oriented and altruistic goals. The entire 
discussion of goals might become a bit clearer if some attention is first 
paid to a distinction that Cartwright and Zander (1960) draw between 
"selfish" and "altruistic" goals in group process. I.n the following 
schematization, process goals, that is, the ways in which the group is 









The ways in which any other goal 




Examples of interactions illustrating each quadrant of the diagram will 
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help make the distinction between goals, especially the distinction· between 
process goals and other goals, clearer: 
Quardrant A: "Selfish" goals (contract, content, need) purused 
"selfishly. 11 This means that a group member pursues a contract, content, or 
need goal that redounds to his own benef-it ("selfish" or "self-oriented") 
in a way that is inimical to the interests of the group. That is, the way 
in which he pursues his goal tends to destroy the efficiency and the 
cohesiveness of the group. Mr. A finds that his anxiety is running very 
high in the group. He has learned from experience that he can reduce his 
anxiety by monopolizing the conversation (this might not be a completely 
conscious realization). This keeps him occupied and it also keeps disturbing 
stimuli at bay. He proceeds to do this, and his anxiety is lowered. He 
has pursued a "selfish" goal (the need-goal of reducing personal anxiety) , 
but he has done so in a "selfish" way (by monopolizing the conversation in 
the group, by keeping the group from being an interacting group). 
Quadrant!= "Selfish" goals pursued "altruistically." This means that 
a group participant pursues a goal (need, contract, content) that redounds 
to his own personal benefit, but he does so in a way that is designed to 
promote inter-member "engagement" and group cohesiveness. For instance, Mr. B, 
too, is quite anxious, and he feels the same need that Mr. A felt, namely, 
to reduce his anxiety. But, instead of dodging the issue, he confesses to 
the group that he is anxious and that this is affecting the quality of his 
participation. He wonders if other participants are anxious, too. He tells 
the group that he would like to know what it is about the group and about 
himself-in-the-group that causes such anxiety. He has pursued an ego-
I 
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centered goal (the reduction of personal anxiety) in an "altruistic" way 
(by bringing his conern before the groui), by eliciting the feelings of other 
i:iembers, by "engaging" the other members of the group). He has also fulfilled 
a contract goal--self-disclosure. 
Quadrant f.: "Altruistic" goals pursued "selfishly." This means that a 
participant pursues a goal that is intended to benefit some other member of 
the group itself, but he does so in such a way as to hinder desirable group-
process variables. For instance, Mr. C decides that the group should talk 
about sex. He realizes that this will make him quite uncomfortable, but he 
thinks that it is an issue that this particular group should handle for its 
own good. He brings the subject up a few times and even gets the group to 
discuss the fact that it has been avoiding this area of discussion. However, 
the group as a whole is not ready to pursue the subject; sex is not yet a 
viable topic for the group. Still, Mr, C, at every opportunity, brings up 
the subject and tries to get the group to engage in a serious, perhaps self-
revealing, discussion of it. He is pursuing an "altruistic" content-goal 
(though it is hardly denied that other, more basic, need goals are operative), 
that is, he sincerely believes that a comparatively open discussion of sex 
will benefit everyone, but he pursues the goal in a way designed to disrupt 
group process. He wants what well might be good, but he wants to get it his 
way. He cannot trust the group to handle the problem. 
guadrant Q: "Altruistic" goals pursued "altruistically." This means 
that a participant pursues a goal (contract, content, need) that is of benefit 
either to another member or to the group as a whole, and he does so through 
the group process, by "engaging" the other members of the group. For 
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instance, Miss D says: "I don't want to hurt or embarrass you, Mr. Y, .but 
you have been rather quiet in the group. It just seems to me that you have 
been reneging on our contract, and I don't think that that is fair to the 
.... -
group or to you. I think we have been remiss in not trying to involve 
ourselves with you sooner." She pursues an altruistic goal (it is a contract 
goal, for she confronts another to "join" the group for his own sake and for 
the sake of the group, and she confronts the group--including herself--for 
being remiss), and she does so in a way designed not to alienate either Mr. Y 
or the other members. Her confrontation is not an act of punishment, it is 
not primarily an expression of her own frustration, rather it is an attempt 
to get the group members--including herself--to involve thems~lves more 
completely with one another. 
Given these distinctions, it is clear that a certain degree of group 
"altruism" is essential if the group itself is to become the vehicle of 
problem-solving and growth. 
Some key group-process-goals. Group-process goals are also contract-
goals, that is, the participants agree to use these goals as standards with 
respect to their manner of participation. These goals or standards set the 
interactional tone of the group. The following group-process goals are 
considered essential to the effective running of the group: 
(1) All concerns ~be made group concerns. Another way of stating 
this is: whatever is done is to be done through group process. The examples 
above make it clear that it is not important to multiply contract-goals 
nor is it important that the content and need goals being pursued be 
"altruistic." What is important is that all goals--contract, content, need--
120 
be pursued through the group process. The members of the contract group nQt 
only agree to pursue interpersonal growth as the superordinate contract-goal, 
but they contract to pursue both personalistic and altruistic sub-goals in 
,.~-
such a way as to involve themselves more deeply with the other members of 
the group. This is the cardinal group-process goal: to submit everything 
to the group. The group should never become just a group of on-lookers, while 
two of the members interact. It is not against the better interests of the 
group for two members to discuss their relationship, whether it be one of 
concern or of antagonism, but they should do so in such a way as not to 
exclude the other group members (although, in one sense, it is impossible to 
"exclude" other group members since they are "there"). If Mr. A and Mrs. Q 
show a great deal of antagonism toward each other and finally discuss it in 
the group, the other group members are not only free to comment on the 
relationship and how it affects them and the entire group, but they should be 
encouraged to do so. This is often difficult. Other group members do not 
want to "butt in." It is "none of their business." Often it is a question 
of the other members being afraid of the emotions that are involved in the 
interchange. They are afraid to engage themselves. 
One of the violations of the everything-through-the-group standard, at 
least in residential sensitivity training laboratories, is "siphoning." Two 
or more members get together outside the group in order to work out their 
relationships. They return to the group changed, and this interrupts the 
rhythm of the group. Or worse, one member will pair with another member 
outside the group in order to discuss and work out feelings toward a third 
member. This dilutes ~roup process and manifests negative feelings toward 
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and mistrust of the group. It is only natural that a certain amount of 
pairing take place outside the group; but whatever significant interactions 
this involves should be made pub,1ic to the group. Pairing may even be 
encouraged or planned if it helps make the group sessions more meaningful. 
For instance, one of the group members might find it quite difficult to 
engage in self-disclosure. So, outside the group, he tells what he thinks 
is important to another group member. This "breaks the ice" for him and 
enables him to be open ~n the group. Mowrer (1963) l<H.11 interview a patient 
before he enters the "integrity" group. The patient unburdens himself here 
first and then usually it is easier for him to "tell his story" to the 
entire group. 
Participants in various kinds of face-to-face groups of ten fail to 
participate, it is true, because they are selfishly preoccupied with their 
own concerns. They neither engage other members, nor do they want to be 
engaged by others. When they speak, they do so in a rather solipsistic 
manner, or they look to the leader for a "solution" to their "problem." But 
there are also participants in these groups who realize that a group has been 
assembled precisely because some problems are handled more effectively 
through group interaction. Cattell (1953) even defines the entity "group" 
of the inter-reliance of the members: 
The definition which seems most essential is that a group is a 
collection of organisms in which the existence of all (in their 
given relationships) is necessary to the satisfaction of certain 
individual needs in each. That is to say, the group is an 
instrument toward the satisfaction of needs in the individual. 
Individuals belong to the group only because they achieve certain 
satisfactions made possible by its organization which would not be 
so readily possible (or which did not happen to occur) for them 
through any other device (p. 20). 
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:;0 one or two individuals should be allowed to act as if the other members 
of the group did not exist. Many participants are too "polite" or too timid 
to "interrupt" non-involving groyp action (or dyadic action, as the case 
might be), to "intrude" themselves. Everyone should feel free to speak to 
every issue and actually take advantage of this freedom. 
Fouriezos, Hutt, and Guetzkow (1950) showed that groups primarily con-
cerned with "self-oriented" needs are relatively ineffective. After 
observation of 72 decision-making conferences, they concluded that groups 
with the highest scores on self-oriented needs rated themselves lowest· on 
satisfaction measures. They were less satisfied with the meeting in general, 
with the decisions reached, with the manner in which the group reached its 
decisi6ns, and with the chairing of the meeting. Groups with high scores 
on "selfish" or self-oriented behavior completed fewer items on the agenda, 
but they held longer meetings. The contract for the interpersonal-growth 
contract-group calls for "altruistic" process goals, not just because they 
seem to be more fully human, but also because they are m:>re "economic." Such 
goals assure that further contract goals will be pursued more quickly and 
more efficiently. 
(2) Acceptance of the "laboratory" nature of the group experience. The 
laboratory nature of the group experience is explained in some detail in 
Chapters I and IV. The contract-group participant is asked to assume a 
"laboratory" set. The experience he is entering is, in a sense, contrived; 
it is different from day-to-day experience. It focuses on many of the 
molecular aspects of human interaction. It demands that the particpants 
experiment with "new forms" of behavior, that is, potentially growthful ways 
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of involving themselves with one another, but ways which are not presently 
part of their interpersonal life style. Since the laboratory is an experi-
~ent, the participant is asked to reserve judgment; he is asked not to 
prejudge the experience, to determine beforehand that it is going to be 
completely successful or unsuccessful. 
(3) Cooperation. Isreal (1956) found that groups which establish a 
"cooperative goal structure" are more effective than groups which establish 
a "competitive goal structure." In the contract group the assumption is that 
cooperation is essential to the work of the group and therefore the partici-
pants are asked to adopt a cooperative "set." Since cooperation is considered 
so important, it will be considered here at some length. 
I (a) Cooperation and personality. In disturbed relationships ''working 
I against" tends to take the place of "working with." Homey (1945) describes the interpersonally disturbed as "moving toward" people, that is, in a 
compliant way which is both an expression of helplessness and a call for 
support, (2) "moving against" people, that is, in an aggressive way, com-
peting with others in order to surpass and defeat them, with the ultimate 
purpose of becoming strong enough to disregard the possible counter hostility 
of others, and (3) "moving away" from people, avoiding all the threats and 
risks involved in any kind of close interpersonal relating. These needs 
tend to give rise to N-interactions that can hamper the efficient running 
of the group. They certainly stand in the way of es·tablishing a cooperative 
goal structure and working pattern in the group. 
On the other hand Dreikurs (1967) insists that effective human relation-
ships are characterized by cooperation. Cooperation, according to Dreikurs, 
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demands four attitudes together with a stance against their antitheses: 
(1) social interest versus hostility; (2) confidence in others versus distrust 
and suspicion; (3) self-confide~~e versus inferiority feelings, and (4) 
courage versus fear. Interest, trust, a feeling of self worth and courage 
are all essential to optimal performance in the training group. 
(b) Cooperation in therapeutic situations. Individual therapy is 
being seen more and more as a cooperative venture in which both therapist 
and client become involved with each other (Schofield, 1964; Steinzor, 1967); 
it is a route taken by both therapist and client (Stern, 1966). In a study 
by Fiedler (1950), the good therapeutic relationship was described by a 
variety of therapists as one in which the therapist saw the patient as co-
worker on a common problem. In my own experience, group therapy progresses 
ioost steadily when the members come to the realization that they are not just 
recipients of help but'that their involvement with one another is the 
condition for growth. When patients cease being patients in therapy and 
become agents instead, then there is cause for hope. In the contract group 
neither leader nor members are "finished products" in the area of inter-
personal maturity. All the members have much to offer one another if they 
are willing to drop some of their defensiveness and become involved with 
one another. 
(c) Cooperation ~ a process goal in training groups. In the "natural" 
developmental sequence suggested by Tuckman (1965) for training groups, a 
Period of initial dependency and confusion is followed by a period of 
antagonism and turmoil in which personal differences and differences in goal 
orientation are worked through. This is followed by a period of cohesion and 
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cooperation. Such a sequence seems "natural" to a group situation character-
!zed by initial goallessness and plann·ed ambiguity. However, whatever value 
may accrue to group participants _t:.rom working through the problems 
associated with the first two stages, still a group experience in which the 
first two stages, if not eliminated, are at least shortened and in other 
respects attenuated has its own peculiar value. Even though group members 
may learn a good deal about the value of cooperation by both engaging in 
and becoming the victims of non-cooperation, there is also a value in 
forestalling and minimizing non-cooperation. Cooperation, after all, must 
be some kind of ultimate goal in all training groups, for productivity, no 
matter how productivity is defined, is impossible without cooperation. 
Cooperation, then, is one of the process goals to which the members of 
the contract group subscribe. The empirical evidence supports the value of 
cooperation with respect to smoother performance and increased productivity 
in a variety of group situations (e.g. Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Deutsch, 
1949; Grossack, 1954). There is also a good deal of evidence that cohesive-
ness in groups is enhanced if members work together for common rather than 
mutually exclusive and individual ends (see Lott & Lott, 1965 for a review 
of the evidence). Cooperation in the kind of enterprise called for by the 
contract is not an easy thing. As Goffman (1967) notes, "Joint involvement 
appears to be a fragile thing, with standard points of weakness and decay, 
a precarious unsteady state that is likely at any time to lead the individual 
into some form of alienation" (p. 117). The hypothesis in the contract group 
is that if the participants enter the group with a set toward cooperation, 
"d II ecay is a good deal less likely. Deutsch (1958) found that prior 
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cooperative orientation and Oak.amp and Perlman (1965) found that public 
commitment to cooperation increased cooperation on a task which ordinarily 
evoked relatively low levels of ~ooperation. Making cooperation one of the 
process goals of the contract group is similar to Deutsch's "cooperative 
orientation," and the participant who agrees to the contract makes a form of 
"public commitment" to cooperation. 
(d) The nature of cooperation in the contract group. In the contract 
group cooperation means getting "into community" as quickly as possible. It 
means that members have come together, not to compete with one another, but 
to grow with one another. A cooperative style of group interaction will 
produce a distinctive type of "interpersonal movement" in the group. Three 
types of interpersonal movement may be indicated as follows: 
Type A. self ~------------------- other 
Type B. self 
-------------------') other 
Type c. self 
-------> (------- other 
In Type A, one member remains entrenched in himself and makes the other 
"capitulate" or move out toward him. In Type B, which is the counter of 
Type A, one "leaves" himself in a movement that entails "giving in" to the 
other. In Type C, which is characteristic of cooperative group movement, 
both participants venture out of themselves and both encourage the other to 
venture forth. In the contract group the participants subscribe to Type C 
movement. This does not mean that types A and B will not occur. For instance 
if a group member remains silent long enough, other group members will finally 
remark on his silence and make efforts to get him to move out into the grot1i;. 
The silent person is engaging in Type A movement (or lack of movement), 
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vhile those who finally pursue him are engaged in Type B movement. The 
!>Uent member should be confronted. However, were he engaged in pursuing 
the provisions of the contract with others who were doing the same, then all 
~ould be engaged in Type C movement~ Type C is the ideal, though this hardly 
lessens the value of necessity of Type B. 
At first it would seem that confrontation, one of the interaction goals 
of the contract, would automatically and necessarily involve a combination of 
:oovements A and B. However, if the group is characterized by cooperative 
l!ffort, this will not be the case at all. At least in an ideal confrontationa 
situation, Mr. X, the object of confrontation, first gives the group some 
cues that he is open to confrontation. By his verbal exchanges he moves 
"into the group" in various ways. When he is confronted, then, he is already 
"out in the group" in some sense. There are a variety of ways in which a 
participant can move into the group, and once he does so, he becomes "avail-
able" for a variety of interactions. 
(e) Cooperation and complementarity of contractual roles. The members 
of the group enter the group by accepting the stipulations of the group 
contract, that is, they say that they want the kind of experience described 
by the contract. One way of interpreting this is that the particpants 
willingly assume, or try to assume, certain roles in the group. The contract 
is so set up as to induce within the group a certain "complementarity of 
roles." This means that, because of the contract and the role complementarity 
that it induces, fewer decisions are required about certain aspects of group 
activity, energy is conserved for more important activities, and the group 
process proceeds more smoothly. For instance, the contract calls for 
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~csponsible confrontation, but it also calls for self-examination rather 
:'.;en defensiveness ·or attack or other forms of counter-behavior, as the 
~csponse to such confrontation ... -The role of the confronter and the role of 
:he self-examining confrontee are complementary. If the contractual roles 
4re learned and accepted, group process moves along vigorously, meaningfully, 
.i!ld comparatively smoothly. 
Spiegel (1957) points out various causes for failures in role comple-
=entarity. Such failures are deleterious to group cooperation and disruptive 
of effective group process. Some of the causes for complementarity failures 
Jre relevant to the discussion on cooperation. First of all, cognitive 
~iscrepancy takes place when one or more parties are not familiar with the 
roles they are expected to assume and therefore miss their "cues." However, 
if the participants in the contract group understand the provisions of the 
contract and are willing to take a "cooperative stance," the possibility of 
cognitive discrepancy is lessened. In the group "missing cues" usually has 
some other meaning than failure to understand the contract. Allocative 
discrepancy refers to non-acceptance of roles. If the participants really 
subscribe to the provisbns of the contract, ailocative discrepancy should 
also be minimized. The problem arises when a group member, after agreeing to 
the contract, reneges on his agreement. In situations in which the contract 
is "imposed," allocative discrepancy arises from the fact that some members 
do not really accept the contract or some of its provisions. Complementarity 
also suffers when one or more members simply do not possess the roles calied 
for by the contract. For instance, a particular member might always see 
even the most responsible confrontation as attack. He cannot assume the 
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role of one-who-explores-himself-upon-confrontation, because his self-identity 
is too weak to sustain confrontation.. He might be almost completely lacking 
!n the capacity to lay aside his _defenses and engage in the self-examination 
called for by confrontation. 
(f) Cooperation, dependency, and conformity. One might object that 
this demand for a cooperative goal structure is an unrealistic attempt to 
banish difference of opinion and disagreement, which are part of the warp 
and woof of interpersonal relating, from the group interaction. Nothing of 
the kind is meant. The kind of cooperative effort suggested here is not 
~cant to eliminate difference of opinion and disagreement, but to have them 
take place as growthfully as possible. The contract states that the members 
are present, not to compete, but to become involved with one another. 
Becoming involved with one another will obviously entail conflict and 
difference of opinion. For instance, when A confronts Bon B's mode of acting 
ideally B will respond, if A's confrontation has been responsible, by 
exploring his behavior. After R, in the give-and-take of the group interactio 
has examined himself and his behavior, he may well reply to A that he 
disagrees with him. A comes to realize that there are modes of living that 
differ from his own, but by involving himself, within the structure of the 
group, with others who live and think and feel differently from the way he 
does, he can broaden the base of his experience. A certain degree of 
heterogeneity in the make-up of the group would seem to be in order precisely 
for this reason. 
Nor can the cooperation called for by the contract be identified with 
conformity or dependency. Tuckman (1965) says that initially there is a 
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period of dependency in the training group. The members look to the trainer 
for goals and direction. Cooperation, however, means that the members assume 
corporate responsibility for the group from the start rather than assigning 
this function to the leader. The early sessions of groups are always filled 
with anxiety, and anxious people tend to surrender blindly to the security of 
authority (Fromm, 1955; Getzels, 1957; Maslow, 1959; Riesman, 1950). But 
this tendency to polarize into leader and members must be counteracted by 
leader and members a_like, for it militates against cooperative effort and 
involves working through problems which are not the focus of the group. 
Darley (1966) found that fear causes increased conformity and that this 
increase is greatest if the conformity pressures come from people toward 
~horn the subject feels affiliative. Anxiety in the contract group should 
be handled as openly as possible so that dependency and conformity can be 
minimized. The only "conformity" looked for in the contract group is 
fulfillment of contract, and the purpose of the contract is to facilitate the 
development of responsible autonomy and relatedness. 
(g) Cooperation and the deviant member. Since failures in cooperation 
and role complementarity involve the notion of deviancy, a word might be 
said about the deviant member. The problem of deviancy is minimal in groups 
in which entry-by-contract is the norm, but it is a more serious problem for 
impositbn-of-contract groups. If the deviant person only reneges·on certain 
provisions of the contract while fulfilling Qthers and if his deviancy does 
not become one of the prime concerns of the group, then the group can still 
function adequately. The problems with the deviate are many: for a period 
of time his deviancy becomes the focus of group interaction and then he is 
131 
:1nally usually rejected, and strongly so if the group is a highly cohesive 
"'ne (Schachter, 1951). Once he is rejected, he hangs albatross-like around 
t!1e neck of the group. If the deviate (one who simply refuses to engage in 
contractual behavior) does not leave the group, then the group members should 
deal briefly with how such a member should be handled. If the deviate actu-
ally disrupts group interaction, then it would seem better to expel him. 
Groups are very reluctant to do this because the members are usually concerned 
about the deviate and expulsion is tantamount to admitting failure on their 
part. 
(4} The here-and-now. This is one of the most important process goals 
in both contract groups and other kinds of training experiences. It involves 
what might be called the "space-time" dimension of the group. The group is 
only a group when the members are actually together. Therefore, the 
principal focus of the group is the present, the here-and-now. The content 
of the interactions that take place in the group must in some way lose their 
space-time "distance." A participant 1 s search for identity may be complicated 
by the fact that his father made him an appendage, denied him the freedom to 
grow as an individual. What is important to the group, however, is the 
members present being-in~the-world-ae-appendage, his present feelings of 
identity diffusion, and how this mode of being influences his action in this 
group. The member may well talk about the past, but the past has to be made 
Present. He may well talk about what has happened or is happening outside 
the group, but the "there" must also be made "here." For instance, a 
Participant's mode of being present to his co-workers at his place of 
employment can be "transported" by comparing it to his mode of being present 
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to the other members of the group. "At work I'm a mouse. Here it's still 
the same. I'm still a mouse." Or--"At work and at home I can hardly contain 
~·hostility, but I don't feel hostile here at all, even when I'm confronted. 
~~ybe you have accepted me. Or maybe I have accepted you more than the 
others, Anyway, there's a big difference." If a past or future concern can 
be made relevant to the activity within the group, then it loses its space-
time distance. 
The problem with the then-and-there is that it (coupled with other 
factors associated with it that will be discussed below, e.g. the quality of 
a person's self-disclosure) engenders ennui. This is just a fact. If group 
~embers spend a good deal of time discussing problems outside the group, the 
group members "lose contact" with one another. There is, as noted above, 
such a thing as healthy egocentricity. A person must be a person first, 
before he can involve this "person" in various activities. There is also 
such a thing as healthy group-egocentricity. It cannot survive, much less 
operate effectively, unless certain of its needs are fulfilled. Prolonged 
dealing with con:erns that are too "distant" is like cutting off the oxygen 
supply of the group. A kind of suffocation takes place. Therefore, group 
members have to search out ways of rendering their then-and-their concerns 
present to the group. These concerns, if they are real concerns and not 
just dodges which insulate the participant from interacting meaningfully with 
the other members of the group, in some way "define" him. They color him 
and his activity, including his activity in the group. The group leader can 
be very helpful here, by "modeling" ways of transporting then-and-there 
concerns so that they become relevant to this group. It seems to me that 
-
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::e of the principal defects of psychotherapy groups is this inability to 
;cal with the here-and-now. Members keep talking about the problems that 
:;:ey have at home and outside the gr:~up in general. They fail to see that 
:~:ese various problems are defining their manner of participation in the 
,;roup. The group is not seen as a laboratory for the examination of these 
;iroblems. The inept group psychotherapist falls back on the expedient of 
·~sing the group as a locus for multiple individual therapy. 
If a member finds it difficult to overcome the space-time dimensions 
0f his concerns, then this very fact should become a concern for him and 
for the group. His inability to overcome "distance" partially defines his 
:'.lOde of presence in the group. This is "diagnostic" in the best sense of 
the word. His discussion of the then-and-there might be a flight from 
group process. Or the concerns that he verbalizes might not be his real 
concerns but diversions, ways of keeping him from thinking about issues 
that are really pertinent to his style of interpersonal living. 
This concern for the here-and-now is also rooted in a theory concerning 
the usefulness (or uselessness?) of investigating past behavior in order to 
change the present. 
This is not to deny the significance of the past in indirectly 
affecting behavior. However, even though the past can create a 
certain condition which carries over into the present, it is, 
nevertheless, the present condition that is influential in the 
present. Strictly considered, linking behavior with a past 
event is an extremely difficult undertaking; it presupposes 
that one knows sufficiently how the past event affected the 
psychological field at that time, and whether or not in the mean-
time other events have again modified the field (Deutsch, 1954, 
p. 186). 
Rogers (1951) applies such thinking to the therapeutic situation: 
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It should also be mentioned that in this concept of motivation 
all the effective elements exist in the present. Behavior is not 
'caused' by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions 
and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors 
to reduce or satisfy. While -it is true that past experience has 
certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in 
present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a 
present need (p. 492). 
:Jo often in training-group situations participants become preoccupied with 
t!:ere-and-then concerns, not because they are more meaningful, but because 
t:1cy are safer. If they are really meaningful, they should be translated 
into here-and-now concerns and become vehicles of involvement rather than 
:-.odes of flight. 
(5) The rules of innnediacy. It is difficult to listen to conversations 
filled with vagueness and generalities. It is difficult because it is 
boring. Truax and Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that "concreteness" 
in therapeutic conversation might well be a variable worth exploring. They 
define concreteness as follows: 
A low level of concreteness of specificity is when there is a 
discussion of anonymous generalities; when the discussion is on 
an abstract intellectual level. This includes discussions of 
'real' feelings that are expressed on an abstract level. A high 
level of concreteness of specificity is when specific feelings and 
experiences are expressed--'I hated my mother!' or ••• then he would 
blow up and start throwing things'; when expressions deal with 
specific situations, events, or feelings, regardless of emotional 
content (p. 266). 
Such concreteness is definitely a value to the contract group and forms part 
of the "rules of immediacy"--ways of making the interaction more immediate 
and personal. The "rules" are: 
(a) The~ of".!.·" When the participant is speaking of himself he 
must use "I" and not some substitute such as "we," "one," "you," "people," 
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or some inpersonal expression such as "it happens," etc. Any substitute for 
"I" entails a loss of immediacy, puts some kind of distance between the 
speaker and the state or action he is discussing. 
,-·-
(b) Concreteness. The speaker should avoid vagueness, abstractions, 
and generalities. If he does talk about something abstract such as a 
principle, he should illustrate what he means by a concrete example, 
preferably from his own experience. In general, he should talk about his 
01Jt1 experience. If he talks about the experience of others, he should talk 
about the impact that the other's experience has on him. 
(c) Speak to someone. The participant should in general address speci-
fie people in the group rather than the entire group. The participant who 
is always speaking to everyone is very often speaking to no one. It is more 
innnediate to address the whole group through a specific member of the 
group. For instance, someone might say: "I think that there is a lot of 
flight behavior in the group. John, you tend to talk about the there-and-
then all the time. Bill, when confronted, you are always very defensive. 
You seldom open up and examine the issue at all. In the morning session I 
said nothing at all." The person who tends to address the whole group teitds 
to talk about generalities and to give speeches. Both are deadly as far as 
the group interacting goes. 
(d) Questions. The participants should not ask too many questions, 
especially the question "why?" :Pointed questions that demand concrete 
answers help keep the interaction concrete. The question ''why?" usually 
demands an interpretation on the part of the respondent and interpretations 
tend to become vague, highly intellectualized, and hypothetical and as such 
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Jre antithetical to the innnediacy desired in the interaction. "Did you hit 
::1m?" gets at the facts of the respondent's behavior. ''Why did you hit him?" 
can lead anywhere and thus nowhere. 
Content Goals 
~~-----
In most kinds of group interaction in which personal and interpersonal 
growth are the overriding goals, the content of the interaction is ordinarily 
not predetermined. It is believed that this would unnecessarily limit the 
scope of group interaction (Grinker, MacGregor, Selan, Klein, & Kohrman, 
1961). Goals, they say (and I would add, specifically content goals), depend 
on and develop from the transactional experience of the group. Any human 
concern is grist for the mill. If the growth experience is taken seriously, 
the content of the interaction will be pitched at a more or less deep 
personal level, that is, group members will tend to treat of subjects that 
"touch" their persons. 
Although content freedom is also the goal in the contract group, still, 
as was indicated above, it i.s possible to include certain "focused" contracts 
in which the content of the discussion is specified. This is especially true 
if the participants are trying to avoid certain areas of human concern. 
"F ocused" content-contracts may also be used to stimulate interaction. 
An example of ~ focused content-contract. A group might contract to 
discuss "non-growthful conformism" in day to day living. If the members are 
to discuss such a subject concretely and intelligently, they should be 
prepared to do so in some way. Some topics need little preparation, but 
the participants could be given the following remarks on conformism by way 
of preparation or stimulation. 
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By "conformism" is meant the tendency to follow fixed patterns, to 
:onform to certain standards, in situations in which conformity is not a 
value at all and to do so from motives which are non-growthful such as fear, 
.. ~-
laziness, or lack of motivation. Munroe (1955) contends that the "triviality 
and the magnificance of hwnan devotion to social goals represent the folly 
and the grandeur of our species" (p. 116). Doubtless all of us are wedded to 
certain social conventions that are meaningless and perhaps even detrimental 
to interpersonal living, but they usually go unchallenged in our lives. 
Henry (1963), for instance, denounces our conformity in the area of 
advertising in America. Advertising, he says, preys upon unhealthy conformist 
tendencies. He sees it as a means used by an irrational economy to imbue 
the subjects of such an economy with "pecuniary logic." If Americans could 
wrest themselves from their conformist tendencies and pursue a more realistic 
logic, such an economy, he claims, could not survive. This is the paradox: 
if Americans are to exist economically as they are, they must work at 
remaining stupid. Although Erikson (1964) sees no reason to insist that a 
technological world as such need weaken man's inner resources of adaptation 
and produce a "nation of sheep," still subscribing without reflection to the 
~~ 
values of a technocratic society, one's creative potential untapped because 
it entails socially unacceptable "divergent" thinking, submitting without 
criticism to the host of unexamined conventions imposed by the societies 
and organizations to which one belongs., accepting the common rituals that 
govern interpersonal living because they provide an escape from intimacy 
(Berne, 1957, 1964, 1966), submitting to personal suppression built into the 
American system of education (Friedenberg, 1963; Keniston, 1965)--all of these 
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forms of conformism are prevalent and some of them affect us. Such conform-
ism undoubtedly, either directly or indirectly, gives a certain definition 
to our persons and affects the quality of our human relationships. We may 
~elcome conformism because it saves us from the agonies of decision and 
intimacy. Convention and ritual undoubtedly have their value in human living, 
• 
but when do they obstruct and deaden human relating instead of channeling it. 
Residential sensitivity training laboratories seem to stimulate the 
non-conformist tendencies of its participants. Whitman (1964) seems to 
be a bit wary of the kind of "regression" or adolescent culture that springs 
up in these situations, although he calls it a "healthy and understandable 
thing" (p. 314). He claims that some regression is necessary for learning, 
but sees problems with those who regress either too little or too much in 
laboratory settings. However, it seems possible to interpret the "adolescent-
culture" phenomenon in terms other than regression. During adolescence a 
certain number of quite engaging qualities are in evidence: the adolescent 
is often quite spontaneous, clever, humorous, adventuresome; there is a 
pleasing unpredictability about him, for he is striving to get a feel for 
himself as an independent being, a person in his own right rather than an 
I 
appendage of home, school, church, or society. His speech is often quite 
refreshing, because there are few "filters" between what he thinks and 
what he says. He is open, honest, candid, frank. The qualities ~f the 
creative person~-fluency or the ability to put out a large number of responses 
to a situation rather than focusing in on just one correct one, flexibility 
or the ability to change one's thinking and to change the meaning, interpre-
tation or use of something, and originality or a flair for the unus~al, the 
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novel, the far-fetched, the remote, the clever (Guilford, 1962)--these 
qualities are often much more in evidence in the "innnature" adolescent than 
in the "mature" adult. "Maturing'' .. ..J.s often a process of controlling such 
"adolescent" behavior in the face of the conventions of society and its 
organizations. In the residential sensitivity laboratory, the need to 
confom is minimized, conventional "conformism" disappears, and many of the 
more admirable qualities of adolescence reappear. Th.is is hardly regression. 
It is progress. 
The purpose of the above discussion of conformism is not to induce an 
intellectual discussion of this phenomenon but to serve as a basis for self-
exploration on the part of the members of the group. The discussion should 
be a concrete, personal one: the conformism of these people and the way it 
affects their relationships to one another here and now. If the participants 
adhere to the process and interaction goals of the contract, the conversation 
will not become intellectualized, abstract, and a-personal. 
~Goals 
The group is not only a contractual group, but it is a "natural" group. 
Each member has his own psychological make-up and his own constellation of 
needs. One of the reasons a member joins the group is that he feels some 
kind of need for a more effective interpersonal life. The group itself helps 
to fulfill this need. In one sense all needs are ego-centered, yet it is not 
logical nonsense to divide needs into ego-centered needs (e.g. a need to 
reduce personal anxiety) and altruistic needs (e.g. a need to improve one's 
neighborhood). Most needs, however, are not pure; they are multi-determined. 
A person's altruistic need to serve his community also s~tisfies ego-centered 
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needs for recognition and belongingness. 
Within the context of the contract group, conflicts will arise between 
need-goals and contract goals. A geed to dominate will obviously conflict 
with the kind of cooperation called for by the contract. Therefore, the 
contract group experience should prove quite diagnostic with respect to the 
strength of certain needs. Often it is only within the context of a group 
experience that a person begins to reali~e how strong is his "need" to 
withdraw. The group experience also gives its participants an opportunity 
to test their ability to control their needs, that is, those needs that 
conflict with the contract. Again, conflict will not be eliminated and 
contract violations will occur, but because of the contract conflicts should 
be highlighted in such a way as to render them more manageable. 
The Overriding Goal--Interpersobal Growth--:R.evisited 
Interpersonal growth is defined operationally as the sum of the inter-
action goals (pursued according to process goals), that is, the person who 
experiments with and engages in responsible forms of self-disclosure, 
expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a 
response to confrontation is, at least by assumption, growing interpersonally. 
Th:fs admittedly introduces a certain kind of circularity in the training 
process. As Campbell and- Dunnette (1968) note: "It appears that some of the 
interpersonal skills most important for accomplishing the T-group's objectives 
are also the very skills constituting the major learning goals of the method" 
(p. 77). The assumption, however, is that the participants have the basic 
ability to engage in these behaviors, but because of personal, group, and 
cultural circumstances, they have had inadequate practice in them. The group 
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as a "cultural island" allows the members to actualize these behaviors rather 
1uickly. The participants "learn" principally in the sense of reducing to 
act what already exists in potency. 
. .. -
The sensitivity-training experience does not provide a major personality 
"overhaul." The person who leaves the group with the intention of going 
"back home" to demonstrate how different he is to family co-workers, and 
friends is a horror to behold. The average participant, upon leaving the 
laboratory, finds that growthful behaviors that became relatively easy to 
engage in in the laboratory situation are difficult to manage in his real-
life situation. He realizes that he experienced something quite valuable in 
the laboratory, but now he is faced with the very difficult task of integratin 
the laboratory experience with life. A certain modesty with respect to the 
ultimate goal of the laboratory is in order. I would say this: if the 
interactions which take place in the laboratory induce in the participant 
a healthy form of diagnosis which leads to attitude change which, ultimately, 
leads to growthful behavioral change, then the training experience is a 
success. A word about "healthy" diagnosis and attitude change is in order. 
Dynamic diagnosis: the cybernetic function of the group. Experimen-
tation with the kinds of behavior described in the contract should serve a 
diagnostic function. It is an opportunity to challenge what Frank (1961) 
calls one's "assumptive world" (see pp. 18-34), especially in the area of 
interpersonal relations. Some people say that it would be a waste of time 
for them to participate in a sensitivity-training experience: they are 
adjusted both personally and interpersonally, they experience deep relation-
ships with others, they are productive. They see the group experience as a 
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refuge for those who cannot ''make it" interpersonally, a kind of substitute 
for real interpersonal living. However, the assumption is not that a person 
enters such a group because there is something radically wrong with the 
quality of his interpersonal life. It is rather that all human relationships 
can be improved; the group offers opportunities to experiment with "new ways" 
of being present to others. The group is not meant to be a flight from real 
life or a substitute for it. Those who come to it thinking that it is usually 
suffer quite a bit. 
For some diagnosis has become a dirty word in psychology. It is assumed 
that as a process separate from treatment, it is relatively useless or at 
least "uneconomic," that is, the fruits of a separated diagnosis are not 
sufficient to warrant pretreatment expenditure of time and energy, which in 
many mental health systems is reduplicated time and energy. Erikson even 
sees the diagnostic process as potentially dangerous (1964): 
Hospitalized patients, having been committed, are often ready 
to commit themselves. They expect 'to go to work,' both on 
themselves and on whatever task they may be asked to do. But too 
of ten they are met with a laborious process of diagnosis and 
initiation which emphasizes the absolute distance of patienthood 
from active life. Thus literally 'insult is added to injury' in 
that the uprooted one, already considered expendable or abnormal 
by his previous group of affiliation, finds himself categorized 
and judged by those who were expected to show him the way through 
a meaningful moratorium. Many a man acquires the irreversible 
identity of being a lifelong patient and client not on the basis of 
what he 'is,' but on the basis of what is first done about him 
(p. 97). 
However, diagnosis, freed from its pejorative connotations (and perhaps from 
a too strict association with the medical model of emotional disorder), is 
a human value. Plato in the Apology claims that the unexamined life is not 
worth living. The fact is that we tend to drift to "maintenance" levels of 
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interpersonal relating. In the contract group, the member gets a sense of 
or feeling for his own "areas of competence," his own "areas of promise," 
and his own "areas of deficit" in ~gterpersonal relating. In the matrix of 
the group experience, disturbances in human communication (Ruesch, 1957) come 
to the surface. The participant develops a feel for his present interpersonal 
limits (and this is usually quite painful) and perhaps even for his absolute 
interpersonal limits (and this is even more painful). He comes to a 
realization of failed-potentialities in interpersonal living, but this implies 
that he gets a deeper insight into these potentialities themselves. This 
makes the diagnostic aspect of the group experience a starting point--dynamic, 
hormic, motivational. 
Diagnosis here is contextual and cybernetic. It is contextual in that 
it develops out of the context of actual interrelating~ It is cybernetic 
in this sense. The participant "emits" certain interpersonal behavior in 
the group. He receives "feedback" concerning that behavior from the other 
members. Finally he uses this feedback as a corrective device or as a stim-
ulus to try different modes of behavior in the group. For instance, Miss G 
constantly introduces new topics of discussion in the group, often in the 
middle of on-going discussions. The other members confront her with the 
fact, first by a not too warm reception for the new topics and then by more 
direct forms of confrontation. Miss G begins to realize that she never 
really listens to what others have to say. Or she realizes that there are 
areas or topics discussed that arouse too much anxiety in her. Or she begins 
to realize that she is not happy in the group unless she is the center of 
attention. Because of the feedback she receives, she can try new forms of 
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Jf behavior in the group. "I always change the subject when you discuss sex, 
~ccause it makes me afraid." 
The group is not miraculous. It-does not create capacity when none 
exists. But if Maslow (1964) and a host of others are right, none of us 
tomes close to using a very significant amount of his human potentialities, 
interpersonal capacities included. Diagnosed patterns of unsatisfactory 
:nterpersonal behavior may be amenable to modification, to learning and re-
learning. Finally, diagnosis, in the sense explained here is not easy, 
especially for those with high levels of anxiety. Studies show that the 
highly anxious do not show a great deal of interest in exploring new areas 
and having new experiences (McReynolds, Acker, & Pietila, 1961; Penney & 
~!cCann, 1965). 
Attitude change. It is suggested that effective diagnosis in the 
training group will lead to attitude change (that is, if such change is 
warranted). Although attitude change seems to be a "natural" goal of labor-
atory learning, it is not mentioned with any frequency in either the theory 
or research literature: "Turning to another type of internal criterion, the 
authors were surprised to find relatively few studies relating T-group 
experiences to attitude changes •.•. [T]he scarcity of research relating 
laboratory education to attitude change is disappointing and rather hard to 
understand" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, pp. 92, 95). Attitude change is a 
modest and realistic goal. For instance, a participant who has difficulty 
responding to even responsible confrontation by self-examination finally 
realizes that he is very defensive, that he usually sees even helpful and well 








changes. Although even responsible confrontation has punitive side-effects, 
still it is possible to ignore or endure these for the sake of the benefit 
to be obtained. After the laborat9ry is over, the participant may still 
react adversely to honest criticism (he has not changed overnight), but his 
attitude has changed and this is the seed of behavioral change. If this is 
true, then research should show attitude changes by the end of the laboratory 
experience and behavioral changes in follow-up studies. 
Behavioral change. The ultimate goal of the laboratory is behavioral 
change. Experimentation with behavior in the laboratory is the first step in 
this process. The laboratory offers no magic and works no miracles. Be-
havioral change demands work, both during the laboratory and especially after 
it. The person who sees little value in working at bettering his interpersona 
relationships is ill-advised to enter a sensitivity-training experience. 
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Chapter IV 
The Laboratory Method 
Introduction 
The "laboratory" character of the interpersonal-growth experience is 
part of the contract. Although a sunnnary of the fundamental aspects of the 
laboratory method is given in the first chapter, an indication of how these 
factors apply to interpersonal-growth experiences in general and to the 
contract group in particular is in order. 
Diversities in laboratory experiences. It would be unrealistic to try to 
catalog here all the differences that exist among the various kinds of 
laboratory experiences. It is much more feasible to discuss some of the 
sources of the differences that do exist. Two factors that account for a 
great deal of the differences are the size of the social unit in focus in the 
laboratory and the purpose of the laboratory. For instance a laboratory 
might be oriented primarily toward (1) the community,. (2) the organization, 
(3) the group, or (4) the individual. In each instance, a variety of goals 
might be contemplated. 
(1) The community. Klein (1965} describes the use of laboratory 
experiences in community development programs. The purposes of such programs 
are quite broad: 
For the purposes of the program which this chapter describes, 
community development has been considered to encompass work 
with community groups and entire communities for the purpose 
of assisting in the development of leadership skills, of 
fostering effective citizen participation in meeting economic, 
social, and civic needs, and of enabling optimal utilization of 
state and national resources from both government an<l 
voluntary bodies while strengthening local community initiative 
and autonomy (Kelin, 1965, p. 185). 
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Laboratories are run in which goals such as the following are set for the 
participants: 
1. Increasing their sense of community, by which [is] meant the 
readiness to view communi~y events in terms of interacting 
forces and processes within a coherent whole. 
2. Enlarging their definition of citizenship ••• an increased 
ability to identify and respond to opportunities for effective 
participation in community events. 
3. Enhancing their sensitivities and skills as citizen participants 
within groups and organizations. 
4. Developing more sophistication and objectivity in their attempts 
to diagnose the forces and processes contributing to cormnunity 
problems. 
5. Helping them to function more effectively as agents of change 
in situations where collaborative planning and effort is 
needed (Klein, 1965, pp. 185-186). 
In some cases community teams composed of a number of workers from the same 
community agency or representatives from a variety of community agencies 
came as units to the laboratory. Teams of trainers or community consultants 
also go into the community itself and work toward a variety of goals with 
community leaders in situ. 
(2) The organization. An example of a laboratory experience which 
focuses on a single organization is found in The Managerial Grid (Blake & 
Mouton, 1964; see also Blake & Mouton, 1965). The "grid" deals with 
managerial styles and emphasizes the two major dimensions of managerial skill: 
human relations and productivity. The grid itself is depicted in Figure 1. 
kn entire laboratory program with a large organization may require from three 
to five years to complete. A six-phase approach to organization improvement 
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Phase 1: learning to apply behavioral science theory of solvin0 
problems of work in a human laboratory. "The aim is for managers to study 
.., 
and to understand behavioral sc~ence theory and research findings sufficiently 
well, and in such a concrete and personal way, that intuitive assumptions 
underlying habitual behavior can be replaced by sound managerial approaches 
for getting work done in a manner that arouses mutual confidence and respect" 
(p. 172). The laboratory is so structured that line personnel rather than 
academic behavioral scientists serve as the faculty for each of the 
laboratory sessions. This makes them better teachers (and one assumption is 
that a good manager is an effective teacher) and makes them also feel more 
responsible for the implementation of what is taught. The participants 
engage in various exercises designed to reveal to themselves their own 
managerial styles and to improve managerial skills with respect to both 
human relations and productivity. The ideal, of course, according to the 
grid is a 9,9 style of management (see Figure 1). The other phases of the 
program involve team training, interteam cooperation, setting organization 
improvement goals, implementing planned change, and stabilizing and replanning 
Even though the managerial-grid laboratory is a highly structured, organiza-
tion-oriented experience, the participant learns much about himself 
personally and interpersonally in the give-and-take of group interaction. 
(3) The group. "Group" here means the small, face-to-face group. 
Obviously small, face-to-face groups are used in both community and organ-
ization laboratories, but there are also training experiences in which the 
principal focus is on the small group itself. For instance, some courses in 
group dynamics are taught in a laboratory fashion. The participants (the 
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,tudents} learn about the small group by actually being one (or becor..... .. 6 vuc1 
for the duration of the course. The leader (usually the teacher) establishes 
!lis position as leader (usually_..by merely being the teacher), but otherwise 
offers little direction, much to the frustration of the participants. The 
~embers of such a group, in an even more basic way that the members of a 
"goalless" sensitivity-training group, must determine the goals of the group 
and work out viable ways of dealing with one another. This is often a 
tortuous process during which they tend to take out their frustrations on the 
leader by symbolically expelling, "killing," or usurping the position of the 
leader (Slater, 1966). From time to time the members use the sessions to 
explore themselves and one another, so that the meetings sound like group 
psychotherapy sessions. Therefore, though the direct goal is to learn about 
small groups by becoming one, the participants engage in a good deal of 
behavior similar to that found in "growth" experiences of various kinds. 
Laboratories are also designed to study the potentialities of small 
groups, e.g., group versus individual ability in problem-solving and decision-
making situations. For instance, small groups are given different types of 
problems to work out or are asked to make managerial decisions. With the 
help of a trainer such groups reflect upon themselves and the processes they 
engage in order to solve problems and come to decisions. The participants 
become more aware, not only of group problem-solving and decision-making 
processes, but also of the human relations problems involved in group 
processes. According to Collins and Guetzkow (1964), inability to handle the 
interpersonal dimensions of task situations is one of the greatest sources of 
task failure. 
Meeting interpersonal obstacles contributes as much toward 
group productivity as meeting problems posed by task-
environmen tal obstacles; in fact, because group members 
have a tendency to ignore interpersonal issues, interperson-
al obstacles may be the majo~ barrier to task effectiveness 
in many groups (p. 88). 
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The principal focus of a laboratory, then, may be the small group its elf--
e.g., how they are formed, how a group of unrelated individuals becomes a 
cohesive unit, problem-solving processes in groups, group decision-making, 
certain group characteristics such as group norms, group climate, group 
structure, and power factors in groups. 
(4) The individual. The contract group is a laboratory in which 
intrapsychic and especially interpersonal issues are the direct focus of the 
group experience. A small group provides a unique opportunity for handling 
such issues: the participant can experiment with a wide variety of inter-
personal behaviors and can benefit from the comparatively wide spectrum of 
feedback he receives from his fellow participants. Stoller (1968) refers to 
such experimentation as "stretching accustomed modes of behavior," The group 
forms a kind of culture-in-miniature within which new constructs may be 
tried not just in an intellectual but in a behavioral way. Hampden-Turner 
(1966), in formulating an "existential" learning theory applicable to 
training situations, suggests that part of the growth cycle involves a 
person's periodically "letting go" and risking a portion of his "experienced 
competence" in order to "bridge the distance" between himself and the other. 
The participant ventures out into the group, experiemnts with "new" behavior, 
receives feedback, and ends with a new synthesis, including broadened 
knowledge and a clearer sense of his identity. 
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In all laboratories, and this includes the contract laboratory, theory 
is subordinated and emphasis is placed on impact-through-involvement. The 
whole purpose of a laboratory is to translate theory into action. Very often 
.---
the participants are not ready for this kind of learning; the emphases are 
unaccustomed ones: "The learning of concepts, the setting of goals, the 
clarification of values, and even the achievement of insight into self, are 
sometimes far ahead of the development of the performance skills necessary 
to expression inactual social transactions" (Berne, Bradford, & Lippitt, 1964, 
p. 17). One of the principal modes of flight employed by groups is to 
regress to an abstract discussion of concepts and values. But the group 
demands interpersonal performance rather than discussion: "Laboratory method 
starts with a different over-all view of learning as a transaction between 
learner and environment in which neither learner nor environment is regarded 
as fixed and in which both undergo modification" (Benne, Bradford, & Lippitt, 
1964, p. 24). Even if the laboratory is an academic course, books are absent 
or secondary. If there are lectures they are very short. The participants 
are not asked to repeat what they have learned and the general authoritarian 
structure associated with learning is laid aside. In fact, almost all the 
cues that traditionally enable a learner to identify a learning situation are 
absent. This disturbs some people. Some think that no learning or an 
inferior kind of learning is taking place. After the experience is over, 
the participant finds it difficult to categorize what he has "learned" in 
traditional terms. This at times embarrasses him and confuses those with 
whom he discusses his experience. 
George Kelly (1955a, 1955b) is interested in man-in-evolution. He 
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claims that man is best understood in the perspective of history and that by 
reflecting on himself he can discover ways of restucturing his life. The 
pattern man uses to view or const_rue the world he is in are called 
"constructs." Whether these constructs are "right" or ''wrong," they still 
exist: "What he perceives may not exist, but his perception does" (1955a, 
p. 8). Even though a person tries to improve his constructs by increasing 
his repertory of experience, his general construct system is resistant to 
change. Thus, two factors hinder him from bettering his construct system: 
(a) fear and the resultant need to hang on to the old and (b) the lack of a 
"laboratory" in which he could experiment with new constructs in a relatively 
controlled and safe way. The training laboratory is precisely the place 
i.·here the search for new "constructs" is secure. It is much easier to let go 
of the old, for it is both permi~ted and encouraged by the group culture. 
Possibly new constructs are there spread out among the heterogeneous group 
comprising the laboratory. Perhaps one of the reasons for the almost 
phenomenal growth of sensitivity-training laboratories and encounter groups 
is the need to have a relatively safe place in which to re-do one's construct 
system. 
Cultural permission. Residential laboratories are sometimes referred 
to as "cultural islands" both because they are cut off or insulated from the 
highly routinized culture in the "back-home" situation and because they 
develop their own culture in miniature. But whether the laboratory be 
residential or not, it affords the participants "cultural permission" to 
engage in certain activities that is not found in the back-there situation. 
"Cultural permission" is one of the keys to the success of laboratory 
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training; it allows the laboratory situation to be different from day-to-day 
living so that it might make a difference in such living. "Laboratory," 
then, means the establishment of a climate of freedom. If it is to succeed, 
there must exist in it a kind of freedom that is lacking outside the group. 
The contract is not just a structure; it is a stimulus to a certain behavioral 
freedom. It serves as a guideline to the kinds of experimentation that are 
encouraged and even demanded. Even contract laboratories, then, are freer 
than ordinary life, for they declare a moratorium on certain inhibitory 
conventions • 
What are some of the cultural permissions afforded by the laboratory? 
It "allows" comparative strangers to talk with one another at comparatively 
deep levels: the cultural prerequisites for friendship and intimacy are 
laid aside and the participants deal with one another at some depth, not 
because they are long time acquaintances, but merely because they are fellow 
human beings. Confrontation is another important area of cultural permission. 
We seldome tell one another what impact we have on one another. In our 
culture it seems much more permissible to tell a third party impressions about 
another that I would not dare tell the other. Such conversations abound, and 
while they may satisfy some need to ventilate one's frustrations in inter-
personal living, there is little in them that could be called growthful. 
The contract, in a sense, is a list of the cultural permissions given the 
participants in their interactions with one another: they may disclose 
themselves, express their feelings, tell others what they like about them, 
challenge the behavior or attitudes, lay aside those forms of politeness 
Which are really no more than interpersonal constrictions, and anything else 
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that appears to be both interpersonally responsible and growthful. Tilere 
is some complaint that some laboratories go too far, that they "permit" or 
even encourage too much, so that the cultural and even ethical sensibilities 
of the participants are offended. In view of the sensitivity-training 
explosion taking place on the American scene, this may well be true. 
However, the contract group encourages responsible cultural permissiveness 
without subscribing to cultural (or ethical) license. The person who 
participates in a contract group learns not only the operational provisions 
of the contract but he also learns why the contractual variables have been 
chosen. In the contract wide cultural permissions are extended, but it is 
the participant who must determine what he is going to allow himself. 
The Assumptions of Training Technology 
Campbell and Dunnette (1968) outline the implicit and explicit 
assumptions of T-group methodology. These assumptions will be listed here 
together with some indication as to how they apply to the contract group. 
Feedback. "A substantial number of group members, when confronted with 
others' behaviors and feelings in an.atmosphere of psychological safety, can 
;;roduce articulate and constructive feedback" (p. 77). The entire contract 
is designed to facilitate just this kind of feedback. Neither the inactive 
nor the irresponsibly confronting participant is fulfilling the contract and 
become themselves the object of group confrontation. Perhaps few of us feel 
comfortable revealing to another the impact his behavior has on us, but the 
contract provides a stimulus to do just that. 
Agreement ~ feedback. "A significant number of the group members can 
agree on the major aspects of a particular individual's behavior exhibited 
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in the group si.tuation. Certainly a complete consensus is not to be exacted, 
but neither must the feedback go off in· all directions" (p. 77). If the 
participant is a person who goes o~f "in all directions," then the feedback 
should reflect precisely this, that is, the contradictions in his behavior 
should become apparent. Secondly, a person l!lust reveal enough about himself 
if he expects any kind of consistency of feedback from the group. If he 
gives little of himself, then the feedback will be scattered, for it will 
be a question of each other member interpreting the participants behavior in 
his own way. There is no guarantee that there will be consistency of 
interpretation. In a word, if the participant wants to get some consistent 
picture of himself from the other members in the group, he must assume an 
active role in the gre>up, he must generate sufficient "data" as the raw 
material for feedback. If the participant is active, then the feedback will 
be consistent: this certainly is the assumption in the contract group, 
though it still awaits empirical verification. 
Completeness of feedback. "Feedback is relatively complete and deals 
with significant aspects of the individual's behavior" (p. 77}. If the 
members are actively pursuing the contract, then feedback will be as complete 
as the participant receiving the feedback will allow. A participant will 
not receive feedback on those dimensions of his person which he chooses not 
to reveal. But even if the participant is q_uite defensive in certain areas, 
feedback will be complete in the sense that others will teli him how 
defensive he appears. Again, this assumption depends upon whether the members 
of the group assume an active role in the group, especially with respect to 
the "significant aspects" of one another's behavior. The contract, in that 
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it encourages both_ self....0.:tsclosure and responsible confrontation, is a 
stimulus to deal with the significant. 
Representative behavior. "The·behavior emitted in the group is 
sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group so that learning 
occurring within the group will carry over or transfer" (p. 77) • There are 
really two assumptions here: (1) that the behavior in the group is a sample 
of behavior outside the group and (2) that changes in the sample behavior 
will transfer to behavior outside the group. The second assumption is 
really dealt with separately below. If a group not only permits but demands 
that its participants be themselves, then behavior in the group will be 
representative of behavior outside the group. A case comes to mind. A 
young lady in a week-end laboratory experience was all sweetness, light, and 
cliches. She was inunediately supportive of everyone and thus ingratiated 
herself with everyone. However, I did not believe that her behavior in the 
group was "sufficiently representative of behavior outside the group," she 
seemed less than real. I confronted her with my misgivings several times. 
She finally got quite angry and manifested a completely different side of 
her personality. After that incident her feedback to others became more 
realistic. A group has a way of dealing with facades; facades prevent 
person to person contact, and this inhibits the growth of the group. It is 
not that thre is any particular sense of accomplishment in stripping away 
the facade of another, it is rather that in the give-and-take of the group 
it is too frustrating to try to communicate with a facade. The contract 
demands a variety of "significant" behaviors. If a person does not engage 
in a particular kind of contractual behavior, this in itself is revealing. 
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For instance, if a person simply never confronts anyone else in the group, 
this can mean several things. It may mean that he is afraid of others or 
overly sensitive. It may mean t~at if he were to confront people would see 
a side of him that he does not want to reveal. In any case, he should be 
faced with his refusal to confront; he should be faced with the fact that 
his behavior in the group does not seem to be "representative." 
Psychological safety. "Psychological safety can be achieved relatively 
quickly in the group (in the matter of a few hours) among either complete 
strangers or among associates who have had varying types and degrees of 
interpersonal interaction" (p. 77). The contract increases psychological 
safety in a number of ways: it adds "high visibility" to the training 
experience and is thus anti-manipulative; it helps create a common group 
culture, so that the "risks" taken by the participant take place against 
the background of a shared culture; it demands growthful forms of behavior, 
e.g., concerned rather than punitive confrontation; the leader "models" 
contractual behavior and serves as a kind of "guardian" of the contract. 
Some would probably object that the contract makes the training situation too 
safe. I would rather hope that the participants would see in the contract 
a pledge of response and support no matter what they risked. 
Interpersonal incompetence. "Almost everyone initially lack inter-
personal competence; that is, individuals tend to have distorted self-images, 
faulty perceptions, and poor communication skills" (p. 77). This assumption 
is overstated. Most men have areas of competence, areas of promise, and areas 
of deficit in the interpersonal dimensions of their lives. The laboratory, 
however, should never be considered just as remedial. The 1 :. 1,oratory gives 
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its participants an opportunity to eKamine their interpersonal styles, 
including their areas of promise. A person, even though he feels that he is 
adequate in relating to others, ~ight discover that he is even more comfort-
able or stimulated when he approaches others in ways different from those 
he is used to. The participant, then, is asked to share his areas of 
competence, explore and experiment with his areas of promise, and discover and 
experiment with changes in his areas of deficit. 
Anxiety and learning. "Anxiety facilitates new learning" (p. 77). The 
place of anxiety in the training situation was dealt with above. 
Transfer learning. "Finally, transfer of training occurs between the 
cultural island and the 'back home' situation" (p. 77). While there is much 
anecdotal evidence that such transfer does take place, there has been 
relatively little empirical corrobo-ration. Burker and Knowles (1967), using 
questionnaires sent to those who knew the laboratory participants in the 
back-home situation, found evidence indicating that transfer of training does 
take place. As suggested above, perhaps the immediate fruit of training 
experiences lies in the area of attitude change, which may subsequently 
underlie behavioral change. 
Most experimental findings are useless unless they have some degree of 
generalizability. Interpersonal growth laboratories are failures if the 
participants do not ttansfer their learning to other social groups. Another 
way of conceptualizing the process is for each participant to consider his 
Wider social environment as part of the laboratory. I have been in groups 
in which college students, once having experimented with openness with 
their peers, widened the scope of their experimentation to include parents 
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and siblings. A number of them reported rather dramatic improvement of 
relationships, while a few said that people outside the group thought that 
they were "putting them on." However successful or unsuccessful these 
experiments outside the group might be, they enhance the group experience 
itself, especially to the degree that what takes place outside the group is 
transformed into the here-and-now. "I talked to my dad, and I tried to be 
open, but I don't think that he had the slightest idea what. I was talking 
about. I'm not sure whether it's him or me. Do I talk and say nothing here? 
I just wonder whether I am as vague as he makes me think I am." It is not 
just a question of trying out laboratory "gimmicks" on one's friends. Such 
childish manipulation would merely reflect the immaturity of the participant. 
But if the laboratory experience generalizes to include some of the 
"significant others" in the lives of at least some of the participants, then 
it is having the impact that it is meant to have, and Ll, lt:1 dialogue-with-
others-outside-the-group can add a new dimension to the total group · 
experience itself. 
"E;xperimental Controls" 
The laboratory as such is not an experiment in the strict sense (unless, 
of course, it is also the object of research, but then such research "stands 
apart" from the actual laboratory, at least in some sense of the term). 
Still, the notions of laboratory and experimentation, even in their widest 
sense, imply some concept of experimental controls. The contract adds a 
degree of "control" to the laboratory, Goals are clearly defined and an 
attempt is made to eliminate other than contractual variables. Even when 
non-contractual behavior arises, e.g •• the intrusion of need-goal behavior 
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that is antithetical to contract goals, such behavior is rather readily 
identified and "controlled" in this sense. The contract also offers a 
structural schema which facilitates the elaboration of different training 
,-·-
"designs." 
§uspension of Judgment 
On the one hand, the laboratory offers the participant a climate of 
interpersonal freedom that is available in few other social contexts; on the 
other, it demands of him a kind of suspension of judgment with respect to 
the design of the laboratory. In the contract group this design is quite 
visible and might seem, at least at first glance, to involve a number of 
artificialities (these are discussed below). There is the natural tendency 
to pre-judge the entire experience or at least various aspects of it. The 
participants, however, contract to suspend judgment as much as possible, to 
experience the laboratory and its exercises before evaluating them. Both 
more traditional sensitivity training laboratories and contract experiences 
involve a certain amount of psychological risk. In the former the 
participants are not sure what lies ahead; in the latter, the members know 
what lies ahead and are apprehensive about it. In both experiences the 
participant might find out that he is not as interpersonally effective as he 
thinks he is. Risk engenders anxiety, and anxiety engenders defensiveness. 
This defensiveness can well take the form of attacking as meaningless an 
experience that well might highlight interpersonal inadequacies both to 
oneself and others. If the participants are forewarned with respect to the 
elements of risk and anxiety and to the tendency to attack what might prove 
to be painful, it is hypothesi~ed here that they will approach the laboratory 
162 
experience with a greater sense of openness. An ideal attitude would be 
something like this: "In general I want the kind of experience described in 
the contract. I realize that it_ involves a certain amount of risk and anxiety 
I also realize that I am not entirely convinced as to the meaningfulness of 
all provisions of the contract, and I will probably have some reservations 
concerning the communication exercises that will be proposed. Still, I 
prefer not to pre-judge any particular aspects of the laboratory, in so far 
as this is possible. I am going to try to enter into everything with an 
open mind." If antecedent suspension of judgment is a value, so is consequent 
evaluation of laboratory and exercise. Again, if the laboratory itself or 
some particular aspect'of it reveals certain areas of deficit in inter-
personal capability, there will be a natural tendency to attack the source 
of this knowledge. Still, laboratory designs will grow in effectiveness 
only if the laboratory experience is realistically ul ti, !.wd hy the 
participants. 
~ 2_ Laboratory in Interpersonal Relations ..!!_Not. 
The laboratory is not an assemblage of guinea pigs who are being 
manipulated either by the leader from within or by researchers from without. 
Jourard (1967) strongly questions the kind of research in which the human 
person becomes an object to be manipulated: 
A humanistic psychologist, like his less humanistic colleague, 
is concerned to identify the factors that affect man's 
experience and action, but his aim is not to render man pre-
dictable to, and controlled by, someone else. Rather, his aim 
is to understand how determining variables function, in order that 
man might be liberated from their impact as he pursues his own 
free projects (p. 109). 
Jourard goes on to suggest that the experimenter-subject relntionship be one 
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of dialogue rather than manipulation. Rome and Rome (1967), who have been 
developing a unique method of studying the organization and government of 
large social organizations, repor~ successful research in which subjects are 
seen as collaborators in the enterprise rather than as objects of manipulation 
~!ilgram (1963) conducted a study in which "obedience" to the experimenter 
meant that the subject (insofar as he knew the situation) had to administer 
painful shocks to another subject. Tuenty-six out of forty subjects "admin-
istered" the highest shocks on the "generator" (the other subject was a 
stooge and was not receiving any shocks at all). It is chilling to think 
what a subject will do for a man of science. Milgram's subjects were given 
a kind of "scientifi.c permission" to do what they would ordinarily consider 
inhuman. It would be ironical if the leader were to engage in any kind of 
large scale manipulation, for one of the purposes of the laboratory is to 
have the participants learn to involve themselves with one another in non-
manipulative ways. 
Artificiality-Reality Dimensions of Laboratory Life. 
The sources of artificiality. At first glance it would seem that a 
laboratory in interpersonal relations labor under a relatively high degree 
of artificiality. In a sense this is true; laboratories are contrived, and 
their artificiality would make little sense unless it somehow had an impact 
on day-to-day living. The sources of artificiality in the contract group, 
for instance, are at least three. 
(a) Laboratory artificiality. The laboratory itself is artificial. 
The people who comprise the various groups in the laboratory situation do not 
come together "naturally," that is, they do not choose to be with other 
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members of the group because they are attracted to them for one reason or 
another. In most instances the participants find themselves in "stranger" 
groups, that is, most of the participants are, at least relatively, unknown 
to one another. Or, if they do know one another, it is not along the 
dimensions emphasized by the laboratory. And yet they are expected quickly 
to achieve a certain degree of intimacy with one another in the give-and-take 
of group interaction. The artificiality of being with the members of this 
group is often emphasized if the laboratory is composed of a number of 
groups. After a while certain members begin to feel the "distant-fields" 
urge, and they begin saying to themselves "I wish I were in that group." 
(b) Contract artificiality. The second source of artificiality is the 
contract itself. The participants are not only expected to achieve a certain 
degree of intimacy with one another, but the contract (at least the one 
described here) specifies to a great extent the nature of this intimacy. For 
instance, the participant is expected to reveal to others the kind of person 
he is~ at least in some degree. He is expected to confront others, and be 
confronted by them. Not only are strangers thrown together in a kind of 
intimacy, but even the dimensions of this intimacy are imposed. 
(c) Exercise artificiality. The laboratory usually entails certain 
stimuli to connnunication in the form of laboratory exercises. These will 
be considered in greater detail elsewhere, but at least one example must be 
treated here, because exercises do constitute a third source of artificiality. 
For instance, there is the "snake" exercise, a somewhat ominous term, arising 
innocently enough, however, from the physical arrangement of the participants. 
The members of the laboratory divide into two groups, arranging themselves 
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in two lines a couple of feet apart so that each member is directly opposite 
Jnother member. Then each member merely looks silently into the eyes of the 
person standing opposite him for ~!fteen or twenty seconds. Each row circles 
around (the "snake" undulates) until every member has gazed into the eyes 
of every other member. This part of the exercise is entirely non-verb.al. 
Then the members of the group sit down and discuss how they felt, what 
emotions or reactions arose, during the exercise. There are other both verbal 
and non-verbal exercises, most of which are designed to stimulate different 
modes of communication among members or to dissolve communication "blocks" 
that arise in the group. Whatever their purpose, however, they are still 
artificial; they are ways of interpersonal acting which are not current in 
even the relatively intimate associations of ordinary life. 
The reality of laboratory life. One of the assumptions underlying the 
laboratory experience is that it must be different from day-to-day living if 
it is to make a difference, if it is to have an impact on such living. But 
the laboratory experience is not designed just to be different, it is not 
a question of courting a "games" artificially. "Artificial" experiences are 
countenanced only to the degree that they are considered useful in changing 
interpersonal attitudes and behaviors in the direction of fuller interpersonal 
living. Perhaps a better way of putting it is this: the artificialities of 
the human relations laboratory are valuable to the degree that they highlight 
"overlooked realities" in day-to-day interpersonal living. Much of what 
takes place in a laboratory is artificial only in the sense that it is not 
what is usually done in interpersonal relationships, not in the sense that 
it is false or inauthentic. Training groups, then are something more and 
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something less than real life. They are certainly more than most of the 
ritualistic and cliche interrelating that goes on in everyday life, but 
they are less than the natural, -~pontaneous growthful contacts that take 
place between those who choose one another as friends at the deepest levels. 
(a) Laboratory reality. The members come together because they want 
to grow interpersonally. The participant is expected to involve himself 
with this group of "strangers" precisely because they are human beings. They 
involve themselves with one another; the work out their likes and dislikes, 
and they do so in the context of this group. The laboratory sets up a 
demand that each member face this set of interpersonal relationships. 
One of the realities of ordinary human living is that people are "locked" 
into relationships with certain other individuals or sets of individuals. In 
the laboratory, interpersonal problems cannot be solved by ignoring them, 
by moving to a different set of persons, or by utilizing other modes of 
interpersonal flight. The pressure for involvement with this particular set 
of people, while artificial in one sense, highlights the unreality of un-
productive modes of involvement or non-involvement with the "real" people in 
the participant's normal life si~uation. Moreover, deal~g with the 
stranger in the laboratory group can bring home to the participant, in a 
dramatic way, his failure to deal with the "stranger element" in those with 
whom he is intimate in real life. The laboratory does not allow the 
opportunities of flight from intimacy that day-to-day living often does. 
Therefore, part of its artificiality is that it is more rather than less 
real than ordinary interpersonal living. 
(b) Contractual reality. The laboratory itself makes it impossible for 
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the participant to take flight from these people, this set of interpersonal 
relationships. The contract, insofar as it defines the general ways that 
each is to involve himself with the others, prevents group members from 
avoiding certain important modalities of interpersonal relating. The member 
is forced to engage in interpersonal activities that may not be part of his 
interpersonal life style. He is not only engaged with these particular 
people, but he cannot avoid the qualitative realities of this engagement 
that are called for by the contract. A member, in his ordinary life, might 
manage to avoid letting others know something about the "person within," he 
nay court "any-price" peace and thus avoid confrontation and the self-
examination it involves, but in the group the pressures of the contract 
tend to force him to face, at least to some degree, these realities of 
interpersonal living. Therefore, the contract, too, for all its artificiality 
exacts an engagement with interpersonal realities which are too often avoided 
in real life. 
(c) Exercise reality. Exercises usually focus in on smaller elements 
of the connnunication experience. The "snake" exercise, for instance: When 
two people communicate, they usually look at each other from time to time, 
and they are aware that they are present to each other. The "snake" exercise 
isolates this aspect of communication. It is artificial in its isolation of 
certain elements of connnunication, in its protractedness, and in its 
completely non-verbal character. But eye-contact and mutual non-vet t;al 
presence are human realities, realities that usually go generally unnoted in 
human interrelating. Exercises focus on molecular aspects of relating in 
order to make them more real in molar living. Some artists exaggerate 
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vJ.rious fonns in their painting in order to make the observer look at a 
:orm that has never really "lived" in the observer's eye or to revive a feel-
ing for something that may have oo..ce lived but is now dead. Exercises are 
the "zoom lens" of the laboratory experience. If they are used judiciously, 
they can make certain aspects of interpersonal relating come alive in 
dramatically new ways. 
Aronson and Carlsmith (1968), in discussing experimentation in social 
psychology, refer to both "experimental" and "mundane" realism. 
In one sense, an experiment is realistic if the situation is 
realistic to the subject, if it involves him, if he is forced 
to take it seriously, if it has impact on him. This kind of 
realism we call experimental realism. The term 'realism' can 
also be used to refer to the extent to which events occurring 
in the laboratory setting are likely to occur in the treal 
world.' We call this type of realism mundane realism (p. 22). 
If this terminology is adpated to l~boratories in interpersonal relations, it 
may be said that such laboratories are high in both experiment and mundane 
realism. The participant can become as "engaged" as he desires in the inter-
action of the group, and, if the intimacy that develops within the group 
does not reflect the intimacy of the participant's "real world," in some way 
it should and therefore becomes diagnostic, if not motivational. 
Conclusion 
Laboratories ~ centers for study of the normal. The interpersonal-
growth laboratory provides an opportunity to study some of the deepest 
reactions of man in an atmosphere of relative security. The environment has 
its realism and yet it is controlled. There is no reason why growthful 
training experiences and research cannot take place at the same time. 
Laboratories as centers for the "therapy" of the !'_:nrmal. Schofield 
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(1964) expresses concern about the number of people with "philosophical·· 
:ieuroses" who take up the time of clinical professionals who have more 
important or pressing work to do .• _- According to him, the "philosophically" 
diseased': 
suffer a freedom of complaint. The absence of conflicts, 
frustrations, and symptoms brings a painful awareness of 
absence--the absence of faith, of commitment, of meaning, of 
the need to search out personal ultimate values, or the need 
to live comfortably and meaningfully in the face of final 
uncertainty. For increasing number of rational, educated, and 
thoughtful men the central struggle becomes one of finding and 
keeping an emotional and psychological balance between the 
pain of doubt and the luxury of faith. A distaste for this 
struggle, or an insistence on its resolution as a necessary 
condition for continued existence is at the heart of the 
philosophical Neurosis (p. 150). 
Encounter groups, led by those with drastically less formal training than 
professional therapists, seem almost ideal in handlin~ such problems. The 
participants are suffering and therefore the group is serious business to . 
them. Bot one of their chief complaints is that, in one way or another, they 
are out-of-meaningful-community. The small group is a meaningful community, 
but it is also a center where the participants learn to involve themselves 
more effectively with others, with the wider community, and with the problems 
which face the country in general. 
Schofield is also concerned with the need of trained people to work with 
the emotionally disturbed. He favors steps that have been taken to recruit 
and utilize non-professionals as mental health counselors (see Rioch, Blkes, 
Flint, Usdansky, Newman, & Silber, 1963). Contract group, under the direc-
tion of professionals, could be used quite effectively to train such mental 
health counselors. 
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The present culture. Growth-through-groups has caught on in America. 
It is hardly surprising. There have been diatribes against sensitivity-
training, encounter groups, resid=ntial laboratories, and other facets of 
human relations training, but any wholesale affirmation or condemnation of 
these phenomena is meaningless. Sensitivity-training is simply not a unitary 
phenomenon. There are good laboratory experiences, poor ones, and even 
dangerous ones. We should now see to it that a wholesome laboratory culture 
takes roots in our social system. It seems that there is even a humanistic 
laboratory-orientation to life. If I am laboratory-oriented, this means that 
I am always somewhat aware of my areas of deficit and promise and that I can 
experiment ways of reducing dissonance in my life and actualizing inter-
personal possibilities. It means that I am willing to take risks in order 
to grow. In means that I realize that others have resources even for my 
own growth which I do not possess myself but which I can tap in a very human 





The question of leadership in general is a complex one. Gibb (1950) 
studied two sets of ten-man leaderless groups (one group of college students 
and one of army officer candidates). He had outside observers rate the 
group members on leadership qualities and the members of the groups them-
selves rated one another on three sociometric questions. The group members 
·•ere to choose (1) those with whom they would like to spend leisure time, 
(2) those with whom they would like to work, and (3) the person whose removal 
from the group would bring about the largest group change. The results 
showed that sociometric choice on the third criterion (removal and group 
change) had, by far, the highest correlation with observer ratings of 
leadership. It is difficult, then, to point out in any general way what 
makes a good leader, for leadership criteria can change from situation to 
situation. As Lindzey and Byrne (1968) point out, "it appears that the 
nature of the relationship between sociometric status and leadership is 
dependent on the demands of the situation and the characteristics of the 
individuals composing the group" (p. 485). 
Mann (1959) sunnnarizes some of the problems associated with evaluating 
leadership. 
Viewed historically, the study of leadership has stimulated more 
than its share of controversy. The trait approach to leadership, 
the view that leadership is an attribute of the individual, has 
received the harshest treatment throughout the years. To have 
spoken of an individual as possessing a measurable quantity of 
leadership was perhaps an unfortunate choice of wor<ls. The clear 




to the indivi.dual, it will remain constant for the individual 
regardless of the situation in which he finds himself. 
Investigations of the actual consistency with which an indi-
vidual maintains leadership status in different groups and 
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under varying conditions h~ve yielded results sufficiently 
equivocal to permit a new bifurcation of the field. On the one 
hand, the trait approach has been modified to imply that an 
individual's achieved leadership status is a function of his 
personality. On the other hand, sufficient evidence has been 
accumulated to give impetus to the situational approach to 
leadership, which lllB.intains that leadership is an emergent 
phenomenon, created through the interaction of individuals 
(leaders and followers), and that selection and stability of 
any leadership pattern is a function of the task, composition, 
and culture of the group. From all this work has emerged some 
such sunnnary formulation as that an individual's leadership status 
in groups is a joint function of his personality and the 
particular group setting (pp. 246-247). 
Given these cautions, Mann goes on to indicate those personality qualities 
~hich the empirical literature shows as associated with effective leadership 
in small groups. 
The pos:t:ive relationships of intelligence, adjustment, and 
extroversion to leadership are highly significant. In addition~ 
dominance, masculinity, and interpersonal sensitivity are found 
to be positively related, while conservatism is found to be 
negatively related to leadership (p. 252). 
It is difficult to specify leadership qualities in as restricted an area as 
laboratory training, for little or no research has been done on leadership 
in such groups and de facto leadership styles vary greatly from leader to 
leader and from situation to situation. According to Whitman (1964), the 
trainer in a T-group should have experience in two areas: (1) his own inner 
life, and (2) group dynamics. Both of these qualities seem essential for a 
trainer in a contract group. 
~ Trainer as Leader-Member 
Leader-member. In the contract group the leader is also a member, that 
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is, he subscribes to the same member contract that the other participants do. 
In most sensitivity-training groups part of the "planned ambiguity" revolves 
1round the role of the trainer in the group. For a while he seems to be 
~either leader nor member, for he gives the group little direction and in 
~;eneral interacts little with the individual members. But again, it is 
Jifficult to talk about what trainers do or do not do in groups in general 
~ecause of the great variability in trainer styles. However, in the contract 
~roup the function of the leader is explicit. What he should do as member 
is spelled out in the member contract. What he should do as leader is 
spelled out in this chapter. What follows, then, constitutes a kind of 
leader contract. 
The leader-member and interpersonal effectiveness. Mann (1959) 
indicated that an effective leader is an adjusted one. Rogers (1967) has 
found that the "congruent" therapist is more effective and describes such 
a person as one who "responds as the real person he actually is," who 
"employs no artificial front and does not have to hide or fear his real 
reactions" (p. 10). The trainer in the contract group should also be a.\ 
justed and "congruent," but this does not place him in a separate category 
in the group. It is not essential that he be the "most adjusted" or the 
" most congruent." The leader-member is in the group because he is interested 
in interpersonal growth, his own included. He is not there because he had 
"made it" in the area of interpersonal relations, but because he thinks that 
interpersonal growth is important. Because of his experience he may be mo re! 
aware of his own interpersonal strengths and his areas of deficit, and it is 
this being in touch with his own experiencing which enables him to make 
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1.:1tclligence, that is, he has a feeling for people and knows how to get in 
, ,.,tact with them without manipulating them. llis social intelligence is 
L"en partially in his ability to become a member of the group sincerely, even 
~hough he is the leader or trainer. If the leader-member is not congruent and 
::1 other respects socially intelligent, then his presence in the group will 
.c disturbing rather than growthful and the participants will have to spend 
1 good deal of energy in learning how to deal with him. 
::1e Functions of the Leader-Member 
Initial structuring. It goes without saying that the leader should be 
familiar, both theoretically and experientially, with the contract under 
·•hich the group will be working. If the contract is given to prospective 
~embers before entering the group, then the leader need say little about 
the contract once the group begins. However, if the contract is "imposed," 
there may be more "contract-disturbance" during the first few meetings and 
some minimal discussion of the contract as contract will be in order. Under 
no condition, however, should the leader allow the contract to become the 
continual object of discussion; one of the reasons for the contract is 
precisely to avoid such "contract talk." The leader should avoid answering a 
multiplicity of abstract questions about the contract, even when the contract 
is brief and therefore open to some misinterpretation. The best time to 
answer a question concerning the contract is when the particular contract 
Problem arises during the group interaction itself. Many areas within the 
contract can be cleared up effectively only within the context of group 
action. 
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Whitman (1964} sees the initial remarks made by the trainer in a T-group 
as extremely important in defining the subsequent character of the group 
(see Redl, 1942). The situation in the contract group, however, is quite 
different in that the contract itself bears a good deal of the weight of the 
initial structuring. What is important in the contract group is the immediate 
affective impact that the leader has on the group. There is no reason why 
he should not be warm and accepting from the very beginning rather than aloof 
and ambiguous. If the emotional attitudes he expresses arouses the resistance 
of the participants, then the group will have to spend time dealing with this 
rather than proceeding to the immediate concerns of the contract. Working 
through such resistance may well be a fruitful experience in itself, but it 
is not part of the explicit design of the contract group experience. In the 
contract group a poor beginning due to a clumsy leader is simply "uneconomic," 
for it is a time-consuming undertaking to try to right "wrongs" in group 
process once they have been made. 
Putting his knowledge and experience at the service of the group. 
According to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), one of the sources of the group 
the rapist's "power" comes from the unique posi tlon from which he sees the 
group "focal conflict," which consists of two elements: a disturbing motive, 
that is, a wish on the part of one or more participants and a reactive motive, 
that is, the fear or fears aroused by the disturbing motive. The therapist, 
because of his experience and training and because he in some way "stands 
apart" from the group, has a vision of the group which none of the 
participants has. This is at least one of the factors which makes him a 
powerful figure. In training laboratories any leader who has a high degree 
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Jf social intelligence, who has a solid knowledge of group dynamics, and who 
; 1as had experience in groups in a powerful figure indeed. However, the way 
in which the trainer in the contr.~ct group uses his power differs from the 
·.:ay in which a therapist traditionally uses his in group psychotherapy and 
from the way in which another trainer would use his in a more traditional 
sensitivity-training group. This is to be expected since the goals (or at 
least the means!) differ .in these three different situations. The primary 
function of the leader in the contract group is to place all of his resources 
at the service of the group ~ directly and ~unambiguously ~possible. He 
is there both to fulfill the contract and to help the other members to 
fulfill it too. He is a kind of "social engineer," who in interested in the 
development of the conditions of the interpersonal setting. The statement of 
the conditions of the interpersonal setting is taken care of by the contract, 
but it is up to the trainer to see to it that these conditions develop in 
such a way as to lead to the fulfillment of the goals of the contract. His 
leadership does not place him "outside" the group nor does his leadership in 
the group give him any special position in the group with respect to the 
member contract. He is not even different from the other members in that 
he is to serve the group, since it is the function of all the participants to 
serve the group. However, because of his knowledge, experiencl!, and skills, 
he is in a special position to serve the group. 
Because of his knowledge of group dynamics (groups as "natural") and 
because of his experience (including his experience with groups as 
"contractual"), he knows, even before the group begins, the kinds of problems 
that will most likely arise "naturally" and impede tLL: pr .;gress of the group. 
177 
::c therefore uses this knowledge of groups-as-"natural" to forestall the 
dnds of group process that do not contribute to the goals of the group, no 
::Jtter how profitable such activUy would be in another context. For instance 
:1e prevents the participants from entering into a long, intellectualized 
discussion of the merits of the contract or of sensitivity training in 
.;cneral. Such discussions, no matter how intellectually profitable they may 
be, do not contribute to the goals of the contract and therefore are 
considered by definition (or rather "by contract") forms of flight behavior. 
If the group wants to pursue goals other than those outlined in the contract, 
they should come to a consensus, abandon the contract, and subscribe to a 
different process. 
Dealing with the major characteristic problems of groups. N-interactions 
(see chapter 2} can be disruptive, neutral, or facilitative with respect to 
the goals set by the contract. The contract trainer ignores the neutral, 
confronts the disruptive, and encourages the facilitative. For instance, 
Lott and Lott (1965), in a review of the literature on group cohesiveness, 
found that increased contact or interaction on the part of group members 
heightens the cohesiveness of the group. The trainer, then, encourages the 
members of the group to interact with one another as much as possible and he 
discourages or confronts behavior that limits interaction (e.g. speeches, 
monologues, psychological withdrawal, excessive silence, etc.). There are 
certain usually avoidable "natural" problems in groups that are so important 
that, at least in the contract group, they should be explained in some way 
from the very beginning. If these problems which are productive of disruptive 
N-interactions are explained in the contract itself, then the leader need 
178 
~ot do so but merely comment on them (and confront when necessary) when they 
do arise. However they are explained and handled, it should be before they 
interfere with an "economic" purs_l,lal of group goals. In other kinds of 
;;roup experiences these same problems arise, but they are handled often 
Jnly after they disrupt the group, and purposely so. For instance, a group 
=ight become entangled in long, intellectualized discussions of psycho-
<lynamics. During the course of these discussions, many members become bored 
and withdraw psychologically from the group. Finally, after the participants 
have experienced the deadening effect of the particular kind of non-growthful 
!\-interaction, the trainer may ask the group to reflect on what is happening. 
The participants learn painfully, but profitably, that they have really been 
avoiding more intimate contact with one another. However, learning the 
anatomy of disruptive or non-growthful N-interaction:, b9 actually living with 
them is not one of the primary goals of the contract group. 
Perhaps the central characteristic problems that will face the group 
should be included in the contract and/or discussed by the leader from the 
very beginning. Later, as less crucial problems arise, the leader can 
interpret them in the context of the group interaction. Some N-interactions 
are more disruptive than others and it is also possible that different kinds 
of N-interactions will prove disruptive (or facilitative) to groups with 
different kinds of contracts. The problems discussed below are considered 
important enough for the contract group to warrant attention before the group 
begins: 
(1) The handling-the-leader problem. Almost everyone who discusses 
the question of leadership in small groups deals with the problems that 
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Jrise because of the polarization that takes place between leader and members 
(e.g. Bennis, 1956, 1964; Bion, 1961; Tuckman, 1965; Whitman, 1964). Tuckman 
(1965) suggests that the initia~_stage of training groups is marked by a 
degree of member-leader disturbance. Bennis (1964) divides participants into 
three categories during this initial stage: the "dependents," those who 
look to the trainer for cues, the "counterdependents," those who solve their 
dependency needs by opposing the leader, and the "independents," those who 
are "not threatened by the prospect of intimacy" (p. 264). Nor is it certain 
that such polarization is confined to the initial stage of the group, for 
although Bennis (1956) hypothesized that the group would deal first with the 
problem of authority (evidenced by power struggles and by preoccupation with 
relationships with the trainer) and then go on to deal with the problem of 
intimacy (evidenced by concerns about how much self-revelation there could 
be, etc.), the results showed a continuous dealing with both these issues. 
Perhaps Slater (1966) deals most intensively with such group-characteristic 
phenomena as dependency, counterdependency, revolt, exclusion-of-the-leader, 
etc. Mann (1967) has developed a rather extensive member-leader analysis 
system in which all feelings of member toward leader are scored. The system 
includes such categories as "moving against," "resisting," "withdrawing," 
"guilt inducing" (e.g. , blaming, accusing, feeling misunderstood, etc.) , 
"identifying," "moving toward," "showing dependency," "showing self-es teem" 
(e.g., showing leader ability of being open and honest), etc. 
As intriguing as such variables are and as focal as they are in a variety 
of group experiences, in the contract group an attempt is made to render them 
relatively inconsequential. The overriding goal of the contract group 
------------------------------.....-·-
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~emands that the parti.cipants become as deeply involved as possible with one 
.:nother. However, if the group spends an initial stage dealing primarily 
·.;ith member-leader phenomena (Tuck.man, 1965) or deals continuously with such 
.. -
?roblems (Bennis, 1956), time and energy are diverted from what are considered 
to be more important goals. Therefore, the leader "blows his cover," as it 
1.·ere, he tells the group about these phenomena, he indicates the kinds of 
::-interactions (e.g. dependency, counterdependency behavior) that arise in 
face-to-face groups because of member-leader polarization. He abdicates his 
"fatherhood" and his "divinity" from the beginning. If members are to have 
difficulty with him, he wants it to be because he is another group member and 
not because he is leader. However, this does not mean that dependency and 
counterdependency phenomena will not arise in the group, but it is 
hypothesized that they will not arise with the same frequency and with the 
same intensity as they would in groups not made aware of such phenomena from 
the beginning. The fact that a particular member refuses to allow the leader 
~o abdicate his fatherhood or his omnipotence is quite significant. But 
~uthority problems do exist and they will be stronger in some participants 
than in others. Member-leader polarization "stages" or "cultures" are to be 
~voided, not individual N-interactions that arise from very deep needs in 
individual cases. No contract can legislate authority or dependency problems 
out of existence. In fact individual problems in these areas will be high-
lighted in the contract group because they will not appear merely as a part 
of a "stage" or a "culture." 
I 
According to Whitaker and Lieberman (1964), part of the therapist's 
,, 
Power" in group therapy comes "from the frequency with which the patients 
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i::ipute to the therapist the power of gratification, threat, and magical 
... olutions. On this basis, the therapist becomes an object of impulses 
:nvolved in the group focal confllct and a source of solutions" (pp. 197-198). 
:t is precisely this power which the leader, insofar as this is possible, 
.1bdicates. The contract-group leader differs from both therapist (at least 
.!s traditionally conceived) and trainer in that he makes himself quite 
''visible." He tries to avoid rather than utilize ambiguity. Unlike the 
trainer as Whitman (1964) conceives him, he is not concerned with a middle-
road between "absence of visibility" and "complete visibility" (p. 312). 
::is cards are on the table. He does not feel constrained to withhold infor-
::::it ion from the group because they cannot "tolerate" it. Both member contract 
Jnd leader contract are group property. It is hypothesized that such 
0penness will facilitate communication within the group and make the leader 
less of a "problem." 
Finally, the trainer in the contract group does not conceive of the 
::iembers' relationships to him and his to theirs in terms of "transference" and 
''countertransference." While there is no special need to look upon transfer-
t;nce as "a devil conjured up only to be sent back to his usual habitat with 
:::uch expenditure of time and energy" (Eysenck, 1959, p. 74), still it is 
considered a non-crucial issue in the contract group. Those who conceive of 
resistance to growth in such tenns as tr.ansference (e.g. Bernstein, 1965) 
I ~ight argue that an attempt to eliminate the problems centering around member-
1 leader polarization by increasing the visibility of the phenomenon merely 
:::o.kes the problem of transference more acute by making it less visible. On 
t-1 l Le.le ot 1er hand, many therapists work without the concept of trans ferencc or 
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.i: leat conceive of it in other than psychoanalytic terms. For instance, May 
:158) suggests that "the neurotic is one who in certain areas never developed 
~<:;:ond the limited and restricted forms of experience characteristic of the 
,. 
I ::1fJnt. Hence in later years he perceives wife or therapist through the 
,,1:::e restricted, distorted 'spectacles' as he perceived father or mother" 
p. 79). It is not a question of "transfering" feelings but of persistently 
;dceiving relationships in maladaptive ways. 
Preventing "tacit understandings." Whitman (1964) refers to the 
~ifferent "levels" on which a group operates simultaneously. He says that 
"for practical purposes, two levels is a useful division. Overt and covert, 
Jr manifest and latent, are ways of describing these levels" (p. 318). 
3oth Bennis and his associates (1957) and Lieberman (1958) found that norms 
.ibout member behavior were established early in the group and tended to 
persist throughout the life of the group. Groups "naturally" make decisions, 
' :!1at is, they make N-interaction decisions, and not just C-interaction 
decisions, about all sorts of things: procedure, topics to be discussed, 
limits to be set, etc. Some of these decisions are overt, some are covert. 
For instance, sex might come up in the course of the group discussion, but 
somehow or other it is sidetracked. It comes up again later, but again it 
is sidetracked. finally, even though it is not openly discussed, group 
members realize that "we do not talk about sex in this group." This is what 
Slater (1966) calls a "tacit understanding." A covert decision has been 
reached in the group. The group of tacit understandings which is currently 
operative, gives direction to the group, and sets limits for group inter-
actions, may be called the "group mentality" or the group "culture." Bion 
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(1959), Slater (1966), and Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) all deal with 
this phenomenon. 
"Facit understandings" can subvert the expressed purposes of the group. 
The trouble with covert decisions is that once they are made, they are very 
difficult to change. 
The group forms its own history and constructs its own standards 
and modes of behavior and, once fixed, they are extremely diffi-
cult to alter •.•. They have almost the binding effect of laws; for 
the social punishment when they are broken (such as disapproval, 
ostracism, and hostility) is as severe as its equivalent prison 
sentence in Western society (Whitman, 1964, p. 315). 
Groups can die from stumbling over their "tacit culture." 
Since covert decisions are considered to impede rather than facilitate 
group process in the contract-group, the leader discusses the notions or 
"tacit understandings" and "group culture" with the participants. He not 
only "blows his own cover," but he ·also "blows the cover" of the group. The 
ideal is that decisions in the group be made overtly and and not covertly. 
Explaining the concept of "tacit understanding" at the beginning of group 
process certainly does not eliminate the "natural" tendency of the group to 
operate this way. The leader must confront the group in the process of 
coming to a "tacit understanding," For instance, if the leader witnesses 
the sidetracking of the sex issue mentioned above, he would confront the 
group: "The sex issue has been brought up a number of times and each time 
it has been sidetracked. It seems that we are on the verge of entering into 
I 
a tacit understanding' not to talk about sex, If we really want to avoid 
the sex issue, let's first talk about it and then make a decision above 
board." Crucial (and thus anxiety-provoking) issues are often sidetracked 
~throueh this covert decision-making ~rocess. 
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Any kind of ''hidden agenda" in the group muddies communication and 
,.,ould be avoided insofar as possible~ Both individuals and groups as such 
. m develop a hidden agenda. Fo:r,_example, A might be attracted to B and 
·•:)Uld like to see the relationship a mutual one. Therefore, A in any number 
for 
;.hink and feel alike. Or a group may conspire, indirectly, to "get" a 
;'unitive trainer • The participants become apathetic and bored or sabotage 
.:::·:crcises suggested by the trainer and in general see to it that the trainer 
'.ails in his task. Since pursuit of a hidden agenda ultimately works 
counter to the declared· goals of the contract group, it should be dealt with 
in the same way as tacit understandings. 
(3) Lowest-common-denominatorism. When even one person in a group 
displays indifference toward the goals of the group, the efficacy of the 
group is lowered. Whitman (1964) claims that the T-group can move along only 
as rapidly as the slowest member. The problem of the lagging or delinquent 
or deviate member is one that arises "naturally" in groups. Although an 
effective contract can help control deviancy by eliminating the unmotivated 
(especially if the contract is freely chosen and not just "imposed") and by 
eliminating the kind of vagueness and ambiguity in group process that often 
engender the indifference or apathy of the deviant member, there is no 
ultimate way of ensuring the interest and cooperation of all members. The 
problem of lack of motivation is one of the most difficult to handle in all 
kinds of growth experiences. Rogers (1966) believes that it is more 
difficult to deal with than psychosis: 
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From our own experience in working with unmotivated schizophrenic 
individuals and a small matched group of unmotivated normal 
individuals I have come to a conclusion which you may regard as 
startling. It is my present conviction that working with a lack 
of conscious motivation in the individual is more difficult than 
working with the problem of-psychosis. This is of course a 
subjective opinion, based in part on our general lack of success 
in trying to form a facilitative relationship with unmotivated 
'normals' of low socioeducational status. Insofar as the two 
elements are separable, I believe the absence of conscious desire 
for help presents a greater challenge to the therapist than the 
presence of psychosis (p. 8). 
Tiie leader, then, should discuss the possibility of the group's ultimately 
having to deal with an unmotivated or deviant member. If this is done, it is 
hypothesized that the delinquent member will not have as much of a retarding 
effect on the group. Whether such a member should be expelled or encouraged 
to remove himself from the group is a moot question. The natural tendency 
of groups which lose a member for one reason or another is to spend a good 
deal of time dealing with their own feelings of guilt and loss. Whatever is 
done, the contract group should not allow a deviant member to absorb its 
energies. 
~Leader as Guardian of lli_ Contract 
Stock (1964) suggests that a trainer may be sensitive to "missing 
functions" in the group and may either deliberately try or unconsciously tend 
to supply the missing element. In the contract group the "elements" of the 
group experience are more clearly delineated and it is therefore much easier 
for the leader (and the other members) to see what is "missing." The traint~r, 
then, should consciously try to stimulate the group to add what is missing. 
In a sense, therefore, the leader-member is, at least initially, the guardian 
of the contract. He is in the service of the group members principally to 
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. ~:1efit to the degree that they share in the "common good" of the group, and 
~t is the function of the leader to see to it that this common good, as 
~efined by the superordinate, int~raction, and process goals of the group, 
:s pursued. He fulfills this function. by encouraging and modeling contract 
·~chavior and by confronting those who do not engage in such behavior or who 
~:1gage in anti-contractual behavior. He has every right to encourage and 
-:onfront quite directly, for his being a "stimulus" is part of the contract 
~o which the members agree. He does not have to apologize for upholding the 
:on tract. However, the way in which he fulfills his function as "guardian" 
:s quite important. If he is a watch dog, an authoritarian figure, who 
~Jnfronts in alienating ways, then he will induce a non-growthful polarization 
~ctween himself and the other participants. An important way of encouraging 
'ontractual behavior is to have the participants reflect on their own 
behavior. He has them stand back and evaluate or "process" the ways in which 
they are pursuing (or avoiding) the goals of the contract. Such self-criticism 
is less ego-deflating and of ten more direct and incisive than that of an 
observer. There is perhaps a curvilinear relationship between the degree of 
''guardian" behavior and productivity in the group. Productivity will be low 
if the leader-member is either too cautious or too eager to confront a 
delinquent group. Optimal productivity will be correlated with forceful but 
tempered confrontation. This is a difficult task, so, again, there is no 
substitute for social competency in the leader. 
~ Leader as Model 
There are various ways in which the leader can promote the contract: he 
c~in encourage, stimulate, confront, "process," and in general act from the 
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"outside." But since in the contract group he is a leader-member, he 
?romotes the contract perhaps principally by modeling the behavior called for 
~y the contract: he accepts, h~_encourages, he engages in self-disclosure, 
~e invites others to self-examination, he responds to confrontation by 
examining his own activity, he expresses his feelings, cooperates with others, 
sticks to the here-and-now, tries to involve himself with others and 
encourages others to involve themselves with him, and generally searches for 
new ways of being present to others. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest 
that such modeling characterizes trainer behavior in all kinds of sensitivity-
training experiences: 
The role of the trainer also constitutes a dominant technological 
element bearing on the group's effectiveness for giving feedback 
and promoting psychological support. The trainer serves as a 
model for the participants to imitate; that is, he absorbs feelings 
of hostility and frustration without becoming defensive, provides feed-
back for others, expresses his own feelings openly and honestly, 
and is strongly supportive of the expression of feelings of others. 
In short, he exhibits for consideration the very process deemed 
necessary for maximum learning to occur (pp. 76-77). 
~!odeling, however, demands a good deal of tact. For instance, if the trainer 
engages in self-disclosure, he does not rush in with a degree of self-
revelation which would shock and inhibit rather than challenge and encourage. 
Dramatic self-disclosure would then be the leader's way of deciding for the 
group at what level of disclosure they should operate. To set this level 
is a function of the group as a whole and should not be usurped by any 
single individual. Similar caut~ons apply to the other interaction goals 
such as confrontation. 
~Diffusion of Leadership 
Whatever might be the most current thinking on leadr- r hip in training 
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1nd/or therapy groups, the function of the leader in the contract group is to 
~ccome less and less a leader and more and more a member. That is, all of 
~~e functions which have been listed as leader-functions above should become 
.---
dispersed among the members of the group. Leadership, according to Collins 
.ind Guetzkow (1964), "is a scattered activity--one member being influential 
;it one time because of a particular combination of environmental demands and 
personal characteristics, and another being influential at another time 
because of a different congruence of demand and trait" (pp. 214-215). As 
Cattell (1951) suggests, leadership is measured by impact-on-group. If an 
appointed leader has no real impact on the work of the group, then his 
leadership is merely nominal. Leadership, then, is really a shared function, 
:t is something fluid in the group. Having a leader-member in the contract 
group is a contrived state of affairs in the same sense that the entire 
laboratory is contrived. He is the leader in the beginning because of his 
experience, knowledge, and skills. But the whole function of the group is 
to have the participants grow in precisely the same skills. As the members 
begin to engage in contractual behavior, there is less and less need for the 
leader-member to stimulate such behavior. Whenever any participant engage in 
contractual behavi.or, at that moment he becomes a "leader" in the sense that 
he promotes the "work" of the group. "Status" in the contract group, if such 
a term is applicable, is identified with contract-fulfillment. 
If leadership is to be diffused in the group, then the leader must be 
Willing to relinquish his "favored" position. If he is over-invested in 
being a "parent," it will be difficult for him to recognize and reinforce 
through support the increasing skills of the participants. If he hangs on 
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' :~o tightly, not only his level or depth of intervention, but even his 
~.i:iner of intervention is likely to become the standard of the group (Blake, 
I / ;164). Such behavior, however, r~ns completely counter to the purposes of 
! 
' :::c group. 
There are analogues to the above conception of leadership in certain 
: · y groups Bach (1966) describes a Marathon group in which "every j ~:ierap • 
I :ember is a co-therapist responsible for the relative success or failure of 
l .1:1Y given Marathon meeting" (p. 997). The professional co-therapists in the 
I 1;roup, "if and when they feel like it," participate as "patients" rather 
I :han consultants. Structure is provided by the "Ten Commandments" of the 
~~rathon which provide a kind of contractual foundation for the group 
experience. The staff in Mowrer's (1968) integrity groups are there as 
?articipants rather than "therapists" or observers. They are leaders in the 
sense that they "go ahead" and fulfill the contract. 
If the trainer in the contract group models effectively and monitors the 
contract judiciously, trying to see to it that C-interactions increase while 
disruptive N-interactions decrease, if he teachers the group to confront 
itself according to the provisions of the contract, then his skills will be 
disseminated throughout the group and the group will be "leaderless" by 
paradoxically being full of "leaders." 
~aderless Groups 
Research is currently being carried on with unled training and psycho-
therapy groups. Leader+ess groups are not new, for Gibb (1964) and others 
have been experimenting with them for a number of years: 
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Our many years of experience with 'leaderless' groups in various 
settings lead us to feel that maximum participative behavior is 
attained more readily in training groups without trainers than 
with trainers. The groups are perhaps more aptly described as 
'leaderful,' in that what occurs is not an abolition of leader-
ship but a distribution of-leadership roles in the group. It is 
perhaps even more accurate to describe the participative groups 
as 'trainerless.' Members learn to observe and experiment upon 
their own behavior in increasingly creative ways. They learn 
that it is less adaptive to take a 'trainer stance,' that is, 
advise, 'help,' teach, change, or persuade others (pp. 298-299). 
!!arrow and his associates (1967) found that unled groups tended to be warmer 
and more supportive. Salzbert (1966), in studying the verbal behavior of 
therapy groups, found that unled groups produced fewer problem-relevant 
responses, but were more spontaneous. Berzon and Solomon (1966) not only 
found leaderless group therapy to be feasible, but one kind of interaction, 
confrontation, increased in unled groups. The authors do not say, but I 
presume that the confrontation was considered therapeutic. In experimenting 
with unled sessions in_group marital counseling (I observed the interaction 
through a one-way mirror), I found that not only were the groups more 
spontaneous (that is, there was much IllOre self-initiated interaction), but 
there was also a high degree of problem-relevant interaction. The latter 
(although contrary to Salzberg's findings) was most likely due to the fact 
that the group was working under a contract. Once they had learned the 
contractual process ("how therapy goes"), they could have profitable sessions 
Without me. At least this was my cl:tnical observation. Not all the 
evidence in this area is cornple tely positive. Truax and Carkhuff (1964) 
found that although some of the deepest levels of therapeutic process took 
Place with juvenile delinquent groups during unled sessions (sessions were 
alternately led and unled), the alternately unled groups showed no greater 
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I l ;rogress on a variety of outcome criteria than did continually led groups. I ::1 unled groups, then, there is the possibility of greater patient process 
j -.-ithout greater outcome. However, the saving of manpower powers seems 
si£nificant in itself, nor is there any reason to suppose that the cautions 
suggested by Truax and Carkhuff need apply in any way to laboratory training 
~roups with non-psychiatric populations. 
"Instrumented laboratories." The National Training Laboratories have 
been experimenting for some years now with "instrumented" training laborator-
1 !es (Blake & Mouton, 1962; also see Benne, 1964). There is no trainer in the 
I "instrumented" group; whatever staff there is usually works outside the group. 
In the place of the trainer, a series of self-administered evaluation forms 
or "instruments" are introduced. These "instruments" are used throughout 
the laboratory to provide its participants with feedback. Group action is 
interrupted from time t? time, and, through feedback, the participants learn 
to see themselves better. In a trainer-directed group, feedback takes 
place through his "interventions." In the instrumented group, wall charts 
and graphs indicate the characteristics of both group and personal action 
during each meeting. In "instrumented" laboratories, the staff engages in a 
variety of activitiea: they provide the instruments of action research, 
train members to use the data gathered, give general sessions in modeling 
and in setting standards for giving and receiving feedback, arrange for 
intergroup competition and collaboration among development groups, etc. 
Although their activity may provide a good deal of structure for the 
laboratory, still they do not sit in and control the groups. The information 
that is fed back into the groups from the data collected is used as the 
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:.c::ibers see fit. 
The "instrumented" laboratory has been used in industrial, university, 
,rn<l hospital settings, with both "normals" and with psychiatric patients. 
Johnson and his associates (1965), in a follow-up study of an "instrumented" 
L1boratory with psychiatric patients, found that the improvement-cure record 
Jf the "instrumented" groups equalled or surpassed that of the regular 
therapy groups. 
The contract group begins with a leader in order that it may become 
effectively leaderless in as short a time as possible. If the leader is 
'.'Jnn and skillful in engaging in con tr actual behavior, then "behavioral 
contagion" (Lippitt, Polansky, Redl, & Rosen, 1952) will take place and the 
group will be quickly on its way to a creative interpersonal experience. 
Semi-led training groups. Although, as indicated above, it is not 
uncommon for psychotherapists to experiment with alternate led and unled 
group therapy sessions and although completely unled training groups are 
common (Gibb, 1964), there is no mention of training groups with alternate 
led and unled sessions. I have experimented with such a procedure in a 
laboratory course in interpersonal relations. When I was in the group, I was 
there as leader-member, but obviously it was much more difficult to become 
a full member. One member even connnented: "Since you were on the outside of 
the group, we did not have to work through the whole problem of your leader-
ship," Even though such parttime leadership-membership is hardly ideal, it 
is workable especially if it is made clear from the beginning that thb 




1 I conclusion 
1_ 
/ The style of the contract-group trainer differs, at least theoretically, 
from that of the trainer in more "traditional" T-groups. Campbell and 
nunnette (1968) says that in a traditional training experience, "a trainer is 
usually present, but he does not accept, in fact he overtly rejects any 
leadership role" (p. 75). He may overtly reject leadership in some sense of 
the term, but he is still present in the group as leader in some sense. If, 
as Campbell and Dunnette suggest, his modeling of growthful behavior does 
give direction to the group, then he is a leader. In the contract group, the 
leader overtly accepts his role as leader, but he makes it clear that one of 
his primary goals is the diffusion of leadership among the participants. 
There is evidence (Fleishman & Harris, 1962; Halpin, 1957; Oaklander & 
Fleishman, 1964; Rush, 1957) that suggests that high-consideration, high-
structure behavior is frequently associated with effective and successful 
leadership for widely different populations. If this is true, then a warm 
and accepting trainer working within the structure of a viable contract 
should be successful, even though success is ultimately defined as the 
diffusion of his leadership qualities. It is not structure per se which is 
offensive, but constricting, controlling, non-facilitative structure. 
~ leader ~ "anti-entropic." Entropy has been described by 
Rosenblith (1967) as the "tendency of a closed system to deteriorate and run 
dowuhill by going from a highly differentiated, and less probable state to 
the more probable, undifferentiated, and chaotic state." (p. 274) The 
group can be considered analogous to such a system. Left to its own devices, 
the group tends "naturally" to run downhill. The leader is an anti-entropic 
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force in the system. He keeps the co11l!llunication system "open. 11 The group 
system "closes" when the individual members seal themselves off from one 
another. When the members are fulfilling the contract, they are engaging in 
"non-probable" interpersonal behavior that is assumed to lead to growth. 
The system, then, is open. The leader helps keep the connnunication system 
open by his knowledge of groups "as nature" and by fulfilling his function 
as "monitor" of the contract. When members close in upon themselves, they 
become undifferentiated, that is, the group resembles, analogously, the 
"rundown" state of the system in entropy (see Wiener, 1954). The ideal is 
that each member become an anti-entropic agent in the group. 
Leadership and individual style. Leadership demands in the contract 
group still allow the leader to be himself, to possess his own style. Any 
particular leader may be m::>re effective in or stress one set of contract 
variables rather than another. The leader should be himself just as he 
allows (or encourages) others to be themselves. The contract-group leader 
will also become a member of the group in his own individual way. Perhaps 
he will always remain differentiated from the group in some way (Slater [1966] 
claims that the image of the leader as differentiated from the group serves 
as a point of orientation in turmoil), but he should "stand off" from the 
group as little as possible. The contract itself is a "point of orientation." 
At times he may be the victim of what Goffman (1967) calls "interaction-
consciousness, 11 that is he becomes preoccupied with his special responsibility 
to see to it that the interaction "goes well." The leader who becomes too 
Preoccupied both fails to "give himself to his own party" and forgets that 
responsibility for effective interaction is a corporate one. Finally, 
I 
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Jlthough the leader should be a fairly well integrated person, there is no 
reason why he must be the "best" group member. Different participants will 
excel in different interpersonal skillS..t with each learning in some way from 
Jll the others. 
Introduction 
Chapter VI 
Total Human Expression·: the elements of human 
dialogue;_ pathos, logos, poiesis 
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Needless to say, the members of a face-to-face sensitivity-training 
group are there in order to co1!llllunicate with one another. Since, in the 
contract group, the members agree to experiment with their interpersonal 
behavior, this means experimenting with the process of communication. 
Communication, however, is both an ambiguous word and a complex task. The 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to consider the elements of communication 
insofar as they relate to a laboratory in interpersonal relations. 
Total human expressions refers to a man's ability to communicate himself 
fully, that is, both on an intellective and an emotional level. This 
ability will be examined in terms of three dimensions of dialogue: pathos, 
logos, and poiesis. Pathos refers to all the elements, passive and active, 
that constitute the experience of feeling and emotion. Logos is a large 
concept: it refers to man's ability to cotlllllunicate himself to others both 
in words and through non-verbal behavior. Logos also refers to the ability 
to utilize all channels of interpersonal communication in the "translation" 
of oneself, intellectually and emotionally, to the other. These "channels," 
according to Wiener (1968), include (a) language in its most straightforward 
sense, that is, "verbal content, e.g., word meaning and syntax," (b) the 
~in which the verbal message is delivered, that is, the "extra-linguistic 
phenomena of communication (Mahl & Schultz, 1964), e.g., variations in tonal 
<1 11alities, patterns of stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by 
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the required linguistic form, and (c) all the forms of non-verbal behavior 
that enter into the connnunication process, that is, "motoric or bodily 
phenomena ••• , e.g., facial expres13ions, gestures, postures, and proxemics" 
(p. 51). Poiesis refers to the ability of man to be "poetic" in his commun-
ication, that is, the ability to integrate verbal, non-verbal, and emotional 
expression in dialogue. Negatively, it is the refusal to strip words of 
their human feeling together with a refusal to allow emotions to become 
irrational. 
The logic of the following discussion of these three elements is not 
the logic of human living, that is, elements discussed separately (and 
therefore somewhat abstractively) are actually woven into idiosyncratic 
patterns in the transactions of any particular individual. However, if this 
dissection leads to the kind of awareness that underlies behavioral change, 
then it is justified. It is obvious that these elements of dialogue are 
important in everyday life. It is just as obvious, then, that they are 
important in any kind of sensitivity-training experience. The contract 
group, however, is explicit in its requiring its participants to focus their 
attention on their emotions, especially those that arise from the interaction 
within the group, on their ability (or inability) to translate themselves 
into language, on their non-verbal communications, and on the difficulties 
involved in allowing emotion to give color and character to one's verbaliza-
tions. 
Men, either by their inability or their unwillingness to communicate 
deeply with one another, seem to foist upon themselves a state analogous to 
social deprivation. It would seem that such self-inflicted deprivation might 
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well have effects analogous to those observed in studies on social deprivation 
Studies by Mullin (1960), Nardini (1962), and Rohrer (1961) indicate that 
variables such as monotony o:f en~ironment and absence of sources of emotional 
gratification can cause intellectual inertia, impaired memory and concentra-
tion, insomnia, headaches, lov-grade depression, and greatly increased 
appetite (with resultant weight gain). An interesting hypothesis is that 
similar symptoms found among relatively normal populations of our society 
reflect self-imposed estrangement from others, although such a macro-
hypothesis would be difficult to verify. The contract group is a laboratory 
in which the participants come together to determine whether or not they 
themselves are victims of any form of self-inflicted social deprivation, and, 
if this is the case, to find ways of remedying such a situation by in-
community activity. 
PATHOS: MAN AS THE SUBJECT OF FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS 
~Flight From Emotion 
There is growing concern--and perhaps it may also be said that there is 
growing evidence, though it is the fruit of observation rather than 
experimentation--over the inability of some to engage in a free and construe-
tive expression of emotion. The hypothesis might be stated: many men in our 
society, especially those in the middle and upper classes, are constricted in 
their ability to experience and to give expression to their emotions; for 
one reason or another, they have not faced up to their "possibilities" in 
these areas. Even in sensitivity laboratories where it is expected that 
a certain selectivity factor would engage a population somewhat more free 
than the average in the area of emotional experiencing and expression, parti-
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~ipants have to be reminded again and again to give expression, not just to 
.. :iat they think, but to what they feel. 
Formal education is overloaded in the area of intellect, impoverishment 
!:1 the area of emotion. As Neill (1968) notes: 
Today our schools educate the head and leave the emotions 
to the crowd-compellers--the press, the radio, the TV, the 
churches, the conunercial exploiters with their lying adver-
tisements. Our pop heroes and film stars have become our 
leading schoolmasters dealing with real emotions •••• The 
d~nger today is underdeveloped emotion, perverted emotion, 
infantile emotion (p. 37). 
:'aperback novels, movies, and the ubiquitous television set all constitute a 
t•.io-edged sword in the emotional life of man. If used with imagination and 
discretion, they can complement a person's emotional life, enhance and enrich 
it by broadening his emotional experience and provide the beginnings of some 
kind of insight or vision into a wide variety of human experiences. But too 
many misuse these media with the result that they are not complements to 
emotional living but rather substitutes for it, and for many this vicarious 
emotional living is sufficient. 
Fromm (1941) decries the general tendency of society to discourage 
emotion and the resulting "cheap and insincere sentimentality with which 
movies and popular songs feed millions of emotion-starved customers" (p. 271). 
He sees the child developing a "pseudo character," not because he has to 
learn to control his feelings, but because he must deny that he even exper-
iences them. Lynd (1958) notes the same trends: "In our society 'emotional' 
is frequently used as a derogatory term. Developing emotional maturity is 
more often conceived in terns of training a child in what he should not feel 
1 and in controlling the expression of his feelings than in extending th\_ r.,<e 
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and depth of his emotions and their expression" (p. 236). Fronun goes so far 
as to suggest that bad dreams result from the fact that people force their 
true feelings out of consciousness . .because these feelings do not fit in with 
the social self. 
In a recent book, Schutz (1967) describes the joy that he experienced 
watching his new-born son being totally absorbed in the experience, both 
happy and unhappy, of growing. He describes what he sees as unbounded joy, 
but also begins to wonder: "But will something happen to Ethan as it does 
to us all? Where will his joy go1 In 1110st of us it becomes depleted, 
distorted, contorted. Guilt and fear begin to defile it. Somehow the joy 
of Ethan goes, never to fully return" (p. 10). The rest of the book is an 
engaging essay on some ways and means of winning back the joy that too many 
men forfeit as the price of security, socialization, and productivity. 
Keniston's Hypothesis. One way of looking at the emotional parasitism 
of society---men become parasites to television, movies, and the rest mentioned 
above--is that it is an essential or at least unavoidable phenomenon in a 
technocratic society such as ours. Xeniston (1965} suggests that two 
phenomena of our society converge to create an emotional dilemma for the 
working man. First of all, many men find little emotional satisfaction in 
the work they do in order to earn a living. Work instead of satisfying 
certain emotional needs, intensifies them. Breadwinners come home, then, 
hungering for emotional satisfaction and expecting to find it with their 
families. But today's family~-and this is the second phenomenon--is a 
smaller unit than yesterday's. Family today no longer means a complex of 
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and children living in the same at least 
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relatively circumscribed geographical area. Family today means wife and two 
or three children too geograhical1y or psychologically separated from close 
relatives to constitute an inte~actional unit with any direct emotional 
~eaning or impact. Keniston claims that, given the emotional constriction 
or frustration of the breadwinner at work, the family, especially so small a 
family, cannot satisfy his intensified or exaggerated emotional needs at home. 
Obviously the wife, too, faces analogous emotional frustrations, and then 
both husband's and wife's intensified emotional needs become interactive. 
There are no ready made solutions for these emotional binds. Ideally, 
husband and wife, without abandoning their obligations to work and children, 
will move out into the community, e.g., in church and civic activities, thus 
broadening the bases of emotional fulfillment. However, other less, 
responsible "solutions" tend to destroy the equilibrium of the family: 
tension and fighting in the home, extramarital adventures, emotional 
constriction and insulation, and the vicarious emotional living mentioned 
above, made easy, for instance, by the proliferation of "engaging," 
undemanding, sports events on television. 
Man's struggle for freedom has been the theme of much of his literature 
from the very beginning of recorded history. While this freedom if conceived 
of in more or less political terms, this does not mean that there has not 
been a concomitant or parallel struggle for more interior forms of freedon 
such as emotional freedom. Today if men have been freed from the emotion-
II constricting slavery of Jansenism, Puritanism, and Victorianism (and certainly . not all have), many have managed to shackle themselves with new bonds. ~hile 
I the prior slavery was enjoined in the name of morality and religion, the new 
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slavery is imposed in the name of technocracy, progress, and production. 
~·'.any have been duped into thinking that they are emotionally free, when all 
that has happened has been a change in the facade of their bondage. It is 
as if men were afraid to allow men to experience either themselves or their 
environment in an unfettered way and to institute communication with one 
another based on this experiencing. Rather this is the unknown, the unknown 
is dangerous, the dangerous is to be feared, and the feared is to be 
resisted. 
Some men are relieved when they are told that "feelings get in the way," 
for it justifies an already determined mode of interpersonal acting. Men 
who are guarded in their feelings toward others do not particularly want to 
become aware of their feelings toward others. They would also prefer that 
others not feel strongly about them. It is thought uncivil, rude, uncon-
ventional, unwarranted, and even obscene to express feelings toward others. 
Emotional insulation parades under such euphemisms as "respect for others" 
and the "dignity of privacy." Sometimes the mentally ill are feared, not 
because they express too little but because they express too much. Men who 
are afraid of feelings and emotions to begin with are utterly terrified when 
these are expressed without restraint. Perhaps the best symbol man-as-
emotional today is the polyethylene bad. Nothing gets in. Nothing gets out. 
He remains enshrined in interpersonal asepsis. 
"Normal Alienation from Experience." Laing (196 7) conceptualizes what 
is assumed here to be a fairly widespread flight from fuller emotional living 
as man's "normal alienation from experience": 
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As adults, we have forgotten most of our childhood, not only its 
contents but its flavor; as men of the world, we hardly know of 
the existence of the inner world: .•. as for our bodies, we retain 
just sufficient proprioceptive sensations to coordinate our 
movements and to ensure thaminimal requirements of biosocial 
survival--to register fatigue, signals for food, sex, defecation, 
sleep; beyond that, little or nothing .•.• our capacity even to 
see, hear, touch, taste and smell is so shrouded in veils of 
mystification that before one can begin to experience the world 
afresh, with innocence, truth and love (pp. 10-11). 
For Laing, psychotherapy is the process of getting back into contract with 
one's experiencing through affective contact with another: 
The psychotherapeutic relationship is therefore a re-search. A 
search, constantly reasserted and reconstituted, for what we have 
all lost and whose loss some can perhaps endure a little more 
easily than others, as some people can stand lack of oxygen better 
than others, and this re-search is validated by the shared exper-
ience of experience regained in and through the therapeutic 
relationship in the here and now (p. 34). 
The contract group or any growth-experience for "normals" is also an emotional 
"re-search" project. Emotional alienation might be more easily "endured" by 
the normal, but if it is true that the "psychopathology of the average" or 
man's "normal alienation from experience" is as serious a problem for society 
as it is assumed to be here, then, while the individual might be able to 
"endure" his emotional constriction, society cannot. 
The evidence is in. It would be a simple, but rather useless, task to 
go on cataloging the evidence of man's sins against the emotional dimensions 
of his humanity. However "clinical" and anecdotal such evidence is, it is 
still compelling, and one need not prove what is self-evident. The growing 
popularity of organizations such as the Esalen Institute, the National 
Training Laboratories, the Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, and of 
sensitivity laboratories in general dramatizes the plight of a people seeking 
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~cliverance from emotional bondage. Whether this deliverance take place in 
I ! :csponsible ways depends, at least partly, on the willingness of behavioral 
I ,cientists to channel some of the~r talents into creative thinking and 
~xperimentation in this area. The growing laboratory-learning culture in 
Jur society offers any number of possibilities for such work. Perhaps a 
i ~c~ era is dawning in the field of mental health, an era in which concern 
1.'ith prevention is absorbed into larger concerns such as self-actualization 
,md community potentialities for human growth. 
Emotional life and the function of the contract-group. Sensitivity 
groups possess the potentiality of developing an intense intragroup emotional 
life. Since one of the process-goals of the group as a whole and of members 
i::idividually is "diagnosis," the group provides ample opportunity for the 
pdrticipants not only to deal with one another on an emotional level but to 
examine the quality of their emotional living. The members should experiment 
with all phases of the pathos experiences outlined below; they should try to 
feel and give expression to emotions and nuances of emotion that do not con-
stitute their ordinary patterns of emotional living. This does not mean that 
the participants should "manufacture" emotions, for most of them already 
probably spend too much time expressing emotions that they do not really feel. 
P~ther they should try to interact as intimately as possible with one another 
and allow themselves to feel the ~hole range of emotions that arises from 
such interaction. Only then will they be able to evaluate, both within 
themselves and in dialogue with one another, their emotional successes and 
failures. The members of the contract-group are told explicitly that the 
group is to serve as a laboratory in which the quality ·of one's emotional 
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living can be evaluated and, hopefully, enriched. The participants contract 
(1) to examine their ability to face up to the emotional realities of 
?crsonal and interpersonal living, and (2) to experiment with different 
aspects of emotional living. The analysis of the pathos experience below 
~ill-help operationalize these provisions of the contract and serve as a 
guide as to what to look for in both individual emotional experiences and in 
the corporate emotional life of the group. 
The Phases of Emotional Experiencing 
The pathos experience, dealt with at a level of abstraction that is 
~eaningful for sensitivity experiences, is constituted by four phases: 
(1) awareness, (b) impact, (c) reaction, and (d) expression. It is possible 
to short-circuit pathos at any one of these phases, the result being a 
truncated emotional experience. 
(a) Awareness. As Arnold (1960) notes, emotion is preceded by a 
cognitive element in which the individual first evaluates the situation in 
which he finds himself. If he evaluates the situation confronting himself 
as innnediately dangerous, fear arises. This means that the quality of a 
person's emotional life is dependent on the quality of his awareness. If, 
either by nature or nurture, a person's ability to be aware of what is 
happening around him is constricted, then his emotional life will be con-
stricted. On the other hand, if a person wants to grow emotionally, he 
must improve the quality of his awareness of himself and of his environment, 
especially his interpersonal environment. 
This refusal or inability to be aware of self and ot>e.rs is charac-
teristic of the emotionally distuTbed. In fact, it m::i.y be hypothesized 
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that the more disturbed a person is the greater his tendency to cut off the 
p~~ process or experience of an earlier stage. The most severely 
disturbed, then, would sabotage emotional experience at the level of 
awareness. I have been in group therapy experiences in which the most 
severely disturbed have been challenged merely to repeat the gist of what 
another had revealed in an emotionally-charged disclosure. An "I-didn't-
hear-what-he-said" typlified the poverty of awareness that characterized 
these patients. This inner numbness or preoccupation with self effectively 
fended off any kind of affective contract with others. 
In a parallel way, this lack of awareness of self and others 
characterizes the more severe forms of the psychopathology of the average. 
In the contract group it is assumed that the unfettered ability to exper-
ience oneself and one's environment is a relatively rare phenomenon. Aware-
ness can be cut off in a variety of ways: men can be "too busy" to notice 
emotion-generating stimuli in themselves or coming from without; emotional 
involvement "gets in the way" and cuts down on productivity, and this is 
treason in a technocratic society. Recently, however, industry itself has 
realized that closing one's eyes to the emotional realities of life is 
literally unprofitable. Programs have been set up for alcoholics because 
merely dismissing them meant a loss of valuable personnel and decreased 
morale. Men in managerial positions have been sent to human relations 
laboratories in order to become more aware of the emotional realities of 
interpersonal relating on the job. Ignored emotion leads to ineffective 
communication; ineffective communication leads to decreased productivity. 
~!anagerial involvement in human relations laborntories is growing because 
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:t is profitable in terms of dollars and cents. It would be a sad commen-
:;iry on the hmnan condition if industry's new-found interest in the emotional 
:limate of the work situation bec.ause it is financially profitable were not 
(Jralleled by a renewed interest in emotional variables on the part of 
?rivate individuals merely because it is profitable in terms of human growth. 
Denial is not the only mechanism used to fend off emotion-provoking 
stimuli. Festinger (1957) suggests that men distort their perception, that 
is, the quality of their awareness, so that reality may seem to be concor-
dant with pre-formed attitudes or pre-chosen forms of behavior. For instance, 
A might be angry with B and express his anger in a variety of ways, and yet 
B, because he does not want to deal with the emotional realities of the 
situation distorts the cues emitted by A. He sees A's anger as A's "not 
feeling well," because "not-feeling-well" is not a factor that would force B 
to become involved with A on an emotional level. Or a person might not want 
to be in contact even with himself because it would force him to come to 
grips with his emotions. For instance, a person might somatize his anxiety: 
his colon is in an uproar, but he tries. to ignore the painful stimuli or if 
he does advert to them, he interprets them as signaling "poor eating habits" 
rather than anxiety. He cannot experience himself reflexively as anxious, 
for this would have behavioral consequences that he prefers not to face. 
The contract calls for a willingness to become aware of one's self and 
one's environment. The first step, then, in the pathos process is, broadly 
speaking, a cognitive one. Awareness is not merely passive, however; a 
person has to make himself aware, he has to reach out into his environment, 
instead of defending oneself from input, especially input that will start the 
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l·motional process. One has to court such input. Schutz (1967) makes much 
of what he calls the "creative process." The first aspect of this process is 
called "freeing, or acquisition":_ "Before one is able to use his experience 
in unusual, productive, and satisfying .•. ways, he must acquire a repertoire 
of experience. He must be open to experience, able to perceive and sense 
his environment, and be aware of his own internal feelings" (p. 55). In 
c!eveloping one's emotional potentiality the element of perception or aware-
ness seems to have at least a logical priority. 
Ambiguity of emotional stimuli. Another reason why awareness must be 
a dynamic, active process is that fact that emotionally tinged or charged 
emotional stimuli in interpersonal transactions are often ambiguous: 
Fiedler (1960) sees distortions in interpersonal perception as so common as 
to provide a means of measurement of attitudes: 
It has become a psychological truism that a person's behavior 
is influenced not by some objectively definable reality but 
rather by the individual's perception of reality. Ambiguous 
stimuli increase the likelihood that perceptual distortions 
will occur, and we assume that these distortions reflect in 
part the inner needs, emotional states and attitudes of the 
perceiver. Among the most ambiguous of our everyday stimuli, 
as Festinger (1957) and others have pointed out, are the 
feelings and attitudes of others. Moreover, it is frequently 
difficult, and often socially taboo, to discuss one's feelings 
towards others openly with them. As a result, distortions in 
interpersonal perception are frequent, and they provide an 
important avenue for the measurement of attitudes, and hence 
also, of the individual's interpersonal relations with these 
others (p. 587). 
Sensitivity laboratories do not operate under the social taboos to which 
Fiedler refers. In the contract group, the participants are not only 
encouraged to scrutinize the <tuality of their own awareness, ferreting out 
tendencies to misinterpret and dis tort stimuli received from others, but 
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:o be active in having others clarify the ambiguous stimuli which they emit. 
(b) Impact. Even if a person does not short-circuit the pathos 
I I experience at its very roots, th~~ is, at the level of awareness, he can do 
I so at the level of "impact." It is true that at times feelings and emotions 
I
I t.:ike us by storm; willy-nilly, we are flooded with fear, anger, sexual desire, 
0r some other emotion. But even though a person remains more or less open 
to emotional stimuli at the level of awareness, he can still learn how to 
cut off the affective impact of that of which he is aware. While he realizes 
in a rather detached, intellectual way that he is encountering an emotionally 
''vocative stimulus and can even correctly identify the emotion or emotions 
that the stimulus is geared to evoke, he has learned how to neutralize the 
affect-evoking dimension of the stimulus. He has learned not to allow 
himself to react at all or to react in such an attenuated way that there is 
no proportion between the stimulus and the strength (or weakness) of the 
reaction. 
Laing (19601 describes. a number of syndromes in witlch the 'logical" 
defense is to strip one's envi.ronmen t, especially one's. interpersonal 
environment, of its emotional impact. First of all, there are those with 
such a poor sense of self-possession or identity that they see interpersonal 
encounter as potentially "engulfing." The best defense in the face of the 
engulfing presence of another is isolation. Since it is impossible always 
to manage absolute physical isolation, the next best thing is to preserve 
emotional isolation. The other is allowed to be present physically, but 
not emotionally. Secondly, there are those who feel som empty that they 
fear the "implosion" of reality. If reality, especially affective reality, 
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·.-ere to rush in upon them, this would mean their destruction, for they are 
their emptiness. In order to get away from the "impingement" of reality, 
the sufferer learns how to cut off the affective dimensions of his "contacts." 
In a third syndrome, the sufferer, rightly or wrongly, perceives himself as 
being treated as an it by others rather than as a person with feelings; he 
feels that he is being "petrified." In order to counteract this process of 
,:c;iersonalization, he "petrifies" others first, he refuses to run the risk of 
experiencing the others as free agents. Interpersonal transactions, therefore 
;:hen theydo take place, become stereotyped "business contacts" with no 
emotional overtones. 
Laing depicts extremes, but perhaps most of us at one time or another 
are victims of milder forms of the syndromes described. He observes with 
respect to "implosion" that all of us are literally just a few degrees 
Fahrenheit away from such an experience, for when we are suffering from even 
a slight fever, the world can become quite threatening and "impinging." 
Whatever the reasons underlying the tendency to eliminate or minimalize 
the emotional impact of reality and whatever different idiosyncratic patterns 
or syndromes this process might take, the partic:lpants in the contract group 
contract to determine the extent to which they are victims of such a process. 
To put things more positive, the group is a laboratory in which the partici-
pants try to allow affective reality to have as full and as constructive an 
impact as possible. 
Rogers (19671, in dealing with a psychiatric population, discovered 
that with respect to the client 1 s in-therapy behavior, the major varlable 
Was "the degree of immediacy of the client's expcriencing--the degree to 
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,';ich he is 'in' his experiences ox :remote from it" (p. 74). This refers 
~o the degree to which the client is open to his feelings, able to "own" 
. ~::cm, and to explore them in search of their personal meaning. Rogers goes 
I J:1 to suggest that the neu:rotic may be one who "looks away" from the felt 
l I ;rocess of experiencing as it goes on within him. The degree to which a 




At one end the individual's psychological functioning is rigid, 
static, undifferentiated, impersonal. Constructs are fixed. He 
exhibits feelings but does not own them. He is remote from the 
experiencing going on within him. He is unable to relate. He 
is unable to communicate himself. He sees himself either as 
having no problems, or being in no way responsible for the pro-
blems which do exist. At the other end of the continuum the 
individual is functioning in a fluid, changing way, responsive 
to the ever-changing experiencing which is going on within 
himself, and responsive to the events going on outside himself. 
Feelings are experienced with immediacy, are owned, may be 
expressed when appropriate. The individual is c2' e to his 
experiencing and refers to it in guiding his behavior. Experience 
is construed tentatively, and new meanings are drawn from new 
experience (Rogers, 1966, p. 5). 
Hobbs (1962) sees the neurotic as one who cannot be intimatt' even with 
himself; he is unable to let him.self feel how he actually feels about 'hL ·, l f 
and others. Others Q1cReynolds, Acker, and Pietila, 1961; Penny, 1%'.J; 
Zucherman, Kolin, Price, and Zoob, 1964) have found that the anxious tend to 
avoid sensation-seeking. They restrict interest in the sensual, in excite-
ment, in the new, in the strange, in the unpredictable. If this is the 
case, then the neurotic has problems with both the awareness and the impact 
levels of the pathos experience. 
Contract-group members are asked to check tendencies to "look away" 




i :.,11 emotional openness. ! .... Yet, if McReynolds and the rest are right, the 
I :,boratory should not be so anxiety-provoldng as to cause or encourage the 
I ·;cry process of constriction that it is supposed to combat. 
I Increasing the range of emotional impact: the "subtle" emotions. Most 
Jf us are readily aware of the impact of the "heavy" emotions such as anger, 
:~ar, sexual desire, depression, and others, especially when they are strong 
.1:1d "make" us aware of their existence, but we are not as aware and as open 
:o their more attenuated or subtle forms or to more subtly nuanced emotions 
such as wonder, surprise, curiosity, ennui, and caution, to name just a few. 
:·;1e English language is filled with words referring directly or indirectly to 
these more subtle forms of feeling and emotion, but, though this might give 
some witness to the reality of such emotions, still it is a reality that does 
:10t seem to play the role it should in our interpersonal lives. For instance, 
when one person meets another for the first few times, he might "like" the 
other, but "like" merely summarizes a whole group of emotionally-laden 
variables. Part of this "liking" is a rather wholesome and pleasing curiosity 
He is attracted to the other and finds a certain delight in "exploring" the 
other or in engaging in mutual "exploration." Again, the contract group is 
a laboratory for learning how to become aware of, experience, and enjoy the 
whole range 0£ these more subtle emotions. If this is the case, then the 
laboratory must provide an atmosphere in which such subtle emotions are viable 
Too often sensitivity laboratories are rather heavy-footed, providing oppor-
tunities only for the more dramatic emotions. 
The ~ of exercises to stimulate emotional awareness. :M.::my laboratories 
use various exercises to stimulate awareness of some of the emotional 
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~:::-.cnsions of life. Participants are asked to relax, to be quiet and become 
... :Jre of themselves as body (to become conscious of their own breathing, to 
:isten to the beating of their hear-ts), to experiment with the "forgotten" 
•,cnses of taste, touch, and smell. Gunther (1968) considers the process of 
·;ocialization as one, at least in part, of "desensitization" in a pejorative 
sense: 
Children by nature are sensitive, involved in sense play and 
exploration ••• Social and formal education stress the cognitive 
and motor functions of the organism without regard for sensory 
development. We teach them non-sense. This lack of sensitivity 
creates desensitization: an imbalance in being; a loss of 
feeling; senseless: inhibition-alienation-depression-anxiety-
deadness (p. 20). 
He has devised any number of exercises or games to enable people to regain 
contact with the physical realities within and around them. One group 
exercise in tasting, the "bread ceremony," seems even to reach back deeply 
into the religious history of man: 
Sit in a circle surrounding a loaf of unsliced bread. After 
sitting quietly, looking at the bread, pass it around the circle. 
Allow each person to feel its eight and smell its flavor. As the 
loaf is passed from one person to another, look into each other's 
eyes. One person slowly (just a fraction of an inch at a time) 
breaks the bread open. The group watches. The two halves are passed 
around the circle, each person looking at the inner exposed half 
and breaking off a piece no bigger than he can chew comfortably. 
After each person has taken his piece of bread, he closes his eyes. 
He puts the bread in his mouth and slowly chews, not swallowing 
until the bread is completely liquefied. Afterward open your 
eyes and see all of the group (p. 179). 
Such exercises may or may not form part of the contract-group culture. 
However, if exercises and games are to be used emotional awareness and 
contact, then the participants should know this from the beginning. 
(c) Non-verbal reaction: the "passive" element. There are those \,•ho, 
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although they are quite aware of the emotion-provoking stimuli in their 
environment and even allow these stimuli to have their impact, still short-
circuit the pathos experience at the level of expression, even non-verbal 
expression, if possible. They have learned to control the emission of non-
verbal cues which would give others some insight into their interior lives. 
rney seem "unemotional," but this does not really mean that they are devoid 
of emotion--frequently it is just the opposite--but rather that they have 
learned to control its expression. Actually they are over-controlled. All 
of us, at one time or another and for one re as on or another, engage in such 
"control," but over-control becomes problematic only when it is resorted to 
with some frequency or becomes part of person's life style. Again, the 
contract-laboratory provides an opportunity for its participants to examine 
the positive and negative aspects of the "emotional control" they exercise 
from day to day. 
Emotional congruence. Rogers (e.g. 1961, 1967) has long insisted on 
what he calls "congruence" in the therapeutic relationship: 
•••• each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust because 
we sense that they are being what they are, that we are dealing 
with the person himself, not with a polite or professional 
front. It is this quality of congruence which we sense which 
research has found to be associated with successful therapy. 
The more genuine and congruent the therapist in the relationship, 
the more probability there is that change in personality in the 
client will occur (1961, pp. 61-62). 
At least part of this congruence is emotional congruence. If the therapist 
hides his emotions from the client behind a professional facade, then he 
lacks emotional congruence and is not as effective as he might be. It would 
seem, however, that lack of congruence is non-therapeutic for the same 
reason that most kinds of behavior are termed non-thcrn eutic: it is non-
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Jl, that is, it falls .short of being fully human behavior. 
Some men choose to be emotionally incongruent; they look upon natural, 
. -:l-verbal emotional reactions as too dangerous, too self-revealing, too 
i 
I i ::itrusive, or too disruptive. And so they opt for a rather drab, expression-
/ :~ss, "archaic-smile" emotional style for rather lack of style) in appearance 
I ,1d gesture as being both "proper" and safe. The problem is that such 
l 
l i ,·.otional asepsis is less than human. When Rogers says that such incongruence 
I 
f ! '~ ! .~ "non-therapeutic," this does not mean that it is non-therapeutic because 
I I !t falls short of some kind of medical or professional standard, it is non-
1 I ~:1erapeutic because it falls short of being fully human behavior. 
I (d) Non-verbal emotional expression: the "active" element. The term l "expression" here does not refer to using language to give expression to 
·•hat one feels. This interpenetration of feeling and language will be con-
sidered below under poiesis. "Expression" here refers to the active use of 
~-verbal forms of emotional expression as part of one's communication style. 
As Murphy (1964) notes, non-verbal communication of emotions has not been 
sufficiently tapped as a source of knowledge of man: 
If communication theory is conceived of only in terms of bits 
of verbal information received, it can miss its most fundamental 
role; for the world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and 
averting the eyes leads into a rich communication world that can 
be treated as communications and which we can teach our recorders, 
and magnetic tapes, and our computers to understand and use. We 
nee.cl to understand the whole communication process. The inner 
structure of man will then be seen more fully in its relation both 
to the social environment he encounters and the social environment 
which he is forever creating (p. 101). 
..•. people interact not only through words but also through 
spatial relations •.• through temporal relations ••• and people 
interact through gesture and touch and many other media. 
They not only send and receive information in these many 
different ways; they use each ~f these ways for participating 
in a communal dialogue, for reciprocating and mediating one 
another's meanings. Collllnunication is far more comprehensive 
than language (p. 3). 
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:!owever, some people--even though they are aware of emotional stimuli, allow 
these stimuli to have their impact, and react in the sense that they allow 
~:ieir emotions to appear "in public" in their facial expressions, gestures, 
~tc.--still truncate the pathos experience to a certain degree by failing to 
:,1'.rn active use of these non-verbal forms of affective communication. It 
is the difference between merely allowing oneself to react and being involved 
in one's reactions, even taking delight in them, to the extent that they 
become part of one's active communication style. One can become "active," 
communication-wise, even in such involuntary reactions as blushing if, 
sensing one's reaction, one puts oneself "in" one's reaction in such a way 
as to say, non-verbally: "You have 'caught' me, you have hit upon a 
vulnerable area, a point of shame." 
All laboratory training and especially all sensitivity training 
laboratories deal with the problems and potentialities of feeling and 
expressing emotion. The contract laboratory is a place where one can not 
only experience all the dimensions of the pathos exper~ence including 
authentic emotional response from others but where the feedback potential 
of the group provides a unique opportunity for the objective appraisal of 
. the role of emotion in h~man life. [_~ Sensitivity Laboratory as Stimulator of Feelin:;s nnd F.motions. 
--~-~J.J..!.'.l>J;.~Il.illl..a .. LD.lsi.na nn(l W1iitnlsc~r.J.1..2i"'..~-1J~J..:l.1lld tli:1t ;m imp0i;.t~---• 
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•?acity of a therapy group is to "induce and release powerful feelings." 
. ::i a group 
[I]ndividuals may be carried ~way~ may experience feelings which 
they later believe are uncharacteristic of themselves, and may 
act on feelings without displaying their typical controls •••• An 
individual may experience preciously-denied feelings not with 
enduring terror but with growth--the corrective emotional experience 
of finding that the feelings are not overwhelming or that the 
feared consequences do not occur. 
In group therapy, participation in group-generated affect may allow 
the patient to by-pass defenses so that the feared affect may be 
experienced first, thus rendering the resistance less necessary. 
(T)he patient in individual therapy who intimates his innermost 
feelings to a benign professional person undoubtedly risks far 
less than the group therapy patient, who may undergo feelings of 
extreme exhilaration or fear as he reveals himself "in public." 
The managing of group affect becomes one of the essential skills of 
the therapist. This skill involves tamping down contagion where 
necessary, protecting individuals who need to be exempted from 
participation in group affect, breaking up group resistance in 
order for affect to emerge, sensing when to let the affect run on 
and develop and when to introduce cognitive reflection about the 
affect (p. 32). 
Sensitivity groups, too, generate a good deal of emotion and perhaps 
experimentation with emotional expression can be more intense than in therapy 
groups because of the greater initial psychological integration of the 
?articipants. The cautions which Lieberman notes, while they should be 
taken into consideration, refer more specifically to psychiatric populations. 
::oreover, the safeguards built into the contract-experience, e.g., the emphasi' 
I 
I J:l supportive behavior, go far in making experimentation with emotion as 
l s:ife an experiment as possible. 
I Emotion-evoking exercises. In sensitivity groups, emotions are not 
/ only allowed to arise naturally from the verbal interaction of the partici-
l_;i.,n t- h • 11 b"' ...1; "'"' '""' 1-.; ~~ ~.f t-1, n t-..-e • • fl ll 
-....S,pt QCC(]$10D,8 y 9t t ~~1JJl~ilt;_(l1,U ~~'r St'S 
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Jre introduced to further stimulate the arousal and expression of emotions. 
;;1ese exercises may be verbal or non-verbal and they may or may not involve 
' 
I
I ~hysical contact. Exercises invc:ilving some form of touch are usually powerful 
I l ~~otional stimulants both in themselves and .because we as a people generally 
I :efrain from touch as a mode of communication. Tactile communication, 
I 
! Jccording to Frank (1957), is one of the more important forms of non-verbal I rnrnrounication. "Tactile experiences considered as messages and responses 
are exceedingly diverse and capable of an amazing variety of transformations 
in human communication, where, as in language, we must recognize both the 
cultural patterning and the idiosyncratic deviations and elaborations" (p. 
209). Perhaps tactile contact is too immediately related to sexuality in our 
society and therefore we are afraid to explore its communication potential. 
3e that as it may, it is not suggested here that the kind of contact that 
takes place during certain laboratory exercises become a way of life. But 
such contact insofar as it stimulates a variety of feelings and emotions can 
be "diagnostic" in the very best sense. Frequently it reveals--sometimes 
dramatically--to a person how hesitant he is to make human contact, how far 
a~ay from others he really is, or how little or how ineffectual he makes 
use of emotion in his attempts to relate to others. 
"Manufacturing" emotion. It may be objected that the participants in 
sensitivity laboratories are called to "manufacture" feelings and emotions 
("feelings-by-contract"). Rather they are asked not to suppress at any 
i "stage" the feelings and emotions that arise naturally in the group and to 
' 
I ~ive themselves to exercises designed to stimulate emotion. Berne (1966) 
I claims that expression of real feeling rarely takes place in therapy groups 
~------~~~~~~----~--~--~~----------~------~~~~--_.;~~--~~------~ 
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::1<l that the feelings that are exprssed are actually "socialized" feelings • 
.. ~:ether this is true or not of therapy groups (and even if it is true de 
'-~' I do not believe that it -~eed be true, it is my experience that there 
'.s a good deal of authentic emotion in sensitivity groups enough to dramatize 
:o most participants their areas of strength and areas of deficit in the area 
Jf emotional living. 
Emotion as a dimension of laboratory interaction. Emotion has been 
discussed here somewhat abstractively, but in the laboratory the participants 
I fo not express emotions abstractly. They do so in the context of the inter-
! Jctions of the meeting. This can be done in several ways. First of all, 
I I Jnd this is the usual case, emotion is expressed as a dimension of the variety 
of interactions in which the participant engages. For instance, when someone 
engages in self-disclosure, he does so with some (and perhaps a good deal of) 
emotion. Likewise emotion can be (and in some sense should be) a dimension 
10f other kinds of interaction, e.g. support, confrontation, self-exploration. 











instance, that he is very angry. However, if a person merely talks about his 
e::iotions without giving expression to them in some way, he usually appears too 
cold and controlled, and the otb.e::rs wonder whether he really "owns" his 
.;motions or not. Finally, emotion can be expressed non-verbally. A person 
::!ay cry or throw his arms around another person or stalk off from the group. 
TI1e laboratory encourages the expression of emotion if emotion is really 
felt, but does not demand emotion for the sake of emotion. 






The contract group contracts to logos, effective interpersonal 
~::::nunication through human language. _It has been assumed above that an 
~specified number of men suffer from emasculation in their emotional life. 
;; 0 ·,: it is also assumed that many men also suffer a concomitant emasculation 
' :n the quality of their verbal communication, in their ability to use 
'.Jnguage as a mode of interpersonal contact. 
Logos, when usad as a generic term, refers to man's interaction with 
~an in tenns of human language, the way a man translates himself into 
:.mguage. While it is true (1) that both philosophers and behavioral 
scientists have theorized about the phenomenon of language as a form of what 
Lorenz (1955) calls "expressive behayior," that is, as a reflection of the 
structure of personality (e.g. Buhler, 1934; Cassirer, 1953; Hodges, 1952; 
Honingfeld, Platz, & Gillis, 1964; Moscovici, 1967; Piaget, 1952; Stout, 1902; 
\'on Hartmann, 1884; Wittgenstein, 1922), and that (2) there have always been 
those who have been interested in the language differences existing between 
?sychiatric and normal populations (e.g. Forrest, 1965; Glauber, 1944; 
Gottschalk, 1961; Johnson, 1944; Lorenz, 1955; Newman, 1938; Sanford, 1942; 
Sherman, 1938; Spiegel, 1959; Wender, 1967) and that (3) more or less 
~olecular psychological studies are increasing man's understanding of the 
Phenomenon of language and verbal behavior (e.g. Cofer & Musgrave, 1963; 
Di%on & Horton, 1968; Kansler, 1966; Meharabian, 196G; Salzinger, 1967: 
:\'iener & Mehrabian, 1968), still little of this theorizing and research h.'.ls 
l::een translated in such a way as to become useful in dealing with people, 
either normal or abnormal, on a "clinical" or applied level. More attention 
must be given to such molar dimensions of language as the quality of man's 
! 
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·:erbal expression in his interpersonal contacts. As Wiener and Mehrabian 
11968) note, it is too fruitful an area of interpersonal discovery to ignore: 
Anyone who listen carefully-to the way people say things quickly 
learns that the particular words a speaker uses to describe an 
event or experience can be a rich source of infonnation about his 
feelings and attitudes. The bases for making these kinds of 
inferences are not usually explicit, although members of a 
communication group appear to respond regularly to these subtle 
variations in word usage (p. 1). 
Laboratory learning situations seem to provide excellent opportunities for 
such research and for the application of research findings. What follows is 
a brief indication of the aspects of language that might be profitably 
considered and experimented with in a sensitivity laboratory. The laboratory 
experience is an opportunity for the participants to examine man-as-one-who-
speaks by subjecting their own verbal interactions to the scrutiny of the 
group. 
The Problems and Potentialities of Language 
Problems. There are various ways in which people underuse or abuse 
language in interpersonal situations and many reasons why they do so. Some 
language problems stem directly from and reflect varying degrees of 
?sychopathology. Bettelheim (1967) discusses children who have surrendered 
the use of language because of parental disapproval, their mutism being an 
indication that they have given up any hope of influencing the world. This 
~~rrender of speech closes a vicious circle: 
Once the child has even stopped communicating with others, his 
self becomes impoverished~ the more so the longer his mutism 
lasts, and the more so the longer his personality remains under-
developed at the time of the onset of withdrawal (p. 56). 
If this [mutism] happens before he has fully learned to manipulate 
~-------~~--~~~------~--~~~----------~--~--~~~-----------------------' 
222 
symbolic forms, before the age of three or four, then the child 
also £ails to develop the higher intellectual processes (p. 57). 
::rikson (1954) discovered that one of the outcomes of traumatic war experience 
I j ·;as a distrust and devaluation ·;f language. Meerloo (1952) found neurosis 
I :::anifested in language-use disturbances: "The insecure neurotic shrinks 
from free word-play; he tries to manipulate words mechanically, like 
:iachinery. He fears the adventure of cormnunication" (p. 87). Ruesch (1957) 
sees the origin of connnunication problems in parents' inability to adapt 
themselves to the maturation level of their children. According to Ruesch, 
three types of language are learned in succession: somatic, action, and 
verbal. If parents do not adapt their language to the developmental stage 
of their children, while at the same time offering encouragment to improve 
verbal language proficiency, then communication disturbances may arise in 
their children. 
Language problems arise out of and reflect not only psychopathology 
in the strict sense; they also reflect the psychopathology of the average. 
~!any "normal" men fear the communication process because of more or less 
normal fears of involving themselves deeply with others. They neither pour 
themselves into their language in interpersonal situations nor do they 
' expect others to do so. Language must remain on a "safe" level. They 
habitually put "filters" between what they really think and feel and what 
they say. This results in exanguinated or muddied, but "safe," communication. 
Some men engage in language that is overly precise--they ask too much of 
language--while others engage in language that is too vaguc--that is, they 
ask too little of language, both both extremes are usually defensive rne.:Jsures, 
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. >S of keeping interpersonal contacts at "acceptable" levels of intensity • 
. :.z men are victims of poor education in language. They have lived in 
· dlies or in societies that hav~ been afraid of open communication with the 
,ult that patterns of language are not available to them to express what 
.ey would like to express. This conversation or language anemia is 
..... :ognized by the novel writer: 
Even in modern-novel dialogue the most real is not the most 
conformable to actual current speech. One has only to read a 
transcribed tape of' actual conversation to realize that it is, in 
the literary context, not very real. Novel dialogue is a form 
of shorthand, an impression of what people actually say; and 
besides that, it has to perform other function--to keep the 
narrative moving (which real conversation rarely does), to reveal 
character (real conversation often hides it), and so on (Fowles, 
1968, p. 89). 
:~n read novels not only for vicarious pathos but also for vicarious logos, 
:::e meaningful talk that is missing from their lives. 
In societies which subtly discourage or limit conversational freedom and 
~eeper interpersonal contact through language, some men abandon (at least in 
J relative sense) language either because it is useless as an instrument of 
Jeep human communication or because the patterns of language "allowed" are 
seen as identified with the "establishment" that is being rejected. In the 
c:ise of the present "hippy" culture, this flight-from-language involves both 
(1) the creation of an argot that reflects a break from the values of society 
that are seen as useless or opporessive while emphasizing the values of the 
sub-culture and (2) an often irresponsible immersion in the pathos dimensions 
of living. A counter language evolves and a counter pathos-society is 
established parallel to or outside the confines of the society being rejected. 
Potentialities. Despite the problems involved in exsanguinated 
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:inguage and conununication, language is still one of the most dramatic ways 
::1 which man differs from other animals. Stout (1902) sees language as an 
i:1strument by means of which man examines the world around him. If he is 
Jfraid of this world, his language will be anemic and feeble, but if he loves 
~he world and is challenged by it, his language will be strong and searching. 
70 adapt a phrase from Wittgenstein (1922), the limits of a person's language 
are the limits of his world. Cioran (1968) sees silence as unbearable and 
·:ould find it easier to renounce bread than speech. He claims that one can-
' ::ot withdraw one 1 s confidence from words "without setting one's foot in the 
abyss." Language exposes, reveals both individuals and societies: "Words, 
at least in traditional societies, often express far more than feelings or 
ideas. The way words are us ed--in tales, riddles, proverbs, and typical modes 
of address and conversation--can reveal a great deal about the structure and 
values of a society" (Abrahams, 1968, p. 62). 
Novelists and writers frequently have, if not deeper, at least more 
striking, distinctive, and challenging insights into the nature and force of 
human language than do behavioral scientists. Writers continually try to 
enlarge the possibilities of language. D.H. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, and 
James Joyce never hesitated to experiment with. verbal symbols that would 
most fully convey what they experienced. As Burgess (1968) notes: 
"Language, of its very nature, resists tau to logy; it wan ts to launch out, 
risk lies, say the thing which is not." 
Brian Friel's entire play Philadelphia Here.!_ Come is based on the 
distinction between what the leading character really thinks and feels and 
'
1
·ould like to say and what he actually says. In the pl.'.ly there are two 
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~e·:els of conversation--the vague, hesitant, compliant, failed bravado of the 
/ .c:1 who is about to leave his father in Ireland to seek a new way of life in 
I 
I ! :'ic United States and the vigorous speech of the son's "inner core" (played 
I.:: a separate character). The pity of it all is that, although the audience 
;s electrified by what the "inner man" says, yet it knows that his speech 
I ~cally dies (and in a sense the son dies with it) because it is never spoken. 
::1e man who chains up his language chaims up himself. 
The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants can 
experiment with the potentialities of language. The purpose of what is said 
I 
I ::ere is not to apotheosize language, for as Lynd (1958) notes, language is 
I 
I ! .m:ietimes a sensitive instrument and sometimes a clumsy tool of communication. 
:ut when a man enlarges the possibilities of his language, he enlarges his own 
possibilities. The laboratory gives him the opportunity to extend the range 
of language in order to contact himself and others at deeper levels. In the 
safety of the laboratory he can run risks in his use of language that he could 
::t outside. The following discussion of language might serve as a basis for 
t~is experimen ta ti on. 
21._fferent kinds of language 
In keeping with the consideration of language from a molar, interactional 
?oint of view, perhaps the following distinction--again, despite the fact that 
they are somewhat abstractive--might give direction to the discussion that 
follows. 
(1) Logos. Logos, in the strict or restricted sense, refers to man's 
ability to translate his real self into language. Logos is language filled 
1 
ldth the person who is speaking and therefore refers to his ability to use 
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?ccch in order to express his identity. It also refers to the use man makes 
: speech in order to establish some kind of growthful interpersonal contact. 
i 
1 ::~gatively, it is the refusal to use speech merely to fill interactional space 
1.1:1d time or as a smokescreen or shield behind which to hide. 
I Just as there are different kinds of truly human contact and various 
i 
' I degrees or levels of such contact, so there are different kinds of logos. If 
i .: man talks meaningfully about his political or religious beliefs, this is 
I . 
I 1c1 gos, 
I 
Logos need not be self-disclosure in the sense discussed in chapter 
: '.'II, but, in that it is meaningful speech, it will always provide some insight 
! ! into the identity of the speaker. Meaningful speech with an intimate friend 
·.·ill be on a different level from meaningful speech with one's fellow workers. 
The special ability to allow one's language to express not only one's 
thoughts but also the feelings and the emotions that surround these thoughts 
is a special kind of logos called poiesis. Poiesis will be treated separately 
~elow. 
Logos must be clearly differentiated from the ability to speak fluently 
and elegantly, for both fluency and elegance are at times used to camouflage 
rather than reveal one's identity. It would also seem necessary to 
distinguish logos from the ability to speak "insightfully" about oneself, a 
quality which as traditionally been seen as a favorable condition, if not a 
pre-requisite, for effective participation in psychotherapy, an hypothesis 
that is being seriously challenged today (Carkhuff and Berenson, 1967; 
London, 1964). Logos here means translating or handing oneself over to 
others through the medium of speech, whatever the es the tic v.:1.lue of the 
lan~unge used. 
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Logos implies a respect for language as a form of connnunication and 
Jntact. It implies dialogue, and, as Matson and Montagu (1967) point out, 
:or certain contemporary existent_ialist thinkers, authentic existence is 
J:mnunication, life is dialogue. Dialogue is certainly the life of the 
:ontract group. That is why the group member, by contract, is expected to 
.;):amine his use of speech. If he is to develop "new ways" of being present 
to the members of the group, he must discover "new ways" of speaking and 
;:crhaps develop a new respect for- language. 
Dialogue in the sense in which it is being used here is opposed to "game" 
~o;:-_rnunication. Dialogue is "game-free" or at least an attempt to make 
co::i.munication "game-free." Rapoport (1964) and Wiener (1950), both of whom 
~ave made significant contributions to the mathematical theory of games, 
caution against the use of game-theory as a basis for human communication. 
Rapoport finds dialogue with the "strategist" impossible, for the basic 
question in the strategist's mind is: in a conflict how can I gain an 
advantage over my opponent~ Rapoport thinks that the much more basically 
human question is: If I can gain an advantage over another, what sort of 
person will I become? The "cybernetic" man is basically monological, not 
dialogical, and for him communication is intimately wedded to control, the 
control of the other. Berne (1966) uses "game" in a somewhat different sense. 
The "games people play" are ways of avoiding intimacy in humm relationships. 
The "game" prevents dialogue. llerne goes so far as to say that the most that 
one can expect in a psychotherapeutic group is the discovery and analysis of 
the "games" played there. Real intimacy, he says, is almost never found· in 
such group situations. It is the contention of this paper that the members 
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.: a contract interpersonal growth group can establish dialogue, can free 
:::e::iselves to great extent from a "game" approach to one another, and can 
I 
' ! c:;tablish not just the social imj. tat ion of intimacy that Berne speaks of, but 
I
I ~cal human intimacy. 
(9) Commercial-speech. "Commercial-speech" refers to the language of 
::1e "market-place," the use of language in the "commercial" transactions of 
=en. Such language is lean, utilitarian, pragmatic; it deals with objects 
r~ither than persons, for it is a medium of exchange rather than of inter-
i1ersonal contact. Much of such language today is left to computers. It 
i ~ould be of no interest to us here were it not for the fact that there are 
I j ~'eople who use commercial-speech as their principal mode of speech in inter-
! personal transactions. They see people as objects to be manipulated rather 
than persons to be contacted and this is reflected in the quality of their 
speech. 
If speech is principally "commercial," then, as McLuhan (1964) suggests, 
it can be dispensed with: "Electric technology does not need words any more 
than the digital computer needs numbers" (p. 80). However, the utopia he 
envisions which is characterized by a "speechlessness that could confer a 
?erpetuity of collective harmony and peace" arising out of a "collective 
awareness that may have been the preverbal condition of man" (p. 80) is 
antithetical to man himself. Speech defines man. It is just strange that he 
:cakes such poor use of it in his effort to humanize himself. 
(3) 
I ,· 
Cliche-talk. "Cliche-talk" refers to "anemic," language, speech in 
the sense of talk-for-the-sake-of-talk, conversation-without-depth, l.:mguage 
that neither makes contact with the other or reveals the identity of the 
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j speaker (except negatively in the sense that he is revealed as one who does 
I . I 
:iot want to make contact or does not want to be known). Cliche-talk fosters 
ritualistic rather than fully hulllan contact ("Do you think that it is really 
going to rain?"--"The way they're playing, they'll be in first place by the 
/ 
first of September I"). Cliche-talk fills interactional space-and-time 
~ithout adding meaning, for it is superficial and comes without reflection. 
?erhaps it is the person who is over-committed to maintenance-functions (see 
Introduction), a person who is either unaware (because he lacks the requisite 
social intelligence) or afraid of possibilities, for further interpersonal 
/ 
growth, whose speech will be predominantly cliche-talk. 
. I 
People usually listen politely to cliche-talk, especially when it is 
pseudo-logos, that is, dressed up or doctored to sound important: 
When a conversation fails to capture the spontaneous involvement 
of an individual who is obliged to participate in it, he is likely 
to contrive an appearance of being involved. This he must do to 
save the feelings of the other participants and their good opinion 
of him, regardless of his motives for wanting to effect this 
saving (Goffman, 1967, p. 126). 
If the needs of the listener are such that he is willing to put up with the 
/ 
boredom of cliche-talk in order to enjoy the safety that is found in ritual, 
then the circle is complete and the field is wide open for such cu1>vu sation. 
I One of the most connnon forms of cliche-talk in our culture(and perhaps 
this is a transcultural phenomenon) is "griping," a more or less superficial 
communication of dissatisfaction with persons, institutions, or things out-
side oneself. It is one of the few verbal expressions of feeling allowed 
in public, and it is probably allowed because it is n ritual and most rituals 
j safe. The trouble with chronic griping is that it is a fixative. As Ell b 
~l 0 6'4-paipts O!!t; ? person 1 S 1l!S'X 1>aJ.;1..zoitio~~, to Ji . ..-·, "1.J..l oll.l•J otlu.uio oft 1m j 
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.. ~and in the way of change; "forces outside of me control me;" "I can do 
:·.)thing to change." 
I 
Cliche-talk is just words, while logos always connotes human contact • 
.. ·-
SJ~e people speak endlessly about themselves and say nothing (if they were 
~~ally disclosing themselves, others would not find it boring). They say 
::Jthing about themselves because they have no real feeling for themselves--
~hey are deficient in the pathos dimension of life--and could hardly be 
expected to relate what they do not experience. Such people simply are not 
using speech as a mode of contact. For them speech is solipsistic, self-
centered, centripetal. It is monologue rather than dialogue. 
(4) Anti-logos. When language is actually used to destroy growthful 
interpersonal contact rather than foster it, then it is anti-logos. There 
are a number of forms of speech that are really violations rather than uses 
of language. For instance, in the heat of anger language can be used as a 
~eapon, a tool of destruction rather than an instrument of growthful 
encounter. When a married couple stand shouting at each other (often saying 
things they do not really mean), language becomes completely swallowed up in 
emotion; it loses its identity as language. At such times it actually has 
More in common with a sledge-hammer than speech. Lying, too, can be a form 
of ~-logos, for deception cannot be the basis of growthful interpersonal 
contact. The speech of the psychopath, for example, is frequently, if not 
continually, anti-logos, for he uses speech to create situations that do not 
exist, to manipulate others rnther than to engage in growthful encounters 
With them. Finally, the language of the psychotic, while it might have its 












-,iy be a desperate fonn of revolt against a "sick" family or society--see 
:.Jing, 1967), is frequently anti-logos. The psychotic, at least at times, 
':'pears to use language to drive others away. He fears human contact so 
:~cply that he reverses the function of language, making it a barrier instead 
.;f a bridge. 
Another way of conceptualizing anti-logos is to see it as the kind of 
expression proportioned to high deficiency-functioning (see Introduction). 
The stronger the influence of deficiency-needs in a person's life, the more 
likely he is to engage in some form of anti-logos. 
Most men engage in all four kinds of speech at one time or another. 
!hey use commercial-speech not only in strictly commercial transactions, but 
allow it to slip occasionally into interpersonal encounters. Indeed, life 
I 
~ithout some cliche~talk. would be intolerably intense for most men. It is a 
question, however, of proportion and most men need to find ways of increasing 
the amount of logos (in the restric~ed sense) in their lives. The sensitivity 
laboratory affords an opportunity of discovering ways how to do just that. 
Language: Content, Invitation, and Self-Expression 
That Buhler's (1934) analysis of the functions of language strikes at a 
?henomenological core is evidenced by the number of writers who use his 
analysis as a basis for a further discussion of the nature and use of 
language. Language, according to Buhler, (1) has content, (2) is an 
~nvitation, and (3) involves self-disclosure or self-expression. First of 
au, language has content, that is, it signifies or represents something; 
the speaker conununicates, explains, or verifies something. Insofar as speech 
merely imparts information, it is functioning at its lowest, impersonal level. 
232 
.\nd yet many people have difficulties even at this point, that is, they have 
~ifficulties in making language a clear conveyer of their ideas. It is 
extremely important, however, for a person to know whether what he says 
.. --
comes across with the requisite degree of clarity. If the manifest content 
of a person's language during group sessions is not clear, it does not help 
if others are "polite" and pretend to understand a muddled message. It 
happens that some people in affective situations defend themselves by dealing 
in unclear content. If this is the case, it takes courage but it is also a 
sign of interest in the other if a listener says: "I don't know about the 
others, but I really didn 1 t understand what you just said." It is amazing 
how often group members allow muddled or unintelligible communications to go 
by without any kind of responsible challenge. On the other hand, there are 
those who habitually strip language of other than utilitarian content 
functions. They take pains to see to it that the content of their communica-
tions are clear, but for them speech is defined as nothing more than 
commercial-speech. But even this attempt at restricting the function of 
language is itself a disclosure of the personality of the speaker. 
Secondly, speech is always some kind of invitation, challenge, or 
sunnnons. It is a~ the very least a request to be heard, even when it is 
being used as a means of driving others away. When a person speaks, he does 
so in order to be heard, his speech is a call for a response. The response 
is expected to be proportioned to the nature of the invitation or challenge: 
a command requires obedience, a petition hopes for a concession, a promise 
expects trust, an explanation demands attention, testimony looks for faith, 
and so forth. Therefore, speech not only has explicit content, but it also 
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.J:itains implicit "messages" for the listener: it tells him to come close or 
.J away, to take a particular stance, to become active or remain passive, 
~d so forth. It is not just the ability to understand the explicit content 
.. -
;f language that makes a person a good listener but rather a sensitivity to 
~:ie other "messages" embedded in language. In the contract group the 
;'Hticipants are asked to reflect on their use of language in terms of the 
::ivitations or challenges that it implies. A participant's language might 
je an invitation to affective contact or it might be a command to stand clear. 
rt is important for participants to come to some understanding of the 
' :abitual invitations, summonses, and challenges characterizing their speech. 
Finally, speech always involves some degree of self-revelation, even 
·.-:1en the speaker uses it as a means of hiding himself ("Even thy speech 
'.ietrays thee"), for he then reveals himself as one who is afraid of the 
intimacy of dialogue. But speech for the non-defensive person or for the 
?erson who is attempting a responsible relaxing of his defenses becomes self-
1 12xpression in a most positive way, even though he is not speaking directly 
Jbout himself. When a person becomes less defensive, two things happen with 
respect to his use of language: he puts more of himself into his speech an.J. 
~e initiates a truer communication with the other by aiming at the other 
directly in himself as a person. If the other responds in a non-defensive 
i.·ay, then dialogue becomes a reciprocal opening up, a mutual revelation. But, 
if this is to happen, both the speaker and the one addressed must respect 
0ne another in the mysteriousness of their personalities and there must be 
:
10th mutual trust and mutual availability. Only under these conditions does 
language lose its fetters and take on the strength and color of the person-
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Jlities of those who use it. Much will be said about self-disclosure in the 
~ontract-group; the participants are encouraged to examine their use of 
language in order to discover how much of themselves they really do disclose 
through their use of language. It may well be that by the way they express 
themselves they are disclosing precisely what they think that they must hide. 
7ne Function of Language in Organizing Reality 
Sapir (Mandelbaum, 1949) and Whorf (Carroll, 1956) suggested one more 
function for language in a proposition that has been called the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, which states that language functions not simply as a means of 
reporting and communicating experience but also as a way of defining 
experience (see Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968, pp. 5-10). Language is an instru-
oent that actually shapes perception to some degree. Lynd (1958) also 
recognizes the ability of language to influence perception: 
In his study of "Memory and Childhood Amnesia" Schachtel (1947) 
gives a particularly illuminating account of the way in which 
language inevitably reflects the dominant preoccupations and the 
limitations of a society. By such reflection it restricts 
perception and experience unless refreshed by innovation. 
Certain kinds of experience may be buried or lost because the 
culture provides no language through which they can be expressed 
(p. 247). 
Schachtel (1947) sees the ability of socialized language to ·turn experience 
into a cliche{ "The capacity to see and feel what is there gives way to the 
tendency to see and feel what one expects to see and feel, which, in turn, 
is what one is expected to see and feel because everybody does. Experience 
increasingly assumes the form of the cliche'~ .. " (pp. 12-13). But Lynd does 
admit that language is a two-edge sword, that although acquiring a language 
freque:ltly means a dulling and conventionalizing of perception, it is also 
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;:ossible "for the use of words to quicken, not to deaden, awareness" (p. 171). 
Though language hardly creates reality, it is one of the organizers of 
perceived reality and as such c~n perhaps reveal a good deal about the inner 
organization of the speaker. If this is the case, then the participant who 
is aware of his use of language has found another "diagnostic" tool by which 
to guage his personal and interpersonal life. 
Translating "Messages" into Logos 
When two or more people are talking, there are usually at least two 
levels of connnunication: (1) what is de facto conveyed by the verbal inter-
change (the "content" mentioned above) and (2) a variety of other "messages" 
that are transmitted in a number of different ways, e.g., the qualities of 
the verbal exchange itself such as speed, tone, inflection, intensity, and 
emotional "color" and nonverbal cues such as eye contact, bodily stance, 
facial expressions, and gestures. These "messages" are similar to what 
Ruesch (1963; see also Ruesch and Bateson, 1951) refers to as "meta-
communicative processes," the purpose of which is to interpret or classify 
the content of the verbal message or to send a parallel message more or l •_' _,:_, 
unrelated to verbal content. These meta-communications can even negate or 
deny the explicit meaning of the verbal message (for instance, it is a rather 
common occurrence to hear "no" on an explicit verbal level and at the same 
time to experience "yes" on a metacommunicative level, the latter being 
the "real" message). As Berne (1966) notes, the metaconunun:L:ative "message" 
might even substitute for some kind of tactile stimulus: 
Game analysis is grounded on the principle that the human org.::tnism 
can accept, up to a point, visual, auditory, nncl symbolic recogni-
tion signals as a substitute for direct tactile stimulation of 
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received (that is, people would "read" one another, if asked to do so, on 
a meta-communicative level even though they might seldom verbalize the fact 
that they have either sent or received such messages), still people would 
differ in their sensitivity to meta-communicative messages and in the number 
and kinds of messages sent out over non-verbal rather than verbal routes. 
One of the functions of the contract group is to become aware of the 
metacornmunicative dimensions of language and then, as opportunities arise in 
the give-and-take of group interaction, to attempt to translate meta-commun-
ications into logos. This means first of all becoming aware of oneself as 
transmitter of such messages and translating them into verbal language and 
:econdly becoming aware of the "messages" of others and confronting them with 
"translations." Obvious, this does not mean that one should be on the watch 
for and attempt to translate all meta-communications, for this would be to 
err in the opposite direction and make the communication process intolerable. 
The meta-communication process is a kind of communication shorthand and, if 
·..:sed correctly, facilitates the communication process. However, both vague 
a~d never-translated meta-communicative messages can clog or muddy inter-
?ersonal contact. Excessive reliance on meta-communication might also mani-
fest an implicit distrust of language. At any rate, all interpersonal com-
~unications problems are fair game for the contract group. 
Language and Self-Identity 
One of the messages of G. B. Shaw's Pygmalion is that in some fashion 
language makes the person. Differences in the use of language not only 
reflect class differences in society but language actually helps create and 
maintain the differences in values that separate one class from another. 
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I :exual matters and do so in public, while a member of an upper class might 
I 
/ ::ot feel free to speak about se:x;l!ality at all. Language, then, is an instru-
1 j :~nt of reinforcement regarding the different approaches to sexuality that 
exist in the two classes. What is true with respect to social identity is 
also true in the area of self-identity. Self-identity is one of those heuris-
tic "impact-concepts" that is just beginning to be translated into operational 
terms and subjected to controlled investigation (e.g. Bronson, 1959; Hess, 
1 :963). Language not only reveals a person's identity, "who he is," but in 
some way it makes him the person he is. The literary dictum, Le style c' est 
A l'homme ~' can also be applied to a person's style of speaking: La parole 
I 
" c'est 1 'homme meme. If a person's language is weak, insipid, cliche-ridden, 
and consistently ritualistic in social situations, this says much about the 
person's ability and willingness to relate both to himself and to others. 
Language not only reflects his encapsulation but becomes one of the instru-
ments of his self-imprisonment. 
Erikson (1956) sees the relationship between language and self-identity 
as developing early during the maturational process: 
•.• [A] child ••• learning to speak •.• is acquiring one of the 
prime functions supporting a sense of individual autonomy 
and one of the prime techniques for expanding the raius of 
give-and-take .•. Speech •.. defines him as one responded to by 
those around him with changed diction and attention .•. [A] 
spoken word is a pact: there is an irrevocab 1 y cornn· i • 1- -f ng 
aspect to an utterance remembered by others ..•. [TJi.e tL~ld may 
come to develop, in use of voice and word, a particular 
combination of whining or singing, judging or arguing, as part 
of a new element of the future identity, namely, the element 
'one who speaks and is spoken to in such-and-such a way' ••• 
(p. 115). 
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::rikson (1963) also discusses the case of a man who wanted to bury his past, 
:o break with certain aspects of his self-identity. One of the things he did 
·•as to pursue graduate studies in a foreign language. Erikson suggests that 
this new language, both in terms of a new career, a new medium of expression, 
.111d a new culture, may well have offered his client an opportunity to 
establish a different self-picture. 
It is hypothesized, then, that language reveals certain dimensions of a 
rerson's life style and also creates and serves to maintain certain patterns 
of living and interacting. Ryle (1952), for instance, suggests that personal-
ity differences exist between those who use dispositional verbs such as 
'.Jelieve, wonder, suppose, and aspire, which signify ability, tendency, and 
proneness-to, and those who deal principally in modal verbs such as does, ~' 
.:md must. Tii.e person who constantly believes, wonders, and supposes is seen 
to be differently oriented toward reality from the person who disposes of 
reality in terms of what does, ~' or must happen. 
Identity crises (Erikson, 1956, 1963, 1964), too, are reflected in the 
use of language. The adolescent who, according to Erikson, goes through a 
kind of natural period of identity diffusion and a moratorium in which society 
allows him to experiment with a number of different roles, speaks the 
specialized language of his sub-culture. Language becomes one of the ways 
in which he declares that he is not just an appendage of parents, church, 
school, and society in general, but a person in his own right. 
The contract group, then, is a laboratory in which the participants 
have the opportuni.ty to reflect on the implications of the propositions: 
"M •y language is me," and "In some .way I use language to make myself what 
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: am." It is an opportunity to examine the ways in which they use logos, 
'/ 
1 
·onmercial-speech, cliche-talk, and anti-logos to fashion a communication 
life-style. 
~ogos in the Contract Group 
The contract group obviously calls for logos rather than any form of 
/ 
co~~ercial-speech, cliche-talk, or anti-logos. Moreover the contract speci-
fies the kind of logos that is acceptable during group sessions. Therefore, 
~ith respect to the contract group, logos can be divided into both contractual 
,1:1d a-contractual Jo gos. For instance, if a participant begins seriously 
:o spell out his views on the current political situation but in no way 
:elates what he is doing to contractual goals (e.g. rendering the there-and-
then here-and-now), given the ordinary sensitivity contract, he would 
?robably be engaging in a-contractual logos. Engaging in a-contractual logos 
is frequently a fairly sophisticated form of flight from group pro~ess, for 
while a-contractual logos might well be meaningful in itself, it is not so in 
the context of the contract group. It is one thing if a member speaks about 
values, another if he speaks meaningfully and feelingly about his values. 
The latter is contractual, while the former is a-contractual logos. Group 
members often hesitate to challenge the member engaged in a-contractual logos 
because they feel that they would be keeping him from doing something that is 
good in its elf. 
The general rul./ is that logos in the group stimulates logos. If a 
person uses language powerfully in the group, others will tend to follow 
his lead. Therefore, one of the functions of the leader-member is to model 
logos. However, he must do so intelligently, that is, he must proportion his 
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:w.1ner of speaking to the ability of others to listen. His language must be 
:i spur rather than a club. Goffman (1967) suggests that this might well mean, 
1 ~ least in the first sessions of .. .the group, "scaling down" one's expression 
::i the service of dialogue: 
These two tendencies, that of the speaker to scale down his 
expressions and that of the listeners to scale up their 
interests, each in the light of the other's capacities and 
demands, form the bridge that people build to one another, 
allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a communion 
of reciprocally sustained involvement (pp. 116-117). 
-'·.~ever, this line of reasoning should not be used as an excuse to keep talk 
:1 a "safe" level. 
In my own experience I have seen ill-timed and ill-controlled logos 
(·•hich then really becomes anti-logos) inhibit and even destroy group process . 
.::1ce one group member, tried of the anemic communication that characterized 
the first couple of meetings, spoke with such dramatic force about himself-as-
?roblematic and the group-as-anemic that he frightened the other members into 
shutting off communication rather than upgrading it. Instead of challenging 
the group from the start, he allowed his frustration to build up until it 
burst forth in language that could not be handled by the group. On the 
other hand, I frequently (but not frequently enough) find myself stimulated 
':iy the "strong talk" of a number of my friends. Their logos awakens logos 
~ithin me and I find myself both thinking thoughts, feeling emotions, and 
giving expression to both with a depth that surprises me. It is as if the 
third thing, dialogue, is greater than its parts, which are my thoughts and 
feelings and those of my friend taken separately. This kind of mutual 
stimulation is the goal of the contract group. 
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_rne ~-Linguistic Dimensions £!_Speech 
Much can be learned about a person, not only from the verbal content of 
/ .:~s communications (the content -can be strong, cliche-ridden, ambiguous, weak, 
etc.), but also from the quality of the voice in delivery, or as Wiener and 
~'.Jhrabian (1968) put it, from "variations in ton:al qualities, patterns of 
stress, pitch, and pauses which are not dictated by the required linguistic 
form" (p. 51). For example, a person may claim that he is not anxious but 
)etray his anxiety quite openly in the tone, pitch, and timbre of his voice: 
··,\.'1 insecure person ••• may speak in complex, involved or even unfinished 
sentences, with poor pitch and volume control, and with frequent nervous 
:::mnerisms" (Mahl & Schulze, 1964, p. 51). Voice quality, rhythm, continuity, 
speech rate, and verbal output all communicate something to the listener, or, 
:rom a more active point of view, the speaker has all of these extra-linguis-
tic factors at his disposal, to use, as he sees fit, to increase the 
effectiveness of his communication. In a sense, there are two kinds of 
extra-linguistic phenomena: (a) those related to speech itself (e.g. pitch, 
tone, etc.), and (b) those forms of behavior which, although they "communi-
cate," are more or less separable from speech in the strict sense. Such 
non-verbal behavior, as it is called, is a subject of intense interest and 




NON-VERBAL COMMUNICATION IN THE LABORATORY 
1'E!. scientific study of non-verbal communication. Although it is a 
truism that non-verbal behavior plays an extremely important part in the 
entire conununication process, some have suggested that its scientific study 
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is not worth pursuing. La Barre (1964) takes strong exception to such a 
suggestion : 
It is easy to ridicule kine~iology as an abstruse, pedantic, and 
unimportant study by pure scientists. But I believe that 
kinesiology is, on the contrary, one of the most important 
avenues for better understanding internationally. Consider, as 
one small example, how Chinese hate to be touched,slapped on the 
back, or even to shake hands; how easily an American could 
avoid offense by merely omitting these intended gestures of 
friendliness! Misunderstanding of nonverbal communication of an 
unconscious kind is one of the most vexing, and unnecessary sources 
of international friction. (Consider, for example, the hands-over-
the-head self-handshake of Khrushchev,which Americans interpreted 
as an arrogant gesture of triumph, as of a victorious prize-
fighter, whereas Krushchev seems to have intended it as a friendly 
gesture of international brotherhood.) (p. 218). 
Birdwhistell (1952, 1961, 1963a, 1963b) and Hall (1959, 1963a, 1963b, 1964, 
1966) have both elaborated categories which relate body movements, including 
gestures and facial expressions, to the process of communication. Davitz 
(1964) has reviewed the literature on the interpretation of emotions from 
facial expressions and researchers such as Ek.man (1965) and Ekman and Friesen 
(1967) continue to do research in this area. Dittman (1963) is another who 
studies the relation of bodily movement to communication. La Barre (1964) 
discusses (not without humor) a wide variety of non-verbal communicative 
behavior--greetings, kissing, sticking out the tongue (in China "a quick, 
minimal tongue-protrusion and -retraction signifies embarrassment and self-
castigation" [p. 200]), gestures of contempt (Neapolitans click the right 
thembnail off the right canine in a downward arc" [p. 201]), gestures of 
.Eoliteness ("a Shan may bend over and snuff the sleeve of the benefactor's 
coat" [p. 202)), conventionalized motor acts (e.g., in both Oriental and 
Occidental acting), and conversational gestures (e.g., "the shaken ri~ht 
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I I :orefinger of accusation, sharp criticism, and threat" [p. 203])--on a cross-
cultural basis. On the other hand, while there is a good deal of talk about 
the non-verbal dimensions of sensitivity-training and even though many 
laboratories use non-verbal exercises in group interaction, I know of no 
systematic study of this phenomenon. Perhaps many of the studies mentioned 
above could begin to lay a theoretical foundation for their use. 
Non-verbal connnunication is always present in the sensitivity-training 
group, but in different ways. The following division might help conceptual-
ize the presence of such behavior in training groups: 
(1) Inadvertent non-verbal connnunications. First of all, since the 
?articipants are physically present in the group, they are continually giving 
off communication cues by their facial expressions and bodily posture both as 
a complement to their verbalizations and when they are silent. They grimace, 
sit on the edge of their chairs, yawn, cough, bury their hands in their 
faces, cast their eyes down, wring their hands, scratch their heads, cry, and 
engage in a whole host of communicative non-verbal acts. Very often such 
acts give some evidence about how they are feeling at the moment, but at 
other times these acts seem ambiguous, out of place, or even contradict the 
verbal portion of the participant's message. For instance, I once videotaped 
the last session of a laboratory course in interpersonal relations. One of 
the participants engaged in a fairly lengthy remark on how much he had liked 
the experience, how interesting and worthwhile it was, etc. However, his 
Voice was flat, without affect, he could hardly be heard by the other 
members, he was slouched down in his chair, and he made no eye contact with 
any of the other members. In a word, his entire tone an<l posture belied 
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J what he was saying, a fact that was not lost on him during the replay of the 
tape. 
(2) Advertent non-verbal communication without physical contact. A 
participant may intentionally emit some form of non-verbal behavior in order 
to make psychological contact with another participant or the group as a 
whole. He may groan, wink, smile and engage in a variety of other non-contac-
tive acts in order to transmit some message. The person who scratches his 
head might unwittingly be saying something about his perplexity and/ or 
anxiety, while the participant who winks at another is actively using a 
non-verbal channel in order to communicate (e.g. he may be flirting or he 
may be engaging in a form of non-verbal support). 
(3) Advertent non-verbal communication with physical contact. A third 
category, and this is the kind of non-verbal behavior that is the object of 
most of the controversy and/or discussion, involves actual physical contact--
e.g., touching, holding, hugging, kissing, pushing, swinging, "passing," 
etc. Sometimes such non-verbal behavior takes place "naturally" within the 
group, e.g., one participant, after disclosing himself at a rather deep level, 
begins to cry, and a second participant puts his arm around him to give him 
support. Other forms of physical contact can take place through exercises 
designed to have the participant feel the effects of physical contact. Some 
exercises involve dyads. For instance Gunther (1968) suggests an exercise 
called "back talk": 
[T]he couple stands back to back with eyes closed, and through 
movement get to know each other's backs. Have a non-verbal 
conversation with your backs. (One person rubs; the other 
listens; take turns.) Have a back argurnen t. Make up. Be very 
gentle, playful. Move up and down at various speeds. 
Eventually stand quietly back to back and slowly separate. 
Experience your back--how you feel. Turn around, open your 
eyes and see your partner (p. 118). 
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Jther exercises may involve the whole group, e.g., "under the sheets": 
Each person goes under a sheet and stays quiet for 5 minutes. 
They are allowed to do anything they want to, except to move around 
the room. The move about the room, contact/encounter other people 
or groups as long as each stays under his own sheet. Be open to 
your desires and let whatever action-reaction that wants to happen 
occur. No talking during the experience. When it is over, 
experience how you feel; come out from under the sheet (Gunther, 
1968, pp. 174-175). 
Such exercises are frequently quite diagnostic: they quickly reveal areas of 
emotional constriction. For example, during a "processing" session which 
took place immediately after a few simple non-verbal exercises involving 
physical contact, one of the participants, who had been obviously rigid 
during the exercises, made a statement something like this: "I really feel 
somewhat disturbed, not by the exercises but by my reaction to them. Over 
the past couple of years I have become much more at home with myself and with 
others. I felt that I was more or less in possession of myself both on 
the personal and interpersonal level. These exercises this morning disturbed 
me because I did experience my rigidity, I did see dramatically that not 
everything has been worked out, I did see that I am still afraid of intimacy 
with perhaps both myself and others." Insofar as these exercises are 
diagnostic, they aid the process of communication in the sense that they 
put the participant in more effective (though sometimes painful) contact 
with himself. Such communication-with-self serves as a basis for more 
effective communication with others. 
The anxiety and the value inherent in physical contact. Physical 
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:ontact in our society is anxiety-arousing. First of all, it is an express-
ion of intimacy and many of us are afraid of intimacy. Secondly, physical 
contact in our society seems to be over-identified with sexuality; it is not 
seen as a universal mode of contact and communication. Anxiety runs very high 
~hen the exercise is so structured that the dyads are of the same sex, 
especially if both are male. "I would feel a lot better if my partner were 
a girl" says a number of things: "I live in a culture in which physical 
contact of male with male is more or less taboo"; "physical contact, is, of 
its very nature, sexual"; "I consider intimacy as something intersexual. 11 
However, the laboratory is a "cultural island, 11 that is, it attempts to 
develop its own human culture apart from the cultural rigidities that exist 
outside the laboratory. In the case of exercises involving physical 
contact, the laboratory culture says this: "Physical contact is another 
channel of human communication. It can be so restricted as to communicate 
only certain dimensions of interpersonal living such as hostility (in acts 
such as shoving, striking, etc.) and sexuality (in any physical act showing 
interest or concern). Here we experiment with physical contact as a channel 
of communication. Our purpose is to see how many different human realities 
we can express through physical contact or through a combination of physical 
contact, non-verbal behavior which does not involve physical contact, and 
verbal behavior. Our purpose here is to grow interpersonally by involving 
ourselves with one another. Physical contact is one of the modes of human 
involvement. Here in the laboratory there is cultural permission to deal 
with it more .freely than we could in day-to-day living. It is hoped that 
we can take advantage of this permission." 
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~of the problems associated with physical contact in the laboratory. 
?hysical contact can arouse strong emotion, especially strong anxiety. In 
:y own experience I have found that the way in which exercises are introduced 
to the group is of paramount importance. An example, in the first residential 
laboratory I attended, we had generally avoided exercises, especially non-
verbal exercises involving physical contact during the first half of the 
laboratory. Around the midpoint we were involved in a session in which 
communication had noticeably bogged down. It seems that we just could not 
£et in contact with one another. We were sitting outside on a kind of patio, 
·.·hen suddenly the trainer sa.id: "I'd like to do something. Let's go inside." 
The anxiety level in the group shot skyward. My imagination ran wild: we 
were going inside because we were going to do something that should not be 
seen by others. Once inside, we sat around for a while, saying nothing. The 
trainer remained in a very serious, brooding mood. Our anxiety continued to 
mount. Finally he said: "I would like a volunteer." Again my imagination 
ran riot: volunteers are called for (especially under the "battle" conditions 
under which we were operating) only when the mission is dangerous. We 
remained silent and frozen in our seats. The trainer made another plea for 








(certainly not me) said that he was tentatively willing to try to cooperate. 
The trainer said: "Hold out your palms, I'd like to feel your strength and 
let you feel mine." They pushed against each other for a while, but the 
volunteer's willingness faded and he withdrew from the E· ,:rcise. 
The exercise the trainer proposed was really a simple, fairly non-
threatening exercise, but the way in which he introduced it crented such 
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I i ::n:iety that it practically immobilized the group. Communication had 
I l :1oundered. The trainer's purpose, then, was to offer an exercise or two to 
I stimulate contact and communication, but he completely defeated his own 
?urpose. The leader can control the degree of anxiety (at least the general 
J:ixiety level of the grotip) by the way he introduces the group to such 
I ~xercises. In the contract group both the experimental nature of the labora-
1 tory experience and the reason for using non-verbal exercises are explained 
~efore the laboratory begins. Furthermore, if non-verbal exercises are first 
introduced as experimental games, they will arouse much less anxiety than if 
used as "serious" dynamite to get rid of communication blocks in the 'Middle 
of group sessions. I often begin a laboratory with a "micro-lab," a kind of 
festival of communication games which involves many different kinds of 
exercises--verbal, non-verbal without physical contact, and non-verbal with 
physical contact, and mixtures. This tends to make the partie ! pants less 
•·ary and thus more ready to experiment with communication-through-physical-
contact later on in the laboratory. 
In the contract laboratory the participants should not be forced or 
'Jullied into more serious exercises or exercises that take place. at more 
serious times during the life of the group. Again, the way the exercise 
is proposed will often determine whether the participants will engage in it 
or not. For instance, if two people seem to be avoiding each other or if 
they have not been able to make contact on a verbal level, the trainer might 
reflect on this and then say: "I wonder whether the two of you would like 
to engage in a little non-verbal experiment which may or may not facilitate 
communication between you. These exercises work no magic, there's nothing 
--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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::iystic about them, but they may help." Individuals differ quite a bit in 
their willingness to explore the non-verbal dimensions of communication. But 
if this dimension of laboratory li_f~ is made relatively non-threatening (it 
;.•ill almost always arouse some anxiety), most of the participants will make 
use of it and it can become a fruitful area of experimentation, complementing 
the verbal interaction of the group. 
Choosing the right exercise. Exercises should not be used indiscrimi-
nately in laboratories, but should rather be integrated with the task at hand. 
If the overriding purpose of the laboratory is to become more aware of oneself 
and of others as body and as sensing, then the laboratory might be highly 
exercise-oriented and many of the exercises suggested by Gunther (1968) might 
be used. If the purpose of the laboratory is interpersonal growth, many of 
the exercises suggested by Schutz (1967) could be integrated into the 
experience. But the choi~e and timing of an exercise are important. If the 
participants are already anxious and the exercise is seen principally as an 
instrument which will arouse more anxiety, there is a strong probability 
that it will not have a beneficial effect, for the participants will not 
be able to give themselves to it properly. In the contract laboratory the 
exercise is not an end in itself. Even when it constitutes a form of commun-
ication in its own right, it is still there to complement and help stimulate 
verbal involvement. Some trainers mechanically substitute exercises for 
the give-and-take of verbal interaction, but this often merely reflects their 
own anxiety and need to see to it that the interaction keeps moving. There 
are certainly plenty of exercises of all kinds available. Besides those 
listed by Gunther, Schutz,, and Malamud and Machover (1965), there is an 
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endless supply in the fertile imagination of those who conduct laboratories~ 
;~ exercise created or modified to fit a specific situation that arises in 
a group will fare better than a 1:>9rrowed exercise, which, although "interes-
ting," does not fit. 
Exercises and life. Exercises, like the laboratory itself, are contrived 
They are not meant to be a way. of life. If they make a participant pause and 
reflect on some dimension of his interpersonal life, if they show him some 
of his unused potentialities, if they enlarge his area of freedom with him-
self and others, then they have served their purpose well. However, even 
though a participant might not make a contrived exercise-culture part of his 
day-to-day living, he may find that because of his laboratory experiences he 
interacts in somewhat different ways. For instance, he may show affection 
more readily in physical ways. The only caution is that he not inflict 
himself in his new-found freedom on others. 
POIESIS: WORDS-MADE-FLESH 
When pathos finds expression in human language, when logos is suffused 
with human feeling and emotion, a new term is needed to describe the communi-
cation that takes place. The term used here is poiesis which comes from 
the Greek verb meaning "to do, to make." The English word "poetry" comes 
from the same stem. When meaning and feeling become artfully one in language, 
the result is poetry. In human dialogue, when words are meaningfully filled 
With human emotion, when feelings and emotions find creative expression in 
human language, the ref';ult is poiesis. Forrest (1965) uses the same term 
With somewhat negative connotations. For him poiesis is a "making" almost 
, in the sense of "making up" or "contriving." The schizophrenic, for instance,, 
•--.,..~ ... --------------------------------------------' 
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but fulfilled. In fact, fulfillment of wishes occurs only in the world of 
.-·-
•ords. Be that as it may, in the present context poiesis has only positive 
I connotations. It is too rich a term to be wasted on pathology. Poiesis is 
·•ord-made-flesh in human dialogue. 
Men seem to feel safer when they compartmentalize their experiences. 
Feelings are all right, and language is all right, but they are to be 
kept apart, if possible. Lynch (1967) recognizes in movies a similar move-
nent, that is, a movement toward immediate, private, and wordless experience. 
He deplores such a movement: "[W] ords and ideas have been given a hard time; 
they have been pushed into a polarized state, devoid of contact with images 
and things. They need to be allowed to re-enter the world and re-establish 
their relation to things and their own power as a human art" (p. 79). 
~!eaningless words and unverbalized feelings both sin against human communi-
cation. Lynch suggests that even brutal language is better than either 
emasculated words or silences that hide hate and bitterness: 
••• [T] words in Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf are, on the 
surface, ordinary human words that say something. On the 
second level they turn out to be words describing games 
being played at, unrealities, fictions. On the third and 
final take they have inflexibly human rules behind them and 
are the only forms of salvation and contact, cruel though 
they might be, between George and Martha (p. 83, emphasis 
added). 
Language, then, can be strong medicine, if it is "made" strong by becoming 
the vehicle of the speaker's experience. 
The members of the contract group are asked to experiment with poicsis. 
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<his does not mean that their language must be continually filled with 
er.~tion. First of all, there are degrees of poiesis, and secondly, we could 
not keep up the process of conununication if all words were afire. What is 
demanded in the contract group is feeling proportioned to meaning and 
expressed with simplicity in human language. 
Experiencing, expressing, conununicating. Men first experience something, 
then they express it, and, if their expression is successful, that is, if 
they actually contact another, they communicate their experience. Gendlin 
(1962) suggests that psychotherapy deals primarily with the first variable, 
experiencing: "Psychotherapy generally ••• seems to involve not only 
verbalization, but more fundamentally, the client's inward reference to and 
struggle with his directly felt experiencing. The individual's inward data, 
concretely felt, seem to be actual stuff of psychotherapy, not the words ••• 
(p. ). In sensitivity groups, however, it is rather a question of getting 
participants to verbalize the more or less integral pathos experiences they 
do have and are in contact with. But even in therapy, the impact of the 
therapist is determined, according to Patterson (1966), by the client's 
perception of the therapist. It is not sufficient for the therapist to have 
positive feelings toward his client, nor is it sufficient merely to express 
these feelings. Rather he must express them in such a way that they are 
actually picked up by the client, that is, he must communicate these feelings. 
Therefore, although helping a patient to get into contact with his own 
experience seems to be the first step in the therapeutic process, still, 
since integral functioning is ultimately defined by the quality of a 




I ;:1eself integrally are also essential goals of therapy. Patterson thus 
i .ighlights one of the frequently forgotten dimensions of poiesis, that is, 
that feelings must be expressed through language in such a way that others 
.---
actually do pick them up. This is work, hard work. This is why integral 
communication is called poi es is, a "doing, a making." Therefore, when Salter 
(1949) recommends "feeling-talk"--"we must forego premeditated utterances 
and say what we feel when we feel it" (p. 99)--it must be remembered that 
:::ere "feeling-talk" may not be sufficient. The expression of feeling must 
be suffused with logos so that it becomes an invitation to dialogue. 
Failed poiesis: action divorced from language. While perhaps the 
primary failure to achieve poeisis consists in an inability or a refusal to 
include emotion in verbal expression, there is also another, even more 
dramatic, form of failed poiesis. It involves what Bloch (1968) calls "an 
inability to substitute and utilize language for action and acitivity" (p. 
178). When a married couple stand screaming at each other, a kind of 
communication-through-action is taking place, but the use of language is 
really incidental to the whole process. This dumping of raw emotion on each 
other is an "action" or an "activity" devoid of both logos and poiesis. But 
if a marriage begins primarily on the level of pathos so that, although each 
"experiences" the other~ still neither is capable of translating that 
experience into language, and if the marriage continues principally on the 
level of pathos, with commercial-speech alone handling the necessary trans-
actions between partners, then trouble is almost unavoidable. The couple 
turns up in some marital counseling situation and it is discovered that their 




I :~·nrd each other have been strong and turbulent, but strength and turbulennce 
';~not imply depth. They have never really questioned their feelings. They 
l eschew logos: they never speak meaningfully about their core, their values, 
I i ~heir goals, the interlaced meanings of all the phases of their lives. 
I I ?athos is not modified, stimulated, and matured by effective logos. There 
I ~as never been any "need" for words. When ephemeral feeling dies away, 
however, and the inevitable problematic of living together arises, communi-
cation fails because it has never really been a part of the relationshi~. The 
2athos level on which the relationship has been based is not sufficient to 
handle the problematic. When undiscussed problems mount too high, irrespon-
sible pathos runs wild, with words becoming the lackeys of feeling. Then 
the conversation that does exist is nothing but a caricature of communication. 
The sooner a couple realizes the potentialities of human language and makes 
~ature verbal interactional systems part of their relationship, the better 
prepared will they be to handle problems that arise, and, what is more 
important, the greater will be their potentiality for interpersonal growth. 
~ Expression of Emotion 
In human affairs there seem to be two highly prevalent, though doubt-
fully growthful, ways of handling strong feeling, both positive and negative. 
Actually both are ways of avoiding rather than handling emotion in trans-
actional situations. 
(1) The suppression of feeling. The "safest" way of handling strong 
feeling is to suppress it. Perhaps "conceal" is a more accurate word than 
" f suppress," for hidden emotion does make itself felt under a number o 
disguises. For instance, if a person suppresses or conceals his anger, it 
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frequently comes out in a number of deceitful ways, e.g., in coolness, 
unavailability, snide remarks, obstructionism, and other subtle forms of 
revenge. Feeling has not really been suppressed, rather it has been trans-
lated into a number of non-growthful activities which are difficult to deal 
1Jith precisely because of their "underground" character. 
Riecken (1952) describes a work camp in which, because of the philosophy 
and religious convictions of the members, the prevailing atmosphere was one 
of friendly and gentle interactions. Since the members disapproved of all 
kinds of aggression, both physical and verbal, a problem arose with respect 
to the handling of the minor antagonisms that arose daily and tended to 
:~terfere with the work to be done. Meetings were held, but problems were 
discussed in a most abstract and intellectualized way. Because of the 
failure to institute real emotional connnunication, the antagonisms persisted 
nuch to the dissatisfaction of everyone. But an intellectual approach to 
a non-intellective situation was bound to fail. 
(2) Acting-out. The second way of handling strong feeling is to foist 
it on the other. Pent up anger is allowed to "explode" or pent up affection 
is allowed to overwhelm the other. Such "solutions" are rationalized as 
forms of honesty, but, strangely enough, such "honesty" seldom results in 
growthful encounter. Acting-out does satisfy immediate instinctual needs, 
but seldom serves the process of communication. Some people pride themselves 
on "blowing up" and getting it "out of their systems," claiming that this 
is more honest than concealment and the subtle "leakage" of negative fe.eling 
that ensues. This may well be true, but such pride should be tempered by 
the fact that there is still a more human way. 
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(3) Poiesis in responsible encounter. Let us suppose that once George 
I :.1s been angered by John, he says something like this: "John, I am really 
! l Jngry with you. I could try to_swallow my anger or I could blow up, but I 
Jon't think that either of these would solve anything, because I think that 
[n a way my anger is really our problem, yours and mine, and I'd like to 
talk it out with you. How about it?" Such a tack (especially if the stylized 
·.:ay in which it is presented here is overlooked for the moment) is rarely 
c~ployed, for it demands too much honesty and runs the risk either of refusal 
or of disquieting discoveries about oneself. It also demands dealing with 
icelings instead of relinquishing them in one way or another. George remains 
Jngry, but now his anger becomes a point of possible contact instead of just 
an abrasive force. Sometimes a person has to choose between the pain of 
talking out another's hostility toward him and the discomfort of being the 
victim of a dozen covert expressions of hostility so rationalized that it 
is impossible to get at them. 
~ Prevalence of Hos.tility 
One of the first emotions that members of sensitivity groups tend to 
experiment with is hostility. For a number of people hostility is a rela-
tively "inexpensive" emotion (though there are those who find it almost 
unbearable either to express or to be the object of hostility), more or less 
readily available for use. Because it is readily available, some use it 
recklessly, and this serves to perpetuate the caricature of the sensitivity 
laboratory as a place where people "tell one another off." 
The responsible expression of hostility as ~form of poiesis. Contract-
group members are in no way discouraged from expressing anger or hostility, 
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~·Jt they are asked to do so in as constructive a way as possible. Mann 
.1959), in reviewing the literature, discovered that the expression of 
:·ositive feelings in group situations is positively correlated with intelli-
feelings is not the issue; it is rather how they are expressed. Negative 
feelings, too, are part of the human condition and are experienced by the 
intelligent and well-adjusted. The hypothesis here is that the intelligent 
and well-adjusted, when they do express negative feelings, would tend to do 
so in a positive way, that is, through some form of poiesis. The positive 
ex?ression of negative feelings can be growthful. Therefore, the airing of 
negative feelings can be quite beneficial to contract-group interaction if it 
is done responsibly, but it should hardly be the major emotional preoccupation 
of the group. 
Hostility that is expressed by some form of anti-logos rather than 
£Oiesis merely elicits more hostility. A study by Bandura, Lipsher, and 
~1iller (1960) showed that hostile therapists encourage patient hostility. 
The study also indicated that therapists tend to avoid patients who direct 
hostility toward them. Finally, patients suppress or redirect hostility 
following avoidance reactions on the part of therapists. Thus, when 
hostility is a more or less "buried" variable in a transactional setting, 
it tends to evoke a manipulative, "game" culture that is hardly growthful. 
In the contract group, if anyone tries to engage in this "attack-immunity" 
game of Bandura's therapists, h~ should be challenged immediately. 
I 259 The meanings of hostility. Hostility frequently expresses more than raw I 
I I "againstness." 
I 
Especially in group interaction it can mean many things. (1) 
it may be a way of expressing on~'s individuality or showing strength in the 
;;roup. This use of hostility, however, is relatively immature and usually 
characterizes only the earlier sessions of the life of the group. Real 
strength and individuality can be displayed in contractual ways. (2) For 
the person who feels threatened by the interaction of the group hostility may 
be a defenisve maneuver rather than a form of attack. (3) "Planned" 
hostility may be used as a "dynamite tachnique" to stimulate action during a 
~ioring session. (4) Hostility can also have a. more subtle and constructive 
~caning: it may be an attempt to achieve some kind of interpersonal contact 
or intimacy. A number of authors (e.g. Burton & Whiting, 1961; Mills, 1964; 
Ogilvie, 1961; Slater, 1966) have suggested (and some have conducted research 
that supports the hypothesis) that identification tends to follow aggression. 
For instance, Slater states: "It is for this reason that aggression leads 
to identification: in fantasy the attack is a freeing of the desirable 
attributes from the hateful shell that prevents their acquisition" (p. 146). 
It would take rather ingenious empirical investigation to determine whether 
this is the case or not, but it does seem to be a fact that sometimes after 
two people storm at each other, they tend to draw closer together. Perhaps 
the direct route to intimacy is too difficult and the turmoil of the indirect 
route is all that is available. 
Perhaps one of the best ways available to a participant in a sensit i.v it y 
group to discover the meaning of hostility in his interperson3l relations is 
to express the hostility that wells up within during group sess:0ns. 
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The Problems and Potentialities of Poiesis 
- --
One of the problems of poiesis is that it is an anti-manipulative and 
anti-"game" form of connnunication in a manipulative and game-prone culture. 
_ .. -
Even therapy does not escape verbal manipulation, for, as Krasner (1963) has 
observed, the connnunication of therapeutic influence is a function of the 
therapist's verbal behavior. His studies indicate that the patient learns 
the role that the therapist expects of him through verbal conditioning. And 
yet the hypothesis under which this book is being written is that the less 
manipulation in human interaction the more growthful will it be. 
A second problem is that it is doubtful that our present culture is 
ready for a sharp rise in the amount of poiesis in interpersonal relating. 
The character Jerry in Albee's The Zoo Story is somewhat disconcerting to 
the average reader, for people are not accustomed to dealing verbally with 
reality on the level that he deals with it. Jerry is resented both because 
he feels too much and because he translates what he feels into language. 
Therefore, even those who are responsibly and intelligently "poetic" in their 
encouters must expect to experience a certain amount of rejection from those 
vho cannot tolerate intimacy. 
And yet, as Lynd (1958) would have it, men have a moral obligation to 
become artists in communication. This is difficult, for schisms within man, 
according to Maslow (1967)--for instance, splits within the personality due 
to the inward battle between impulse and control--cause splits in his 
communication: "To the extent that we are split, our expression and communi-
cations are split, parital, onesided," but, on the other hand, to the extent 
that we are integrated and whole, our communications are "complete, unique, 
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idiosyncratic, alive, and creative" (p. 197). The split between feeling and 
verbal language reflects the schizoid nature of the "average" man. His task 
is to overcome this split, because, if Lynd (1958) is right, too much is to 
be lost if he does not: 
It may be asked why, since the language of intimacy will always 
be to a large extent a language of gesture, facial expression, 
and touch, it should be important to enlarge the possibilities 
of verbal language for such connnunication. For at least three 
reasons: 1. Lack of a verbal means of connnunication of certain 
experiences may sometimes lead to atrophy or lack of awareness 
of the experiences themselves. 2. Ranges of mutual exploration 
may be cut off and unnecessary misunderstandings may arise if 
there is a feeling that words should not be used or an unwilling-
ness to search for words to use as one medium of connnunication. 
3. The creation of symbols in language is a characteristically 
human ability that can bring unconscious creative forces into 
relation with conscious effort, subject into relation with 
object, can give form to hitherto unknown things and hence make 
possible the apprehension of new truth (pp. 249-250). 
Such integration of words and feeling is perhaps both a cause and a reflection• 
of the general integration of the individual. If the participants of ·a 
contract laboratory come away with a deeper respect for· honest emotion, 
honest language, and honest attempts to integrate the two, then the laboratory 





One of the principal interaction goals in the contract group (and all 
·ensitivity-training groups) is self-disclosure. Since self-disclosure of 
·ome degree constitutes an integral part of almost any kind of laboratory 
'xperience and does so in a special way in laboratories in interpersonal rela-
.ions, it needs special attention, especially in view of the fact that most of 
s fear self-revelation to a greater or lesser extent and therefore find it 
'.ifficult to estimate its value in interpersonal living. l Since this chapter is comparatively long, a preview is in order: the 
(.0llowing topics are dealt with: (1) Dangers associated with concealment. 
· :iere is a growing literature pointing toward the potential pathogenic nature 
f concealment. The works of such people as Mowrer and Jourard are considered 
rom this point of view. (2) Our culture and self-disclosure. The relation-
'.iip between our culture and self-disclosure is placed in focus, for there seem 
IJbe a number of cultural bans against self-disclosure. This same society 
~~ems to extol privacy as an absolute value. Therefore the value of privacy 
i 
t~d its relationship to interpersonal involvement are considered. (3) Truth 
'-~ h ·~ .....Q.nes t_y_. At least in practice, truth and honesty are not the precious com-
~ities that they are made out to be. Some of the factors militating against 
~reater spirit of truth and openness in society and how this affects self-
t "'elation among men are discussed. 
(4) Intra-individual resistance to disclosure. Resistance to self-disclo-
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·Jre is not just a function of certain factors in society. There are also 
~:1tra-individual factors which prevent a greater spirit of openness among men--
.. g., flight from self-knowledge, fear of intimacy, and a refusal to bear re-
-?onsibility. (5) Guilt and disclosure. Guilt is an everyday human commodity 
• 
. ~ich often is instrumental in keeping a person out-of-community in some way. 
'.t has many faces, and some of these are probed. (6) The value of shame in 
:uman life. Shame, too, is a common experience. Depending upon how it is 
i;iproached, it can either enhance or prove detrimental to both personal and 
interpersonal living. How it differs from guilt and how it relates to communi-
:ation with self and others are considered. (7) Honesty in the group experi-
·~·nee. Possible areas of. self-disclosure during the group experience itself are 
Jiscussed. Of especial importance is the here-and-now honesty of what is hap-
?ening to oneself and how one stands in relationship to the other participants 
foring the group interaction. 
(8) Self-disclosure: "story" and "history." It is argued that humanistic 
self-disclosure is not a mere recital of actuarial data, no matter how intimate 
they might be. (9) The degree of disclosure in the group. Different groups 
achieve different levels of self-disclosure. Some of the factors determining 
the depth of disclosure are reviewed. (10) Labeling ~ ~ form of behavioral 
control. It is hypothesized that self-disclosure can be used as an effective 
behavioral control device. It is then called "labeling," a term borrowed from 
Dollard and Miller (1950) to describe a process somewhat different fru1:1 theirs. 
(11) The dangers of self-disclosure. Finally, some of the dangers of self-
revelation, especially self-revelation in a group situation, are reviewed. 
However, it is suggested that these dangers can be minimized or even eliminated, 
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50 that the potential advantages of self-disclosure will outweight its paten-
tial disadvantages. This is not to deny, however, that self-disclosure always 
entails a certain degree of risk...-
Interaction Goals 
In contrast to the T-group in which there is an "absence of any prearrange 
or externally assigned task" (Benne, 1964a, p. 217), the contract group imposes 
certain tasks on its members. The impact-value of the traditional T-group lies 
in its members search for viable goals and effective modes of interrelating. 
The impact of the contract group, on the other hand, lies in the specific kinds 
of interactions to which its members subscribe. The provisions of the contract 
dealt with so far--the concept of the contract itself, group goals, the labora-
tory nature of the group experience, leadership, and the elements of dialogue--
have, to a large extent, specified attitudes that group members are expected to 
adopt and the structures of group process. Interaction goals, however, deal 
more specifically with the kinds of interaction that are expected to take place 
in the group. These interactions flow from the attitudes and the structures 
which have already been dealt with. The participants, then, are expected to 
engage in self-disclosure, for this is one of the provisions of the contract. 
But the self-disclosure engaged in must be made relevant to the here-and-now, 
and it must be done in cooperation with (rather than opposition to) other mem-
bers. That is, all the interactions to be discussed in this and the following 
chapters must reflect the attitudinal and structural aspects of the contract 
I
' which have already been discussed. Self-disclosure, then, is one of the inter- , 
. actional means of "operationalizing" (March & Simon, 1958) the ovcrridin~ goa1 
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of the group. If self-disclosure, as outlined in this chapter, is effectively 
engaged in, then this ..!.§_, in part, interpersonal growth. 
SELF-DISCLOSURE: A BASIC STEP TOWARD GROWTH 
All the participants in the contract group must agree to engage in some 
degree of self-disclosure; they must make some efforts to reveal the "person 
·•ithin" to the other members of the group. Self-disclosure is cardinal in 
growth groups, pivotal in the sense that many of the "good things" that happen 
in such groups happen because of self-disclosure. In non-contract groups in 
~hich interpersonal or personal psychological growth is at least an implicit 
goal, a good deal of the group's activity, especially in earlier sessions, 
deals with formulating policy with respect to self-disclosure. "I'm not so sure 
how far I can go," "I am beginning to wonder whether we are starting a therapy 
group here," "Boy that (some disclosure made by one of the participants) was a 
bomb; how are we going to handle that?" -- these and similar statements are 
"contract talk" referring principally to self-disclosure. The prospect of re-
vealing oneself .is unsettling and must be approached gradually in such groups. 
The group must first decide whether self-disclosure is a value or not, at least 
for !hi§_ group in these circumstances. Or, while many of the members of such 
groups might realize that it has a value in human living and even in this groupi 
they need time to get used to this idea, or time to decide how to approach such 
a dangerous undertaking, or time, perhaps, to screw up the courage needed to 
talk about oneself. In tpe contract group the person must make most of these 
decisions before he enters the group or at least at the time that the contract 
is imposed. Self-disclosure in the contract group ..!!!_a value. The rest of thi~ 
266 
·?ter is an attempt to explain why it is a value and how it may be approached 
:· :!le group. Lynd (1958) says that "a person who cannot love cannot reveal 
:~~elf" (p. 241) • The contrary also seems to be true: the person who cannot 
:·.cal himself cannot love. If this is true, then the question of self-disclo-
: ~~ is intimately associated with interpersonal growth. The assumption in this 
:· i:ement is that responsible self-disclosure is a kind of royal road of commun-
: .... This sharing of the human condition - in its sublimity, banality, and de-
~ ~ity - pulls people together. 
U Deception and Concealment ..2.§.. Pathogenic .Q.!. Growth-Stifling 
Mowrer's position. In a series of publications (e.g. 1950a, 1950b, 1952a, 
' '2b, 1953a, 1953b, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1966a, 1966b, 1966c, 1966d, 1968a, 1968b) 
~ '··rer has elaborated a theory concerning the etiology of emotional disturbance. 
? '•rer is constantly re-thinking his position, so that what started out to be a 
t ·2ory of psychopathology is being modified, complemented, and expanded to such 
'~ extent that a coherent interpersonal theory of man is beginning to emerge. 
~:ch of what Mow.rer says deals directly or d.ndirectly with the problem of self-
H:losure. 
Mowrer (1968a) places himself in the camp of "third-force" psychology. 
'. 
' ::1 is both free and responsible. To a large extent he can fashion his own 
· .stiny, and need not be just a simple product of his heredity (force I) and 
.s environment (force II). Or, from a different viewpoint, neither Freudian 
:;choanalytic theory (force I) nor Watsonian and Pavlovian behaviorism (force 
::) • separately or in combination, provide an adequate working model of man. 
sees Adler (Adler, 1964; Ansbacher, 1967; Dreikurs, 1950) as. having "antici-
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?ated both aspects of contemporary Third-Force psychology: the emphasis on vol 
!tion, individual choice and responsibility, and the emphasis upon man's irrev-
.'cable need for community, that is.,_ deep communion and identification with one's 
~ellow men" (Mowrer, 1968a, p. 9). 
Mowrer turns to Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966) for a conceptual or struc-
:ural model of man-in-community, man's interactions with himself and his fel-
lows. For Pratt and Tooley, all social relations represent "contractual trans-
Jctions." All of life is a patterning of contractual arrangements which men 
:ake with themselves and with others, so that contracts become the "instrumen-
:alities" for both the creation and the exchange of values among men. "These 
tontracts may be explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, unilateral or 
[ultilateral, voluntary or coercive. They constitute the warp and woof of per-
cnal and social life. Men~ their contracts" (Pratt & Tooley, 1966, p. 882). 
· '.uch of psychopathology, then, can be conceptualized in contractual terms: 
'Psychological and psychosocial disorders are conceptualized as personal-social, 
:ontract-system disorders, contract crises, contract conflicts. distorted or 
Jn ti-social contracts, contract deficity, contract stress-and-strain, inade-
:;uate or immature contract system development" (p. 882). Self-actualization is 
1lso depicted as a contract function: "The ideal is authentic competence in th 
::ajor contract spheres of liv;f.ng" (1966, p. 882). 
The first step on the road to emotional disturbance, then, is some kind 
'f mismanagement of contractual life. A man may overcommit himself, he may 
.:ndercommit himself, and he may "cheat" on the commitments that he has made 
~fowrer, 1968a). The selfish person is someone who is overcommitted· to himself 




1 e.g., the miserly recluse) or he is irresponsibly in-community (e.g., the per-
_in who must always have "his way" when he is with others). A person may mis-
::..inage his contractual life in a seemingly endless variety of ways, and no man' 
:ife is enti!ely free of contractual failure. Emotional disturbance may be 
~efined in terms of contractual failure itself. Thus the sociopath, either in 
·?ecific area of life or more generally, disregards the contractual structure o 
interpersonal living. He makes his own rules. 
Contract mismanagement, then, is man's first mistake. The second mistake i 
in a sense worse than the first. If a man fails to fulfill a contract, but ad-
-cits that he has failed, and tries to make restitution, he can usually avoid 
~motional trouble. This, however, is not the course which all men follow. Som 
~en fail to live up to their contractual obligations and then try to conceal 
their failures both from themselves and from others. Deception, then, becomes 
a way of life. Mowrer sees this refusal to face up to the ''what-is" as patho-
genie. It is a break with reality, and breaking with reality is the warp and 
woof of emotional disorder. 
In his writings Mowrer contends that this refusal to "confess" one's misbe-
havior, at least to the "significant others" in one's life, often leads to emo-
tional disorder. Re tentatively divides the usual symptoms associated with 
emotional disturbance into two types (Mowrer, 1967) Type I symptoms are the 
agonies usually associated with emotional disturbances of one kind or another: 
•e.g., tension, anxiety, depress.ion, loss of appetite, fatigue, loneliness, pho-
bias, scrupulosity, sense of unreality, hypochondriasis,etc. He sees these 
.->'\' 
symptoms as discomforts ··arising from deviant behavior, contractual failures. 
These symptoms are usually involuntltry, mediated by the autonomic nervous sys-
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tem. Yet they are potentially sueful in that they aim at motivating the suffer 
er to change his life-style, to get at and do something about the contract dis-
orders underlying them. Type IJ_ symptoms are the means, usually ineffectual, 
that the sufferer uses to try to handle Type I symptoms. They are attempts to 
escape the pain rather than attempts to get at its roots: withdrawal, suicide, 
rationalization, blaming others, self-pity, busy-ness, overeating, abuse of sex 
day-dreaming, intoxicants, tranquilizers., etc. Type II symptoms are disabling, 
because they prevent the sufferer from moving in the right direction. They are 
"home remedies" of various types either chosen by oneself or suggested by · · , 
others. Though they may bring temporary relief, they do not get at the root of 
the problem. Since they are delaying tactics, they ultimately make things 
worse. Both Type I and Type II symptoms are "muted confessions," they are sign 
of a person's inability or refusal to involve himself responsibly. in his con-
tractual obligations. Mowrer is not the first to recognize the potentially 
pathogenic nature of secrecy. In his writings (e.g., 1964, 1968b) he uses ex-
amples drawn from literature of the therapeutic value of "confession." Harper 
(1959) notes that "the personal privacy, the hidden subjectivity, of various i 
aspects of neurosis can be removed by talk alone (even if the talk is devoid 
of insight into causation and does nothing other than expose the problem to 
objective discussion), and sometimes the emotional disturbance loses its power 
With its privacy." Mowrer probes further into the "why" of the pathogenic 
nature of such privacy. 
In his earlier writings, Mowrer refers to the process he instituted to help 
those with emotional problems as "integrity therapy." Recently he has tended 
to drop the term "therapy" and substitute "training" for various reasons. 
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; , :it of all, the term "therapy" implies illness, but, generally, Mowrer does no 
,:< the emotionally disturbed as "sick" in the usual sense of the word. He does 
: : : reject biochemical approaches to psychopathology, but he is wary of their . 
. ·irextension: 
We are not here holding that organic or biochemical anomalies do not 
reflect themselves in the sphere of human functioning; and in this 
sense and to this extent, the so-called medical model is highly adq-
quate and relevant. The danger lies in possible over-extension of 
the model •••• To the extent that mental and emotional suffering have a 
viochemical basis, their elimination or amelioration is a merciful 
boon to all humanity. But where suffering i~ the consequence of 
behavioral malfunctioning, it has motivational, educational work to 
do, and its chemical counteraction is clearly not indicated. We have 
yet to determine the dividing line between the organic and the func-
tional, and the argument advanced in this paper is offered primarily 
as a means of conceptualizing emotional problems with a beh&vioral 
and interpersonal, rather than a strictly organic, biochemical basis 
(1968a, pp. 37-38) • 
:condly, Mowrer's groups are actual "training-grounds" for more effective in-
lcrpersonal living. I had experience with these groups in Galesburg, Illinois--
1 'th at Galesburg State Research Hospital with Mowrer himself and in the commun-
ty, These groups were run according to a simple contract which was the basis 
or entry. The prospective participant was to agree (1) to "tell his story," 
~at is, to reveal the "unconfessed" deviant behavior that could possibly be at 
~e root of his distrubance and to remain "confessionally current" as the group 
f'JVed along· (2) to assume responsibility for himself, that is, to stop blamin 
tthers for :is problems and to ass1>11e the direction of his own life; and (3) to 
tecome interested in and involved with the other members of the group. The 
r;roup formed a small community which became the vehicle of the redintegration 0 
rts members into the other communities from which they had come, e.g., family, 
reighborhood, church, job, etc. Self-disclosure, however, was not the only or 
I 
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ven the most important group variable. Once a person revealed himself, he was 
.ext expected to discuss with the group what kind of "restitution" he was to 
:.ake and how to go about it. He ·-Was asked to review his contractual relation-
·hips with himself and with others, -especially with the "significant others" in 
.is life and to start on a process of contractual re-adjustment, first within 
he group and then in the· other groups to which he belonged. 
The group produced some dramatic successes (as far as "success" could be 
~asured by clinical observation), but there were also the failures. One of the 
ources of the failures, I believe, was a "violation" of the "laws of the groups 
.pelled on in this paper. Too often the groups became places where individual 
'therapy" or "training" took place in the presence of others. The members were 
.ot sufficiently encouraged to interact with one another. It was seldom that 
hey dealt with their feelings towards one another. It was seldom that they 
·dealt with their feelings towards one another. Too much of what was revealed 
ealt with the then-and-there, no attempts being made to make it relevant to 
hese people in this group. All in all,' the theory of the source of emotional 
isturbance became so central that other conditons for effective interpersonal 
nvolvement were overlooked. While Mowrer's natural "feel" for what kind of in-
eraction should take place within a group made him an excellent group leader, 
believe that he has underestimated the necessity a>f "teaching" effective group 
rocess in the tvaining sessions. I also have some difficulty with a certain 
arrowness in Mowrer's initial formulations concerning the etiology of emotional 
isturbance, but this problem will be dealt with below. 
Other approaches !.Q_ the relationship between openness ~ growth. Mowrer 
I 
·is not alone in advocating complete openness in the therapeutic situation. 
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~sychological honesty or openness is a goal of almost every therapeutic ap-
?roach, but there is something distinctive about the "confessional" honesty 
~emanded from the beginning by Mm.i;er., .· Mainord (1968) describes what he calls 
"Therapy 1152--The Truth." The prospective client must agree to a group con-
tract which is much like Mowrer's: (1) the patient must agree to be completely 
1 open with the group. (2) He must agree to accept total responsibility for all 
l 
; of his behavior all the time, twenty-four hours a day. Responsibility here I . 
: ::eans acting according to one's own ethical code. (3) Each patient must 
' 
j Jccept responsibility for every other patient in the program. Mainord says 
i 
I 
: that the first two conditions are usually accepted, but with a lack of under-! . 
! 
J taking of the behavioral demands that these conditions will entail. The 
I third condition, he says, is usually bewildering to the patient. In Mainord's 
groups are much more "behaviorally" oriented than Mowrer's: 
The group meetings are to be sources of new information, 
and an avenue for feedback, for manipulation of consequences, 
and even a place to learn skills in new modes of interaction, but 
the truly important social environment will. never be .. some group 
sharing a similar plight with reinforcements manipulated for the 
patient's benefit. The appropriate social skills can never be 
completely demonstrated in the therapeutic group, and only a 
rigid adherence to the use of an external criterion makes it 
possible to expect much generalization. 
The group meeting should result in extracting new behav-
iors, but the crucial reinforcements can come only from the 
environment (p. 33). 
'.owrer, too, was beginning to talk about a totally controlled hospital environ-
ent in which group work would be only a part of a total program. 
l Jourard .Q!!. concealment. Jourard (1964, 1968) has been investigating the 
r:iplications of concealment and self-disclosure in a context which is much wider 
·nd perhaps more positive than Mowrer' s. He, like Mowrer, believes that con-
__________________________ ,,. ... 
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;~ 3 lment can "sicken." The person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in one 
, 1y or another, both to himself and to others must conceal his own identity. 
l"e person who finds his behavior unacceptable, in .. one way or another, both to 
i ::.self and to others must conceal his own identity. The energy that he pours 
!:to concealment adds to his stress and dulls his awareness of his own inner 
t1.?erience. Whatever contact he makes with others is through a facade; a kind 
1! rigidity or stereotype permeates his relationships with others. Loneliness 
I I rd depression are inevitable as part of the price for concealment, for the 
r-~ncealer is separate, apart, out-of-community. The concealer thus increases 
! 
(::~e stress factors in his life and thus becomes susceptible to all sorts of -<. ~ 
I 
/ickness, both physical and psychological. But when Jourard talks like this, h 
I r~s not describing just the neurotic or .the emotionally disturbed in general. 
~~es this as the affliction of most men, at ·1east in our own society. This lac 
)f transparency is a major element in the "psychopathology of the average" that 
1fflicts the so-called "normal" personality of our time. The more desperate 
~he need to conceal, the greater the stress, and the more likely the occurrence 
lf physical and psychological decompensation. 
~pathogenic secret. Ellenberger (1966) discusses the concept of the 
''pathogenic secret." Like Mowrer, he believes that the content of this secret 
:ay be deviant behavior, but it is not limited to deviancy. For instance, the 
secret may deal with thwarted love, jealousy, or some physical infirmity. It 
~ 
"oes not always ~eal with guilt and shame, but •it always hds hopelessness con-
:iected with it, a "no-exit" aspect. Ellenberger claims that Moritz Benedikt 
I (1835-1920), a Viennese physician, was the first to deal systematically with 
the pathogenic secret. Benedikt cites instances of hysterical women who were 
,..,..--------------------------------------------------------...... ._...,,,,,.~. ------------....... 
274 
:ured of their neurosis by confessing their pathogenic secrets and working out 
related problems. 
None of these men "prove" that··-Concealment in itself causes emotional dis-
turbance and that self-revelation, even accompanied with restitution-behavior 
in the case of deviancy, effects a cure. But it is undoubtedly true that in 
~any well-documented cases deception and concealment have at least aggravated, 
if not caused, emotional anguish and that "confession" of self-revelation, 
often coupled with restitution-behavior, has led to dramatic improvement. Self 
disclosure of guilt and failure is certainly one of the principal patient vari-
ables in the psychotherapeutic process, just as concealment, as Jourard notes, 
is an undeniable facet of "normal" living. It is essentail, then, to review 
the factors within society and within the individual which mitigate against 
greater openness; Evidence concerning the deleterious effects of concealment 
has always been with us; it is only recently that men have begun to point a 
scientific finger at this evidence. But why is self-disclosure in such 
disrepute? 
Self-disclosure .!!.!.£ Cultural Taboo. 
There seem to be at least two forces in society that militate against 
greater self-disclosure among its members: (1) a kind of cultural ban againtit 
intimate self-disclosure, and (2) a society-wide cultivation of the "lie" as 
a way of life. 
Self-disclosure ~weakness. The person who exhibits strength by "suffer-
ing in silence" has become a cultural stereotype in our socuy. "Little bc,ys 




1 ·e fiction of radio, TV, or the novel, confesses that 11I simply have to talk 
• t) someone" is really confessing, not a deep human need, but her own weakness, 
... -
r•·en though such weakness migP,t be understandable and even excused in a woman. 
~!self-disclosure is not weakness, then it is "exhibitionism, 11 and, as such, a 
1:~gn of illness rather than a desire for htnnan communication. Very often, the 
.~!olescent, in his discovery of himself and "the other, 11 engages in a good deal 
r! self-disclosure. But this drive to exchange intimacies, even though it might 
hve overtones, at times, of exhibitionism and other kinds of problematic beha-
1 
I 
r·ior, is usually not looked upon as the beginning of something that could be 
l;uite sood--being at home in discussing oneself with significant others at an 
:ntimate level (see White, 1964). It is rather just that, adolescent behavior, 
:aive and immature. Such behavior will pass, just as the "natural neurosis" of 
dolescence passes. When the adult finds it necessary to communicate himself 
~o a friend, he often feels that he needs an excuse for such action. "The 
erson with a painful and perplexing personal problem is loath to ask a friend 
to share the knowledge of it, and his friend is loath to encourage him to talk 
it out" (Schofield, 1964, p. 160). It is difficult for both of them, for there 
is little cultural support for what they are doing. Lynd (1958) goes further 
nd maintains that the ban refers not only to "revelations of the inmost self" 
ut to the revelation of the "central dynamics of society" itself (p. 231). A 
acist community is loath to have that aspect of its culture discussed. Nom-
'nally non-racist communities sometimes engage in rather ludicrous startle and 
denial behavior when the unpondered and unconfessed racist elements of this 
culture are exposed and openly discussed. 
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Mowrer has received a good deal of criticism for his views on the thera-
~eutic value of "confession." While much of what he has written and especially 
the tone of his writing are not above criticism, it is still interesting to 
listen to the "tone" of his critics as they focus in on the "confessional" as-
pects of his theories. It is difficult not to see an element of "Thou-does-
protest-too-much" in this spontaneous "this-is-nonsense" style of criticism. 
~uch of this criticism, it seems, stems from unexamined cultural taboos against 
self-disclosure. The critic is speaking out, ritually as it were, the fears of 
his society, the "central dynamics" of which have been challenged. 
The medical model and cultural permission. Even a society that is some-
•hat afraid of honesty cannot ban self-disclosure completely. One person's 
communicating himself intimately to another, especially in times of special 
stress, is such a basic need that even a relatively closed society must find 
ways of channeling such disclosure, must find cultural justification for it. 
Freud was a courageous.man. He took a bold step forward when he declared that 
the revealing of intimacies about oneself was a medical act and, as such, was 
perfectly justified in any society. Society could hardly be recused of greeting 
Freud's thesis with wholehearted approval. Still, over the years, it has be-
come quite acceptable to reveal oveself to a doctor or to a psychologist or 
counselor. Intimate self-disclosure became justifiable as a medical act, or at 
least as a para-medical act. Society's way of allowing self-revelation was 
also its way of containing it: it should take place between a client and a 
Professional. Seeking therapy or counselling gives a person the cultural ex-
cuse he needs to establish a relationship in which he is free to tell any': [ting 
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about himself. But "therapy" implies illness and even counseling implies 
"problems," so that, to a large extent, self-disclosure is till associated with 
;.•eakness, if not illness or emotional disturbance. 
The professional has become the traditional one to listen to and deal with 
the intimate details of one's life because he is considered capable of under-
standing "what is behind" disturbing or uncontrolled behavior. At least he is 
the one who can become the cataly~t for understanding or insight, and insight 
has long been considered the key to the control of behavior:. The problem is 
that we live in a day when both the medical model of emotional disturbance 
(Szasz, 1961; Werry, 1968; Sarbin, 1967) and the primacy of insight (London, 
1964; Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967) are being challenged more and more. One of th 
problems is the work "problem" or at least the work "solution." It is true tha 
::ien refer to disturbances in interpersonal living as "problems," and when they 
come to mental health professionals, they are looking for "solutions." Behav-
ioral scientists have more or less followed this "problem-solution" paradigm in 
their approach to psychopathology. But, while this paradigm is obviously well 
suited to mathematics, it is not clear that it is generally applicable to human 
relationships. Too many people think that they have the "problem" and that the 
professional has the "solution." But impasses in interpersonal relationships 
are more properly "transcended" than solved; that is, when two perple change 
their attitudes and their ways of acting toward each other, when they communi-
cate more freely with each other, areas of conflict dissipate or are transcende 
e problem-solution paradigm is too neat and pat to fit the complexities of 
uman interaction, especially the complexities of disturbed conununication. The 
person suffering conml\mication disturbances does not need a professional "solu-
. ! 
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cion." He needs experiments in cominunication, not someone to give him an ans-
ver. The professional is a professional, not because he has answers, but be-
cause he is creative, because he- can set up and evaluate these experiments in 
communication. 
Group therapy widened the scope of the cultural permission to reveal one-
self. One was now allowed to reveal himself to peers, provided that some pro-
fessional presided over the group interaction. The present popularity of all 
kinds of "sensitivity training" is a further breach in the wall. People do not 
want to have to declare themselves ill in order to involve themselves in com-
munication experiences analogous to those in group therapy, so they turn to 
sensitivity training as a kind of "therapy for normals." It is quite true that 
the latest National Training Laboratories brochure asks prospective participant 
not to look upon the various laboratories as psychotherapy or a substitute for 
psychotherapy, and yet, for many, sensitivity training seems to afford a cul-
tural permission to speak freely about themselves not unlike the permission 
granted in group psychotherapy. It seems that there are several different 
"b II I rands of sensitivity training and the question of "therapy for nonnals' in a 
laboratory setting is not an issue that has been settled even within the Nation 
al Training Laboratories (e.g., W~~~hler, MasJ;rlk~ :and Tannenbaum, 1962; 
Benne, 1964b; Frank, 1964). The contract gro~p seems to take up a position 
somewhere to the right of group psychotherapy and to the left of "traditional" 
sensitivity training. 
Privacy: the pros, ~especially the ~· Much has been written on the 
Value of and the individual's right to privacy (e.g., The Panel on Privacy and 
Behavioral Research, 1967). Much heat has been generated in discussions con-
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:erning the tendency of the behavioral scientist to overstep his bounds in this 
1rea. But the coin has two sides and Bennett (1967) takes a rather refreshing 
:Jok at the obverse side: 
Privacy ••• is a graceful amenity, generally to be fostered, but with 
discriminating restraint and with due recognition of obligations as 
well as privilege. It is the writer's contention that the moral im-
perative is more often allied with the surrender of privacy than with 
its protection ••• Secrecy within the community is incompatible with 
cooperation, inimical to the welfare and progress of the ingroup ••• 
Strictly speaking, of course, sex is not ordinarily a private experi-
ence, but a peculiarly delicate and intimate transaction between at 
least two people. I submit that even in this sensitive area, more 
serious problems stem from mismanaged connnunication about sex--part-
ners who cannot discuss it, children who must not be told, and alien-
ation of the deviate-than from mere breaches of privacy ••• The con-
fessional is also respected as a confidential relationship. It should 
be noted that this, too, is a communication; a revelation, in fact, of 
the most private secrets to at least one other person ••• The reference, 
in many religions, is to public confession. The Protestant sinner 
must bear witness "before men11 to achieve absolution. Indeed, it is 
recognized in Catholic circles that the traditional confessional, 
intent on making peace with God, leaves unresolved the problem of 
making peace with the connnunity ••• The readiness of people to discuss 
their personal problems with neighbors, and even strangers, makes one 
wonder, in fact, whether confidentiality.is so necessary to the priv-
acy of the patient as the comfort of the therapist. There are ther-
apists who believe that the therapeutic process is facilitated in 
the presence of an audience. The popularity of group therapy re-
flects a similar assumption that patients find help in sharing per-
sonal problems--that confession i~ good for the psyche as well as 
the soul ••• The contemporary concern over privacy parallels a per-
vasive need to communicate ••• Our dilennna will not be resolved by 
hiding away from each other in separate caves, but through more and 
more interpersonal communication, better managed ••• The critical 
problem we face is not how to keep secrets from each other but how 
to facilitate this readiness to communicate. The overriding ques-
tion is how to maintain an atmosphere of trust and confidence which 
will enable us to talk about personal affairs ••• freely •••• It is the 
writer's conviction that the importance of honest communication in 
our interdependent relationships outweighs the sanctity of privacy 
as a social value ••• Anyone who undertakes to influence the lives of 
other people must accept an obligation to let them know where he 
stands, to reveal his motives, to share his purposes (pp. 371-376). 
This entire article is worth reading. Undoubtedly, many would take excep-
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i-:e might find difficult to respond to with honest self-examination and honest 
txamination of the "dynamics" of society. 
Jourard (1967) has already been mentioned as championing more openness, 
, I 
;~ss secrecy, by means of a more honest experimenter-subject dialogue in behav-
! :ral research. Sidowski (1966, p. 22) discusses the "mutual distrust" between 
i 
hperimenter and subject that characterizes a good deal of behavioral research. 
! 
~~ener (1954) approaches the problem of secrecy in the context of a different 
Lad of research, but perhaps he, too, has hit on a principle that has wider 
I 
i /;plication to the human enterprise than one might first suspect. Wiener has 
secrecy that surrounds research projects, i I aong reservations regarding the 
I 
I ;iecifically government research. 
. I ·~ch secrecy is uneconomic. Lack 
I 
It is his contention that in the long run 
of connnunication leads to reduplication of 
·ffort. Thus, if the purpose of secrecy is, let us say, to gain time ·on an 
·nemy in an area of research which will eventually yield its secrets anyway, 
f~'.ien the price of secrecy is usually too high: the loss of progress that great-r comml.lllication would lead to. It seems that Mowrer, Mainord, Jourard, Bennett rd Wiener are all saying, though from different points of view, that there is a 
[
:endency in society to look upon secrecy and privacy as values in themselves, 
,·ven though in the long run they may be self-defeating. In many areas of life, 
f
:he loss imagined to stem from revelation is imaginary. The amount of energy 
':-:Pended in keeping the secret and "encoding" it -- the neurotic may be consid-
rred to "encode II his secrets in his symptoms -- is too costly and ill spent. I 
1· ( much more costly than revelation. Just as secrecy is often considered a 
j"'alue in itself, so revelation is considered as an evil ~n itself. We have 
j:earned to fear self-disclosure as self-destructive, so that few of us are 
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~eady to examine the possibility of its having constructive consequences. 
,ocietv and Truth 
In a study by Kohn (1959) in which middle-class and working-class parents 
~ere asked to select the three characteristics most desirable in a ten- or ele-
1en-year-old child, the top-rated choice was honesty, This may or may not 
point to some fundamental drive for truth and honesty, at least in these seg-
.:ents of the population, but whether it does or not, there is some question as 
o both the availability and the social desirability of truth. 
Psychoanalysis £!!. the availability of truth. The widespread impact of psy-
hoanalysis on society, or at least on some segments of society, is undeniable. 
'very educated man has some knowledge, however distorted, of psychoanalytic 
~heory. Psychoanalysis has opened up (at least some would say so) whole new 
"1stas in the domains of history (e.g., Erikson's Young~ Luther, 1958) and 
~iterature. Comedians find in it an almost limitless source of humor, their wit 
~ometimes adding to already distorted conceptions, and sometimes, though more 
~arely, laying bare the very marrow of some Freudian insight. 
There is no intention here to mount an attack against psychoanalysis, but 
it does not seem out of place to suggest a hypothesis pertinent to the question' 
bf self-disclosure. One of the perhaps not too subtle messages of psychoanalysi ~ 
-whether this be the "fault" of the theory or those who exercise the right of 
Private inte:n>retation in variegated exposures to the theory--is that truth is 
not a commodity that is readily available. Things, especially human things, are 
lot what they seem to be. Much of the "really real," to borrow a phase from 
~lato, is a below-the-surface phenomenon; it is a source which is not easily 
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:apped, however good the intentions of the searcher might be. The analyst de-
:ands free association rather that or at least in addit~on to the revelation of 
the intimate details of the patient's life, for the latter is not as significan 
ly revealing as the former (Munroe, 1955, p. 38). Therefore, it would seem that 
psychoanalysis is one of the forces contributing to a kind of "tacit understan-
ding"~~in society that man is relatively incapable of telling the truth about 
:iimself, of revealing the deepest sources within himself. 
Nor is such a view restricted to psychoanalysis. Thorne (1955) claims tha 
the individual is never able or willing to reveal what is really important abou 
!1imself. "Nothing should be taken at face value in eliciting facts concerning 
the life record" (p. 116). It seems to be something other than strong addic-
tion to empiricism that leads him to say: "Actually, no statement or behavior 
pattern should be taken at face value, whether the person is normal or abnormal, 
except with confirmatory evidence from external sources" (Thorne, 1950, p. 134) • 
. owrer has been heavily criticized for his sharp attacks on psychoanalytic 
theory. However, I would suggest that at least part of Mowrer's intuitive dis-
taste for psychoanalysis arises from the more or less philosophical position of 
that theory that man is unable to tell the truth about himself. It is a defi-
nition of man that Mowrer finds intolerable. It is a philosophical position 
that affects man's appraisal of himself and his communication with others. 
The cultivation of the lie. While it may be assumed that many men in soci 
ety have become more or less convinced that the deepest truths about themselves 
are tmavailable, many others find a need to distort the truths that are avail-
able. The fact that most men lie now and again is such a truism that, on a 
widely used personality inventory, a confession to this effect is part of a 
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-.·alidity scale built in to the test (Hathaway & McKinley, 1942; Hathaway & 
~ehl, 1951). Perhaps a less evaluative way of looking at validity scales is 
~o say that they attempt to measure the defensiveness of the individual taking 
the test. The fact that most men lie now and then, however, is not the point 
~1cre. It is rather that we seem to live in a society that actually cultivates 
f the lie, and does so in ways \ll\available to the generations that have preceded 
~. Perhaps Alexander the Great and Caesar lied about their campaigns to their 
subjects at home. This is a question that classicists and historians must set-
tle. But it seems undeniable that a good deal of the \ll\easiness felt in the 
~·nited States today stems from the suspicion that ''they" are not really telling 
'JS the truth in many aras of nati.onal liveing. Some critics are quite outspo-
'.:en in their condemnation of what they see as a lying generation • 
••• This new generation of the Left hated the authority because 
the authority lied. It lied through the teeth of corporation 
executives and Cabinet officials and police enforcement offi-
cers and newspaper editors and advertising agencies, and in its 
mass magazines, where the subtlest apologies for the disasters 
of authority (and the neatest deformations of the news) were 
grafted in the best possible style into the ever-open mind of 
. the walking American lobotomy: the corporation office worker 
and his high-school son (Mailer, 1968, pp. 83-84). 
Lying in diplomatic circles is frequent enough, well documented enough, and 
publicized enough to be considered axiomatic. It could be the cause of a good 
deal of hilarity were one not sober enough to interpret it in terms of devas-
tating mistrust among individuals and communities. Henry's (1963) comments on 
the passion for truth in our culture· are certainly apropos: "Most people are 
not obsessive truth-seekers; they do not yearn to get to the bottom of things; 
they are willing to let absurd or merely ambiguous statements pass" (p. 49). 
One of the principal objects of his attack is the phenomenon of advertising: 
I 
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The relaxed attitude toward veracity (or mendacity, depending 
on the point of view) and its complement, pecuniary philosophy, 
are important to the American economy, for they make possible an 
enormous amount of selling that could not take place otherwise (p. 49). 
One of the discoveries of the 20th century is the enormous vari-
ety of ways of compelling language to lie •••• We pay intellectual 
talents high price to amplify ambiguities, distort thought, and 
bury reality (p. 91). 
:How. many men in our society are "outer-directed" (Riesman, 1950), their anten-
:1as high in the air in an attempt to pick up cues from society as to what they 
~ay and may not say? Fromm sees men as considering themselves, their person-
alities, as a commodity to be "marketed" in society, and one wonders how much 
deceit, falsification, and facade are indigenous to this marketing process. 
The poin~ of these remarks is not that psychoanalytic theory is wruthout 
value (this would be absurd) or that twentieth-century western culture is nee-
essarily more addicted to both the blatant and the subtle lie than other cul-
tures, past and present. However, given the assumption that the kind of self-
disclosure required in the contract group has some interpersonal-growth value, 
it is essential to face the fact that there are subtle and not-too-subtle forces 
within society that militate against this kind of self-disclosure. A deeper 
awareness of these forces, it is hoped, will help facilitate the fulfillment of 
the self-disclosure provision of the contract. 
Intra-Individual Sources of Resistance !_e. Self-Disclosure 
The flight from self-knowledge. The problem-solution model of psychother-
apy which sees self-disclosure as a transmission of necessary information to thE 
therapist so that he can work out a solution is so obviously inadequate that it 






clients, at least initially, subscribe to such a conception. Stockpiling infor-
:ation about oneself with another s!Lmply does not .. necessarily or ·automatically 
lead to more effective emotional- adjustment. Unless the client begins to lis-
~en to himself in such a way that he begins to get into better contact with his 
own experiencing (Gendlin, 1962), then he speaks on in vain. Self-disclosure 
is one of the principal ways, not only of communicating with others, but of 
comnnmicating with oneself. Perhaps the latter is even logically prior. It is 
assumed here that many men flee self-revelation because they fear this closer 
contact with themselves. "The human organism seems capable of enduring any-
thing in the universe except a clear, complete, fully conscious view of one's 
self as he actually is" (Sherrill, 1945). Self-disclosure both crystalizes and! 
in a sense reifies aspects of the self that a person would rather live with si-
lently--however painful the living--than face. At least in this one aspect, 
then, a group is only as threatening to a participant as he is to himself. 
Inevitable it is the individual participant who is his own severest judge. 
Jourard (1964) speaks out very strongly to this very poing • 
••• When a man does not acknowledge to himself who, what, and how 
he is, he is out of touch with reality, and he will sicken and 
die; and no one can help him without access to the facts. And it 
seems to be another empirical fact that no man can come to know 
himself except as an outcome of disclosing himself to another per-
son. This is the lesson we have learned in the field of psychother-
apy. When a person has been able to disclose ·himself utterly to 
another person, he learns how to increase his contact with his 
real self, and he may then be better able to direct his destiny 
on the basis of knowledge of his real self (p. 5). 
When I say that self-disclosure is a symptom of personality 
health, what I really mean is that a person who displays many of 
the other characteristics that betoken healthy personality ••• 
whill also display the ability to make himself fully known to at 
least one other significant human being ••• Neurotic and psychotic 











patient's real self and the gaze of the onlooker. We might call 
the symptoms 'devices to:. avoid_ becoming known. ' 
A self-alienated person--one who does not disclose himself truth-
fully and fully--can never-love another person nor can he be loved 
by the other person (p. 25). 
~!uch is being written about alienation and identity conflicts, with attempts 
being made to establish both the social conditions and the interpersonal dynam-
ics of these problems. Man's flight from himself is, in large part, a flight 
from connnunication with himself. Self-alienation is frightening, but any kind 
of intimate contact with the "problem-self" is seen as even more frightening. 
Self-alienation, then, becomes self-reinforcing, its ·"reward" lying in its 
being, supposedly, less painful than its alternative. Even when a person gets 
out of contact with himself and with others to the degree that he flees to a 
mental hospital, this is still no guarantee that he is ready to face himself. 
Time and again in mental hospitals, when a patient is faced with the choice 
between the pain of alientation and the pain of therapy, he chooses the former, 
unable to find the courage to be. Since a similar dynamic is seen as operative 
in the. "psychopathology of the average," self-disclosure is stressed in the 
interpersonal-growth contract. 
Fear of intimacy. In dealing with patients in both individual and group 
psychotherapy, I discovered another block to self-disclosure. It is difficult 
I to reveal oneself on a deep level to another without creating, by the very act 
! f of self-revelation, some degree of intimacy. In a group situation, for some 
reason or another, this intimacy has a special intensity. The participants in 
group psychotherapy and in other kinds of group growth-experiences are aware of 








Jf iniquity" or even the "mystery of goodness" that they. are, they cannot tol-
erate the intimacy that this act would create. They do not flee self-revelatio 
~ such. They flee intimacy. Meerloo (1956) believes that for many persons 
fear of hwnan relations is greater than the fear of death. Berne's (1964) thesi 
seems more apropos in our present culture. The all too real possibility of in-
timacy frightens many people. They prefer to skirt real self-revelation and to 
avoid real intimacy. They engage in sporadic acts of pseudo-self-revelation 
leading to pseudo-intimacy in a "games" approach to human relationships. Other 
=erely eschew self-revelation. If it takes place by accident, they try to neu-
tralize its effect. "Am I frightened? I suppose so. Most men are from time 
to time. It's quite normal." The obvious "message" here is "Don't probe." 
Failed intimacy is another major dimension of the "psychopathology of the aver-
age." 
Flight from responsibility. In some cases flight from self-disclosure is 
flight from responsibility, a flight from the anxiety and work involved in 
constructive personal change. Self-disclosure leads to·;the revelation of "area 
of deficit" and "areas of aspiration" in human living. It is relatively easy 
to avoid both these areas in day-to-day living. However, once these areas are 
"reified," once a person ddares what he finds 'lmacceptable in himself and 
what goals he thinks that he should be pursuing, he connnits himself to change, 
and avoidance behavior becomes more painful. Self-disclosure commits one to 
It 
conversion," to the process of re-structuring one's life; it demands that a 
Person leave the security of his own house and journey into a foreign land, and 
most men balk at that, If one senses that "conversion" is impossible, then 
self-disclosure must be avoided. So it is assumed that some men fear or even 
,-------------------------------------------------------2-8_8 _________ , 
~eprecate self-disclosure because of the behavioral consequences it entails. 
lf the self-revelation takes place in a group, then the pressure to change is 
even greater than in a one-to-one- situation, for there is the necessity of 
facing the pressures and demands of a "commtm.ity." 
In the mental hospital it is common enough to run into patients who would 
I like to be better adjusted, if adjustment could be effected through some kind of magic. Popular forms of magic are: just being in the hospital, drugs, 
getting other people to change, getting the "answer" from the professionals, 
the hope for spontaneous remission, etc. In this sense, it seems not \lllfair to 
say that a certain percentage of mental patients actually choose their illness. 
Some will argue that it is the function of the therapist to motivate the pa~ 
tient, that if the patient does not want to participate in some therapeutic 
program, he should be taught to appreciate the program and its potential bene-
fits. So much of psychotherapeutic theory and technique is predicated on the 
assumption that the patient wants to be cured. In the academic setting, it can 
be all theory, method, technique. In the mental hospital, it is often a ques-
tion of 'motivation. If a person "chooses" to be "mentally ill, 11 how much money 
and energy should society pour into convincing him that he really wants to be 
well and that he should decide to undertake an arduous program of psychotherapy 
This problem is not as serious in private practice. First of all, the patient 
most likely is actively seeking therapy. Secondly, there is the selection fac-
tor: the "best candidates" for therapy are often chosen, and part of the defi-
nition of "best" is "well-motivated." Psychotherapy and growth-experiences in 
. 
general can be proffered, in many different ways and repeatedly. Part of the 
"proffering" may even be a hospital ward behavioral reinforcement program 
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e.g., Ayllon & Ayllon, 1959; Ayllon & Haughton, 1962; Ayllon & Azrin, 1964), 
~csigned to help the regressed patient· achieve, if possible, a state of inte-
,ration and "contact" sufficient to elicit from the patient some kind of cues 
~ndicating that he "wants" to be cured. Beyond a certain point, however, the 
.. atient must himself opt for health .and the work involved in striving for it. 
Mowrer's (1968b) contract intimates that self-disclosure is part of the 
sychotherapeutic "work," but that it is not enough. Self-disclosure is the 
relude to behavioral change, especially self-initiated behavioral change s. 
~ainord' s (1968) contract implicitly demands a great deal of behavioral change, 
though he admits that the patient is somewhat unsuspecting when he agrees to 
:ontractual terms that do not appear to be excessively difficult. The contract 
~roup also demands behavioral change. The change directly contracted for is 
~reater openness. But it is only fair to warn the person who intends to be ope 
about himself that this has behvaioral consequences beyond the group. 
Anderson (1964) proposes the thesis that at least some of men's emotional 
roblems have their toot, not in guilt, but in "grandiosity." Men, she says, 
are filled with feelings of "entitlement." When they are frustrated, they give 
ay to resentment. This grandiosity also underlies feelings of helplessness. 
J lbe "helpless" person is one who cannot reach a preconceived degree of perfec-
l tion in some area or who cannot get others to behave as they should. This 
ride is subtle and insinuates itself into all areas of life. This thesis is 
interesting and perhaps pertinent to flight from self-disclosure. There is in 
.. est men a rather deeply embedded desire to change first, if they think that 
they must change at all, and then present themselves as changed to others--in 
the case at point, to the group. Anderson would recognize this as false inde-
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;endence. Perhaps there are some changes that demand a group, a community of 
some kind. There are some things that either cannot be done outside of com-
:unity or are done much more effectively in community. It takes humility, and 
~ot just a surrender to dependence, to admit this. Group experience .is not an 
abdication bf autonomy, but it is a potent vehicle of change. However, a man 
will reveal himself to the group only to the extent that he wants to change. 
The reverse halo-effect. Another source of fear in self-revelation could 
~e termed the "reverse halo-effect." The halo-effect refers to the fact that 
a person, judged to be competent or outstanding in a particular area, will also 
likely to be judged to have a similar degree of competence in other areas. If 
A is an expert in psychology, this aura of expertise tends to spread to other 
areas and either he or others begin to look upon his pronouncements in theology 
or political science with the same awe. The reverse process sometimes stifles 
self-disclosure in growth groups. The group member fears self-disclosure be-
cause he usually thinks first in terms of disclosing the worst in himself. If 
he tells the other members about incompetence in one area of living, he feels 
that they will assume similar incompetence or irresponsibility in related or 
even unrelated areas. If a person admits problems in his private life, he 
fears that others will assume incompetence in his professional life. This is 
especially true if the person's profession is closely related to human living, 
e.g., psychology. There are several ways of handling this in the group. The 
participant can ·try to give a balanced view of himself, speaking alternately of 
. II 
strengths and weaknesses. Or the group can take up the problemof the reverse 




?roblem of stereotyping and categorizing. No one likes to be dealt with as 
''problem," but there is a tendency in groups to identify the participants with 
cheir problems in living, for it-is easier to deal with problems than with per-
sons. Self-disclosure in the contract group should be in dialogue-disclosure, 
that is, the participants should reveal themselves gradually in dialogue with 
one another and not allow themselves to fix on one person, even those his prob-
lems differ from those of the rest of the group. 
These, then, are some of the reasons why people tend to avoid self-disclo-
sure. As Shaffer and Shoben (1956) note:. "One of the hindrances to successful 
counseling is that it depends on discussing the very things that the client is 
least inclined to discuss ••• " (p. 529). And yet, willingness to engage in 
self-exploration, which certainly involves self-revelation, is central to the 
growth process. Truax and Carkhuff (1967) review the evidence for such a state-
ment: 
A number of studies have explored what it is that successful 
patients do in therapy. There is a great deal of convergence .upon 
the patient's intrapersonal or self-exploratory experiences. Using 
a variety of indices of constructive behavioral and personality 
change, Truax (1961) fotmd significantly more depth of self-explor-
ation ••• in successful than in unsuccessful cases of hospitalized 
schizophrenics. Truax and Carkhuff (1963) reviewed results indi-
cating relatively clear-cut findings that the greater the degree 
of patient engagement in the deep intrapersonal or self-exploratory 
process, the greater the degree of constructive personality changes 
in the patient. Further analysis indicated that even during ini-
tial stages of psychotherapy (the second interview), the level of 
patient self-exploration was significantly predictive of final 
outcome ••• Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler (1960) report similar find-
ings in a study of client-centered counseling. Their data indi-
cated that patients with successful outcome tended to explore 
themselves more in the course of psychotherapy, whereas patients 
who could be classified as therapeutic failures showed little 
self-exploration and emotional involvement. In a more specific 
study of client-centered counseling, Braaten (1961) found that 
measures of self-reference and 'private self' differentiated 
______________________________ """"' _______ "''""' h 
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successful from unsuccessful counseling cases (pp. 372-373}. 
It is hypothesized here that such openness will be of equal benefit to non-
psychiatric populations. 
~ and Self-Disclosure 
In a study by Talland and Clark (1954}, clients judged the therapeutic 
value of fifteen topics discussed during counseling. There was general agree-
~ent as to the relative value of the topics. Ratings showed a high correlation 
between the perceived helpfulness of a topic and its "disturbing" qualities. 
The topic called "shame and guilt" was experienced as extremely upsetting, but 
the discussion of this area of life during counseling sessions was considered 
to be very helpful. A group of psychologists also rated the same fifteen top-
ics for their "intimacy," that is, the degree of personal significance for 
the clients. There was a high correlation between what the psychologists 
deemed "intimate" and what the clients judged to be helpful. Guilt and shame 
are household items in human living. It would be impossible to deal adequately 
with self-disclosure without treating of them. They will be treated separately 
guilt in this section, shame in the next. 
The many faces of guilt. The psychological literature, especially the 
literature dealing with theoretical formulations, is filled with references to 
guilt and guilt feelings (e.g., Cameron, 1963; Erikson, 1963; London & Rosen-
thal, 1968; Lynd, 1958; May, 1958). Guilt and anxiety are often related. For 
instance, Lowe's (1964) work with a guilt scale compiled from MMPI items indi-
cates that anxiety and guilt are highly related phenomena. Levitt (1967) sug-
gests taht individuals with high anxiety-proneness are given to stronger guilt 
293 
feelings or ot more easily provoked guilt feelings. He suggests that anxiety 
and guilt are really not separate constructs, but that guilt is simply another 
form of anxiety. Mowrer (1968b) sbggests that poorly handled guilt leads in-
evitably to increased anxiety. The problem is that guilt seems to be a genus 
with a number of species. Guilt as a genus implies violation-of-standard, 
~hether the standard be real or imagined, and some kind of perception of this 
violation on the part of the violator, whether this perception be· "clear~_ana · 
distinct, 11 vague, or even "mi.conscious. 11 The species of guilt differ depending 
on the kind of standard violated and/or the kind of perception involved. The 
species of guilt that seem relevant to the discussion may be termed: moral, 
existential, pseudo- (or conventional). It is the contention of the writer 
that hidden guilt, of any kind, is a potential source of psychological trouble 
and that one of the most effective ways of handling guilt is self-disclosure. 
Self-disclosure is related, though in different ways, to the "therapy" of all 
species of guilt. 
(a) Moral guilt. Moral guilt refers to a willful violation of some moral 
or ethical or contractual standard that a person holds, either implicitly or 
explicitly. If A, realizing that it is a violation of his norms of conduct, 
steals money from B, then he becomes the subject of moral guilt. Ethical value 
systems differ from culture to culture, and even from individual to individual; 
that is, both individual and cultural subjectivity enter somewhat into the 
determination of a particular value system. AI.most everyone, however, has some 
kind of value system or, from the viewpoint of Pratt and Tooley (1964, 1966), a 
network of contracts with ~elf, others, and society at large. If the network 
itself is either non-existent or deficient, one is considered "ill" in whatever 
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;ense the psychopathic or antisocial personality may be considered ill. It is 
~ot necessary for a person to reflect explicitly on the contractual nature of 
~is relationships. By merely existing as a human being, by entering into rela-
tionships with others, and by living in society, one assumes contractual re-
sponsibilities. When a person, more or less knowingly and willfully, violates 
one or more of these contracts, he becomes the subject of moral guilt. 
It is of course Mowrer's (1964, 1968a, 1968b) thesis that the complexus--
contract-violation-behav!or, followed by concealment and failure in restitution 
behavior--is pathogenic. "Confession," especially when coupled with restitu-
tion, seems, at least generally, to deprive, contract violations of their 
potentially pathogenic power. Since value systems usually deal with social 
relationships, a violated value usually implies a break in human relationships. 
The guilty person is who, by his behavior, has gotten "out-of'cotmnunity." 
Recognition and revelation of this behavior is a step toward getting back into 
community. Many people would say that this is good common. sense: at least it 
seems to be a very good working hypothesis. However, attempts should be made 
to test this hypothesis in various ways, though it is evident that experimenta-
tion in this area would be quite difficult. There are apparent exceptions to 
this hypothesis. For instance, some people brag about exploits that others 
would consider to be contract violations. In defense of the hypothesis, how-
ever, such behavior might not be the exception that if first seems to be, for 
(1) the deviant behavior is "confessed," that is, it is externalized in the 
community, and (2) those who engage in such behavior misght not see it as a 
Violation of any contract. Different contractual systems exist at different 
levels of society. It is enough to know this fact without entering into the 
295 
question of the relative merits of each contractual system. ThereDore, what 
seems to be "contractual unawareness" might merely reflect cultural and indiv-
idual variations, ignorance, or, ·if the deviation· is significant, the "illness" 
of the anti-social personality. 
Tournier (1962) calls moral guilt "value" guilt, It arises, he says, from 
a decision of the self against the self. Becker (1966) calls it "realistic, 
objective, or social" guilt. It is a falling short of the requirements of life 
~ith-others. He, too, admits that cultural differences are important in the 
determination of such guilt. Others see the whole question of moral guilt as 
an unfortunate mixing of theology with psychology. Terms like "guilt," "self-
disclosure," "confession," "restitution," "contract," and the like are consid-
ered too "moralistic" to be dealt with in a behavioral science. If this is the 
case, I would have to disagree with them. Secrets concerning past moral failur 
ay well be contemporary determinants of behavior if they divert energy into 
putting up a facade and keeping it in good repair. Undoubtedly, 
of Mowrer' s critics are disturbed by the fact that he'·refers to man's moral 
at all. However, one criticism of Mowrer does seem justified. It is 
isturbing that Mowrer, at least in his writings published to date, deals d.L:";:,;t 
xclusively with moral guilt. At least this is often the tone of his writings. 
is position is reductionistic in that he tends to reduce most, if not all, 
eurotic guilt to moral guilt, and in the process ignores both existential and 
harisaical guilt. Perhaps it is not that Mowrer says too much, but rather 
little. 
(b) Existential guilt. It is also asstnned here that self-revelation gets 







,r ontological guilt deals with "failed-potentialities." From the very fact 
that we are human, there stand before us any number of "possibilities" in the 
Jrganic process that we call human--life and growth. It is quite obvious that 
a man cannot choose and fulfill all the "possibilities" or "potentialities" in 
~is life. But the fact that he allows too many possibilities to slip by, that 
he chooses poorly among the possibilities that are at :·.hand-this is the source 
of existential guilt. May (1958) follows Medard Boss (1957) in his treatment 
of this species of guilt: 
If, as Boss puts it, we 'forget being' --by failing to bring 
ourselves to our entire being, by failing to be authentic, by 
slipping into the conformist anonymity of das Man--then we 
have in fact missed our being and are to that extent failures. 
'If you lock up potentialities, you are guilty against ••• what 
is given you in your origin, in your "core"' (p. 53). 
Failed-potnetiality can take a number of forms, both intrapersonal and inter-
personal: 
••• We can be as guilty by refusing to accept the anal, genital, 
or any other corporeal aspects of life as the intellectual or 
spiritual aspects. 
We have cited only one form of ontological guilt, namely, 
that arising from forfeiting on's own potentialities. There 
aer other forms as well. Another, for example, is ontological 
guilt against one's fellows, arising from the fact that since 
each of us is an individual, he necessarily perceives his fellow 
man through his ownlimited and biased eyes. This means that he 
always to some extent does violence to the true picture of his fel~ 
low man and always to some extent fails fully to understand 
and meet the other's needs. This is not a question of moral 
failure or slackness--though it can indeed by greatly increased 
by lack of moral sensitivity. It is an inescapable result of 
the fact that each of us is a separate individuality and has 
no choice but to look at the world through his own eyes. This 
guilt, rooted in our existential structure, is one of the most 
potent sources of a sound h\llllility and an unsentiment'al attitude 
of forgiveness toward one's fellow men (p. 54). 








:-.m potentialities," for it is a question of failed-potentiality in the area 
Jf interpersonal living. 
Clark (1967) makes a distinction between existential guilt and existential 
-~I-
5hame, but the notion of failed-potentiality underlies both: 
Buber has shown (1965, pp. 121-148) that existential guilt is the 
guilt of not having affirmed another, of not having answered an-
other's plea for community, of not having entered an I-Thou rela-
tionship. Existential guilt, then, is clearly an important deter-
minant in one's coming to value and create relation, for such 
guilt can often be expiated only by the establishment·-. of relation 
in the here and now. 
Existential shame, on the other hand, is the shame of not 
experiencing nneself as an actor, as a creator, as--to use Bugen-
tals 's term (1965, pp. 203-208)--an 'I -process.' We experience 
existential shame as we are aware of having reated ourselves only 
as recipients of power and not also as expressors of it (p. 256). 
Dealing with existential shame and guilt seems to be a function of a growth-
experience or "therapy for normals." If this is the case, then Clark sees 
sensitivity training as precisely this kind of experience: "This kind of 
experience people in sensitivity training groups have is one which is designed 
better than any other I know of to allow for the experiencing of both existen-
tial guilt and existential shame, and both are manifestly important for man to 
experience" (p. 256). 
What are the "standards" violated in existential guilt? They cannot be 
contractural standards, for violation of contract leads to moral guilt. In 
many of the contracts that define a person's life, there is what "must" be done 
or not done, if the contract is to remain integral. Beyond that, however, lies 
the fullness of the contract. Scholastic philosophers make a distinction be-
tween~ (to be), the bare existence of something, and its bene ~(to be 







! iarties must not commit adultery, the husband. usually must support his wife, 
; 
?utting them into more intimate contact with each other, with themselves, and 
.-ith others (children, friends, etc.), then it is a question of the bene ~ 
Jfmarriage. Living out this potential seems to be related to a kind of quasi-
contract tha0t a person has with himself, to what he demands of himself with 
respect to the bene ~ of the marriage. It is no longer a question of ful-
fillment or non-fulfillmertt, it is rather a question of degree. Existential 
uilt refers to the bene ~of living. 
Men do experience existential guilt. Everyone carries the burden of failed 
otentiality, in the pursuit of a career, in interpersonal relationships, even 
nplay and creative enjoyment. But few men discuss failed-potentialities. 
e contract group and growth groups in general afford an excellent opportunity 
o reveal and discuss areas of failed-potentiality. However, entering a sen-
itivity group, or especially a contract group, may increase the risk of adding 
0 one's store of existential guilt. Once it becomes clear that the provisions 
f the contract, such as self-disclosure and expression of feeling, are "possi-
ilities" for growth, then a refusal to participate in these experiences will 
nly add to one's existential guilt. The group experience becomes just one more 
ailed-potentiality. Such failure can produce a real sense of diminishment. 
(c) Pseudo- .£!:. neurotic guilt. This guilt, which Tournier (1962) calls 
'functional", and which Becker (1966) refers to as "fantastic," is usually con-











~:1 quite different ways. Some psychotics think or feel that they have com-
:itted the "unforgiveable sin," when they have not done anything very repre-
i [ ~ensible. Some neurotics think they are "rotten," though they do not speak of 
{ 
I or even know of any particularly egregious. contract-violations in their lives. I prefer to refer to this kind of guilt as "pseudo-guilt" rather than "neuro-
tic," for (1) its analog is also foi.md in psychotic patients, and (2) "pseudo-" 
implies that (a) there has been no real violation of standard, there has been 
no relevant instance of contract-violation, although the "guilty" party insists 
that there has been or at least "feels" that there has been, or (b) there has 
been some kind of contract violation, but the individual's reaction is out of 
proportion. Stern (1954) reco\lllts a case in which a woman, after the death of 
her rather brutal husband, talked about having committed the 11\lllforgiveable" 
sin. It was finally learned that her guilt revolved around the fact that a 
friend of her husband's had made a "pass" at her some thirty years previously. 
She had not cooperated with the man, so that no real contract-violation had 
occurred. Her reaction was simply not proportioned to the incident. 
Stern summarizes the differences be~ween moral and neurotic guilt (which, 
in Stern's sense, is a narrower concept than pseudo-guilt): moral guilt has 
the quality of proportion, can be assuaged by realistic restitution or atone-
~ent, does not necessarily depend on emotion, and refers to realized acts only; 
pseudo-guilt lacks proportion, cannot be "undone," is so inextricably inter-
woven with anxiety that that which is experienced subjectively is at times only 
the anxiety without conscious feelings of guilt, and refers to repressed drives 
rather than realized acts. 
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Sometimes pseudo-guilt takes the form of an exaggeration of existential 
~'Jilt. A person feels, without "reason," that his whole life has been meaning-
:css, that his life, rather he himself ,--is defined by failed-potentiality • 
. ;ome draw a distinction between "guilt" and "guilt feelings." If it is a ques-
~ion of contract-violations and/or failed-potentialities, then the individual 
"feels guilty" (and should). If, however, a person invents, exaggerates, or 
otherwise distorts normal guilt, either moral or existential, then he ''has 
.~uilt feelings." This terminology is abandoned. here as being too ambiguous. 
Another problem, more complex than that of classification and terminology, 
is the source of abnormal guilt. As indicated above, Mowrer (1964, 1968a, 
1968b) has tended to think that "neurotic" guilt is the result of concealed 
and otherwise mismanaged moral guilt. There has been little room for "pseudo-
guilt" in his system, though I have ~the feeling that he is movb.g away from 
what I consider to be an overly reductionistic position. Psychoanalytic theor-
ies, on the other hand, tend to see the origin of pseudo-guilt in such proces-
ses as repressed libidinal drives. A drive exists. The individual learns in 
some way that, at least for him here and now, it is prohibited. The drive is 
repressed. Since this process, in the main, takes place on the level of the 
unconscious, it remains "unlabeledu (Dollard & Miller, 1950). Even though the 
individual has never actually violated the· standard in question, he •:feels as if 
he did, and because of repression he does ~ot know why he feels quilty. This 
I "d evelopmental guilt" is explained somewhat differently by others. For in-
stance, the significant adults in a child's life reject him for one reason or 
another (e.g., he was not wanted in the first place, he is not attractive, they 
are too busy with other interests, etc.). The rejection may be open or subtle, 
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. 'Jt the point is that the child forms his self-image from the cues he receives. 
~- Erikson (1964) puts it: 
Hardly has one learned t~ recognize the familiar face (the origi-
nal harbor of basic trust) when he becomes also frightfully aware 
of the unfamiliar, the strange face, the unresponsive, the aver-
ted, the darkened and the frowning face. And here begins ••• that 
inexplicable tendency on man's part to feel that he has caused the 
face to turn away which happened to turn elsewhere (p. 102). 
:n the extreme case, the child learns to look upon himself as worthless. Guilt 
!l!arned in this fashion becomes a mode of being. I have dealt with cases in 
·~hich the patient who "learned" his worthlessness as a child and youth later 
:icted out his worthlessness. "'They' treated me rottenly, so now I will act 
rottenly," is the logic of such behavior. This renouncement of responsibility, 
~ven though it is triggered by adverse developmental circumstance, seems to be 
a contract violation situation, however mitigated the person's guilt might be. 
These are cases of "mixed" guilt. 
The point of this hurried, incomplete, and somewhat over-simplified con-
sideration of the possible etiology of pseudo-guilt is to suggest that it, too, 
can be, and is, treated, at least in part, by one form or another of self-dis-
closure. The concealed is laid open, the repressed is "labeled." If therapy 
is considered not just a question of insight but a "corrective emotional ex-
perience" (Alexander, 1963), this, too, demands self-revelation. The paradigm, 
perhaps over-simplified, is something like this: Patient: "I am worthless." 
Therapist: "Tell me about yourself, reveal to me the ~person inside.'" Then, 
perhaps slowly and painfully, the p~tient reveals himself. Therapist: "I 
you have revealed worthwhile. have to be honest with you. I find the person 
I If you have really been listening to yourself, I think that you might have Lite 
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' " same reaction. 
·But enough about pseudo-guilt. Perhaps the pseudo-guilt 11 of everyday 
life" can be handled in the contract-group. However, the consideration of the 
~tiology, nature, and treatment of its more serious manifestations belongs in 
·•orks on psychopathology and psychotherapy. The contract group is, by defini-
d J:ll 1 II tion, ma e up OJ! norma s. 
(d) Pharisaical guilt. Some of the standards of conduct established in 
j society refer to the more superficial, conventional, and ritualistic aspects 
i ~f interpersonal relating and living in community. It is not that ritual is 
not necessary. On the contrary, ritual is an essential part of human living, 
whether the .ritual be religious or secular in character. Ritual is a deep 
human need and finds expression in any number of ways: in liturgical services, 
in guru-style meditation, in the stylized activities of fraternal organizations 
in some stereotyped family activities (e.g., Sunday visiting of relatives can 
be deeply ritualistic), etc. Indeed, this area of human behavior would be a 
fruitful area of more intensive socioiogical and psychological research. The 
"sick" rituals of the obsessive-compulsive and of the psychotic are dealt with 
in detail in works on psychopathology, while normal ritual remains compara-
tively ignored. Berne (1964) sees much of ordinary human living as ritualistic 
but his viewpoint is somewhat cynical (though often realistic), and he ignores 
the deeper rituals that bind men together. Why do people keep going to movies 
and watching television programs that are cast in the same mold, that follow 
the same pattern? Why do people read certain genres of literature such as spy, 
detective , and love stories? At least part of this behavior seems to be rit-
, Ualistic L . a search for same ness. Ritual, whether it centers on t!1e deepest 
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I ,re of human living or on its more superficial aspects, connotes security, ntrol, rhythm of living, a 'Sense of well-being from knowing what is going to 
1?pen, a kind of securely encompassing knowledge. Ritual excludes the in tru-
. tve and the unexpected. 
Convention might be considered as part of the ritualistic dimension of li-
:ing. It seems to connote, however, defined aspects of interpersonal living 
hat are, at least relatively, more superficial. Ritual taps something deeper 
:n man than does convention. The latter refers to the more superficial aspects 
::1d even to the more humorous aspects of the "what-is-done" and the ''what-is-
1ot-done" in social intercourse. For instance, it is said that Mrs. Vanderbilt 
'nee asked Fritz Kreisler to play at a dinner party which she was giving for 
H~r exclusive set of friends. She asked him what he would charge. The violin-
lst replied: "Thirteen thousand dollars." She agreed, but added: "Of course, 
:ou will not mingle with my guests." "In that case, Madame," Kreisler is said 
.. o have replied, "my fee is five hundred dollars." Day-tp-day living is filled 
ith conventions. The conventions of society usually call for a certain degree 
f conformity and men readily respond. Technological societies are particularly 
emanding. Keniston (1965) suggests that, since so many of the positions of-
fered by the corporations and organizations of our society demand on-the-job 
training, the primary value of a diploma and a degree is to give witness to the 
fact that one has been able to endure sixteen years o~ "education." This is 
the proof that a technocracy requires to be assured that a prospective employee 
,dll become an obedient cog in an efficient organizational machine. 
Allport (1962) suggests that the concept of "social influence," as u., twlly 




is rather a "theater of operations" -for the satisfaction of indivi-:ne group 
1 1 needs, it is a medium of self-expression •. "Norms" arise from a kind of 
.ua 
:yclic.action within the group. It is this-rather than a "one-way agency of 
the group acting upon the individual." The group or the "grouping" is consti-
tuted by the give-and-take of behaviors of seeking and recognition. The rela-
tionship, then, between the conduct prescribed by group norms and the coopera-
tive activities of the group members is close and facilitating. The forces 
that Allport sees as operative in a group or "grouping," then, seem to arise 
out of a kind of benign, security-motivated utilitarianism. 
Collins and Guetzkow (1964) see both advantages and disadvantages in the 
"conformity" behavior noted in groups. In general "the social weighting given 
to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes the better alter-
natives to be chosen" (p. 41) . But there are circumstances under which "social 
influence" is more likely to lower the quality of a group product: 
(1) An expert may continue to receive the respect of an authority 
even though the topic is outside his own area of specialization. 
(2) A group member may conform merely for social approval. (3) 
Conformity and agreement can set in so soon that all opinions are 
not considered. (4) Finally, group members can become so much in 
the habit of depending on other persons for knowledge and infor-
mation that they cannot make contributions on their own. 
Useful as social knowledge may be, it must be used intel-
ligentlly. It may be that we place too much emphasis on getting 
along with others and not enough on the content of connnunication 
in our culture (pp. 41-42). 
In general they take a more moderate approach to the question of the "pressure 
to conform" in our society than does someone like Whyte (1956) in ~ Organiza-
tion Man 
-· 
t Ritual and convention do have a place in human living and in this sense a 
L~tatn d 11 
.:::::::::::- egree of conformity and/or utilitarian "patterning of behaviors is 
?art o~ the social cement that binds men together. To teject ritual in personal 
~d interpersonal living and to defy .convention as conformism would obviously 
:iave a devastating effect on both the individual and society. To the extent 
:hat ritual and convention are necessary for the necessary relationships betwee 
the individual and society, they belong to the sphere of contract obligations. 
!!owever, ritual can become outmoded and convention can prove stifling. Phar-
isaical or conventional guilt is the guilt that arises from violation of stan-
<lards or ritual and convention that have lost their function. Personal ·growth 
:md necessary change within society demand the ability to go beyond ritual and 
convention. Both the individual and society should feel free to experiment wit 
~ypassing certain conventions. The over-ritualized and the over-conventional-
ized balk at this for such pruning and experimentation make them feel guilty. 
The flexible person knows when ritual and convention may and should be set 
aside. He feels, not guilty, but free. 
The contract group is a place where one might well explore his relation-
'~ip to ritual and convention. Mutually shared self-revelation in this area 
has the potentiality to free the rigid and inhibited and to confront the insen-
1 tives. 
An example illustrating~~ species of guilt. Perhaps an example in 
the area of sexuality might draw together some of the principal notions con-
cerning guilt. (1) An outright misuse of sex such as adultery is a contract 
violation and leads to moral guilt. (2) If a couple have failed to integrate 
sexuality into their married life so that it becomes a means of det:pening tl1eir 
love for one another, at once a symbol of their love and an expression of it--
this can lead to a sense of failed-potentiality and existential guilt. (3) 
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~pressing one's sexuality, learning to fear this drive as dangerous and/or 
~irty, may well lead to pseudo-guilt. (4) If a married couple were to eschew 
•erfectly acceptable forms of experimentation with sexual technique in order to 
r 
remain within the bounds of what they perceive to be a conventional approach to 
sexual expression, they would most likely do so in order to avoid pharisaical 
or conventional guilt. 
! summary word £!!. guilt. The topic of guilt is not a popular one. It 
::iakes too many people wince inside. It is tmpopular enough to make some scoff 
when even an attempt is made to deal with it in some kind of scientific con-
text. But guilt is part of the human condition; it is unavoidable in human 
living. It is a two-edged sword. If mismanaged or not managed at all, it 
tends to become psychological deadweight; if faced and handled, it can become 
an important growth factor. Concealment of guilt from self and others, which 
initially appears to be the least painful, if not the only, solution, eventu-
ally exacts its price in terms of human growth. Self-revelation, on the other 
hand, is almost always initially painful. But once guilt "has to be hidden" 
from oneself and from others, it is liable to psychological translation or 
transformation. A sense of failure, for instance, becomes fatigue, boredom, 
depression, or touchiness in interpersonal relationships. It is the assumption 
iiere that a certain degree of self-revelation in a sensitivity-training group 
~an open up new perspectives with respect to the effective handling of guilt, 
whether the guilt be moral, existential, pharisaical, or even pseudo- or 
neurotic. These diffemt types of guilt are usually not found in the "pure" 
state. They are intermingled and confused in the ordinary man's life, and only 
When a man dares let others see his life for what it is, is there hope that the. 
I 




Even though Talland and Clark (1964) treated "shame and guilt" as a single 
:opic in their study, there are reasons for separating the two here. Erikson 
(1963, 1968) rightly calls shame an "emotion insufficiently studied" (1968, 
?· 110). While it is true that the discussion of failures that have led to 
;uilt may evoke shame, the experience of guilt and the experience of shame are 
simply not the same thing. Shame experiences can arise completely outside the 
context of guilt. Just as guilt experiences, if mishandled, can become psychol 
ogical deadweight and stand in the way of growth or, if well managed, can have 
Jn opposite effect, so shame, too, can be either a destructive experience or a 
stimulus to growth. It, too, is intimately related to self-disclosure, but in 
a way different from guilt. 
Erikson on shame. Erikson (1963, 1968) deals with shame briefly in consid-
ering the various "stages .of man." The crisis of "autonomy versus shame" comes 
early in the life of the 'child. The child suddenly wants to have a choice. 
~is tendency must be encouraged, and yet he must be protected from anarchy; he 
::iust be trained to "hold on" and "let go" with discretion. He must be encour-
aged to "starid on his own two feet," and also be protected from meaningless 
experiences of shame and doubt. Shame, as Erikson sees it, implies that a per-
son is completely exposed, conscious of being looked at, self-conscious, visi-
ble--yet not ready to be visible. The person who is ashamed would like to a-
vert the eyes of those looking at him, but he cannot, and so he turns his rage 
in upon himself. Erikson, therefore, spells out the dangers inherent in shamin,. 
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If a person is shamed too much, this leads to his trying to get away with 
things unseen. If a child or an adult is constantly forced to consider self, 
body, and wishes as dirty and evil, he will either revolt, sometimes even to 
,• -
the point of defiant shamelessness, or he will succumb to a lasting sense of 
shame and doubt. Erikson believes that many adults, otherwise mature and free 
of neurotic symptoms, display this sensitivity, or perhaps over-sensitivity, to 
a possible shameful "loss of face." 
Shame, then, is a powerful emotion and must be evoked with some caution. 
Shame in a group experience is even more powerful. I have participated in 
group experiences in which shame was evoked recklessly, causing a great deal 
of pain but very little "healing." Evoking shame without providing adequate 
human support may be as dangerous and destructive of growth in adult life as it 
is in childhood. As Fromm (1956) notes, shame involves a deep awareness of 
human separation, and without reunion by love, shame is sterile. Erikson's 
cautions, then, are well taken. But this does not mean that shame experiences 
are merely negative; they can be a powerful force for growth. 
Lynd .Q!!. shame. Helen Merrill Lynd (1958) has written a most remarkable 
~1alysis of shame and its relationship to identity. The root 'llleaning of the 
~ord is to uncover, to expose, to wound. But shame is not just being pain-
fully exposed to another; it is primarily an exposure of self to oneself. In 
shame experiences particularly sensitive and vulnerable aspects of the self 
are exposed, especially to one's own eyes. It is a sudden experience. In a 
flash one sees his unrecognized inadequacies without being "ready" for this 
revelation of self to self; much less is he ready for exposure to the eyes of 
others. 
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Shame, according to Lynd, in some way pre-exists the specific shaming 
~vent: 
••• I think that this public exposure of even a very private 
part of one's physical or mental character could not in itself 
have brought about shame unless one had already felt within one-
self, not only dislike, but shame for these traits (p. 29). 
The feeling of unexpectedness marks one of the central contrasts 
between shame and guilt. This unexpectedness is more than sudden-
ness in time; it is also an astonishment at seeing different parts 
of ourselYes, conscious and unconscious, acknowledged and unac-
knowledged, suddenly coming together, and coming together with 
aspects of the world we have not recognized (p. 34). 
:he external event, then, that precipitates a shame experience might be quite 
trivial. A casual remark or a joke might trigger a profound feelil'\g of shame 
in another, while the person who made the remark often remains oblivious to 
•hat is happening inside the person who was the object of his remark. But 
;hame could not arise, could not be touched off by "insignificant" incidents 
:.:.~less, deep down, one was already ashamed. 
~ difference between shame and guilt. Shame and guilt differ. Alexan-
~ 1-·r 0963) 1'elieves that shame generates feelings of "weakness" or "inadequacy, 
: le guilt ghres rise to an "I-am-no-good" or perhaps rather an "I-am-not-
good" feeling. He contends that inferiority feelings in shame are rooted in a 
deeper c~nflict in the personality than the sense of wrongdoing in guilt. 
Piers and Singer (1953) believe that guilt accompanies transgression, while 
shame follows upon failure. So guilt is generated whenever a boundary is 
transgressed or a standard is violated, while shame occurs when a goal is not 
being reached. Shame thus indicates a real "shortcoming." Lynd (1958) says 
that shame lacks the inherent legal reference of guilt. It is not a question 
of failing to pay a debt or of violating a prescribed code. Rather shame is 
• 
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:-:uch more intimately associated with failed-potentiality and as such related to 
~xistenital rather than moral guilt: " ••• The Ego-Ideal is in continuous inter-
function with the unconscious and conscious. awareness of the Ego's potentiali-
ties ••• Shame ••• occurs whenever goals and images presented by the Ego-Ideal are 
:10t reached" (Piers and Singer, 1953, pp. 14, 16). Because shame represents a 
failure to be, it gets into one's guts in a way that differs from guilt: "It 
is pervasive as anx:ety is pervasive; its focus is not a separate act, but revel 
ation of the whole self. The thing that has been exposed is what I am" (Lynd, 
1958, p. 50). 
A shame experience might even be defined as an acute emotional awareness 
of a failure to be t-n some way. It differs from existential guilt in that it 
• - '\ ·1, 
is an acute emos~o~l experience and in that it is not just a realization of 
-. ~ 
failed potentiality but a painful awareness of what one is not. For instance, 
one can be ashamed of one's own body (it lacks grace, beauty; it has grown old; 
it is crippled, deformed, etc.), but one's physical make-up is hardly a source 
of existential guilt. 
As Lynd well notes, both shame and guilt might arise from the samt! ~itua­
tion: " ••• Shame and guilt may sometimes alte~b and reinforce each oth-
er ••• a particular situation may be experienced by an individual as shame or 
guilt or both according to the nature of the person ••• " (pp. 22-23). Murder 
may be experienced as both a.violation of a standard and as a deep personal 
failure. It is an act that may suddenly reveal to a person his deepest person-
al inadequacies and his most tragic interpersonal failures. Less dramatic 
acts may do the same. A burst of uncontrolled anger may be experienced as some 
kind of contract failure, but it might also be a source of deep shame insofar 
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, it reveals a person to himself and forces him to gaze at the nakedness of his 
'•11 inadequacy. Both failures to be and over-stepped boundaries are potentially 
'.•'Structive to personality integration. When these tWO strains meet in the same 
.u:nan experience, the danger is heightened markedly. 
When an acute shame experience strikes, there is no defense. It rinses 
ne's being. Bur few recognize the fact that such an experience has potential-
ties for growth. The icy clarity of self-knowledge that is part and parcel of 
~e shame experience is usually too painful. One has to escape and forget. The 
Jund is allowed to heal and any situation that might possibly re-open the 
·otmd is quietly avoided. This not only constricts one's "life-space," but it 
.:ikes one vulnerable to further shame experiences: "Not knowing what should be 
one with shame, one's first impulse is to conceal it, and this may produce 
urther shame, for this involves the demanding process of examining or re-exam-
ning one's "assumptive world" (Frank, 1961): "Part of the difficulty in ad-
nitting shame to oneself arises 
n false assumptions about what 
from relue~o recognize 
the world one lives in is and 
that one has built 
about the way 
'thers will respond to oneself'·' (Lynd, 1958, p. 43). But, as with guilt, con-
ealment is no answer: "Protection against isolation and the difficulty of com-
nunicating such experiences as shame may take the form of impersonalization and 
ehumanization ..•. I will deny the possibility of openness; I will protect myself 
gainst it" (Lynd, 1958, p. 70). 
Erikson (1963, 1968) emphasizes the dangers in shame, or perhaps rather in 
~shaming" and "being shamed," while Lynd (1958) emphasizes the potential value 
f dealing with shame through self-disclosure: 
If, however, one can sufficiently risk uncovering oneself and 
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sufficiently trust another person, to seek means of coimntm.icating 
shame, the risking of exposure can be in itself an experience of 
release, expansion, self-revelation, a coming forward of belief in 
oneself, and entering into the mind and feeling of another person (p. 249) 
.. -
f, as Fromm (1956) says, shame is a feeling separateness without retm.ion by 
ove, then self-disclosure can be the beginning of this retm.ion. And just as a 
efusal to deal with the roots of shame can lead tp personality constriction, 
.o faced or transcended shame can enhance personal identity: 
Shame interrupts any tm.questioning, tm.aware sense of oneself. But 
it is possible that experiences of shame if confronted full in the 
face may throw an unexpected light on who one is and point the way 
toward who one may become. Fully faced, shame may become not pri-
marily something to be covered, but a positive experience of revel-
ation (Lynd, 1958, p. 20). 
Experiences of shame are a painful tm.covering of hitherto tm.recog-
nized aspects of one's personality as well as of unrecognized aspects 
of one's society and of the world. If it is possible to face the, in-
stead of seeking protection from what they reveal, they may throw 
light on who one is, and hence point the way toward who and what 
one may become p. 183). 
~arne, then, is a way of discovery. 
Shame, revelation of both self and society. Just above, Lynd refers to 
'unrecognized aspects of one's society and of the world." She says that some 
1f the most acute shame experiences arise when one is ashamed of the "failure 
:o be" of those closely related to oneself. Identification with significant 
;thers seems to be the 
is identified with the 
mechanism that mediates suc~e. If, then, a person 
society that surrotm.ds him, ,~can feel deep shame for 
I 
this society when its "failures to be" are recognized. A young man came to me 
once for counseling. He had been playing basketball; a game was organized with 
!"skins" against "shirts," and he had been asked to remove his T-shirt. When 
he manifested some reluctance to do so, one of the other players remarked that 
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·.'was reluctant because he had a scrawny build. Even though his antagonist 
~d the other players did not realize it, he was flooded with shame. The inci-
~nt was trivial, but in an instant he did realize with painful clarity that he 
as ashamed of his l>ody. In the counseling session it came out that his shame 
~nt further than that. He also realized that he lived in a society that ex-
. essively extols physical grace, charm, or beauty, often to the extent that it 
ecomes a condition for acceptance. He realized that he had more or less con-
urred with society in this, so that he was ashamed of himself for having been 
o ashamed of his body and he was ashamed of his society for its hierarchy of 
alues. Now he wanted to talk about his feeliµ,gs about his own body and the way 
~at he swallowed whole the values of society. His shame could have led to con-
triction or growth. He chose to have it lead to growth. 
~summary ~.2£. shame. An attempt has been made to indicate the growth 
otentialities of facing shame. This means not only discussing the sources of 
~ame within oneself but also facing the actual shame experience that often 
rises both from the disclosure made in the group. This does not mean that in 
ome pollyannish fashion self-disclosure and facing guilt and shame will consti-
"'e some kind of panacea for the ills of the human con~. Sharing shame, 
or instance, does not mean that it will be dissipated: "It is also true that 
f one discovered that one was not alone in having these traits, shame would 
n one sense be alleviated by being shared; but if one still felt these charac-
eristics as mean and ugly no matter how may people had them, shame would in an-
ther sense be extended" (Lynd, 1958, p. 29). This points up the fact that mu-
t1al self-disclosure is not designed just to relieve anxiety. It is designed to 
ut people in more effective contact with the what-is. It is true that often a 
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,crson needs a good deal of support in order to face the what-is, but this is 
:ar more conducive to growth than giving support to another in order that he may 
·ndure the more or less self-inflicted agonies that arise from not facing the 
·hat-is. 
Risk and trust. Most people hesitate to disclose themselves to a group. 
:bey balance- ott', the edge of self-disclosure as they would on the edge of a di-
:ing board. But just as the shock and pain of entering the water are short-
;ived and inevitably outweighed by the benefits of mutual sharing. Refusing 
o "enter the water" in the group because the shock and pain of self-revelation 
;re seen as protracted in a defensive maneuver, a kind of psychological meton-
·::iy. Still the pain of self-disclosure and the possibility of rejection lurk 
iround the comer, so group members bide their time. 
Behind the feeling of shame stands not the fear of hatred, but the 
fear of contempt which ••• spells fear of abandonment ••• the deeper 
rooted shame anxiety is based on the fear of the parent who walks 
away .!in disgust,' and ••• this anxiety in tum draws its terror 
from the earlier established and probably ubiquital separation 
anxiety (Piers & Singer, 1953, pp. 11, 16). 
isk is an essential feature of growth groups. But before one take~s this risk 
e asks himself searching questions: "Can one have faith that wit c rtain 
ther persons greater openness can increase understanding, respect, lo ? 'nlat 
ith them increasing intimacy can be, not a corroding, but a deepening and en-
iching process?" (Lynd, 1958, pp. 238-239). Perhaps the "nothing ventured, 
othing gained" truism has a special applicability to communication in growth 
roups: 
Confronting, instead of quickly covering, an experience of shame as 
revelation of oneself and of society -- facing 'actual life' -- re-
quires an ability to risk, if necessary to endure, disappointment, 
frustration, and ridicule •••• Engagement with life and with history--
self-discovery and further discovery of the world--has always involved 
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such risks (Lynd, p. 232). 
till, even initial risk demands some kind of climate or trust. But to demand 
rust from others, one must first show that he himself is trustworthy. And one 
f his "integrity" groups contract to absolute self-disclosure before even meet-
ng the other members of the group. Very often this works. It is true that 
he initial interviewer usually "models" for the prospective group member and 
·hows that at least he is trustworthy. But, since there is no such initial 
ommitment in the contract group, the problem of mutual trust must be worked out 
'erhaps the notion of "kairos," the "right moment," has some value in the con-
ract group. The.participants all contract to self-disclosure, but each puts 
omself "on the line" at the moment that is "right" for himself. Obviously 
uch a concept could be used to rationalize away complete failure to fulfill the 
elf-disclosure provision of the contract, but this need not detract from its 
ossible utility. The problem of trust will be taken up more thoroughly in the 
hapter on support. 
Shame and fantasy. Daydreaming is a little discussed activity. Full-
ength studies on daydreaming are few and literally far between (Green, 1923; 
inger, 1966; Varendonck, 1921). Daydreaming or directed fantasy (rather than 
'ust mind-wandering) is considered an adolescent activity that is outgrown with 
1..he responsibilities of adulthood. In adulthood, fantasy is encouraged if it 
• II f i s creative," if it is a source of growth rather than a substitute or t. If 
ot encouraged, it is at least countenanced when it is used sparingly-- with 
respect to both quantity and quality -- to take the edge off a depressing day 
--
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or a dreary life-situation. In this sense, Singer (1966) calls daydreaming 
or directed fantasy " a neutral skill available for adaptive enrichment of the 
life of otherwise ordinary persons" (p. 187). But this is not the place to 
review theoretical considerations and empirical findings concerning daydream-
ing. Singer's work is both adequate and interesting. 
The point here is that many men engage in some kind of fantasy in varying 
degrees. Only to the degree that this fantasy distorts the what-is and the 
~hat-should-be (contract standards) of life in a non-creative way does it be-
come problematic. The revelation of such fantasy can be the source of intense 
shame, but it can also get at some of the deepest roots of unfaced failure in 
a person's life. For instance, if a man, when he is having sexual relations 
with his wife, imagines that he is with someome else, either real or imaginary, 
then it seems that he has failed to integrate sexual experience with love. If 
he reveals his fantasy, he might feel deeply ashamed, but the revelation seems 
essential to his getting to the source of his interpersonal failure. Examin-
ation of fantasy, then, while often painful and productive of shame, can, at 
least for some, be an important factor in a growth experience • 
.Qfher Approaches 12_ Self-Disclosure .!!!.. the Training Group 
Areas of guilt and shame, as important as they might be, are by no means 
the only topics for self-disclosure. Perhaps they may even be more accurately 
considered as dimensions which are sometimes involved in the process of self-
disclosure. If a person talks about the what-is of his life, he will inevita-
bly talk about areas of living which are touched or even suffused with gui 1 t 
and/or shame. The discussion above indicates the importance of not avoiding 
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,:i area of living because of the guilt or shame associated with it. But some 
ther approaches to self-disclosure might be indicated here: 
(a) Values. In talking about themselves, people often shy away from two 
ost important areas, the "best-in-me" and the "worst-in-me." The "worst-in-me" 
s the area of shame and guilt and has already been discussed. But people also 
void talking about the good they do, the values they hold, the aspirations 
hey have. In face, when given a choice, that is when asked simply to engage 
n some form of self-disclosure, most people immediately think of areas of shame 
::id guilt. Perhaps one of the principle reasons why. the area of values and as-
irations is overlooked is the fact that the good meru do is often not unadulter-
ited good. We have goals, but we fall short of theml we have certain values, 
ut there are times when we ignore these values; we do good, but even the good 
·e do is not pure, unmixed, stainless, without blemish. This is, it is very 
1ifficult to talk about the "best-in-me" without also talking about the "worst-
n-me." 
It is also dangerous to talk about values in a group, because one soon dis-
overs that it is impossible, even intolerable, to do so without arousing one-
elf from one's value-lethargy and doing something about it. Uncommunicated 
·alues remain uncertain, ambiguous, inoperative in life; communicated values 
lace demands on the communicator. Just as self-disclosure concerning the 
'Uilt-shame dimensions of life dem,ands "conversion," so self-disclosure in thi:> 
irea of values demands action. Some find the price of such self-disci t,., 
1igh. Finally, a person is···sometimes loath to communicate his values bL·cause 
ie lacks the co.trage of his convictions; he is afraid that his values will ap-
ear too naive or outmoded to others. He is afraid to say "I believe" to a 
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·orld that has lost faith even with itself. He is afraid to admit values that 
eem inconsonant with a materialistic world. On the other hand, there may be 
hildish elements in the values he does hold. Then subjecting one's values to 
.he scrutiny of a community will entail a process of purification and refine-
.ent. This, too, can be demanding and painful. 
(b) Contract system. Talking about contract-failures (moral guilt) pre-
upposes a contract system. A group experience can be an excellent opportunity 
for its participants to examine the expressed and implied contracts that pro-
rlde the guidelines for interpersonal living. For instance, a college student 
living at home and commuting to school might examine some of the contractual 
relationships that exist between himself and his parent. Is there, for example, 
1 contract of mutual non-interference or mutual non-involvement? Is the con-
tract a utilitarian one: "I' 11 obey your rules since you are paying for my 
'ducation, even though ~ see these rules as your way of keeping me an adoles-
cent"? Contracts, of course, can be much more positive and open-ended. An 
2xarnple of such a positive, though in this case unilateral, contract might be: 
"I contract myself. to show concern for my parents, to be open with them, even 
though they do not reciprocate." 
(c) ~l·stand .!!l~grouR• The kind of self-disclosure that is absol-
utely essential to the life of the group is the revelation of what is happening 
inside each member with respect to the process of the group. If a participant 
is afraid to disclose himself, he should at least disclose that. If he is 
bored because what is happening in the group is actually flight from real group 
Process, he should say so. Very often, when a member who has been silent for a 
long time is confronted concerning his silence, he will say: "I've been quiet 
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'ecause nothing has been going on. What you have been doing is very boring." 
.\ctually, he has been violating the contract, for the contract demands that he 
~ake the initiative and present his-views about what is happening when it is 
· appening. If group process is boring, then his silence is part of that bore-
Jom and not, as he might view it, a legitimate commentary on it. 
The modality of self-disclosure, properly used, is one of the most effec-
tive ways of handling the "hidden" variables in the group. A person that is 
honest about himself and his feelings in the group does much to minimize the 
effect of the "underground" group culture-- that complexus of "tacit under-
stnadings" that often leads to group s.tagnation--which was discussed in the 
chapter on leadership. High "visibility" is an essential part of this experi-
~ent in interpersonal growth. Self-disclosure with respect to the here-and-now 
adds a dimension of "control" to eht experiment which is often lacking in other 
kinds of growth experiences. 
In day-to-day living we seldom take the time to clear up communication 
problems that disrupt our interpersonal living. For instance, research has 
shown that there is a powerful tendency to assume that one's positive or nega-
tive feelings toward another are reciprocated (Newcomb, 1956, 1958, 1960; 
Tagiuri, 1958; Tagiuri, Blake.,.& Bruner, 1953; Tagiuri, Bruner, & Blake, 1958) 
and people tend to act on such assumptions, whether they are true or not. Sine 
the contract group is an experimental situation, the participants have "cul-
tural permission" to find out where they stand in relationship to one another. 
If the group culture supports a healthy feedback system, communication channels 
remain open and the participants can related to one another realistically. 
In a human relations laboratory which I attended, the trainer of the group 
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to which a friend of mine belonged called an extra session. He told the par-
ticipants that a good deal was happening between different members of the group 
;oth in and outside group sessions that was not being discussed and that this 
failure in openneess was suffocating group process. For several hours they 
discussed hitherto undisclosed love relationships, animosities and the way 
that the members had been "pairing" either with members of this group or other 
groups and working out binds and hang-ups outside the group. The trainer's 
demand for intra-group honesty seemed to work. The siphoning process stopped 
and the group was reborn. In the contract group, the members should demand 
this kind of intra-group honesty of themselves; this is the responsibility 
of the group and not just of the leader-member. 
"Processing" ~.!!.way of keeping the group honest. Every once in a while 
a group should stop and "process" what it is doing. For. instance, after the 
group has been discussing for a while, the leader-member (this is one of his 
legitimate functions especially in the beginning sessions of the group) might 
interrupt the discussion and ask: "All right, what have we been doing here? 
"hat's going on; what's been ·happening?" The response is usually refreshing. 
The group stands outside itself, as it were, as its own critic. A new-found 
freedom of speech, a freedom that belongs to the legitimate critic, often 
springs up in the group during these "processing" sessions and stands in vivid 
contrast to "hedging" and "fencing" that was going on before. 
The "fish-bowl" technique may also be used as a processing device. In 
this case, the group splits in two -- either in a random fashion or perhaps 
into the quiet members and the talkative members -- and half engage in dis-
cussion in an inner circle while the other half listen in an outer circle. 
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After a predetermined length of time, the discussion is halted and, while the 
-.embers of the inner circle remain silent, the members of the outer circle 
''process" the discussion. This "p.rocessing" usually focuses, not so much on 
the content of the discussion, but on "process" variables: was -the group 
Jpen and honest" were there any "tacit understandings " that subverted the 
discussion? did the members engage in contract behavior? who failed to en-
gage in the contract and how? what N-interactions obstructed contract behavior 
These and similar questions deal with process behavior. 
The Mode .£!. Quality of Self-Disclosure: "Story" Versus "History" 
The way in which a person reveals himself in the group is very important. 
In a sense it is even more important than the content of the revelation, for 
content, no matter how intimate in itself, can lose its intimacy and its mean-
ing in the telliQ.g. I propose two styles or modes of self-disclosure: "story," 
the mode of involvement, and "history," the mode of non-involvement. 
History. A recent televeision documentary showed excerpts from a "mara-
thon" group experience conducted at Daytop Village, a rehabilitation center 
for addicts. During the early hours of the marathon a young addict began talk 
ing about himself and his past life. His self-revelation was almost totally 
"history." I was disturbed to think that what he was doing was considered 
acceptable group process, that is, I was disturbed until one of the group 
leaders finally spoke up and confronted the speaker. In effect he said: "You 
have been engaging in 'history' rather than 'story,' and mere 'history' in 
this group experience is meaningless." 
"History" is pseudo-self-disclosure. It is actuarial and analytic, and 
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.:sually has a strong "there-and-then" flavor. It clicks off the facts of ex-
~erience and even interpretations of· this experience but leaves the "person" 
Jf the revealer relatively untouched; he is accounted for and analyzed, but 
unrevealed. The person retails many facts about himself, but the "person with-
in" still remains unknown. "History" is often a long accotmt. It is long and 
jften steady because it fears interruption. Interruption might mean involve-
:::ent, and a person engages in "history" to avoid rather than invite involve-
~nt. "History" has a way of saying "Be quiet" or "Don't interrupt," but these 
are dodges to keep others at bay. The steady clicking off of facts keeps the 
group focused on the irevealer, but does not allow the members to deal witi.-i him. 
In "histo~ the manner of self-revelation is usually somewhat detached. 
There is little ego-involvement and thus little risk. The speaker deals with 
himself as object rather than as subject. Intimate life details might be re-
vealed, but their intimacy has no particular meaning. They are just more 
facts. On the other hand, "history" might be ·a concatenation of generalities, 
generalities poorly disguised by the first personal pronoun. But whether it is 
a question of intimate details or generalities, the message is always the 
same: "Keep your distance." It is as if the revealer were trying to inti-
matie to others that he is rather invulnerable: "This is not really affecting 
me; I don't see why it should affect you." Sometime~ sheer quantity of in-
timate informtion about self is divulged because the "historian" implicitlv 
realizes that if he retails enough, quickly enoult the others will not be 
able to react effectively to any particular part of it. "History" is also 
self-centered. The leader in the Daytop Village marathon took the young ad-
dict to task for his ego-centricity. He told him that he had been talking a 
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:ong time and had not even mentioned that he had a wife who had feelings. 
"Historical" information does not llllite speaker andlisteners. Rather 
:he information sits there as an obstacle between them. It is a barrier rather 
.. -
:han a bridge. It sometimes even has an "I-dare-you-to-do-anything-about-this" 
aura about it. Even when the information disclosed is intimate, it is usually 
~oring. The' "historian" exudes and "I-don't-really-care" attitude that is 
readily picked up by the other members of the group. The information is boring 
~ecause it ia divorced from the person. It is flat, there is no human drama 
about it. To use Matson and Mantagu's (1967) paradigm, "history" is "compu-
torial," and, as such, calls for "feedback" rather than human response. Or 
in McLuhan's (1964) terms, "history" is a "hot" modality, high in definition 
and low in involvement. Its high definition refers not just to sheer quanti-
ty, but to its "there-it-is-and-there-is-really-nothing-to-be-done-about-it" 
quality. 
"Story." "Story" lies at the other end of the continuum. It is authen-
tic self-disclosure, for it is an attempt to reveal the "person within," and 
more than that: it is an attempt to get him involved with his listeners. 
"Story" is an invitation for others to "come in;" it is an opening of the 
door. In group growth experiences, as in the rest of life, others often 
stand around waiting to "come in." "Story" is a signal for others to move into 
one's presence. 
"Story" is not actuarial; it is rather selective in detail, for the 
revealer intuits the fact that it is not the transmission of fact that is im-
Portant but the transmission of self. It does not avoid detail, but the 







' : : 
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avoids interpretation, too; it allows experience to remain unintellectualized 
md thus speak for itself. The "story-teller," even if he leaves out detail, 
is still graphic and specific; he does ··not hide behind generalities disguised 
~y the first personal pronoun. Facts are selected for their impact-value, for 
their ability to reveal the person as what-he-is-now-through-what-he-has-exper-
lenced. 
The "story-teller" is taking as risk and he knows it. Therefore, "story" 
is always an implicit request for human support. The revealer has come to 
trust the group to a certain degree, but he still feels his vulnerability; his 
ct of self-revelation is askin to Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" which is al-
ays a leap of trust. But he takes this leap because he wants to relate to 
he other members of the group and relate more fully to himself. He realizes 
hat "story" is the way of involvement and the way of discovery, and he wants 
oth, And so he comes to the point, He does not wander around in. the there-
d-then, but manages to make the past and the "there" and even the future de-
"ine him as he is in the here-and-now. "Story," then, is not analytical and 
t iscrete. It is synthetic; it attempts to present a totality, the complex 
f Otality that is the person himself, who takes shape out of the complexity of I is •Xperience. 
A The one who tells his "story," in that "story" is not computorial and there ~j ore not a request for "feedback," in a dehunanized sense, is looking for human 
esponse, "Story" of its very nature is dialogue and merits such response. L< 
ause " story" is not computorial and monologic, it is inevitably engaging, even 
'he 
n someone who is usually a bore adopts it. Some people are constantly talk-
and most men find this terribly boring. Such people are 
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,ring because they are usually engaging in "history" rather than "story." 
·irst of all, they are really. saying nothing about themselves, and secondly, 
.~ey care little for the objects of their monologue and would find real re-
.~~-)Onse such as self-disclosure and confrontation frightening. Bores do speak 
n generalities po<i>rly disguised under the pronoun "I." But "story," on the 
ther hand is always engaging, for it means that the speaker has to "blow his 
·over" and drop his defenses and stand somewhat naked in his own eyes and in 
he eyes of tohers. Men are seldom, if ever, bored with a sincere confession, 
: ecause they intuitively realize its importance for the one revealing himself 
,nd respect him for what he is doing. The person who engages in "story" is one 
·ho stops complaining about how much he hurts and begins admitting who he is. 
nis is most refreshing in human affairs. I think perhaps that it might be 
mpossible to dislike someone who engages in "story," for it is an act of humil-
ty, a manifestation of a need to move "into community," and a surrender of ego-
entricity (or at least a beginning of surrender). 
In l1cLuhan's terminology, "story" is a "cool" modality, low in definition 
nd high in involvement. It is low in definition not just because it is sel-
ctive of detail and thus allows others to "fill in the gaps" in an information 
ense, but the information transmitted is seen as a medium, a bridge instead of 
barrier. "Story" has high impact-value; it tends to change both speaker and 
istener; it draws the listener out of himself and towards the speaker. It 
hanges the speaker in that it calls forth emotions that are more authentic and 
herefore perhaps less familiar to the revealer. "Story," then is not maudlin, 
ut it is shot through with emotion; it is not sensational, but it has drama 
n the same way that a life fully lived has drama. 
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The kind of self-disclosure wanted in the contract-group is that in which 
)person gives testimony to himself, gives witness to his own mysteriousness, 
·oth the mystery of goodness and the mystery of evil that he is, When a per-
.. -
on gives testimony, he asks others to trust him and he binds himself to tellin 
:he truth. Testimony, then, engages not only the mind, but the will: it in-
·:olves love. Testimony is "involving": it involves the witness because he 
,inds himself to his listeners, and it involves the listeners because it demand 
: 11at they believe. Men have access to a person's innermost being otlly through 
:estmony, and persons give testimony to themselves only under the influence 
Jf love (see Latourelle, 1962), 
"History" and "story" in the contract-group. It may be useful to imagine 
"hisoty" and "story" as anchoring opposite ends of a continuum. The members 
of the interpersonal-growth group contract to "story," that is, "story" is a 
goal toward which the participants are working, In the same way, the elimina-
tion of the modality "history" is also a goal. "History" is thus an object of 
confrontation in the group, 
Levels of Self-Disclosure. 
Different kinds of face-to-face groups could be placed in a more or less 
rough order according to the degree or level of self-disclosure that de facto 
takes place in the context of the group meeting. From least to most, the 
order might read something like this: 
1. "Business" meetings, e.g., mangerial meetings, faculty and 
teachers' meetings, community council meetings, etc, 
2, Discussion groups, e.g., formal or informal academic or 
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seminar-type groups, discussion clubs, etc. 
3. Groups investigating the phenomenon of "group dynamics," e.g., 
academic groups that learn about group dynamics by being a group, 
unstructured groups that come together to see what human value 
there might be in coming together, etc. 
4. "Sensitivity training" groups, e.g., human relations labora-
tories, personal growth laboratories, etc. 
5. Psychotherapy groups. 
6. "Integrity training" groups (Mowrer, 1968b). 
fnis does nht mean that no self-disclosure takes place during a ''business" 
Jeeting. For instance, if the members of a managerial training have gone 
through a sensitivity training laboratory, they may work out their feelings 
toward one another before tackling an important managerial decision. Also, 
the above order is not rigid. For instance, a great deal of intimate self-dis-
closure might take place during a laboratory course in "group dynamics," de-
pending on the kind of group culture that develops. A particular sensitivity 
training group, too, might engage in a degree of self-disclosure usually found 
in psychotherapy or integrity groups. The position of the contract group in 
thelist will vary according to the nature of the contract. The contract being 
explicitated here would probably place the contract group between sensitivity-
training and psychotherapy groups. We have been speaking pf groups in general. 
However, within groups a good deal of individual differences with re~pect to 
self-disclosure will be manifested by the participants. 
The contract group differs from the other groups (and is like the; integrity l 
group) in that self.:..disclosure is explicitly established as a group value. 
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::owever, unlike the integrity group the '~level" of self-disclosure is not de-
:ermined by contract. In the integrity group the prospective participant must 
Jgree to disclose all his past contract failures and do so sometime during the 
early part of the group experience. He also contracts to remain "confession-
llly current" throughout the rest of the experience. Therefore, the integrity 
~roup establishes a certain "level" of self-disclosure at least in one area, 
the area of contract failure. 
"Level" is a term difficult to define operationally. It seems to be an 
operational term in the integrity group, for there :It means all those actions 
:.'hich the "trainee" believes to have been contract failures in his life. Since 
the scope of self-discliosure is wider in the contract group, "level" is not as 
easy to define. Still, group members.have a kind of instinctive awareness of 
different "levels" of self-disclosure. To move to a "deeper" level of self-
disclosure means to reveal that which is more painful to reveal, that which one 
is more reluctant to reveal. The "deeper" one goes, the closer one gets to his 
"core," to the "person within," to the person he really is. "Deep" self-dis- · 
closure gets at a person's identity. It gets at the repressed, the unrecog-
nized, the ignared, the unseen, the unam~; 1..i.;;..,<::u 1u ,, p• 1 .• in; it gets at the 
"best" in a person and the "worst" in him. The deeper the self-disclosure, the 
more does it reveal the "mystery" of one's person. "Level," then, is not a 
certain set of statements about a certain area of living. What member A dis-
cusses freely might be a most painful area for member B; the same area of dis-
cussion represents different "levels" for them. "I am bored with this group" 
is often an honest statement that reveals something about the person wtH) so 
speaks his mind. But, "My mother is an alcoholic and I t ind 1 t difficult to be 
L 
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!th her" would usually be a more painful kind of revelation, tapping areas of 
:iilt and shame, and therefore getting cioser to the"core" of the revealer. 
·r get deep satisfaction from being a Christian" or "I have deep religious 
Jnvicitons, but I have always been afraid to share them with anyone because 
don't always live up to them" are statements about values that might tap even 
'ceper levels in some persons. 
This .more or less metaphorical approach to the concept of "level" is quite 
'.Jbviously not entirely satisfactory, but perhaps it is sufficient for the pur-
1ose intended here. A more clinical and empirical approach to the concept "lev-
1" is discussed by Truax and Carkhuff (1967) in terms of a self-exploration 
.cale ranging from no self-exploration to a very high· degree of self-exploration 
n the first stage no personally releveant material is communicated by the clien 
.or does he respond to attempts on the part of the therapist to reveal himself. 
n stage two, the therapist must coax material from the client, while in stage 
hree the client may actually make brief conunents on material introduced by the 
herapis t. Ins tage four, the client discusses personally relevant mate rial, but 
n a mechanical fashion: he does· not "own" what he is talking about. Spontan-
ous discussions and reactions on the part of the client begin with stage five. 
n stage six the client reacts spontaneously and with feeling, while in stage 
even he,:makes tentative gestures toward discovering new material. Active in-
erpersonal exploration is characteristic of stage eight, and stage nine is a 
ighly developed phase of stage eight. The contract more or less demands that 
he participant begin at lesat with stage five, though many participants "re-
,ress" at one time or another to a lower stage. In a certain sense, the scale 
efines the manner of self-exploration but does not define cnntcnt ar0ns. 
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The members of the contract group contract to self-disclosure, but not to 
J~Y particular level of self-disclosure. The group has to work through the 
?roblem of the level of self-disclosure. and in this respect the variability 
.i:iong groups can be great. The level of disclosure in the group will depend on 
"number of factors: the courage of individual members, the atmosphere of sup-
port and trust developed by the group, the ability of individual members to see 
che value of self-disclosure for themselves, and the spirit of cooperation in 
che group. It is assumed that the level of disclosure in .the group will grad-
ually deepen. The process will not be an even one: members will retreat dur-
ing crises of trust; there will be plateaus of apparent stagnation and indif-
ference when members are ''feeling their way;" there will be sudden surges of 
honesty and intimacy which most members wi-11 find deeply rewarding. The con-
tract serves as a means of keeping the group under a certain degree of pressure 
with respect to self-revelation. If it is true that the level of self-disclo-
sure in the group will usually not go beyond the limits set by the atmosphere 
of trust and support that exists in the group, then the contract should exert 
pressure on the group to create the kind of atmosphere in which disclosure is 
Possible and profitable. 
~lf-Disclosure at the Service of Behavior Control: "Labeling" 
Dollard and Miller (1950) emphasize the greater behavioral effectiveness 
of articulated over non-articulated thoughts. As the child grows up, he under-
&oes a great variety of emotional experiences, but he does not have the ability 
J. to Verbalize these experiences. Anxiety=ridden emotional experiences retain 
~avioral consequences which are more or less outside rational control becaus<' 
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:~ey have not been subjected to "higher mental processes." The lack of verbal 
.. spouses to drives such as fear, sex, and aggression increases the likelihood 
f maladaptive behavior or symptoms... Learned verbal cues can prevent the gen-
ralization of anxiety from the past to the present. When previously repressed 
·.Jterial is verbalized, the result is not uninhibited behavior but rather be-
.avior that is under better social control. 
Dollard and Miller deal with labeling in the context of psychotherapy in 
,;hich the labeling process refers principally to past experience. But such 
abeling or a process similar to. labeling, with an orientation toward the future 
m be used as it form of behavior-control. For instance, the group members may 
'iscuss the seeds of irresponsibility or the seeds of failed potentiality with-
n themselves, that is, they "label" unporductive forms of behavior to which 
~.ey feel drawn. Usually when .a person :lis tempted to do something that he 
.·:.inks that he should not or to fail to do something that he thinks that he 
~ould, he tries not to think about it. He puts it out of mind, refuses to sub-
.it it to "higher mental processes," allows the behavior to run off princir 't Ly 
'n the level of emotion. The man who knows vaguely (or not so vaguely) that if 
~goes to this tavern he will get drunk and irresponsibly involved with some 
,f the women there will often put such considerations out of mind. On the sup-
Position that he does not want to engage in such behavior, he might try to re-
verse the process. That is, he forces himself to think about what he is tempted 
to do; he forces himself to "label" the entire sequence of undesirable behavior 
Prior to initiating the sequence. The assumption here is that if he labels this 
0 ehavior, submitting it to "higher mental processes," he will be in better con-
trol of this behavior. And if he does initiate the undesirable behavior se-
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:·Jenee, he will do so with increased responsibility (and culpability). 
'The contention here is that such a process is most effective when carried 
~t "in-community," whether the connm.mify is a natural one (e.g., marriage 
:Jrtner, family) or some conventional group (e.g., the contract group). It 
: 3kes a certain degree of courage to discuss one's "temptations" to violate 
'!'!e's contracts or one's tendencies to "fail-to-be" in various ways, but if one 
~oes so, he enlists the resources of the connnunity in his program of behavior 
:ontrol. 
"Labeling," to be effective, should be specific. "I feel that I won't liv 
up to my expectations during the next semester" is too general and sound more 
like a cry of despair than an attempt to control behavior. "If I go home with 
this chip on my shoulder, I'll have a fight with my wife, go out and get drunk, 
and end up in a mess" is a much more appropriate example of effective labeling. 
Since the over-riding goal of the contract group is interpersonal growth, la-
beling of specific "temptations" to maladaptive interpersonal relating belongs 
in the group. Effective labeling is a way of transporting the there-and-then 
of the future into ~he here-and-now of group process in that it reveals seeds 
of action or inaction that are gro~ing and maturing right here and right now. 
Labeling need not be restricted to avoiding unwanted behavior, but it can 
also be used to stimulate desired behavior. The individual rehearses something 
that he ·:.wants to do, noting what he will do when certain difficulties arise, 
but also noting the rewards associated with the desired behavior. The hypo-
thesis is that the more concrete thelabeling process is, dealing with specific 
behaviors in specific situations, the more effective will it be. 
--
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ssible Dangers Associated with Self-Disclosure 
Self-disclosure is a powerful behavioral instrument and must be used with 
~iscretion. Under certain conditons, then, self-revelation will be either 
;angerous or useless. 
(a) 1f it is exhibitionism. Self-disclosure may be nothing more than 
·:erbal exhibitionism, a verbal exposure of self in a exhibitionism-voyeurism 
context (see Glatzer, 1967). Exhibitionism is a manifestation of lack of con-
trol and a symptom therefore of pathology. The exhibitionist is merely using 
~is listeners to satisfy his own distorted needs. He is neither attempting 
·to involve himself responsibly with others nor is he asking them to respond by 
involving themselves responsibly with himself. The "drama" of the disclosure 
.1ssumes a disproportionate significance in exhibitionism; its "shock" value is 
often its most important feature. Jourard (1964) believes that either too much 
or too little self-disclosure is a sign of disturbance. I wound tend to think 
that the context in which it is done and the way in which it is done is more 
important than its quantity. 
(b) ll the person receives ~ support for his openness. Even in an atmos 
phere of relative trust, self-disclosure entails risk. If a person puts himsel 
on the line and then fails to receive support, self-disclousre can be quite 
tra'lllllatic. Self-revelation is a way of involving oneself with others. If they 
fail to respond, this is usually experienced as rejection no matter what the 
real or objective state of affairs might be. Sometimes, after engaging in 
self-disclosure, a person will feel diminished--perhaps the next day or during 
the week between meetings. This seems to happen when the participant discloses 
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'1imself in the wrong way (e.g., with a strain of exhibitionism) or when: he fail 
~o receive proper support. It is as if he had emptied himself and now there is 
~othing to fill the vacuum. Support is so essential a variable in growth 
,.--
~roups that it will be treated separately (chapter VIII). 
(c) If l!_ person contracts to engage in self~disclosure and then reneges. 
This isusually a case of failed-potentiality. It is one of those existential 
failures that can confirm a person in a negativistic self-image. 
(d) If l!_person engages in "history" rather than "story." In this case, 
self-disclosure is useless, for "history" puts something between the "histor-
ian" and his listeners and cuts off interpersonal involvement, the supposed 
;mrpose of the group. 
(e) If self-disclosure is incomplete in l!_ situation that calls for .££.!!-
rlete openness. If a participant in Mowrer's integrity group tells only a 
part of his story of contract-failure or refuses to stay "confessionally cur-
rent," then he is more or less living a lie, pursuing a course of action in 
the very group that is designed to eliminate such behavior. It is difficult to 
see how this would not take its toll in terms of guilt and anxiety. 
Self-disclosure is not as dangerous as some make it out to be. It is not 
a medical act; it is first of all a human act. Nor need it be a sign of imma-
turity, of "adolescent" behavior. , If done responsibly, it is a continuation of 
Valuable human behavior that often does ~egin, however imperfectly, during 
adolescence. 
IE._ilo,..&. 
~ Johari Window. Luft and Ingham (1955) and Luft (1963) have presented 
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1 model of awareness in inter:;>e~rsonal relationships called "The Johari Window." 
: t is depicted below: 
Known to 
others 





Area of free activity 
III. 
Avoided or hidden area 







Figure 1: Til.e Johari Window 
I have used this model as a basis for an exercise in a course in abnormal psy-
chology. The figure is put on the.board and the quadrants are explained. The 
class members are then given blank three-by-five cards. Til.ey are asked to Move 
some bit of information about themselves from Quadrant III to Quadrant I by 
writing it on the card. Til.e cards are collected and a few minutes are spent 
eliciting their reactions tothe exercise. Meanwhile, the person conducting 
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:~1e exercise shuffles the cards so that the exercise can be carried out with 
:omplete anonymity. Next he reads all the cards, without comment, one after 
.1nother. Finally, he elicits the·reactions of members of the class to what 
:hey have heard. 
There is usually a wide variety of responses, from "I have a hole in my 
sock" to "I am a practicing homosexual" of "I have felt like committing sui-
dde." The modal response usually deals with alientation, difficulty in human 
relations, operating under a facade, and identity problems. The effect on the 
::embers of the class is often quite striking. Some, for the first time, realiz 
that there are others, many others, who have problems similar to theirs. One 
student once said: "Things just couldn't be the same in that class anymore." 
rhe problem is that things can be just the same. There is a moment of openness 
:nl its possibilities are seen, often in a dramatic way; then people return to 
their "normal" patterns of living. People really dislike being shut off from 
others, but few want to pay the price of venturing out of themselves. 
The value of self-disclosure: ~~kind of communication. Mowrer deals 
~ith self-disclosure principally as a way of handling the deleterious effects 
of mismanaged guilt. However important this might be, it is not the focus of 
the contract group. Self-disclosure in the contract group is seen as leading 
to a new kind of communication or at least to a new freedom of communication. 
Dealing with one another is something like showing one another the "houses" we 
live in, houses in which one or more rooms must remain locked because of what 
is behind the doors. In the contract group the participants learn the skill of 
opening some of these doors and the air that sweeps through the house is re-
freshing. To use another metaphor, communication which is characterized by a 
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:car of self-disclosure is like trying to talk to someone across a room filled 
·.-ith pillars. In the contract group the participants learn how to remove some 
Jf these pillars and to their amazement the house remains standing. The 
contract is a training group in which the participants learn the value of self-
Jisclosure. If they learn well, then they return to the "significant others" 
in their lives with the potentiality for a new kind of communication. 
Self-disclosure is not the only value in life, but it is a dimension of 
the interpersonally fruitful life. Only the individual can determine what 
?art it is to play in his own interpersonal life. 
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Chapter VIII 
Supportive Behavior in Sensitivity Groups 
If a sensitivity-group co~~ract calls for such variables as self-
disclosure in a rather demanding sense ("story" rather than ''history") and 
total human expression in terms of pathos, logos, and poiesis, then the 
contract must also provide an atmosphere which will not only sustain but also 
actively encourage such variables. In a word, the contract must provide ~ 
climate of support. However, the problem is that attempts to give solid, 
/ 
non-cliche support--whether these attempts are made in the context of group 
therapy, sensitivity training, or real life--are often clumsy and ineffective. 
When faced with the more dramatic dimensions of others such as their pain, 
their anxieties, their peak and nadir experiences, their strong emotions, 
whether positive or negative, their successes and their failures, we fumble 
around, babble inanities, or take refuge in silence. The contract-group, 
then, is a laboratory in human living in which the participants learn how to 
react to the more dramatic dimensions of others. In the give-and-take of 
the group meetings, they learn to remedy their deficiencies in both giving 
and receiving support. 
The need for a supportive climate in sensitivity-training laboratories 
is generally recognized: 
The second element necessary for assuring effective feedback is 
what Schein and Bennis (1965) referred to as a climate of 
'psychological safety' and Bradford et al. (1964) called 'per-
missiveness.' That is, no matter what an individual does in a 
group or what he reveals about himself, the group must act in a 
supportive and nonevaluative way. Each individual must feel that 
it is safe to expose his feelings, drop his defenses, and try 
out new ways of interacting. Such an atmosphere has its obvious 
counterpart in any constructive clinical or therapeutic 
relationship (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76). 
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::ot only must a climate of psychological safety exist, but it must be commllll-
icated to the participants if it is to have any kind of 11\lllfreezing" affect 
with respect to their behavior: 
People must certainly differ greatly in their ability to 
accept the guarantee of psychological safety. To the extent 
that the feeling of safety cannot be achieved--and quickly--
the prime basic ingredient for this form of learning is absent. 
Its importance cannot be overemphasized, nor can the difficulty 
of its being accomplished (Campbell & Dunnettee, 1968, p. 78). 
It is not difficult to find support for such suggestions in the literature 
dealing with interactions in small, face-to-face groups. For instance a 
series of studies (Gibb, 1960; Lott, Schopler, & Gibb, 1954, 1955) indicated 
that feeling-oriented, positive feedback resulted in the greatest efficiency, 
least defensiveness, and greatest spread in participation in such groups. 
Supportive behavior, then, is a value in all kinds of sensitivity-training 
laboratories. Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest that support is not only 
essential but that it must be felt as quickly as possible. The hypothesis 
here is that the contract will facilitate the speedy establishment of a 
climate of support. 
This chapter has three sections: one on listening, one on giving 
support, and a short section on receiving support. First of all the 
Participants must learn how to listen to one another; this is an absolute 
Prerequisite for supportive behavior. But listening is much more demanding 
than is ordinarily supposed, since it involves much more than just hearing 
and registering words, sentences, and ideas. 
LISTENING: THE SINE:QUA-NON OF SUPPORTIVE BEHAVIOR 
~Listening 
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For our purposes listening means becoming aware of all the cues that the 
other emits, and this implies an openness t? the totality of the communica-
tion of the other. In the sensitivity group, this requires being aware not 
only of individuals but also of the mood of the group as a whole. Perhaps 
listening to the group is even more difficult than listening to individuals 
because it demands an awareness of subtle interactional patterns. Ideally 
the leader-member is already sensitive to these patterns and one of his 
functions is to point them out to the other members. Listening, then, demands 
work, and the work involved is difficult enough so that the effort involved 
will not be readily expended unless the listener has a deep respect for 
the total communication process. · · 
One does not listen with just his ears: he listens with his eyes and 
with his sense of touch, he listens by becoming aware of the feelings and 
emotions that arise within himself because of his contact with others (that 
is, his own emotional resonance is another "ear") , he listens with his mind, 
his heart, and his imagination. He listens to the words of others, but he 
also listends to the "messages" that are buried in the words or encoded in 
all the cues that surround the words. As Berne (1961) suggests, he listens 
to the voice, the demeanor, the vocabulary, and the gestures of the other, 
or, as Haley (1959) would have it, to the context, the verbal messages, the 
linguistic patterns, and the bodily movements of the other. He listens to 
the sounds and to the silence. He listens not only to the message but to 
the context also, or, in Gestalt terms, he listens to both the figure and 
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the ground and to the way these two interact. Re is aware of what Murphy 
(1964) calls the "world of blushing, blanching, sighing, hinting, and 
averting the eyes"; like Smith (1966) he is aware that "people interact not 
.. ·-
only through words but also through spatial relations ••• through temporal 
relations ••• and ••• through gestures and touch and many other media" (p. 3). 
The contract group is a laboratory in which the participants are to 
learn to become more fully aware of every possible channel of communication, 
both verbal and non-verbal. Weick (1968) thinks that non-verbal aspects of 
communication are generally overlooked, much to the detriment of the 
communication process: 
Observers who are accumstomed to analyzing speech behavior in 
naturalistic settings may regard nonverbal actions as a redundant 
source of infonnation. This point of view neglects the fact 
that humans spend a very small portion of their interactional 
time vocalizing •••• (p. 381). 
Although nonverbal behavior holds promise for observational 
research because of its visibility, naturalness, and discrimina-
bility, it can also be too subtle to record unless the obset"Ver: 
has been trained to be sensitive to it. That persons are often 
unaware of the rich nonverbal language is not surprising, since 
much of it occurs unconsciously (Scheflen, 1965, p. 34). Jecker 
et al. (1964) found that teachers who were untrained in the 
analysis of nonverbal behavior could not predict, from filmed 
facial cues, whether a student had comprehended a lesson in 
algebra (p. 382). 
We are perhaps too ideationally oriented and have a set to bypass non-idea-
tional cues. Tomkins (1962) has suggested that the face is the "primary site 
of affect": "The centrality of the face in affective experience may also 
be seen in the relationship between the hand and the face. The hand acts as 
if the face is the site of feeling" (p. 210). The relationship of hand to 
face, then, is an important source of information concerning the feeling 
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states of the other: "It is our argument that human beings slap, hide, 
stimulate, support, caress, inhibit, or reassure their faces with their 
hands because they correctly localize the face as the primary site of their 
... -
concern" (p. 212). Others have studied the face as a rich source of 
communication (e.g. Ekman, 1965; Haggard & Isaacs, 1966; Leventhal & Sharp, 
1965; Levitt, 1964). Exline and various associates (Exline, 1963; Exline, 
Gray, & Schuette, 1965; Exline & Winters, 1965) have examined the phenomenon 
of eye contact and exchanged glances, finding them important channels for 
conmnmicating such affective information as liking and various forms of 
interpersonal discomfort. The connnunication potential of both posture 
(Scheflen, 1964) and body movements (e.g. Katz, 1964; Mahl, Danet, & 
Norton, 1959; Spiegel & Machotka, 1965; Werner & Wapner, 1953) is also an 
area of serious study. In the laboratory setting of the training group it 
is feasible to focus more attention on nonverbal aspects of connnunication 
than one would ordinarily do outside a laboratory setting for the purpose of 
enhancing one's total interpersonal listening skills. 
The non-selective character of total listening. Total listening is, in 
a sense, non-selective: it encompasses all the cues emitted by the other, 
even those that the other would rather conceal and those the listener would 
rather not "hear." For instance, the weight of an obviously over-weight 
person is a cue to be reckoned with, for through it the other is "saying" 
something to those with whom he interacts. The message may be "I am 
frustrated" or "I don't care about others" or merely "I have poor self-
control," but it is a message that should not be overlooked. In a group 
therapy session in which I was an observer the therapist asked the wife of 
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one of the in-patients (the patient himself refused to attend the sessions) 
what she thought she was trying to tell others by her obvious overweight. 
The therapist "listened to" a cue_, confronted the woman in a firm, kindly, 
responsible way, and successed in instituting a dialogue that proved quite 
useful. Therefore, good listening demands both "subjectivity," that is, 
engagement with the other, and "objectivity," that is, disengagement from 
the other, in order to pick up both positively and negatively valenced cues. 
The good listener is sensitive to the what-is and not just to the what-
should-be or to the how-I-would-like-things-to-be. 
Active listening. It becomes quite apparent that the good listener is 
an active listener, one truly engaged in the communication process, one who 
goes out of himself, as it were, in search of significant cues emitted by 
others. Listening, then, is facilitated if the listener is actively 
interested in others. Newcomb's (1953) "strain toward synnnetry" principle 
leads to the prediction: the more intense one person's concern for another, 
the greater is the likelihood that he will be sensitive toward the other's 
orientations toward objects in the environment. Certain studies do show that 
liking another increases sensitivity toward him. Eisman and Levy (1960) 
showed that lip-reading was more accurate the more the reader liked the 
corrnnunicator. Suchman (1956) discovered that people who were more favorable 
toward others were more accurate in estimating the feelings of these others. 
In a study by Fiedler (1950), it was discovered that all therapists 
described the good therapeutic relationship as one in which the therapist 
Participates completely in the patient's communication, and, ns Rogers (1961) 
has noted, this is impossible unless a mutual respect and liking arise in 
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the therapeutic encounter. 
The person who is an active listener is much less likely to stereotype 
others and becomes guilty of "univocal" listening. Perhaps an analogy would 
.. -
make this a bit clearer. Everytime Brahm's Second Symphony is played, the 
untrained ear hears only the Second Symphony; it is quite a univocal 
experience. The individuality of different orchestras and different conductor 
and the nuances of different tempos and accents are all missed. Thus, while 
there is only one Second Symphony, it can be played with quite different--and 
distinguishable--nuances. Similarly, John Doe is only John Doe, but John 
Doe, too, has different nuances of orchestration at different times, and 
these nuances will be missed by the untrained, "passive" listener who finds 
it more comfortable to deal with him as a stereotype in univocal terms. The 
active, searching listener, who is open to all the nuances of John Doe, will 
more likely pick up many of these cues. This openness to nuance, however, 
does not imply that the good listener is skilled in "analyzing" the other, 
for analysis often means reducing the other to a whole series of stereotypes, 
and sometimes this mistake is worst than the first. 
All of Rogers' works (e.g. 1942, 1951, 1961, 1967) form a magnificent 
treatise on total listening: 
I also find the relationship is significant to the extent that 
I feel a continuing desire to understand--a sensitive empathy 
with each of the client's feelings and communications as they 
seem to him at that moment. Acceptance does not mean much until 
it involves understanding. It is only as I understand the 
feelings and thoughts which seem so horrible to you, or so weak, 
or so sentimental, or so bizarre--it is only as I see them as 
you see them, and accept them and you, that you feel really free 
to explore all the hidden nooks and frightening crannies of 
your inner and often buried experience (1961, p. 34). 
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Perhaps Rogers' emphasis on total listening explains in part the impact that 
he has had on the field of psychotherapy. He has seemed to prove that total 
listening is in itself therapeutic. Up to the time of Rogers' studies total 
listening had been a too little explored aspect of the therapeutic encounter. 
Social intelligence and listening. Tilere is no doubt that this ability 
to become totally aware of others demands intelligence: " ••• [S] ensitivity 
to the subtle aspects of the wordless communications in psychotherapy is a 
most important dimension of therapeutic skill. Tilis skill is not too readily 
learned but rather reflects native or early acquired aptitudes that are 
highly correlated with general intelligence" (Schofield, 1964, p. 105). 
However, the intelligence required. seems to be more closely related to what 
uay be termed "social" intelligence, a "feel" for people and an ability to 
involve oneself creatively and responsibly with them, rather than academic 
intellectual interest. The socially intelligent person is capable of 
becoming aware of the wide range of cues emitted by others, of evaluating 
them, and of responding to them. 
Obstacles to Effective Listening 
Alienation from communication. Against the background of what it means 
to be a good listener, it will be helpful to review some of the obstacles 
that arise to prevent effective listening in the group. Goffman (1957) 
discusses three kinds of preoccupation that disturb the communication process. 
The kinds of alienation he describes actually interfere with a person's 
ability to listen to others in the fullest sense of that term, althoush what 
he says must be modified somewhat in order to apply it to a sensitivity-
training group. (a) External preoccupation is the first kind of alienation: 
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the individual neglects the prescribed focus of attention, giving his main 
concern to something unconnected with the other group members in their 
capacity as fellow-participants. He is "listening" to something that is 
"outside" the group in some way. According to Goffman, the topic of 
conversation is the prescribed focus of attention, but in a sensitivity-
training group the focus of attention is wider than just the topic being 
discussed. For instance, in the contract group the topic actually being 
discussed might well be irrelevant to contractual goals and should be 
challenged rather than attended to. The daydreamer is alienated in any 
group, but in the contract group the person who is actively listening to the 
total interaction might become more preoccupied with the atmosphere 
surrounding the discussion rather than the topic itself, perhaps because 
the atmosphere is "speaking louder" than what the participants are saying 
about a specific topic. The atmosphere is not external to the topic of 
conversation, for it is having an effect on the entire conversation. In 
the case described, the good listener will interrupt the conversation, 
bringing up the problem of the non-facilitative atmosphere of the group. 
(b) Self-consciousness is a second cause of alienation. Self-consciousness 
results from one's preoccupation with himself as an interactant and this 
prevents him from giving himself entirely to the topic of conversation. 
Whitman (1964) discusses this phenomenon in terms of perceptual defense: 
The extreme type of perceptual defense is autistic perception. 
Here there is really no perception at all. Very often you see 
somebody in the group who has a dreamy look in his eyes or 
perhaps even listens interestedly, but a few minutes later 
will say, 'Well, I've been thinking what was said to me (ten 
minutes ago!) and I have thought of this point •••• ' This is the 
person who most often is responsible for contributing a thud 
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or dud to the group discussion, because his remark is connected 
to his own ruminations but not to the thread of group discussion 
(p. 321). 
In the sensitivity group, however, a certain degree of self-consciousness is 
.---
expected of the participants, for they are evaluating themselves precisely 
as interactants. There seem to be two kinds of self-consciousness: one 
which draws the participant away from the interaction into himself and one 
which makes the participant more acutely aware of his part in the interac-
tional process and therefore more acutely aware of all the cues generated 
during group meetings.~_ (c) The third kind of alienation, according to 
Goffman, is interaction-consciousness. The participant is so worried about 
how the interaction itself is progressing that he constricts his ability to 
follow the topic of conversation. Again, in the sensitivity-group there is 
a constructive form of interaction-consciousness just as there is a 
destructive form. Perhaps the difference is between being interaction-con-
scious (Goffman also calls it being "other-conscious") and being interaction 
or other-involved. In human relationships "the medium is the message" to a 
large extent, that is, the manner in which the interactional process is 
conducted also connnunicates. Therefore, members of sensitivity-training 
groups are asked to become aware of interactional styles. The victim of 
interaction-consciousness is really so deeply involved with his personal 
concerns that his awareness of what others are saying and of what is 
happening in the group is constricted, while the interaction-involved 
participant is "hearing" more than just the conversation, for he is picking 
up communication cues from a variety of sources. 
Listening, then, in sensitivity groups is different from listening in 
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ordinary conversation groups, for in sensitivity groups listening itself 
is a focus of study. But even in ordinary conversation groups there is more 
to communication than just the_ topic of conversation. An awareness of all 
the factors involved in communicating increases one's ability to follow 
and evaluate a topic of conversation. 
"Message anxiety" ~ ~ obstacle to listening. Research indicates 
that the comprehensibility of a message is unfavorably influenced when the 
content itself is anxiety-arousing. Nunnally (1961) calls this "message 
anxiety." Gynther (1957) found that "message anxiety" lowered the 
"communicative efficiency" of the speaker. Kasl and Mahl (1965) discovered 
that it led to speaker anxiety and flustered speech, while Geer (1966) 
found that it produced speaker anxiety, slowed speech, and silences. 
"Message anxiety," then, is an obstacle to effective listening in two ways: 
(1) it makes the speaker himself less comprehensible so that the listener 
has to fill in the "gaps," and (2) it is hypothesized that the speaker 
conununicates his own anxiety plus the anxiety of the message to the listener 
and the resultant "listener anxiety" further distorts the message. Since 
in sensitivity groups there is likely to be a good deal of "message anxiety," 
the participants should be prepared to handle the communication difficulties 
that arise from it. This means that both the speaker and the listener must 
be aware of possible communication distortions and make efforts at minimizing 
them. High visibility would be very helpful here, that is, if the speaker 
were to admit that he finds the content of the message quite disturbing, 
this would be a cue for the listener to listen more intently and become m<'t-e 
aware of the anxieties that are possibly being generated within himself. 
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Campbell: human error in the communication process. Campbell (1958), 
in studying the communication process, discovered certain sources of 
systematic error, an understanding of which is extremely useful to anyone 
.. ~-
interested in human interaction. Both speaker and listener can profit from 
Campbell's findi~gs, for these findings can be cast in terms of principles 
. for improving the process of speaking (output) and the process of listening 
(input) • 
(a) Length of the speaker's remarks. If the only "recorder" present 
to take down a speaker's remarks is the listener himself, then both the 
speaker and the listener should realize that a coinmunications "leakage" 
takes place between output and input. There is a good chance,. according to 
Campbell, that the average listener will tend to shorten, simplify, and 
eliminate detail from the actual output of the speaker. The longer the 
speaker's remarks, the greater the leakage. Thus, if the speaker really 
wants to get his remarks across, he will take into account the natural 
leakage of the listening process and not be unnecessarily long. There is an 
important lesson here for sensitivity groups. In such groups there is 
usually little reason for anyone to speak at considerable length. Extended 
speeches are out of place both because they cut down on interaction and 
involvement and because they entail too much leakage. Extended "history," 
for example, has less impact than compact "story." An active, concerned 
listener will interrupt longer discourses precisely because he does want to 
listen, assimilate, and interact. On the relatively rare occasions on which 
a participant does speak at some length in the group, he must realize that 
his listeners are not assimilating all the facts that he is retailing but 
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are rather receiving a total impact from his remarks. If he speaks at 
length, it must be because "total impact" is more important than individual 
facts. 
,---
(b) The middle of the message. " ••• [T]he middle of the message will 
be least well retained" (p. 343). The concerned listener must take greater 
efforts to retain what is said as remarks lengthen, but the concerned speaker 
realizing this, will try to "eliminate" the middle, that is, by keeping his 
remarks short enough so that they have, as it were, only a beginning and an 
end. 
(c) "Rounding off" the message. The listener tends to "round off" 
what he hears, "dividing the content into clear-cut 'entities,' reducing 
gradations both by exaggerating some differences and losing others" (p. 344). 
This seems to be a function, at least in part, of a kind of egocentricity 
with which every listener is afflicted: he tailors messages to fit his own 
needs. The good listener, then, has to take pains not to ignore subtle 
differences in what is said, even though these differences go contrary to 
opinions that he himself holds. Also the good speaker will speak frankly, 
honestly, and plainly, making shadings of meanings as clear as possible. 
When a speaker becomes too subtle, when shadings of meaning begin to 
proliferate, this may mean that the speaker is unsure of himself or afraid 
of those to whom he is speaking.. If either is the case, he should be 
honest enough to say so and let his message be interpreted in the light of 
his own misgivings. 
(d) The past haunting imperfectly transmitted messa.ges. "An imperfect-
ly transmitted message will be distorted in the direction of important past 
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messages, both rewarding and punishing past messages" (p. 350) • Perhaps 
another way of putting this is that a listener is influenced in his listening 
by the way he has been reinforced by communications in the past. If a parti-
cipant in a sensitivity group hears a confused, abstruse, or poorly delivered 
message, there will be a natural tendency for him to interpret it in the light 
of past messages that have had either positive or negative (rather than merely 
factual) meaning for him, that is, messages that he himself has found impor-
tant. Obviously, the good listener, being active, will try to minimize this 
source of error by having the speaker clarify the message. But it is 
surprising how many participants, for one reason or another, allow imperfectly 
transmitted messages to go without challenge. Secondly, a good listener will 
try to be aware of what the speaker is actually saying in light of previous 
emotional experiences with the speaker. If the participant is honest enough 
to keep his relationship with the other members out in the open, there should 
be less tendency for him to distort messages because of emotional reasons. 
(e) The reductive nature of listening. The "most pervasive of the 
systematic biases" (p. 346) is the tendency for the listener to modify a 
new message so that it becomes more like previous messages. Obviously, if 
the spaakers were never to say anything new, the listener would not be bur-
dened with a~have to cope with anything new. Therefore, the speaker who 
rarely says something new is contributing to this bias. But the good 
listener is one who can consistently break away from this bias. To do so, 
however, he must be in affective contact with the speaker and he must allow 
the speaker the freedom to change. Time and again in sensitivity groups 
member A, after listening to member Z, will say something 1 ike: ''We've 
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really heard that story before: in fact, we have heard it over and over 
again," only to have member B, who possibly has been listening more creatively 
say: "That's not ture. There is something new here. He is now saying, even 
... -
though in a confused way: 'I do want to change.' Anyway, that's what I'm 
hearing." Unfortunately poor listeners are a most formidable obstacle to 
change in group members. 
(f) Hearing what ~ expects to hear. In general, according to 
Campbell's findings, listeners will modify messages so that they conform to 
the meaning expected by them. The poor listener, then, either does not 
listen or stops listening half way through a message, and he does so because 
he "knows" what the speaker is going to say. This is "creative listening" 
at its worst. Again, it is a question of casting the speaker into a univocal 
mold, thus stripping him of his freedom. Too much listening is "Kantian" 
listening or "computer" listening. The listener has present categories and 
whatever is heard must fit into these molds or handled by these "banks." 
Whatever cannot be received into his computer banks must be shunted off and 
excluded. And yet, Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature 
on group decision-making processes, find that "the most important part of 
conference communication may occur when another member says something that we 
do not expect and thus offers us a perspective or possible solution which 
should not have occurred to us while working alone {p. 184). Poor listening 
is poor business practice besides being poor human relations. The intelli-
gent speaker, realizing this human tendency to stereotype, truncate, and 
not to allow for the possibility of change, will emphasize the fact that 
what he is saying is different from what he had said before, that he has 
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~!1anged or moved away from a previously held position (if this is the case) , 
~n order to break through his listeners' natural stereotyping process. 
:·inally, I would hypothesize thaE those who are uncomfortable with their own 
freedom or with the freedom of others tend to constrict the messages of others 
(g) ''You agree with me." The listener tends to modify messages so that 
they are in better agreement with his own opinions and attitudes. Although 
such a tendency is nothing more than a concrete specification of the ancient 
scholastic principle "whatever is received is received according to the 
state, condition, or bias of the receiver" and as such is in no way new, 
empirical data are being amassed which manifest just how pervasive such a 
principle is in man's practical life. Thus, to a large extent we hear what 
we want to hear. The sensitive listener, however, addicted as he is to the 
what-is, constantly fights this natural tendency in order to hear what is 
actually being said. This means that to be a good listener one must drop or 
at least relax his defenses a bit in order to be willing to explore the new. 
(h) Black-or-white listening. "There is a tendency to distort coding 
assignments in the direction of an affective or evaluative coding. The most 
natural coding .of any input by the human operator seems to be the general 
nature of 'like' versus 'dislike,' 'approach' versus 'avoid,' 'gooJ' ver:.,u:, 
'bad,' 'beautiful' versus 'ugly,' etc. The general finding of psychologists 
is that whatever assignment is given tends to be distorted in this direction 
of this evaluative assignment. This is shown repeatedly as a 'halo' effect, 
• 
or general factor in rating assignments' (p. 357). This is a reflection of 
the either-black-or-what tendency in man. Not only is everything a subject 
of evaluation, but things tend to end up in just two categories, "good" or 
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"had." It seems almost natural for man to listen to messages in evaluative 
1 'terms and it is much simpler to hear a communication as "bad" or "good" in 
its entirety rather than to expend the effort that differential evaluation of 
.. ·-
a message would demand. This basic tendency to listen to conununications in 
evaluative terms prevents the listener from assimilating other aspects of 
the message; creative aspects of the message are lost in its "badness" or 
deficiencies are swallowed up in its "goodness." If the speaker realizes 
that his message might strike others as immediately "good" or "bad," then a 
caution against this should be built into the message itself urging listeners 
to suspend, if possible, this evaluative propensity. 
(i) The pressures of the group and "filtered" listening. "When a 
group of persons are exposed to a message stimulus and asked to state its 
meaning (size, degree of movement, amount of prejudice, etc.), they will 
distort their individual interpretations in the direction of their fellows" 
(p. 361). The average listener tends to listen, at least to some extent, 
"through" the group, that is, he filters what is said through the more or les 
complex interactional and attitudinal patterns that comprise one aspect of 
the culture of the group. Although such a process can be advantageous at 
times--for instance, in group decision-making situations: "The social 
weighting given to the majority opinion (i.e., conformity) frequently causes 
the better alternatives to be chosen" (Collins & Guetzkow, 1964, p. 55)--
this is not the case in sensitivity groups. The good listener listens, or 
makes every effort to listen, directly to the other without sifting what is 
said through the attitudinal filters of the group. It would seem that there 
is greater possibility for success in this area in the contract-group 
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:ecause of the high-visibility nature of the group culture and because of the 
~uilt-in cautions against "tacit understandings" and "covert decisions" in 
the group. But even under such contract conditions nature will out to a 
.. ·-
certain degree and members will tend to modify what they hear so that it 
~ight fit more neatly into the group culture. For instance, if there is a 
tacit understanding in the group not to discuss sexuality, when a member does 
bring the subject up, others will tend to ignore what he has to say or "hear" 
it as a digression. This pres en ts another challenge to the good listener, 
for he must see the individual as primary and the group as serving the needs 
of the individuals who constitute the group. 
It is hardly necessary for sensitivity-training participants to memorize 
the communications obstacles described by Campbell. It is sufficient to 
realize that it has been demonstrated that just in the ordinary course of 
events it is difficult to be an unbiased listener. The pitfalls that he 
describes cannot be avoided entirely; they can only be minimized. 
The Impact of the Speaker ~Listening 
Whenever a member speaks and really says nothing or, in the contract-
group, whenever he engages in various forms of flight behavior, he must 
realize that the quality of listening will go down in the group. As a 
general rule, the speaker gets the kind of attention he deserves. Some 
participants speak vaguely and evasively because they do not want to be "read' 
by their listeners; they thrive on the haphazard listening they receive. 
Such tendencies should become the object of confrontation in the group. 
~ "Compleat" Listener 
It has been suggested that the good listener is tho active listener, 
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one who readies himself to be as receptive as possible to all cues generated 
in the group and one who is aware of and tries to combat the variety of 
obstacles, stemming from within himself and from the matrix of the group, 
standing in the way of effective listerilng. The "compleat" listener, 
however, goes further than this, for he realizes that the proof of the 
pudding always lies in the eating. Therefore, once he has listened in the 
sense described here, he must in some way manifest to the speaker that he 
has listened fully, intelligently, and sympathetically (that is, he has not 
prejudged the speaker's remarks.) In fact, this is the basic source of 
support in the group: the knowledge that one has been listened to actively 
and intelligently. Secondly (and this is the ultimate proof on one's 
listening skills), he translates what he has heard into effective contractual 
interaction. That is, the good listener is hardly just one who amasses 
information, however conscientiously, and communicates to the speaker that 
he has been an effective tool of enregistration; rather, the variety of ways 
in which the individuals and the group itself have spoken have served as 
stimuli, and because he has listened well, there is a mu.h better chance that 
his responses will be proportioned to the stimulus. In the contract group hi 
response will generally take the form of one or more of the contractual 
modalities, namely, direct supportive behavior, self-disclosure, expression 
of feeling and emotion, or some form of confrontation. All of these modal-
ities, if carried out responsibly, are supportive. 
~tening as Diagnostic 
The quality of one's listening is "diagnostic" with respect to the 
quality of one's human relations. Rotter (1962) claims that it is not lack 
~------------------------------··_..i"~ . ..,_>n"-,...' 
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of insight into self that characterizes the person in emotional trouble but 
rather a lack of insight into others. He is so poorly aware of others that 
his interactions with them are awkward and self-defeating. The contract-
group, then, is a laboratory in which the participants are to experiment with 
active listening. Part of the process of being an active listener, one who 
searches out communications cues, will include challenging participants who 
speak vaguely or evasively. The participant who finds out that he does not 
listen carefully or that he is unable or unwilling to venture out into the 
group insearch of clarity of communication will profit diagnostically. On 
the other hand, the participant who succeeds will find himself much better 
prepared ~o provide active support in the group. 
SUPPORT: CREATING A CLIMATE FOR GROWTH 
The universal need for interpersonal warmth. There is almost universal 
recognition of the fact that a degree of warmth in interpersonal relation-
ships is absolutely essential for psychosocial growth. This need begins at 
birth and, although it might undergo certain transformations throughout the 
maturational process, it would seem that it is a still strongly felt need 
during old age. Watson (1959), in reviewing the literature on the deleterious 
effects of maternal deprivation, found the evidence confirmatory despite the 
fact that there were experimental inadequacies in many of the studies (for 
the specific kinds of design inadequacy varied from study to study). 
Lehrman (1960), in his clinical work, found that this need for warmth does 
not stop with childhood: 
The incisive work of Ackerman (1958) and others on intra-family 
interactions, ••. Ferenczi's (1926) demonstration that the analyst's 
warmth is a necessary condition for cure, and Fromm-Reichmann's 
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(1950) brilliant sensitivity with schizophrenics all encourage 
the hope that precise knowledge of the effects of inter-personal 
warmth at the breast, in the home and role-appropriate warmth 
in the office can help us fulfill our task of preventing and 
curing mental illness (p. 1102). 
The work of Rogers (1961, 1967) and others (e.g. Schofield, 1964; Truax, 1961 
1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1964) not only supports this conclusion but leads 
one to believe that warmth is not necessary just for psychotherapeutic 
situations, but that it is universally needed for personal and interpersonal 
growth. 
Frank (1961) claims that "the greatest potential drawback of therapy 
groups is the tendency not to supply sufficient support, especially in 
early meetings, to enable members to cope with the stresses they generate" 
(p. 190). Whether this is the greatest potential drawback of sensitivity 
groups or not (some would certainly think so) is still to be determined, 
but the fear of non-support is certainly one of the greatest fears of those 
who are considering the possibility of engaging in sensitivity training and 
of sensitivity-group members who are considering taking certain risks in the 
group (e.g. disclosing themselves, dealing openly with emotional issues, 
etc.). Prospective participants realize in one way or another that they 
are to engage in some kind of self-disclosure, that they are going to be 
confronted or challenged by the leader or other participants, and that such 
interaction is more than likely going to arouse strong emotion. They see 
the possibility of some kind of shame experience and they rightfully fear it, 
for, as Erikson (1959) says, "Shame supposes that one is completely exposed 
and conscious of being looked at •••• One is visible and ready to be visible 
.•.• Shame is early expressed in an impulse to bury one's face, or to sink, 
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right then and there, into the ground. But this, I think, is essentially 
rage turned against the self" (pp. 142-143). Prospective participants 
foresee quite easily the potential pain of the sensitivity experience, but 
what they do not or cannot foresee is a climate of support that will render 
what is foreseen as painful interaction not only tolerable but even 
stimulating and deeply satisfying. 
Psychological safety, then, is a legitimate concern of any kind of 
growth group, any kind of group in which intrapsychic and interpersonal 
concerns constitute the principal focus of attention, and it is a seeming 
lack of concern for such safety in some quarters that disturbs many 
professionals. However, support has always been a concern for those seriosly 
committed to laboratory training, e.g. the personnel of the National 
Training Laboratories (NTL): 
A first purpose of the T Group is to help individuals to 
learn from their continuing experience in the areas of 
self-awareness, sensitivity to phenomena of interpersonal 
behavior, and understanding of the consequences of behavior--
one's own and others'. Learning in these areas requires 
willingness to explore openly one's motivations and one's 
feelings; to utilize the reactions of others as feedback 
about the consequences of one's behavior; and to experiment 
with new ways of behaving. Since each of these steps 
requires emotional support, the T Group faces the dual task 
of creating a supportive climate and of developing situations 
in which members can learn through examining their own 
experience (Bradford, 1964, p. 191). 
Yet, while most practitioners agree that a supportive climate in human 
relations laboratories is absolutely essential (and actually see to it that 
such a climate does develop in the group or in the community of which the 
group is a part), still few have taken the pains to discuss either the nature 
of support or the ways in which a supportive climate is created in a group. 
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::eedless to say, there is little if any published research in this area. 
Antecedent and Consequent Support 
In the contract group support can be discussed in terms of the kinds of 
interaction specified by the contract. There are basically, then, two kinds 
of support: antecedent and consequent. Encouragement of any kind, whether 
direct or indirect, given to participants to engage in contractual behavior 
is antecedent support, that is, it comes before contractual behavior and 
is directed toward eliciting it. For example, if the leader-member models 
some form of contractual behavior, let us say that he engages in self-disclo-
sure of some kind, and if he does so skillfully and sincerely, his behavior 
is a form of antecedent support, for it is designed to encourage members to 
engage in the same kind of behavior. On the other hand, reinforcement give 
to participants for actually engaging in contractual interaction is 
consequent support. Reinforcement, of course, can take place in many 
different ways, but it always "says" to the participant who has engaged in 
contractual behavior: "You have done a good thing in the group." During the 
early sessions, the trainer primarily (but also as many of the other partici-
pants as possible) should engage in forms of antecedent support, for it is 
amazing how many "normal" people have fears and feelings of inferiority 
floating immediately below the surface or lurking behind carefree facades. 
These feelings inhibit group process and people need encouragement to 
overcome them. In the contract group, the contract itself provides one of 
the main sources of antecedent support in that it takes into consideration 
the natural fears of the participants and serves as a stimulus to 
participation. The contract establishes a rather large "cultural island" 
hn 
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around which the participant may wander freely and with relative safety. If 
the participant chooses to remain on one small part of that island and remain 
a spectator of instead of a participant in the life of the island, this is 
not the fault of the island culture but rather of his exaggerated fears. 
~ ~ of Antecedent Support 
"l accept you because you ARE": Acceptance ~unconditional positive 
regard as antecedent support. The contract-group recognizes the fact that 
the basic attitudes its participants have toward one another merely or 
simply as fellow human beings are crucial to the climate of interpersonal 
growth. Therefore, insofar as possible (though obviously one cannot change 
deep-seated attitudes and habitual behavioral patterns by contract or edict) , 
the contract calls first of all for the basic kind of acceptance which 
Rogers (1961, 1967), following Standal (1954), calls "unconditional positive 
regard"; this attitude, considered essential for the therapeutic process, 
is described by Rogers and Truax (1967): 
A second condition which is hypothesized as essential for 
therapeutic movement and change is the experiencing by the 
therapist of an unconditional positive regard for the client. 
This means that the therapist communicates to his client a 
deep and genuine caring for him as a person with human 
potentialities, a caring uncontaminated by evaluations of 
his thoughts, feelings, or behaviors. The therapist 
experiences a warm acceptance of the client's experience 
as being a part of the client as a person, and places no 
conditions on his acceptance and warmth. He prizes the 
client in a total rather than a conditional way. He does not 
accept certain feelings in the client and disapprove others. 
He feels an unconditional positive regard or warmth for this 
person. This is an outgoing, positive feeling without 
reservations and without evaluations. It means not making 
judgments. It involves as much feeling of acceptance for the 
client's expression of painful, hostile, defensive, or 
abnormal feelings as for his expression of good, positive, 
mature feelings. For us as therapists it may even be that it 
is easier to accept painful and negative feelings than the 
positive and self-confident feelings which sometimes come 
through. These latter we almost automatically regard as 
defensive. But unconditional positive regard involves 
a willingness to share equally the patient's confidence and 
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joy, or his depression and failure. It is a non-possessive 
caring for the client as a separate person. The client is thus 
freely allowed to have his own feelings and his own experiencing. 
One client describes the therapist as 'fostering my possession 
of my own experience and that I am actually having it; thinking 
what I think, feeling what I feel, wanting what I want, fearing 
what I fear; no "ifs," "buts," or "not reallys,"' This is the 
type of acceptance which is expected to lead to a relationship 
which facilitates the engagement of the patient in the process 
of therapy and leads to constructive personality change. 
Thus, when the therapist prizes his client, and is searching 
for the meaning or value of his client's thoughts or behaviors 
within the client, he does not tend to feel a response of approval 
or dissapproval. He feels an acceptance of what is. 
Unconditional positive regard, when communicated by the therapist, 
functions to provide the non-threatening context in which it is 
possible for the client to explore and experience the most 
deeply shrouded elements of his inner self. The therapist is not 
paternalistic, or sentimental, or superficially social and agree-
able. But his deep caring is a necessary ingredient in providing 
a 'safe' context in which the client can come to explore himself 
and share deeply with another human being (pp. 102-104). 
To a great extent what Rogers and Truax describe here is the kind of 
acceptance ideally owed to another simply because he is a human being. It 
is a willingness to let the other be who he is and what he is, but it is an 
active, concerned letting-the-other-to-be rather than a detached "not-giving-
a-dam" what the other is like or what he does. It means allowing the other 
to have the psychosocial lifespace that he needs in order to be himself as 
fully as possible. Negatively it means a refusal to exercise various sorts 
of control over the other, demanding that his life-style conform generally 
or in specific aspects to one's own, e.g. with respect to style or modes of 
interpersonal interaction and to value-system. Acceptance implies an activt 
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allowing the other to be different from oneself, "active" here meaning that 
A's interaction with B should actually foster B's otherness, his differences, 
his unique way of being. In a sensitivity group it is as if each member of 
the group were to say to every other member: "You have a value that neither 
I nor we collectively either determine or can abrogate. We recognize you 
as being this value." 
At the very minimum acceptance demands that one allow the other to 
express the ways in which he is different, different from the other members 
of the group and perhaps different from the images of man that are currently 
"acceptable" in our society. But if such acceptance is to be active, the 
members must be willing to say to one another: "Your actions cannot be so 
different or bizarre as to open an unbridgeable gap between you and me." 
Insofar as acceptance is active, it appproaches what Fromm (1956) calls 
"brotherly love," the most fundamental kind of love. This love means such 
things as care, respect, and the desire to further the life of the other. 
Such acceptance or love tends to disregard status, for it is a love between 
equals. 
Schofield (1964) says that "this quality of 'acceptance' in~ culture 
~this time is peculiarly stricted to the psychotherapeutic contract, but 
it is common to all such contracts. In this sense, psychotherapy provides 
a very special, perhaps ideal, form of friendship" (p. 109). There is no 
absolute reason, however, why such attitudes of acceptance cannot become 
more pervasive in ~ culture at this time. Perhaps one of the reasons for 
the proliferation of sensitivity-training laboratories in our culture at 
--- --
this time is to disseminate among the general population "growth-variables" 
---
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that up to now have been common only in therapeutic enterprises. Sensitivity 
laboratories--and certainly contract~group laboratories--are designed to 
stimulate the cultivation of such attutides of acceptance among people not 
engaged in any strictly therapeutic situation. These laboratories encourage 
participants to become aware of their basic attitudes of acceptance and 
rejection of others and to grow in their active concern for others to be who 
and what they are. This is essential to the kind of support-in-depth that 
creates a climate in which participants can engage freely in the modalities 
called for by the contract: self-disclosure, expression of feeling and 
emotion, and mututal confrontation. As Latourelle (1962) says, for 
communication and dialogue to become a reciprocal opening up, that is, a 
mutual revelation, both the speaker and the hearer must respect each other 
in the mysteriousness of their personalities: there must be mutual trust 
and availability. One of the principal tasks of the laboratory is to find 
ways--direct and indirect--of communicating this basic attitude of acceptance 
of one another to one another. The laboratory is also diagnostic in this 
regard. If a person finds himself lacking in this basic acceptance of 
others, then he should explore the interactional consequences of his lack. 
If he decides that he should do something about it, then, for him, the labor-
atory will be principally remedial. If he decides that he is unwilling to 
change, then he mus.t learn to live with the behavioral consequences of his 
decision. 
Stern (1966), in discussing psychotherapy, makes a distinction that 
might well bridge the gap between Rogers and Truax's views of unconditional 
positive regard and the following section on acceptance versus approval. 
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According to Stern, there are two approaches to experience: (1) the 
instrumental which aims at mastery, and (2) the sacramental which aims at 
appreciation. The therapist using the instrumental approach will see the 
,.·-
patient's past as something to be overcome (either by emotional insight, 
behavioral modification, learning ways of adjusting to reality, or a 
combination of all these methods). On the other hand, the therapist 
following the sacramental approach looks upon the patient's past with respect, 
even though (in the eyes of the therapist or of ·society in general or of the 
patient himself) it may need to be trascended 9 and he looks upon the patient' 
present as an experience which can be transformed, at least in part, through 
concerned and appreciative confrontation. In the sacramental approach the 
patient's task becomes that of learning how to recognize himself as a unique 
and total being, while the therapist must enter into the relationship 
as an interacting-with-another self instead of a mirror in whose clear 
surface the patient can come to appreciate his deepest feelings and how he 
is distorting reality. I sincerely believe that the core of what Rogers call 
unconditional positive regard is compatible with the kind of respectful con-
frontation suggested by Stern. 
Acceptance versus approval. Acceptance, whether it is described in 
terms of Rogers and Truax's unconditional positive regard or in terms of 
giving the other respect, concern, understanding, the freedom to be, and the 
opportunity to make and be responsible for his own decisions, is not 
synonymous with approval (Rogers and Truax explictly place it outside the 
pale o.f either approval or disapproval). But acceptance in the fint·s t sense 
does not, it is contended here, exclude the kind of confrontation to be 
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described in the next chapter. I do not believe that A, if he is sincerely 
interested in growth, wants or expects .B to accept him in the sense that B 
must accept, overlook, discount or even approve of modes of acting with which 
A himself is dissatisfied and which remain for him a source of concern if not 
of some kind of contract or existential guilt. A does not (or should not) 
expect B to consider his own (B's) value system so cavalierly and narrowly 
as not to be concerned about these values among men in general and even with 
respect to A. Therefore, B can really accept A in a way that is consonant 
with such concepts as unconditional positive regard and non-posessive warmth 
(and certainly this kind of acceptance does have some kind of priority in 
human relationships) and still (at least eventually, if not inunediately) 
suggest to A the hypothesis that some aspects of A's behavior might be 
proving deleterious to A himself, if not also to others. B can do this 
without in any way refusing to "respect" the experience of A, no matter how 
different from his own such experience might be. Once a person has declared 
effectively--perhaps by word but especially by his actions--that he is ante-
cedently "for" another, that he is open to him and his experience--his 
miseries, his joys, his triumphs, his failures, his problems--then,and 
perhaps only then, does he had the freedom to make careful confrontational 
interventions in the life of the other. 
Rogers and Truax (1967) and Schofield (1964), in discussing acceptance 
as a therapist variable, do not discuss the relationship between acceptance 
and confrontation nor do they discuss approval at any length. But if, as 
Patterson (1966) suggests, one person manifests certain ideal qualities in 
his relationship to another--empathy, genuine concern, a desire to help, a 
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belief in the ability of the other to change, an expectation or a hope that 
the other will change in directions indicating growth, self-congruence, and 
sincerity--then it would seem to follow that approval simply could not be 
tied to the coattails of acceptance, for this would demand a certain 
dishonesty on the part of one desiring to give himself to the other and thus 
vitiate the concept of acceptance itself. In a word, at least at a certain 
stage of a relationship between two people, confrontation can be a 
manifestation of positive regard, a regard that still remains unconditional 
in that the confronter does not make his friendship depend on a change of 
life in the confrontee. His positive regard is also still unconditional 
in that he is not trying to rob the person he is confronting of his 
freedom (indeed, he wants him, if possible, to be even freer than he is now). 
On the other hand, wholesale approval of another implies .either radical 
non-involvement with him or non-concern or it implies unlimited rather than 
unconditioned love. If A really does not care for B, then he can be lavish 
with his approval, because it costs him nothing. Or if A's unlimited "love" 
for B is really an unlimited need for B and B's affection and approval, then 
A might well be ready to do whatever is necessary to maintain this relation-
ship. But there is no evidence that such unlimited approval or "love'' is 
therapeutic or otherwise growthful. On the contrary, developmental studies 
have demonstrated that setting limits for a child as he is growing up, if 
done responsibly with the child's growth rather than just the adult's 
comfort in mind, is an obvious act of care and concern. On the other hand, 
there is evidence that unlimited approval is deleterious to growth. 
Strickland and Crowne (1963) found that patients with high need for approval 
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terminated therapy significantly earlier than patients with low need for 
approval. It is true that these patients might have terminated the relation-
ship for a number of reasons (poor therapist, "spontaneous remission," 
failure to receive unconditional positive regard, misunderstanding of the 
nature of therapy, financial concerns, etc.), but it also is possible that th 
early-terminators were, on the whole, immature people who expected to 
receive unlimited approval or love from the therapist. Truax and Carkhuff 
(1967) suggest that the need for approval (as opposed to a need for respect, 
concern) is an indication of disturbance rather than a remedy for it. In 
somewhat the same vein, Frank (1961) maintains that in group therapy support 
need not be expressed in terms of increased "liking" (one of the forms of 
approval) but in terms of respect for the "new" self that emerges from the 
therapeutic process. I am· in no way suggesting that Rogers and Truax's 
concept of unconditional positive regard suffers from the inadequacies 
outlined here; rather it is a question of trying to demonstrate that there 
is no conflict between the concept of non-possessive warmth and responsible 
confrontation, even though the latter has not been a part of the armamentar-
ium of non-directive or client-centered approaches to therapy and other 
growth experiences. 
Antecedent acceptance ~ an expressed sense of solidarity in the human 
condition. An acute awareness of the fact that man, for all his splendid 
accomplishments, often not only chooses unwisely but doggedly adheres to 
self-destructive choices--this awareness expressed by sensitivity-group 
members in such a way as to make it evident that no one is exempt from 
human folly is a form of antecedent acceptance. The sooner a member gives 
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sufficient cues to indicate that he is open to both the heights and the depths 
of the human condition, the sooner will he find himself "in-connnunity" in a 
spirit of mutual trust. It is the person who in one way or another can say: 
"We are a micro-community of men participating in both the wisdom and folly 
of man--it is this person who expresses a kind of solidarity with others in 
the human condition that is both a statement of acceptance of others and a 
plea to be accepted by others. 
Fromm-Reichmann (1950) says that the respect that the therapist has for 
his patient is valid only if the therapist realizes that his client's 
difficulties in living are not too different from his own. She also maintain~ 
that such a statement is not just a humanitarian or charitable hypothesis 
but that it is a scientific conviction. Another way of putting this is that 
in order to create a climate of trust, acceptance, and support, the parti-
cipants in a sensitivity group must in some way denude themselves of status-
roles and appear in the group simply as human beings, subject to both the 
sublimities and follies of the human condition. Stern (1966) suggests that 
this should also take place in therapeutic encounters. The therapist, he 
says, should let his clients see some of his own problems in living, for 
therapy is someplace where two or more people go together. 
If this is to be accomplished, then the participants must lay aside 
not only formal status roles (e.g. psychiatrist, psychologist, clergyman, 
manager, teacher, etc.) but also any role that would interfere with free 
contact among group participants. For instance, if someone assumes a quasi-
role based on the supposition that "problems put people in categories, 
problems divide," and if he translates this role into interaction in the 
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group, saying implicitly or explicitly: "I've listened, but my hang-ups are 
not yours nor are yours mine; we're playing this game in different ballparks,' 
he is assuming a role that demands that he reject others and that others 
, .. -
reject him. This kind of psychological or interactional distancing, no matteI 
how subtle or covert, inhibits mutual acceptance and therefore limits or 
interferes with the kind of trust that is absolutely essential in the group 
if all the participants are to "contact" one another freely. This distancing 
works in two directions. The one who says, at least by implication: "My 
problems are not yours: they make me less than you, they set me apart from 
you" sets himself apart from others, making it very difficult for them to 
provide him with any kind of support. Though he does this in order to make 
himself less vulnerable to rejection, he defeats his purpose because he 
creates an atmosphere in which support is not viable. If he also adds a 
poor-me element, he complicates matters further, for he both refuses support 
and at the same time tries to extort it. This makes the rest of the 
participants ambivalent toward him, if not angry. On the other hand, if a 
participant takes the attitude toward another: "Your problems are not mine: 
your problems set you apart from me," then his "support," if .he gives it at 
all, will smell of condescension, and the one being "supported" will resent 
being patroni2ed. 
Support is most effectively given by one who has a feeling of involve-
ment, of being with others, whatever the human experiences of these others 
might be. He has a strong feeling for the what-is of human living instead 
of the what-should-be. He so gives himself to others that the ways he is 
like others and the ways in which he differs from them do not determine his 
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involvement. The one who isolates himself from the experiences of others 
in the group is less human for doing so, no matter how he rationalizes his 
isolation. 
----
Availability~ antecedent support. Friendship, and this includes the 
beginnings of friendship in sensitivity or contract-groups, may be defined in 
terms of availability. Friends are mutually available and the degree of 
availability defines the strength or the depth of the relationship. Some 
distinction, however, must be made between physical and psychological avail-
ability. Physical availability refers to the spatio-temporal dimensions of 
the relationship. lbere is a high degree of physical availability if one 
person spends a good deal of time with another, if he remains georgraphically 
close, if physical presence of some sort (e.g. even contact by telephone) can 
be easily achieved, or if more intimate kinds of actual physical contact are 
a dimension of the encounter. But, as important as physical availability 
is for friendship, psychological availability is even more important. 
Physical and psychological availability are separable, and the latter is the 
more difficult to define. First of all, any kind of availability, whether 
physical or psychological, can be either active or passive. For example, A 
might invite B to spend some time with him or, on the other hand, he might 
merely allow B to be with him. These would be examples of active and passive 
availability. A person is actively available in a psychological way if he 
takes the initiative in sharing hirnself--his deeper thoughts, concerns, 
feelings, and aspirations--with another. If he merely allows the other to 
share such things with him, that is, if he is a more or less willing listener 
to the confidences of another, then he is also psychologically available, but 
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passively so. 
It is evident that there are all sorts of combinations and degrees of 
availability, both active and passive, physical and psychological. For 
instance, a prostitute might be actively available on a physical level, but 
not psychologically available at all. Perhaps the ideal marriage, in terms 
of availability, is one in which the partners are utterly psychologically 
available to each other and in which mutual physical availability is worked 
out according to the individual needs and responsibilities. Marriage 
partners come together with a frequency and an intimacy of contact which are 
not available to others, and their physical intimacy symbolizes, promotes, 
and enriches their mutual psychological availability. Both their physical 
and psychological intimacy reveal how deeply they are "for" each other, how 
deeply each wants to support the very being of the other. In like manner, 
failures in marriage, and in friendship in general, can be conceptualized 
in terms of failures in physical and psychological availability, both active 
and passive. 
Since I had always been an at least "implicit "believer" in the dictum 
that one could have very few close friends, I was taken aback once by a 
trainer in a sensitivity group in which I was participating when he said 
that he neither believed in that dictum nor lived by it. He claimed that he 
had many deep friends. It is true that he did not see many of them very 
often (physical availability was relatively low in many cases), but when he 
did see them, he did not need time to "work his way" back into the relation-
ship. Rather he and his friends started communicating immediately at a deep 
level (psychological availability was very high). It may be that our sub-
--------------------------------------------------------------------~ .. .....J. 
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scribing to the few-friends dictum (don't spread yourself too thin, 11 11 don't 
become a psychological glutton," etc .• ) is a way of rationalizing our fears 
of getting too close to others. 
In the contract group, then, members are supportive to the degree that 
they become available to one another. At first glance, it would seem that 
they are always, as long as the group is in session, physically available to 
one another, but even in the group itself there are degrees of physical 
availability. For instance, there are certain physical cues--e.g., looking 
at the other, modulations of voice, etc.--that indicate psychological 
availability or the beginnings of it, and these cues may or may not be 
present. One of the main purposes, in my opinion, for using nonverbal, 
"contact" exercises in the group is to allow the participants an opportunity 
to use physical contact both to stimulate and symbolize their psychological 
availability to one another. Such exercises, however antecedently anxiety-
arousing or "silly" they may seem to be (see Kaplan, 1968), are actually 
serious and fear-reductive, for they usually reveal others as more psycholog-
ically available than one had realized. The sooner the participants 
become available to one another and the more deft they become in finding ways 
in which to reveal or give evidence of this availability, the sooner will 
they create a climate of trust that will support more than superficial 
manifestations of the modalities of self-disclosure, expression of feeling, 
and confrontation. 
Participant "congruence" as antecedent s~1pport. Rogers (1961) , Rogd ': 
and Truax (1967), and others (e.g. Truax & Carkhuff, 1967) have studied the 
value of therapist autheticity or "congruence" in the therapeutic relation-
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ship, and they have come to the conclusion that it, together with uncondi-
tional positive regard and accurate empathy, is one of the most important 
therapist variables: 
We readily sense this quality of congruence in everyday life. 
Each of us could name persons who always seem to be operating 
from behind a front, who are playing a role, who tend to say 
things that they do not feel. ·They are exhibiting incongruence. 
We tend not to reveal ourselves too deeply to such people. On 
the other hand, each of us knows individuals whom we somehow 
trust because we sense that they are being what they are in an 
open and transparent way and that we are dealing with the person 
himself, not with a polite or professional facade. This is the 
quality of congruence. 
In relation to therapy it means that the therapist is what he 
is, during the encounter with the client. He is without front 
or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at the 
moment are flowing in him. It involves the element of self-aware-
ness, meaning that the feelings the therapist is experiencing are 
available to him, available to his awareness, and also that he is 
able to live these feelings, to be them in the relationship, and 
able to conununicate them if appropriate. It means that he comes 
into a direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him 
on a person-to-person basis. It means that he is being himself, 
not denying himself. 
It is not a simple thing to achieve such reality. Being real 
involves the difficult task of being acquainted with the 
flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked 
especially by complexity and continuous change •••• 
It is not an easy thing for the client, or for any human being, 
to trust his most deeply shrouded feelings to another person. 
It is even more difficult for a disturbed person to share his 
deepest and most troubling feelings with a therapist. The 
genuineness, or congruence, of the therapist is one of the 
elements in the relationship which makes this risk of sharing 
easier and less fraught with dangers . 
•••• At a very low level of congruence the therapist may be 
clearly defensive in the interaction, as evidenced by the 
contradiction between the content of the message and his voice 
qualities or the nonverbal cues which he presents. Or the 
therapist may respond appropriately but in so professional a 
manner that he gives the impression that his responses are form-
ulated to sound good rather than being what he really feels and 
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means. Thus incongruence may involve a contrived or rehearsed 
quality or a professional front. 
At the upper ranges of therapist genuineness, his openness to 
all types of feelings and experiences, both pleasant and hurtful, 
without trace of defensiveness or retreat into professionalism, 
is usually most evident from the quality of his voice and the 
manner of his expression (Rogers & Truax, 1967, pp. 100-102). 
It is hypothesized here that this quality of congruence is essential not only 
for a therapist in a therapeutic relationship but for anyone who wants to 
live a fully human life. Again, it is a question of a variable that is 
perhaps too closey identified with the therapeutic relationship. It is 
therapeutic because it is deeply human. Therefore, participants in a 
contract group are to examine or rather experience their ability or inability 
to be congruent in the interaction of the group and attempt modes of behavior 
designed to develop congruence. It is evident that a group of congruent 
participants will be supportive provided that they effectively handle the 
confrontation that arises naturally from their being congruent. This 
problem will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Trust formation as antecedent support. One way of conceptualizing 
antecedent support is as trust formation. Erikson (1959, 1963, 1968) sees 
trust-versus-mistrust in existence itself as the first crisis faced by the 
child: 
What we here call trust coincides with what Therese Benedek has 
called confidence. If I prefer the word 'trust,' it is because 
there is more naivete~ and more mutuality in it: an infant can be 
said to be trusting where it would go too far to say that he has 
confidence. The general state of trust, furthermore, implies not 
only that one has learned to rely on the sameness and continuity 
of outer providers, but also that one may trust oneself and the 
capacity of one's own organs to cope with urges: and that<ne is 
able to consider oneself trustworthy enough so that he providers 
will not need to be on guard lest they be nipped. 
•••• But let it be said here that the amount of trust derived 
from earliest infantile experience does not seem to depend on 
absolute quantities of food or demonstrations of love, but 
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rather on the quality of the maternal relationship. Mothers 
create a sense of trust in their children by that kind of admin-
istration which in its quality combines sensitive care of the 
baby's individual needs and a firm sense of personal trustworthi-
ness within the trusted framework of their culture's life style. 
This forms the basis in the child for a sense of identity which 
will later combine a sense of being 'all right,' of being one-
self, and of becoming what other people trust one will become 
(1963, pp. 247-249). 
Thus trust-mistrust crisis is, of course, resolved differentially so that 
even the "normal" participants in a sensitivity laboratory will differ in 
their ability to trust themselves and others. It is important for the 
participants to realize this as they attempt to create a climate of trust in 
the group. 
Gibb (1964) claims that trust is absolutely essential for growth; he 
links defensiveness to the trust-mistrust crisis: 
A person learns to grow through his increasing acceptance of 
himself and others. Serving as the primary block to such 
acceptance are the defensive feelings of fear and distrust that 
arise from the prevailing defensive climates in most cultures. 
In order to participate consciously in his own growth a person 
must learn to create for himself, in his dyadic and group 
relationships, defense-reductive climates that will continue 
to reduce his own fears and distrusts (p. 279). 
Gibb sees the participants' unresolved feelings of fear and distrust, even 
though these may be buried and denied, as formidable obstacles to growth 
through group interaction. Acceptance must precede what he calls "data-flow, 
that is, the free interaction of group members: "Data-flow is possible only 
within the limits of trust formation. A free flow of data is possible only 
with antecedent or concurrent reduction of distrusts and fears" (p. 283). 
It is evident that this is an area in which careful research is needed, but 
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there is some evidence to back up Gibb's clinical observations. Mellinger 
(1956), for instance, found that scientists in a research organization tended 
to conceal their attitudes about a particular issue when communicating with 
persons in whom they lacked trust. Read (1962) found that among executives 
the less trust they hold for their immediate superiors the greater the 
tendency toward "inaccurate communication" (p. 10) with these superiors. As 
Collins and Guetzkow (1964) note: "Communication behavior is a function of 
... the nature of the milieu" (p. 167). If distrust colors the environment, 
we can expect distortions in communication. 
Some of the symptoms of distrust in the group are: 
••• persistent defense of one's public image, attempts to 
change attitudes and beliefs of others, attempts to make 
decisions for others, avoidance of feeling, avoidance of 
conflict, advice giving, flattery, cynicism about the powers 
of the group, derogation of the group's abilities, lack of 
confidence in the product of the group, and denial of 
membership (Gibb, 1964, p. 284). 
Gibb (1968) suggests other symptoms of lack of trust in groups: "strategy" 
behavior, differences between what is said inside and outside the group, 
and impersonal talk: 
[E]arly in groups, people are pretty closed and they operate with 
a certain kind of strategy. They program their communications, 
they plan what to say. They plan what to say on the basis of the 
effect it will have •.•. The more I fear someone, the more I ration 
my communications, the more I restrain my behavior, the more 
controlled I am •••• 
[An] operational test we use in research is: Do people say the 
same things about each other in the group that they do in clusters 
going home? To their wives after they get there ••• ? If they say 
the same things about each other outside as they do to each inside, 
that is a good feedback system. It is very rare in my experience. 
[P]eople tend, when they are fearful to be impersonal. They tend 
to escalate the cognitive level, to say: "Isn't it interesting that 
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people are this way--people need people," rather than to say "I 
need you," "I hurt," "I ove you," "Sit by me" •••• (pp. 3-4). 
Therefore, since little happens in a group until the participants learn to 
trust one another, one of the most important tasks of early group sessions 
is the formation of a climate of trust. It is far better to try to forestall 
the mistrust behavior described by Gibb than to try to remedy it. In the 
contract group, the process of building a climate of trust is aided by the 
contract itself. If one knows that all the other participants have 
subscribed to the same contract, then it is easier to trust them, for one 
can, at le:st to some degree, predict their behavior and reactions. However, 
if the contract is imposed on the group instead of being freely chosen 
(imposition-of-contract instead of entry-by-contract), t~en it is necessary 
to determine to what degree the participants are actually "buying" the 
contract before one could use the contract as a source of trust. The 
leader-member should be familiar with the signs of distrust within the group 
and bring the entire trust issue out into the open. If he does not do 
this, the participants themselves will do it eventually (and sometimes 
repeatedly), therefore his early confrontation of the trust issue might be 
more "economic" in the long run. 
The way the preposition "behind" is used in the English language casts 
some light on the question of support and trust. If someone is "behind" 
someone else, this is usually either a heartening or a threatening situation. 
"We are behind you all the way," is a positive and supportive situation, but 
if a person is merely "behind" another in the sense that he is in the 
shadows, as it were, undeclared and unknown, then his presence is experienced 
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as threatening.· If a person does not in some way declare himself "for" me--
especially if my contract with him is fairly extensive--then it is not 
paranoid for me to wonder whether he is "against" me in some way or not. He 
.. -
need not declare himself "for" me directly; it is sufficient if he indicates 
that he is the kind of person who is "for" others generally. Another way 
of saying this is that the "he who is not for me is against me" dictum has 
some general applicability to human relationships. Most men would prefer 
to have those who are not "behind" them in a positive sense to stand out in 
the open, "in front of" them, in honest opposition, if necessary, rather 
than remain in the shadows unknown. This kind of honesty in the sensitivity 
group goes far in establishing a facilitative climate of trust. 
Misplaced trust can, as Lynd (1959) points out, lead to deep, even 
incapacitating, experiences of shame: 
Even more than the uncovering of weakness or ineptness, exposures 
of misplaced confidence can be shameful--happiness, love, anti-
cipation of a response that is not there, something personally 
momentous received as inconsequential. The greater the expecta-
tion, the more acute the shame; the greater the discrepancy be-
tween one's image of oneself and the image others have of one, 
the more one has to put on a 'brave face' (pp. 43-44). 
Creating 'a climate of trust, then, involves having others "declare" themselve 
in the group, that is, declare their attitudes (or lack of them) toward 
others. Still one cannot wait to share oneself until he is absolutely sure 
that he will be accepted by others. There is always the chance that one's 
gift of oneself will be spurned or go unnoticed, at least to a degree. 
However, the risk of laboratory training reflects the risk of life; too 
many of us fail to grow because we prefer a climate of absolute or excessive 
safety. The laboratory, because it is life in miniature (though it is also 
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life under a magnifying glass), has supportive resources more ready at hand 
for those who take risks and fail or are failed than do macro-life situations. 
Someone once called belief "prophetic of reality," that is, if a person 
believes deeply enough in something, his faith will enable him to muster the 
forces needed to create that in which he believes. Trust, in the sense of 
entrusting oneself to others, can also be prophetic of reality: the person 
who dares to entrust himself to others goes far in creating a climate of 
trust in the group. 
Consequent Support in Terms of Reinforcement 
Collins and Guetzkow (1964), in reviewing the literature on communicatio 
and interaction, come to the conclusion that "communication behavior is a 
' function of •.• the kinds of reward particularly valued by the individual (his 
motives and needs). A communicator initiates communication when he expects 
a reward on the basis of his own past experience with this or similar task 
environments and fellow group members" (p. 167). Therefore, if the various 
forms of antecedent support are instrumental in getting effective group 
interaction started and in contributing to the formation of a viable "inter-· 
actional climate," it is conseq9ent support in terms of reinforcement that 
keeps the interaction going and brings it to term. 
Recognition and appropriate response as reinforcement. In the contrac.t-
group, reinforcement means, in general, that once a member has part i:·ipated 
in some form of contractual behavior (e.g. self-disclosure, expression of 
feeling), the other members should both (1) recognize (actively, behavior 
the fact that he has acted contractually, that he has done "something good" 
in the group, and (2) respond appropriately to his contractual behavior. 
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Ideally, recognition and response emerge into a single act. For instance, if 
a person engages in meaningful self-disclosure ("story"),· it is not enough fo 
the group simply to recognize verbally the fact that he has acted contract-
ually: "You have engaged in 'story' and this is a 'good thing' in this 
group"--but they should react or respond to what he has said (if it is "story' 
the assumption is that it is meaningful), that is, they should react person-
ally to the disclosure. "Appropriate" response means response proportioned t 
the modality in which the other is speaking. For example, if A, perhaps only 
after screwing up his courage to take a responsible risk in the group, 
confronts B, then B's best response to A would be to examine himself on the 
issues suggested by A. Such a response would both recognize and reinforce 
A's contractual behavior. Again, if A reveals himself significantly to the 
group, then B might respond by revealing himself along similar or relevant 
di mens ions • B's act would indicate to A not only that he has listened 
carefully to him but also that he has felt a certain solidarity with him. 
Such an act would provide A with a good deal of reinforcement. On the other 
hand, if B were to reply to A's self-discl~E\fe irresponsibly--for instance, 
by trying to "upstage" A with his own disclosure--then, obviously, his 
"response" would have the opposite effect. 
The trouble with simple direct recognition of contractual behavior--
"We recognize the fact that you have engaged in 'story "'--as opposed to full 
contractual response which includes recognition is that recognition that 
,. 
stands by itself can carry overtones of "separateness" from the other. If A 
merely recognizes the fact that B has acted contractually, he "stands off" 
from B to a certain extent, at least by not really involving himself with B. 
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Mere recognition of the plight of another is closer to pity than empathy, 
and a person who pities another separates himself or stands off from the 
other. Sometimes, however--and this is especially true of earlier sessions 
in the life of the group--the only response a person is honestly capable of 
is to recognize the fact that another member has acted contractually. For 
instance, if someone reveals himself to a degree that was unexpected in the 
group, he might catch the other members off guard, as it were. Perhaps 
all they can say at the moment (if they say anything) is something like this: 
"This is the deepest level of self-disclosure that we have experienced in 
this group. But, although we appreciate the fact that someone has moved us 
forward by his contractual behavior, we are still at a loss for appropriate 
modes of response." I have participated in groups in which "premature" and 
ill-prepared-for self-revelation has, unfortunately, merely angered the 
group. In one group, the participants kept referring to such a disclosure as 
"the bomb," and the group finally ended without their really being able to 
handle this disclosure. Such a situation could have been avoided if the 
group had first discussed its goals and worked out some sort of contract to 
deal realistically with possible group interactions. 
Jourard (1967) discusses some research that seems to support the general 
position taken here, that is, that more than mere recognition of contractual 
behavior is necessary for adequate reinforcement: 
Another student, W.J. Powell, Jr. (1964), did a doctoral 
dissertation which was more carefully controlled than Rivenbark's 
exploratory study. He conducted interviews with college students, 
asking them to make themselves as fully known to him, the inter-
viewer, as they cared to. He carefully controlled all extraneous 
variables and compared the increase in self-disclosure (using an 
op'eran t-condi tioning design) that occurred when, on the one hand, 
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he responded with authentic disclosures of his own (in contrast 
to 'reflecting' the feeling or content of their disclosures) 
and when, on the other hand, he responded with expressions of 
approval and support. He found that 'approving, supporting' 
responses did not increase the students' disclosures at all. 
Reflection and restatement of their disclosures resulted in an 
increase in disclosures of negative self-statments, but did not 
affect positive, self-enhancing expressions. Self-disclosure 
from the researcher was associated with significant increases 
in the subjects' disclosures of both positive and negative self-
references (p. 114). 
This research tends to confirm what has been said here about approval and the 
value of responding by self-involvement. The implications not only for 
sensitivity training but for therapy in general are evident, even though 
it means a departure from more comfortable therapeutic approaches to which 
we have become accustomed. 
The necessity of "immediacy" of rein.forcement. Collins and Guetzkow 
(1964), in extending the experimental data on the timing of rewards (see 
Hilgard & Bower, 1966), suggest that temporal immediacy has its place in 
social reward situations also: 
The experimental data on the timing of rewards suggest that 
they are most effective when they follow behavior within a few 
seconds. Although the ability of humans to verbalize and plan 
for the future increases the effectiveness of an environmental 
reward, many social systems would be impossible if events in the 
task environment were the sole source of reward. It may take 
a goodly time for the group to realize its goals, but social 
rewards may be applied immediately by verbal and gestural 
behaviors in the face-to-face group (p. 77). 
For instance, what is suggested here may well refer to the situation in 
which a sensitivity-training participant puts himself "on the line" in some 
way or other, and, once he is finished, there follows a comparatively long 
silence. We should find out whether such temporal "gaps" are deleterious to 
the social reinforcement system operative in the group, and the hypothesis 
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here is that they well might be. I remember one group in which a young 
man "put himself on the line" and, after he had finished, called for some 
feedback from the others. Luckily enough, this particular segment of the 
group experience was recorded on videotape. He received practically no 
immediate response from the others. In fact, when he called for response, 
most of the participants tried to "leave the scene" by bowing their heads or 
by looking off in a different direction. When I replayed the tape, I told 
them to watch what they did with their heads when they were asked to give 
some feedback. Then I asked the one who had put himself "on the line" how 
he felt at that moment. He said that he had felt alone, very much alone. 
I would hypothesize that the more "immediacy" there is in reinforcement 
behavior in the sensitivity group the greater the effect. This refers to 
1 temporal immediacy, certainly, for temporal immediacy of reinforcement means 
at least that the listener has picked up the cue "I-am-finished" or the cue 
"I-would-like-some-response." But it also refers to "qualitative immediacy," 
that is, the degree to which the respondent really puts himself "into" the 
response. Indeed, such qualitative immediacy seems to be more important 
than mere temporal immediacy. One way of conceptualizing this qualitative 
immediacy of response is in terms of a therapist variable currently receiving 
a good deal of attention--accurate empathy (Rogers, 1961, 1967; Truax, 1961, 
1963; Truax & Carkhuff, 1967). 
Immediacy of supportive reinforcement in terms of accurate empathy. 
Rogers and Truax (1967} describe accurate empathic understanding: 
The ability of the therapist accurately and seii::d t tvely to under-
stand experiences and feelings and their meaning ~ the clie1~~ 
during the moment-to-moment encounter of psychotherapy consti-
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tutes what perhaps can be described as the 'work' of the therapist 
after he has first provided the contextual basis for the relation-
ship by his congruence ••• and his unconditional positive regard. 
Accurate empathic understanding means that the therapist is 
completely at home :lhthe unhr-erse of patient. It is a moment-
to-moment sensitivity that is in the 'here and now,' the 
immediate present •.•• [I]t is of limited use to the individual 
if the therapist only arrives at this insightful and empathic 
understanding ••• as he drives home at night. Such a delayed 
empathy or insight may be of value if the therapist has a later 
chance to respond to the same theme, but its value would lie in 
formulating his empathic response to the patient's immediate 
living of the relationship. 
The ability and sensitivity required to communicate these inner 
meanings back to the client in a way that allows these experiences 
to be 'his' is the major part of empathic understanding • 
.•• To communicate this perception in a language attuned to 
the patient that allows him more clearly to sense and formulate 
his confusion, his fear, his rage or anger is the essence of 
the communicative aspect of accurate empathy • 
••• The communication is not only by the use of words that the 
patient might well have used, but also by the sensitive play of 
voice qualities which reflect the seriousness, the intentness, 
and the depth of feeling . 
••• This empathic understanding when it is accurately and 
sensitively communicated seems crucially important in making it 
possible for a person to get close to himself, to experience 
his most inward feelings, to maintain contact with his inner 
self-experiences, thus ailowing for the recognition and resolu-
tion of incongruencies. It is this self-exploration and consequent 
recognition and resolution of incongruities that we believe allows 
the client to change and to develop his potentialities. 
The common element in a low level of empathy involves the 
therapist's doing something other than 'listening' or 'under-
standing'; he may be evaluating the client, giving advice, 
offering intellectual interpretations, or reflecting upon his 
own feelings of experiences. Indeed, a therapist may be accurately 
describing psychodynamics to the patient, but in a language not 
that of the client, or at a time when these dynamics are far removed 
from the current feelings of the client, so that there is a 
flavor of teacher-pupil interactions (pp. 104-106). 
Truax and Carkhuff (1967) note that "accurate empathy which stressed dLi,'"'' 
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tic accuracy or sensitivity to feeling or experience from a slightly analytic 
point of view proved much more highly related to the criterion indices than 
did the better known variable which grew out of the client-centered tradition" 
(p. 365). However this S·tatement may be reconciled with what Rogers and 
Truax have said above, it is hypothesized here that the accurate empathy 
that is effective in sensitivity groups (and indeed in human relationships 
generally) includes both the ability to get "within" the other and the 
willingness and ability to convey this to the other in terms that are 
intelligible to him. Perhaps this would make a therapist more active than 
a Rogerian therapist is generally thought to be, but ff this is a development 
in client-centered theory, it seems to be in the right direction. 
Reinforcement of the individual rather than the group. Research 
indicates that individuals involved in some group task, rather than the 
group as a whole, should receive reinforcement. Rosenberg (1960) demonstrated 
that an individual will not learn new modes of behavior if the group as a 
whole is rewarded in such a way that the task-environmental rewards and 
punishments are not specifically coordinated to his behavior. Zajonc (1962) 
has reported that the performance of seven-man teams was inhibited when 
individuals received knowledge only of group success and failure and did nut 
receive feedback on individual performances. This contains an important 
lesson for sensitivity groups. Group members frequently tend to address the 
group as a whole instead of one another when more individualized responses 
would be more appropriate. While this might be safer (because it is less 
involving), it is also self-defeating, because the participants as individuals 
are not rewarded for taking risks in communication. Furtherr:,,. r·e, communica-
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tions addressed to the group as a whole tend to become general and abstractiv~ 
less immediate, less personal. Certainly some communications must be 
addressed to the group as a whole, and all communications are directed toward 
the group in some way. If A reveals himself, he usually reveals himself to 
the group as a whole directly (unless his self-revelation is in response 
to a communication from another member, in which case it is made directly to 
the other member and indirectly to the entire group). But if B responds to 
what A has said by addressing the group in general, even in rewarding terms--
"Now we are getting somewhere!"--his response is less effective than if he 
had addressed A directly. In this case the group is best reinforced by A's 
being reinforced. 
Failures in Support 
Group members can fail to support one another in a variety of ways. 
Some of them are listed here. 
Clichl' £!. ritualistic support. Our language is filled with socially 
,; 
appropriate cliches expressive of support--"! know how you feel," "Is there 
anything I cun do," "You must feel awful," "I just didn't know," etc.--an.d 
I 
they usually abound in sensitivity groups. One of the more disturbing cliche 
is the "I know just how you feel" followed immediately by "because !· .. " 
It is disturbing because the implication is that the authenticity of 
another's feelings in some way depends upon whether it can be verified in 
the experience of the one listening to him. This situation at its worst is 
represented by the person who merely I uses the cliche "I know how you feel" 
in order to divert attention to his own experience. The problem with such 





We find non-cliche support difficult because it involves emotion--the other's 
and our own--and we simply are not comfortable with emotion. We find non-
,, 
cliche support difficult because it involves going out of ourselves to the 
other. It demands that we lay aside our egocentricity and many of us are not 
ready to do that. Frequently when we try to express positive emotions in 
support of one another, we sound phony because we do not trade in these 
emotions from day to day and we are simply gauche with the unfamiliar. In 
a sensitivity group it may be more supportive (because it is more honest) 
if a member were to admit that he is faced by one of the lessons of the 
Book of Job, that is, that it is fruitless and even inhuman to try to engage 
in logical and highly "socialized" dialogue with someone who is suffering. 
If a participant frankly admits his inability to go beyond the cliche for 
the moment, even this can be refreshingly supportive. In fact, this honest 
"clearing of the decks" might make attempts at more authentic kinds of 
support somewhat easier. 
Cheap empathy. Some sensitivity-training participants never miss an 
opportunity to give support, especially to the sufferer. They resemble 
professional wake-goers, their motto seeming to be: "I am always at your 
side (in times of disaster)." Such support is ritualistic, triggered by any 
sign of pain in the other, and seems to be directed toward fulfilling the 
needs of the one "giving support" rather than the one in need. Actually the 
one supported is seen as a stereotype, "one-in-pain," "une-·needing-rny-
support," and to the degree that this is true support is not authentic inter-
action with this person. On the other hand, over-support might be a per:-'. --: , s 
! L way of manifesting his own need for support or mothering. Support should n~t ' I 
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be "mush," even though it may be tender; it should not be sentimental, even 
though it involves feelings and emotions. It should arise out of the strength 
of the one who gives support and_not out of his weakness. The one who gives 
authentic support will give support in both adversity and joy, success and 
failure because support does not mean "propping the other. up," it means being 
"with" him especially when the other reveals or is trying to come to grips 
with some of the more dramatic dimensions of his life, positive or negative. 
Lynd (1959) suggests that we overemphasize support-in-adversity: "Scheler 
points out that the term 'sympathy' is often wrongly confined to pity or 
compassion. Sympathy with suffering (Mitleid) and sympathy with joy (Mit-
freude) are two different things, often confused, and the second is frequent! 
neglected in the study of the first" (p. 236). It takes both strength and 
skill to support the other because he is the other and not because he is 
either victim or hero. Only those who are not afraid of universal contact 
with the other can provide a wide range of support. 
The St. Sebastian Syndrome. St. Sebastian was a Christian martyr who 
was killed, it is reported, by being shot full of arrows. Tilis frequently 
happens in an analogous way in sensitivity groups. A person tells his "story' 
and, although it is vaguely sensed by others that support would be an 
appropriate response, no one knows how to go about such a task. Being 
unskilled in the .art of support, they tend to substitute a caricature: they 
begin to ask questions to show their "interest," "How do you feel?--When did 
it happen?--How are things now?--How long has it been going on?"--etc., etc. 
This keeps the victim in the center of attention of course and does away 
with the need for real involvement or response. At first (at least this is 
r.:y experience) the victim does not recognize the game: he thinks thcit tht~ 
others are actually asking serious questions and he tries to answer them. 
Then he begins to feel that what is taking place is either out o~ place, 
missing the point, or downright ludicrous, but being polite, he still 
answers the questions for a while (though with less and less enthusiasm). 
His interlocutors keeping pumping him with arrows (by this time even they are 
tiring of the game) until he and the interaction die. This caricature of 
support can also be called the "Is-it-bigger-than-a-breadbox" syndrome both 
because of the Twenty Questions nature of the game and because such a ques-
tion frequently seems as "meaningful" as the others being asked. This does 
not mean that an occasional question cannot be both extremely insightful and 
deeply supportive, but it must be appropriate, non-ritualistic, sincere, 
pithy, forceful, and a prelude to a deeper involvement with the other. A 
question in this vein which is actually quite confronting can be more 
" supportive than all the cliches and vapid questions put together. 
Support versus "red-crossing." "Red crossing" is a term that originated 
I believe, at Synanon and means "rushing to the aid of a group member like a 
Red Cross worker." Its connotations are obviously pejorative. Some people 
cannot stand seeing another in any kind of pain, physical or psychological, 
even in cases in which the pain is beneficial. For instance, if someone is 
being confronted in the group in a responsible way and therefore necessarily 
undergoing the pain associated with the process of confrontation, it is the 
"red-crosser" who comes. to the aid of the confron tee in an effort to "get 
him off the hook." He does so in a number of different ways: he gives 
approval to the confrontee's behavior (whether the confrontee approves of his 
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own behavior or not), he tries to rationalize away the other's guilt or 
responsibility, giv~s speeches the burden of which is that "all of us are 
likewise sinners," and in gene!al tries to show that the person being 
confronted is an innocent victim needlessly suffering. The "red-crosser" 
is not at all like the person who intervenes when he believes that the 
confrontational process has become irresponsible, negative, and profitless 
in a particular case. This kind of intervention is often needed in 
sensitivity-groups (less often, I believe, in contract-groups). Needless to 
say, in the contract-group the "red-crosser" fulfills no useful function. 
Silence ~ failure in support. "They also fail who only sit and wait"--
to misuse a line from Milton. A ·group member once talked about the "hurt" 
that she felt from the silent members. She did not sense that they were 
hostile, but she found it difficult to engage in self-disclosure in front 
of people who willed to remain strangers. Even silence that is perceived as 
sympathetic is harmful if it is protracted. In the contract-group there 
should be no silent members; in fact, there cannot be if the contract is 
being fulfilled. 
,TI!! PROBLEMS IN RECEIVING SUPPORT 
Even when support is given responsibly and sincerely, there is no 
guarantee that it is going to be received as it is given. The people who 
attend sensitivi.ty laboratories come with a wide range of normal problems 
of living a number of which militate against their being open to even very 
really human supportive behavior. Some arrive with dependency problems 
against which they have been struggling. They see themselves as tending to 
be overly dependent and the resent any kind of behavior in others which c.'.ln 
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be interpreted as pla¥ing to thei.r dependency needs. Evidently such 
counterdependent behavior interfers wi.th their effecti.ve involvement with 
others. Therefore, if it becomes clear during the interaction of the group 
that a participant has been fending off attempts on the part of others to 
support him, his behavior should become the object of confrontation. If he 
is struggling with dependency, then, if possible, he is to share this problem 
with the group, he is to 'bring it "into community" where it can be handled. 
On the other hand, there are those who thrive on attention and uncreative 
forms of "support." They are constantly looking for subtle forms of approval 
Ideally, support, at least in the contract-group, should elicit further 
contractual behavior from the one who s.eeks support or to whom support is 
actually given. If it does not, if supportive behavior constantly goes "sour' 
in the case of any particular participant, the group should take this as 
diagnostic and try to get the problem out into the open. Furthermore, if 
the members of a group are giving one another support and still find that 
little or no progress is being made in effecting a viable climate of trust 
(even though there is a generally "pleasant" atmosphere in the group), then 
it is time to investigate whether support putatively given is also "support 
received." Unfortunately, groups can run a long time on social "pleasantnes~.''. 
and other counterfeits of support. Support-counterfeits are seen for what 
they really are by their effects: (1) the tend to make the group comfortable 
and the participants tend to lose that edge of anxiety that frequently stirs 
up meaningful interaction; (2) contractual behavior diminishes, becomes 
emasculated, or disappears entirely. 
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CONCLUSION 
No one and no contract can program the development of a climate of trust 
and support in a sensitivity-training group. As Gibb (1968) notes, the 
group, no matter how long it remains in existence, continually discovers new 
levels of trust and support. The initial reaction of many participants is 
one of hopelessness: "I could never really entrust myself to you." However, 
as the group moves forward, even the most timid, encouraged by the risks 
the other members take, begin to move out into the group. If the contract 
helps the participants, including the most fearful, to move "into community" 
more quickly and with a greater degree of psychological safety, that it 
serves its purpose we.11. 
Introduction 
Chapter IX 
Confrontation ;i.n Laboratory Training 
394 
Confrontation is an important "growth" variable both in the laboratory 
and in life, but it is one that merits careful explanation for a number of 
reasons. First of all, confrontation-in-caricature is popularly taken as 
the symbol of laboratory training in general and sensitivity training in 
particular: "I don't have to attend a laboratory to tell people off and to 
give them their chance at me." It is true that some laboratory experiences 
are characterized by irresponsible confrontation, but this is certainly not 
generally true nor is there any reason why it has to be the case in any 
given laboratory experience. Laboratories are designed to be growth-exper-
iences, not places where the psyche is laid open to possible destruction. 
And yet time and again people approach me asking me whether a particular 
individual should take part in a laboratory experience or whether a laborator 
should be allowed to operate at all lest an individual or a group be exposed 
to psychic harm. Well-run laboratory experiences are no more "dangerous" 
than group therapy experiences, and I assume that the latter are run for the 
benefit of the participants. Laboratories have been designed in which all 
the participants are drawn from a psychiatric population (Morton, 1965) and 
with apparently excellent results (Johnson, Hanson, Rothaus, Morton, Lyle, 
& Moyer, 1965). Other laboratories prefer to exclude those with more severe 
problems in living (the NTL literature specifically states that its labora-
tories are not designed as therapy sessions). If confrontation is 
responsible, that is, proportioned to both the laboratory design and popula-
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tion, then it will be a powerful force for growth. 
Secondly, confrontation as a therapy-variable or as a modality of mature 
human interaction has received practically no theoretical attention in the 
literature (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967), and controlled 
research in this area has just begun (e.g., Berenson & Mitchell, 1968; 
Berenson, Mitchell, & Laley, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; 
Boyd & Sisney, 1968; Truax, Fine, Moravec, & Millis, 1968). Confrontation 
is another one of those "therapy-variables" that is therapeutic because it is 
a fully human and growthful kind of interaction; it receives no mystic 
baptism because it is associated with therapy. Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & 
Pierce (1967) suggest that life itself ''without confrontation is directionles~ 
passive, and impot~nt" (p. 172). One of the reasons why confrontation 
seems necessary for full human living is what might be called the ''bias" 
nature of man: man, when unchallenged, tends to drift towards extremes, he 
becomes either too much "for" himself (Anderson, 1964) or too much "against" 
himself (Reik, 1949}. Or he merely drifts into the "psychopathology of the 
average," which, given his potentialities, is also an extreme. The mature 
man is one who has learned to challenge himself and his own behavior; is 
always looking for more productive ways to be and interact with others. But, 
since he is really mature, when he fails to challenge himself, he is grateful 
when his friends (and perhaps even his enemies) are concerned enough to 
confront him. 
Confrontation, then, has its place first of all in all mature human 
interaction, and, because it is a modality of mature living, it also belongs 
both in interactions which attempt to explore human potentialities and deal 
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with the "psychopathology of the average" (training laboratories) and in 
interactions designed to come to grips with more serious problems in living 
(psychotherapy). It is not strange to find confrontation in therapy and 
other interpersonal-growth experiences, rather it is strange that "normal" 
men make such limited and ineffectual use of such a powerful growth variable. 
Confrontation, psychoanalysis, and client-centered counseling. Douds, 
Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce (1967) note the general failure of the 
"psychotherapies" to deal with the issue of confrontation: "Confrontation, 
as life, continues independently of all therapeutic models. With the possible 
exception of the existentialists, none of the major systems leaves room for 
the concept of confrontation: the existentialists alone approach confronta-
tion by their concept of 'encounter"' (p. 170). Many of the therapies in 
existence today have been directly or indirectly, but still deeply, influenced 
by both the psychoanalytic tradition and, at least in the United States, the 
non-directive approach. Non-directive approaches, by definition, eliminate 
direct confrontation and the therapies that have been influenced by the 
psychoanalytic tradition have stressed insight rather than action (see London, 
1964). Douds and his associates (1967) believe that the absence of confronta-
tion in therapy has produced a rather exsanguinated therapeutic culture; they 
refer to the "middle-class" therapy "which hopes to seduce the illness aw< " 
(p. 171). With regard to the non-directive tradition, however, perhaps we 
have come full circle in a spiral of growth. In Hegelian terms, the thesi~ 
would be therapy as advice-giving, therapy in which the therapist took over 
the direction of the other's life, therapy that was too heavy-handed, robbj,-
the client of his freedom to grow. In the main the non-directive appro3ch 
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became the antithesis to such a tradition and stressed total acceptance and 
empathy, the ability to get into the ''world" of the client. The synthesis, 
the beginnings of which are being felt today, finds a place in therapy for 
responsible confrontation, but in an atmosphere of unconditional positive 
regard and empathy. 
Confrontation and other therapies. Although theoretically few writings 
deal directly and separately with confrontation as a therapy variable, this 
does not mean that therapies in which confrontation plays a key if not centra 
role do not exist. Synanon and Daytop Village (Casriel, 1962; Maslow, 1967; 
Patton, 1967; Shelly & Bassin, 1965; Yablonsky, 1965) have been using 
confrontational "encounters" as an important part of their total institutiona· 
program; and it is with some frequency that those participating in the progr 
are called to task because they are ''talking the talk but not walking the 
walk," that is, their behavior is lagging behind Daytop & Synancin expecta:n-
cies. Alcoholics Anonymous groups have long been confronting what they call 
the "stinkin' thinkin" of members who try to rationalize and excuse their 
behavior. Mainord (1968a, 1968b) and Mowrer (Mowrer, 1967; Drakeford, 1967) 
have for years now been using contractual approaches to therapy in which 
contract-oriented confrontation plays a major role. For instance, Mainord 







How did you get along sexually? 
Not very well. 
What do you mean? 
I'd rather not talk about that--it gives me this 
terrible feeling just to think about it. 
Your agreement was to be completely honest, and that 
witholding information was to be considered dishonest. 
You didn't agree to be honest only when it felt 
good, if you'll remember (1968b, p. 1). 
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Ellis (1962) uses logic, reasoning, suggestions, persuasion, and prescription 
of activities in his rational-emotive psychotherapy, all of which contain a 
large element of confrontation: 
TH: Let's get back to changing John. Would it be so terrible if 
you got refused, even by a girl you didn't know that there was a 
good chance beforehand she was going to refuse you, and you didn't 
know at all what was going to be? Or would it be so terrible if 
you gradiosely didn't get exactly what you wanted without any 
effect and without their selecting you? 
PT: No, it, uh, it wouldn't be bad. This I, you know, I, this 
I can logically believe this. 
TH: At times. 
PT: Yeah, at times. 
TH: But most of the time, more strongly, you still believe the other 
things ••• (Patterson, 1966, pp. 128-129). 
Bach (1966) conducts "Marathon" groups according to rules which demand a kind 
of total confrontation or what he calls "constructive aggression" (p. 998). 
The ordinary rules of tact are suspended for the duration of the Marathon. 
Stoller (1968b) also outlines a kind of marathon therapy in which confronta-
tion plays an important part. Beier (1966) has written on the use of the 
"asocial" response as a means use9. by the therapist to free himself from the 
"games" of his client and to confront the client with what he is really 
saying or impl.ying. Corsini' s (1968) "immediate therapy" is a form of 
group therapy in which both self-confrontation in conununity and confrur:tation 
by others play a central role. The existentialists (e.g., Frankel, 1962; 
May, 1958, 1961; May & van Kaam, 1963; van Kaam, 1962) place such emphasis 
on the client's "possibilities" and on his freedom and responsibility that 
confrontational encounters between patient and therapist are inevitable. 
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The list of those who use confrontation as one of their therapeutic 
tools could, I am sure, be lengthened considerably, but the point here is 
that confrontation is not new to therapy just as it is not new to life 
(Plato long ago said that the unexamined life is not worth living, and the 
unchallenged life tends to be the unexamined life). Moreover, there is a 
good deal of informal experimentation with confrontation taking place both 
in therapy and in laboratory-training situations. As a powerful element of 
human interaction, it can both stimulate personal and interpersonal growth 
and it can cause extensive harm. In inept hands it becomes the tool of the 
user's own deficits and pathology. On the other hand, when used responsibly, 
it becomes another avenue of involvement with and concern for the other. 
What follows is an attempt to describe confrontation and its caricatures and 
to indicate some of its uses in a variety of growth-group experiences. 
Toward ~ Description of Confrontation. Berne (1966) defines confronta-
tion in terms of his transactional system: 
In confrontation the therapist uses information previously 
elicited and specified, in order to disconcert the patient's 
Parent, Child, or contaminated Adult by pointing out an 
inconsistency. The patient is stirred up and his psyche is 
thrown out of balance, and this tends to cause a redistribu-
tion of cathexis .•• 
To the patient's Child, a confrontation may represent a Parental 
move in a game that stimulates defensive operations learned 
early in life .••. To his Adult it may represent an intellectual 
challenge for which he is grateful ("I never noticed that 
before"). To his Parent it may represent an incursion on 
Parental authority •.•. (p. 235). 
Confrontation, therefore, has the purpose of ending a "game" type of inter-
action, but if it is not reacted to properly, it becomes a stimulus for 
further game-involvement. Douds and his associates (1967) describe confron-
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tation in a way that is more adaptable to the needs of a sensitivity-group: 
Direct confrontation is an act, not a reaction. It is initiated 
by the therapist, based on his core understanding of the client. 
It brings the client into more direct contact with himself, his 
strengths and resources, as well as his self-destructive behavior. 
The purpose of confrontation is to reduce the ambiguity and 
incongruities in the client's experiencing and communication. In 
effect, it is a challenge to the client to become integrated; that 
is, one with his own experience. It is directed at discrepancies 
within the client (his ideal versus real self); between what the 
client says and does (insight and action); and between illusion and 
reality (the therapist's experience of the client versus the 
client's expression of his experience of himself and the therapist). 
The therapeutic goal is nondestructive and emerging unity within 
the client. It implies a constructive attack upon an unhealthy 
confederation of miscellaneous illusions, fantasies, and life 
avoidance techniques in order to create a reintegration at a higher 
level of health (p. 171). 
This is the kind of confrontation that people engage in who are concerned abou 
one another. 
The measurement of confrontation in research. Berenson and his 
associates (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & 
Moravec, 1968) have distinguished five "major" types of confrontation for the 
purpose of research: 
Five major types of confrontation were employed: Experiential, 
Didactic, Strength, Weakness and Encouragement to Action •••• 
Experiential confrontation was defined as the therapist's 
specific response to any discrepancy between patient and ther-
apist's experiencing of the patient, or to any discrepancy 
between patient statement about himself and patient's inner 
experience of himself, or to say discrepancy between patient 
and therapist's, experience of the therapist. A didactic confron·-
tation was defined as the therapist's direct clarification of 
the patient's misinformation or lack of information. This type 
of confrontation may include the therapist's efforts to offer the 
patient information based on test data, behavior, or data about 
some aspect of the world as well as details about the therapist 
or the structure and function of the therapy process. Confronta-
tion of Strength referred to an experiential confrontation which 
focused on the patient's resources. Weakness referred to an 
experiential confrontation which focused on the patient's 
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liabilities or pathology. Finally, Encouragment to Action 
involved the therapist pressing the patient to act on his world 
in some constructive manner and discouraging a passive stance 
toward life. Frequency and type of confrontation were accepted 
only when the two independent judges agreed upon both presence 
and type of confrontation (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968, 
pp. 111-112). 
In a sense, then, there are only three types, for Strength and Weakness are 
both subdivisions of Experiential confrontation. Results seem to indicate 
that "high-level" therapists use "experiential" confrontation more frequently, 
while "low-level" therapists tend to confront the client's weaknesses (howeve , 
confrontation of weakness is defined in the article as a kind of "experien-
tial" confrontation). Whether these are the categories which will eventually 
prove most helpful in research remains to be seen, but certainly a much 
clearer theoretical discussion of the bases for classification is needed at 
the present time. 
Truax and his associates (Truax, Fine, Moravec, and Millis, 1968) have 
studied the effects of therapist persuasive potency in individual psycho-
therapy. A therapist is high in persuasive potency if during an interview he 
"is the kind of person that communicates a socially influential or potent 
person" (p. 360--again, a clearer operational definition of "persuasive 
potency" would have made this article more meaningful). The results suggeste 
"that therapist persuasiveness operates to effect patient improvement 
somewhat independently of other personal qualities of the therapist (specifi-
cally his level of accurate empathy and nonpossessive warmth for the patient)' 
(p. 362). I would hypothesize that there is some positive relationship be-
tween therapist "persuasive potency" and his ability to L':1gage in growthful 
confrontation. Indeed the relationship between persuasion (see Frank, 1961) 
----------------------------------...... --------..... --~----------.._ ........... ._ .... ______ ~~----
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and confrontation in therapy and other growth experiences is an intriguing 
one, but little can be said until more effective operational definitions for 
and measurement of both persuasion and confrontation have been devised and 
research has been carried out. I would now like to dissect the act of 
confrontation and suggest ways in which it can become an effective variable 
in interpersonal growth experiences. 
THE ANATOMY OF CONFRONTATION 
Generally confrontation takes place (1) when one person (the confronter) 
either deliberately or inadvertantly places some act (2) which causes or 
directs another person (the confrontee) to advert to, reflect upon, examine, 
question, or change some particular aspect of his behavior. In other words, 
some act on the part of the confronter--whether he is aware of it or not--
acts as a stimulus to the confrontee and this stimulus-act has a specific 
effect on the confrontee: it challenges him, "pulls him up short," directs 
him to reflect upon or change some aspect of his behavior (behavior, that is, 
in wide sense: overt acts, inaction, attitudes, moods, etc.). I believe 
that confrontation must be described or defined as ge~erally as this if it 
is to include all behavior that is referred to in the literature as confron-
tational. Moreover, if it is defined this generally, it becomes q11lte easy 
to see that there are many different forms (both growthful and destructive) 
and many different degrees of confrontation. It is extremely importcmt f,"r 
sensitivity-training participants to understand the natur.e of confronL1l i,'n 
and to become acquainted with the different forms it can take, for it can ' 
one of the most potent forms of interpersonal behavior and i ~s powe ;· should 
be respected. 
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At first glance confrontation is a simple process, but it can become 
extremely complicated because of the variables involved: 
(1) the nature of the stimulus act; 
(2) the natural "bias" of the confronter; 
(3) the relationship between the confronter and the confrontee; 
(4) the motivation of the confronter; 
(5) the manner in which the confrontation takes place; 
(6) the effect which the stimulus act has on the confrontee; 
(7) the manner in which the confrontee responds to the confrontation. 
Each of these elements of the confrontational process merits separate 
consideration. 
(1) The nature of the stimulus act: the forms of confrontation. 
A wide variety of act, both verbal and nonverbal, may have a confronta-
tional effect upon any particular person. If the confronter realizes or 
suspects that some act that he places will have a confrontational effect on 
someone else, then he is deliberately engaging in the modality of confronta-
tion. However, if he merely places an act which de facto has some confron-
tational effect which he neither foresaw or intended, then the confrontation 
is not deliberate. I.t is evident that group members should become as aware 
as possible of the effects of the acts they place, for :hdeliberate (and t 1'• 1s 
uncontrolled) confrontation can be destructive. A review of some of 
of stimulus-acts that can have confrontational effects is a starting 
for making confrontation a more rational process. 
Confrontation can take place through a variety of stimulus acts. The. 




(a) giving the confrontee information he does not possess or is 
considered to possess in an adequate way; 
(b) interpretation of the confrontee's behavior; 
(c) directly challenging the other's behavior; 
(d) self-involvement of confronter with confrontee as a mode of 
confrontation; 
(e) group situational variables which are considered confrontational, 
e.g., group exercises, the contract itself in a contract group, 
being with strangers, etc.; 
(f) "processing," that is, group self-criticism; 
(g) withdrawal of reinforcement; 
(h) the use of videotape. 
Each of these will be taken up in order. 
(a) Confrontation through information. One of the basic forms of 
confrontation is to transmit to another sume infonnation concerning his 
person. Again such information transmission may or may not be deliberate 
and it may not be foreseen that it will have a confrontational effect. One 
way of illustrating this process is by means of the "Johari Window" 
(Luft & Ingham, 1955), which we have already seen in Chapter VII. (See 
Figure 1). Each quadrant of the "window" is defined by its coordinates. 
Therefore, Quadrant II (blind area) involves those things which a person 
does not know (at least in some sense of "know") about himself but which are 
known by at least some others. In confrontation through information the 
confronter moves some kind of information that has some relationship to tht:: 
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"outside" another he has a view of the other of which the other is meta-
physically incapable. In this sense, those that surround us are, at least 
potentially, valuable sources of information about our own persons, for they 
have sources of evidence that are not directly available to us. 
If confrontation were merely a question of the transmission of correct 
and meaningful information by a concerned observer to a willing listener in 
order that the latter might engage in and grow t~rough self-examination and 
subsequent behavioral-change, then everything would be simple indeed. In 
reality, however, such simplicity has to be learned: it is a goal rather 
than a starting point. In confrontation-through-information, there are a 
number of important variables: the nature of the information transmitted 
(its veridical status and/or hypothetical character), the person (confronter, 
confrontee, or other) to whom it principally refers, the fact as to whether 
or not the seriousness of the information, and the differential meaning the 
information has for confronter, confrontee, and the other members of the 
group. Since these factors influence the quality of the confrontation, they 
must be taken into consideration. 
A third set of statements deals with the interpretations of behavioral 
cues emitted by the confrontee. These will be dealt with below under 
"interpretations." 
Does the confrontee already possess this information or not? If the 
confrontee suspects or knows that what he has to say is already known by 
the confrontee, then he should weigh the consequences of telling someone 
what he already knows. For instance, if he says to another participant: 
"You have not said a word here this C:Jening," undoubtedly the other already 
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realizes this. If the information is already known, then the confronter 
should manifest his intent in repeating it; for instance, he should explain 
how he feels about the other's silence and why he has interrupted it. 
Usually the confronter assumes that what he has to say is "unknown" 
to the other in some sense of the word "unknown." For instance, the 
confronter may think that the information, though known, bears repeating, 
that it should be brought "into community," that repeating it here and now 
would have a specific effect, that it needs to be dramatized, etc. In this 
case he assumes that the confrontee does not ''know" the information well 
enough to act upon it, that is, the information is "unknown" in the sense 
that it has either made little impression on the confrontee or has not had 
any behavioral consequences. On the other hand, if the confronter realizes 
that it is most likely that the confrontee simply does not possess the 
information that he is about to transmit, then he should first weigh the 
consequences of his act, its surprise or "shock" value, the impact it will 
have on the group, etc. In other words, the confronter should have a healthy 
respect for the power of knowledge and use it reasonably. 
The importance of the information and its differential meaning ~ 
confronter and confrontee. ''Your tie is crooked" is a relatively unimportant 
piece of information, while ''You have bad breath" or "I notice that John 
never sits close to you" might be relatively more important. The seriousness 
or the objective importance of a piece of information will usually determine 
its impact on the group as a whole, including the confrontee, but still at 
times the subjective meaning of any particular bi~ . i irt;"ormation might di ff e1 
greatly with respect to confronter, confrontee, or any other member of the 
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group. For instance, if the confronter says, "Your tie is crooked," this might 
be accepted by the confrontee and the group as a whole with a certain amount 
of indifference, but the point is that a crooked tie on this particular person 
might bother the confronter quite a bit. On the other hand, the confrontee 
might be particularly sensitive to information that is relatively meaningless 
to confronter and the group as a whole. The intelligent and considerate 
confronter is one who can judge not only the absolute importance of any piece 
of information but its relative importance to the confrontee and to the 
others. If there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective impor-
tance of what the confronter has to say and its subjective meaning to him, 
it might be best if he were to lay the entire problem before the group: 
"You know, your tie is crooked and that has been bothering me. I tend to be 
compulsive, I know, but I really think it bothers me because it is your tie 
that is crooked. I think that I have something to work out with you." This 
keeps the real issue before the group. Furthermore, if the confronter suspec:ts 
that there is a good deal of discrepancy between the objective importance of 
the information and the subjective meaning it has for the confrontee, he will 
have to decide what constructive use may be made of the information. 
(b) Interpretation ~~stimulus-act. Interpretation of the behavior 
of another as a mode of confrontation is a two-edged sword: :it can either be 
a powerful stimulus to fruitful self-examination or it can lead to irrelevant 
and meaningless speculation and be utilized as a means of flight by an 
individual and by an entire group. If interpretations are nothing more than 
detached intellectualized exercises on the part of the confronter, then he 
is playing "psychiatrist" in a game of "psychiatry," the purpose of the game 
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being to avoid intir:iacy. Interpretation as a game is at best an exercise in 
logic; at worst it is a destructive form of manipulation of the other. On 
the other hand, interpretation, if carried out with skill, integrity, and 
empathy, can be a powerful stimulus to growth. 
Theoretically interpretation leads to insight and insight is supposed 
to be some kind of key to better psychological living. This point of view, 
however, is currently being strongly challenged: 
As for goals of therapy, the actionists allege that Insight 
therapists delude themselves and at their worst, defraud 
society, by claiming to sell self-knowledge, for this is what 
practically nobody comes to them to buy. Even knowing that 
their clients seek relief, not information, they stock their 
bazaars with certificates their license dispensation of a 
balm they do not have. Face to face with customers, they then 
produce a diagram of illness and a blueprint for repair, both 
always the same--they say he suffers from illusions that must 
dissipate when once he knows himself. Chief among them, and 
most illusory of all--he thinks that what he thinks is his 
trouble really is his trouble. Almost by sleight of mind, 
the sufferer's surface troubles are made secondary, and the 
rationalization with which the therapist diverted his attention 
from them to begin with, launches him on his introspective 
voyage, and perhaps keeps him there forever--for when does a 
man really know himself? (London, 1964, pp. 75-76). 
London goes on to maintain that the Action therapists, too, have their 
problems and suggests a combination of the best of both action and insight 
might be the road that therapy must travel. Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, and 
Pierce (1967) also have problems with insight as a vehicle of growth and 
suggest that too often it leads to psychological paralysis: 
In his helplessness and confusion [the client] seeks therapy. 
More of ten than not, he receives insight in the form of a 
conceptual integration of himself. He may choose insight as a 
way of life, a culturally higher, secondary goal. Insight may, 
seemingly, reduce confusion by subsuming the conceptualizations 
he has about himself in a neater package, allowing him the 
illusory belief of being "on the top of his problems,"--he can 
now explain his anxiousness on high level terms. Victimized 
by a wishful need for a magic solution, he accumulates 
insights based on his reactions to different people and 
situations, hoping for THE ULTIMATE INSIGHT which will be an 
answer to everything. Still paralyzed to act, he remains 
dependent and passive, noticeably lacking action and 
directionality in his existence (pp. 172-173). 
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Insight gives the client an "out," a way to not-deal with his behavior. 
Insight in the sense in whi,ch it is under attack here deals principally with 
cognitive systems and the relationships between cognitive systems. The 
problem is that in the client cognitive systems and behavior are in 
separate compartments. The critics of insight might well paraphrase 
Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel and say to the client: "Your insights are 
beautiful castles; too bad you do not live in them." 
However, this does not mean that insight and the interpretations which 
"produce" insight are useless in and of themselves. Interpretations as 
therapeutic variables are certainly prone to certain defects: they are too 
often presented as facts instead of hypotheses and they frequently come as 
packaged answers to questions instead of stimuli designed to goad the 
confrontee into finding his own answers. Moreover the focus of interpretation 
has been the dynamics underlying behavior, the hypothetical sources of 
behavior, rather than behavior itself. But, in the final analysis, both inter 
pretation and insight are valuable to the degree that they lead to constructiv 
behavioral modification: 
A comprehensive psychotherapy of the kind implied by this 
argument would be one that uses both insight and action to 
attack complex psychological problems. But insight, within 
this system, would no longer focus so much on motives as on 
those behaviors, present and historical, that produced 
disorder by violating one's relationship with the functional 






purpose, once achieved, would be to steer the development 
of a new action system, one which channels the individual's 
behavior in ways intended to restore his functioning within 
that context. And the context, the referent that makes the 
action system meaningful, would oe neither the painful 
symptom, nor the wounded selfhood that may lie beneath it, 
but something external to the individual. For most such 
therapies, a social system, real or hypothesized, must 
provide that context (London, 1964, p. 133). 
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Effective interpersonal living is the ultimate goal of therapy or any other 
kind of growth experience and the value of any therapy variable must be 
judged according to this criterion. Interpretations, then, are valuable to th 
degree that they are points of departure for growthful action, whether "insigh " 
intervenes or not. An interpretation is "valid" and an "insight" is "meaning-
ful" if the action which follows from it on the part of the confrontee is 
"growthful," that is, if it leads him to more effective interpersonal relating. 
What then can we say about interpretation as the stimulus in an act of 
confrontation? What antecedent "validity" must it have before it is 
proffered? Slater (1966) suggests that we need not worry much about the 
"validity" of an interpretation, because, in a sense, all interpretations are 
valid: 
••• [I]n psychotherapy, an interpretation can never be incorrect, 
unless it is stated comparatively or quantitatively, since 
human beings are so complex and ambivalent that any statement 
will be accurate at some level. (This follows from the psycho-
logical law that every motive has an equal and opposite 
contramotive,) From a theoretical viewpoint, the issue is 
whether it is salient or not; from the practical one it is 
whether or not it is well timed (p. 162, fn 57). 
I cannot agree with his epistemological views concerning interpretati<m (and 
I will say why presently), but I am in complete accord that the saliencv 
(which 1 consider a practical issue) of the interpretation and other variables 
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associated with the conditions under which it is presented to the confrontee 
are extremely important. The "goodnessn of an interpretation is measured by 
its positive or growthful impact-val~e: it must cause the confrontee to 
examine his concrete behavior, some aspect of his life style, in such a way 
that he is moved to modify this behavior in ways which improve his ability 
to involve himself with others. It is only the empathic confronter that can 
come up with salient interpretations, for he alone is both outside and 
"inside" the confrontee enough to put his finger on issues that are central 
to the confrontee's behavior and life-style. Timing, too, is important: the 
good confronter knows when the confrontee has opened at least enough to 
receive the full impact of an interpretation. Furthermore, confrontation must 
be related to the ongoing process of the group and not just appear from 
nowhere; it should flow from the group experience and be integrated into it. 
:inally, it should be pithy, the starting point for interaction between the 
confronter and the confrontee (and the rest of the group) and not a long-
winded statement with an air of finality. In general, long-winded speeches 
2-n groups, no matter what their "pith and moment" tend to "lose the name of 
action." 
The epistemologx of interpretation. Interpretations transmit 
"information" that is hypothetical, conjectural, inferential: "You know, Bill, 
I think that you have real sexual hang-ups with women and that maybe you are 
even latently homosexual." Such a statement is a hypothesis and as such is 
the conclusion of an inferential process. Since it is a conclusion, it has 
premises: certain behavioral "cues" emitted by the confrontee and a subjectiv 
element, the feelings or "clinical" judgment or insight of the confronter. 
------
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for instance, the premises of the hypothesis stated above might have been: 
"When you talk nth the males in the group you are usually animated and 
interested, but your conversations witJl the females are guarded, short, and 
sometimes clip" and other such behavioral observations together with the feel-
ings and "insights" that lead to the confronter's interpretation of the 
behavioral cues. That is, such hypotheses are inferences based on both fact 
(the behavior of the confrontee) and feeling (the feelings of the confronter 
which arise from the impact the confrontee has on him). 
Since hypothetical statements arise from the process of clinical 
inference, it should be remembered that such judgments suffer from all the 
problems with which the inferential process is plagued. O'Neill (1968) points 
out the bases of clinical inference and the problems to which each kind of 
inference is subject: no matter whether one reasons from definitions and 
categories ("She is obviously schizophrenic"), uses empirical tools of 
varylng accuracy nnd sophistication ("Sho lrns nn olovntl'<l Pd 1-ll'.llrt'. " "Tlit't°l' 
is a poverty of M ro1:1po111,u.rn"), Otl81l!J;tHl ln lntorprtit11l ll'" t11' uymh11\ri ( 11 ::11.., uh11'~' 
a preference for asparagus"), deals in "causal" explanations of behavior 
("He probably has some minimum brain damage," "It is a question of an 
excessively strong superego"), or uses his own emotional reactions, whatever 
their integrity or sensitivity, as the basis of his inferences ("I can tell 
You are ripped up inside," "I feel a tremendous warmth when you talk to me")--
whatever the bases of one's inferences, when it is a question of confrontation 
it is essential to communicate to the confrontee that one is dealing in 
inferences and not in self-evident facts. Moreover, the confronter should 
convey to the confrontee some indication of the degree of certitude he believe. 
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to underlie his hypothesis. The certitude underlying a statement like 
"You are anxious" will probahly differ from the certitude underlying "You 
are dishonest." Every hypothesis, by definition, falls short of certitude 
in some way. The "high visibility" of the contract group demands that the 
confronter give some indication of just how hypothetical his statement is. 
The point is this: in the group, facts should be presented as facts, 
feelings as feelings, and hypotheses as hypotheses. The problem is that too 
often in sensitivity groups the confronter presents his feelings and his 
hypotheses abruptly and apodictically as facts concerning the person of the 
confrontee. As a rule this simply should not take place in the contract 
group • The contract calls for "high visibility." In this case this means 
that the confronter should share with the confrontee the bases of his 
feelings and the premises of his inferences and not wait until they erupt 
abruptly as "facts" (£or they they are really accusations). If the more 
apodictic "You are arrogant" is preceded by the less apodictic "I. feel that 
you are more or less patronizing me" and "Your tone then was pretty harsh" and 
"At times you don't seem to give the rest of us much credit," it is likely 
that there will be more mutual honesty and involvement and less need for 
destructive sledgehanuner-confrontation. If I bring my feelings and my 
premises "into connnunity" as quickly as possible, then the other person can 
share in the inferential process and is more likely to accept a reasonable 
hypothesis concerning his behavior, especially if it contains a realistic 
suggestion for growth. If the participants are willing to be this open, then 
' at least facts will sould like facts, feelings will sound like feelings, and 
hypotheses will sould like hypotheses, and failed epistemology will not muddy 
,,.,,...-··· ·-
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the waters of the group experience. 
(c) The direct challenge. Although there is an element of challenge in 
any kind of deliberate confrontation, still the explicit verbal challenge can 
stand as a specific kind of stimulus-act. In its simplest form the challenge 
is a suggestion, request, or demand that the con£rontee change his behavior 
in some way: "I don't deny that it might be painful, but maybe it would be 
more growthful if you were to try to involve yourself with us more," "Do you 
think that you could honestly answer a few direct questions about our 
relationship, yours and mine?," "Stop monopolizing the conversation." 
Evidently these are examples of bald challenges, whereas most challenges are 
situated in a much wider context of information, explanation, etc. 
The direct challenge as such is neutral, that is, its growth value for 
the confrontee (and for the group) depends on a number of confronter, confron-
tee, and situation variables. For instance, the confronter may act for a 
number of reasons: annoyance, concern for the confrontee, concern for the 
group or others influenced by the behavior of the confrontee, a feeling that 
he "should" say something, etc.; he may challenge the confrontee to do 
something that is growthful or nongrowthful, relevant to the confrontee's 
needs or irrelevant, possible or impossible; the confrontee may or may not 
be prepared for the challenge: he may be hurt and not ready to listen, he 
may be very anxious, etc.; there may or may not be a climate of trust and 
support strong enough to sustain the kind of challenge made. -If the confront-
er fails to take these variables into consideration, he may end up blowing 
in the wind, much to his own frustration. 
It is usually a mistake if the confronter deals in dem.:tnds rather than 
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suggestions and requests when he challenges the behavior of others. Even if 
he does not intend to play God or omnipotent father, he may give the impress-
ion that he is doing so, and this tends to destroy any value that the confron-
tation might otherwise have. Since no one can predict with absolute certainty 
whether a change in andher's behavior will benefit the other or not, there is 
always an element of hypothesis in every challenge. Therefore, as in 
confrontation-through-information, the degree of certitude associated with 
the hypothesis should dictate the manner in which the challenge is made. If 
the confrontee's behavior is obviously self-destructive or destructive of those 
around him, then the challenge can be put quite directly and forcefully. If, 
on the other hand, the confronter only suspects that a change in behavior 
will benefit the confrontee or others, the force or the "demand-element" in 
the challenge must be proportioned to the certitude of the hypothesis 
underlying the challenge. For instance, whenever a confronter says to a 
confrontee: "You talk too much here," there are certain hypotheses and 
attitudes underlying such a challenge, e.g., that the confrontee talks but 
says nothing, that he monopolizes the time of the group, that he is exhibition-
istic, that he prevents other members who want to interact from interacting, 
etc. Perhaps it would be more realistic to say that no matter how forcefully 
the confronter challenges the behavior of the confrontee, honesty demands 
that he deal openly with whatever is implicit in his challenge. If the 
confronter is willing to do this, he will soon learn whether he tends to 
challenge others because of his concern for them or because of his own needs. 
Calling the other's game. A special and quite effective form of direct 
challenge consists in "calling the other's game." According to Beier (1966--
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a book well worth reading in its entirety), many patients in therapy attempt 
to "engage" the therapist either by their verbalizations or other communica-
tions, that is, they try to get the therapist to play their "game." The 
patient tries to hide his game under the guise of certain conventions, his 
real intent lying in subtle cues rather than in the overt message: 
Subtle cues are actually the means by which a sender constricts 
the response outcome. He uses these subtle cues to influence 
and control another person's responses to his own ends with only 
a minimal risk of being exposed for his attempts .••• 
In addition to constructing the respondent's possible recogni-
tion of his intentions, an individual can, as stated earlier, 
also hide the meaning of his manipulation from his own aware-
ness. With his subtle hidden cues he can influence the respon-
dent and bid for and provoke certain responses, yet maintain that 
he is quite innocent, that he really had no share in triggering 
these response activities •••• 
The mechanism described here allows the sender to 'engage' the 
respondent and at the same time reduce the possibility of 
exposing his own intentions. The concept of engagement leads 
to new observations helpful in the analysis of the communicative 
process, particularly with reference to understanding certain 
practices in the psychotherapeutic process (pp. 280-281). 
The purpose of "engagement" is to keep the environment as safe as possible: 
Vulnerability, then, gives rise to certain preferred behaviors 
in interaction, which are ways of engaging and involving another 
person. When carefully analyzed, these messages seem to yield 
the ideas that made the individual vulnerable in the first place. 
An individual's preferred modes of interaction are not merely 
defenses; they are also behaviors that seek out ce".~~ain responses 
in the environment. They trigger responses that are safe (as 
the sender has created an emotional climate in the respondent 
by which the resp0nse activity has been constricted) and 
apparently are also rewarding. They give the patic~nt the 
experience that he is still dealing, still 'alive' in the .area 
of his vulnerability (p. 281). 
The effective therapist "disengages" himself from the patient's game, 
affording the latter an opportunity to grow: J 
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The therapist is most effective when he provides disengaged 
responses that do not reinforce the patient's present behavior. 
The therapist's responses not only interrupt the patient's 
expectancies (and in this manner extinguish association) but, 
being disengaged, are actually designed to give the patient 
the experience of 'beneficial uncertainty.' This experience 
provides a challenge to explore new choices- in a nonthreaten-
ing situation. The patient should experience with the therapist, 
message by message, that he can tolerate the uncertainty and 
even utilize if for the discovery of territory previously 
prohibited to him. He will experience that in this 'sanctuary' 
he can forgo the dangers and pleasures of being misunderstood, 
and so his messages will become less discordant. 
Through the disengaged response, the therapist trains the patient 
to give more freedom to the people he encounters (p. 283). 
This is one example where withdrawal of reinforcement is an effective mode of 
confrontation. 
The general instrument of "disengagement" is what Beier calls the 
"asocial" response, a response which indicates a refusal on the part of the 
therapist to give "conventional" replies to the conventions the patient uses 
to restrict the therapist's interaction. It is a response that fails to 
reinforce the patient's expectations. A few samples of such responses will 
illustrate what is meant: 
Patient: I hate you. 
Therapist: Go on (p. 51). 
Patient: You are sure a quack. I don't think I should come to 
see you again. 
Therapist: To seek help from an ignorant man like myself, this is 
crazy (p. 53) . 
A patient who claims she has been raped says: I like you very much, 
I even dream of you. 




Nice weather today. 
Oh, yes, I love a blue sky. 
And the clouds are just beautiful. And the wind is 
blowing so sweetly. And the sun is sparking, bright and 
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handsome. 
Member 1: Let's get going (p. 149). 
Patient: You only see me for the money. 
Therapist: Why would anyone want to see a fellow like you for 
anything but money1 (p. 60). 
The "asocial" response "disengages" the patient, thus placing him in a state 
of "beneficial uncertainty," but it is a type of growthful uncertainty 
especially in view of the fact that it takes place in an atmosphere of 
acceptance and support. 
Others suggest a variety of approaches to "catch" patients in their 
attempts to keep growth at a distance and to ward off constructive inter-
personal contacts. Dreikurs (1967) suggests that patients in psychotherapy 
use their symptoms to cover up their real intentions and he considers one of 
the goals of the therapeutic process the revelation of the "game": "As 
Adler pointed out, one of the most effective therapeutic means is 'spitting 
in the patient's soup.' He can continue what he is doing, but it no longer 
'tastes as good"' (p. 230). Ellis (1962) challenges the "illogicalities" to 
which the patient is addicted and which he (the patient) perpetuates by his 
·1erbalizations. Beier claims that although what he proposes may sound like 
Ellis' rational-emotive therapy, it is really different: "Ellis argues the 
patient into behaving rationally, while we propose to provide the patient 
with responses that give him the experience of beneficial uncertainty about 
his previous expectations. We propose that with the proper, disengaged 
response by a therapist, the patient is placed in a position. where he can 
make more adequate choices" (p. 55). That is, Beier jolts the client into 
experiencing his own freedom, while Ellis is much more interested (or more 
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exclusively interested) in the client's behavioral changes. 
, I 
I 
What Beier proposes pertains, I would suggest, not just to therapy but 
to sensitivity training, other growth experiences, and life itself. We 
would be better off if others were to respond to us "asocially" more 
often, catch us in our games, pull us up short. Beier (1966, in discussing 
family group therapy, offers three guidelines for effective confrontation: 
he suggests that the therapist should intervene (1) when a member says or 
implies that someone else must change to solve his (the speaker's) problem 
("If John would only stop drinking .•• "), (2) when any member makes a 
' statement which is designed to maintain the past ("Well, this is the way my 
father was and his before him," "My wife wants me to be more aggressive, but 
I am what I am, and I can't help it"), and (3) when a member constricts I 
communication by asking "loaded" questions or by giving connotations of which I 
he may not be aware ("We always talk things over, don't we, dear?," "Isn't 
that the way you have always treated me?"). These kinds of communications i I 
always crop up in sensitivity-training groups and they should be challenged, 
but not just by the leader; in the contract-group all the members agree to 
challenge such response-restricting communications. 
(d) Involvement of self~!!. stimulus-act. Not every kind of confron-
tation is an explicit and direct form of con r: un td t L,;n. If a person tries 
to live up to the implicit contract of any sensitivity-training group or tr•· I 
explicit one of the contract-group, he will take an active role in "contactinc; 
others in various ways, especially through the modalities of the contract, 
e.g. self-disclosure, expression of feeling, and support. In short, he will 
reach out to others in attempts to establish varying degrees of intimacy. 
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Such contact is confronting because intimacy itself is confronting. The 
person being contacted, the "confrontee," feels himself being reached out 
to, he feels himself as the object of unconditional positive regard and 
.. --
empathy, he fee.S the impact of the other's congruence, he experiences the 
other as a locus of deep feelings and emotions. But in many ways he is 
probably not used to such behavior, especially such focused behavior, and it 
"pulls him up short," it makes him take stock of himself, it makes him reach 
for responses that are not usually at hand. Intimacy in our culture is 
almost bound to have a confrontational effect, especially when it is set in 
sharp focus through the experiences of the laboratory. Since these indirect 
forms of confrontation can be as strong or even stronger than more direct 
forms such as challenges of the other's behavior, the participants should be 
as aware as possible of the impact their behavior is having on the other. 
Some of the conflicts which arise in the laboratory stem from the fact that 
a participant's whole mode of behavior has been confrontational without his 
realizing it. For instance, the way a participant interacts with another may 
place the other under extreme emotional pressure. If this is the case and it 
is not sensed by the confronter, then the confrontee or someone else should 
advert to what is happening: "John, you are making tremendous emotional 
demands on me right now, and I do not think that I can reply to them at this 
time or under these conditions." Indirect forms of confrontation have the 
same effects, generally speaking, as more direct forms and should be pursued 
in the same way. 
(e) Group situation variables as confrontational. Certain aspects 
of the laboratory experience itself are designed to have a confrontational 
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effect on the participant. In the contract group the contract itself is an 
instrument of confrontation: it outlines a rather demanding set of inter-
?ersonal behaviors and usually sends the prospective participant searching 
into himself to see if he has the resources necessary to engage in such 
behaviors. The fact that a certain degree of intimacy is demanded in any 
sensitivity-training group is confronting enough, but this is compounded by 
the fact that the participant finds himself in a "stranger-group": he does 
not choose his bedfellows. As he looks around the group, it is as if each of 
the other participants were saying: "Here I am; you have to deal with me." 
It is not that any of the participants verbalizes or even conceptualizes such 
a challenge, rather each is the challenge by his very being. The verbal and 
1 ~onverbal exercises used to stimulate communication in the group constitute 
lanother source of confrontation. The participant finds himself touching others 
or Jroking at others without using words, and such focusing in on relatively 
molecular aspects of the interactional process is foreign to him and as such 
places its own set of demands on him. One commonly used exercise,called 
prescription, is directly confrontational. If this exercise is used, then some 
where towards the middle of the "life" of the group each member takes his 
turn leaving the group while the others work out a "prescription" for him, 
that is a set of suggestions for improving the quality of his interpersonal 
'living. When he returns to the group, the prescription is presented to him 
rand he can use it' if he wants' as a basis for further experimentation in 
I 
:the group. These are just a few of the group variables that can have a 
l 
!confrontational effect; whether they do not depend on how they are perceived 
lby the individual participant. 
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(f) Processing ~ a group mode of self-confrontation. "Processing" 
is a very useful form of group interaction. After the participants have been 
interacting for a while, the interaction is stopped and the members "process" 
what has been taking place, that is, they try to examine the nature of the 
interaction and answer such questions as: ''What have we been doing here? 
!low have we been interacting with one another? Who has been interacting with 
whom? What have been our communication blocks? Who has been active? Who 
has been silent? Which participants have assumed leadership roles? Who has 
been bored? Processing gives the group an opportunity to be its own critic. 
The members receive a kind of "cultural permission," as it were, to stand 
outside themselves and act as critics of their own behavior. Remarks made 
during this period are not taken as "critical" in a negative sense, because 
responsible criticism is ~he very meaning of this processing interlude. Very 
of ten because of this cultural permission participants will find themselves 
saying things that they simply had not been able to say during the group 
interaction itself: "We have really been beating the air," "John, I think 
you wanted to get us going, but you really monopolized the situation," 
"Bill, I am not so sure now that I was really honest with you," "I think we 
showed how really afraid of self-disclos.re we are," "I was just too anxious 
to say anything." In the early stages of the group life, processing is 
something that stands "outside" the regular interaction of the group. This 
gives the members an opportunity to realize that self-criticism can be quite 
constructive. Gradually, however, the members lenrn to incorporate processing 
I into the regular group interaction itself. Until this is possible, processing 
! periods provide excellent opportunities for groups to confront themselves, 
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to admit and frankly examine the modes of flight which individuals and the 
group as a whole have been utilizing, and to do so without arousing 
intolerable anxiety. 
(g) Withdrawal of reinforcement as confrontational. As seen above, 
Beier' s "asocial" response is one that fails to reinforce certain behaviors 
that are seen as nongrowthful. Other such withdrawals of reinforcement in 
sensitivity groups can also serve as stimuli with confrontational effects. 
For instance, the person who uses humor to flee intimacy or interrupt inter-
j actions which are uncomfortable for him is reinforced in such behavior when 
' I others laugh. Tension dissipates and uncomfortable issues are sidetracked. 
! 
I A refusal to reinforce such behavior, that is, a refusal to laugh and/or 
I 
aJandon an uncomfortable issue, is confrontational. Another example is the 
non-involving monologue: if group participants tend to deliver monologues 
which prevent mutual interaction, then passive attentiveness will be an 
effective reinforcer. Confrontation in this case means interrupting and 
:;:igaging the speaker. Part of the "processing" of group interactior. should 
consist in pointing out the .ways in which unproductive forms of behavior in 
the group are reinforced and in determining effective ways of withdrawing 
such reinforcement. If the participants fail to support a- or anti-contractua 
behavior, the group will become less diffuse and more productive. 
(h) Videotape as a vehicle of confrontation. Since about 1960 an 
increasing amount of research has taken place in which attenpts have Li,. 
made to alter the behavior of psychiatric patients by confronting them with 
photographs, movies, or videotape recordings of their appearance and behavior 









:liller, 1963; Miller, 1962; Moore & West, 1965; Pascal, Cottrell, & Baugh, 1967 
Rogers, 1968; Stoller, 1968; Ward & Bendak, 1964). This technique has also 
been used with cardiac patients (Verwoerdt, Nowlin, & Agnello, 1965) and in 
the training of counselors and psychotherapists (Schiff & Reivich, 1964; Walz 
& Johnston, 1963). Boyd arid Sisney (1967), using videotape playbacks, found 
that "interpersonal concepts of the self, the ideal self, and the public self 
became less pathological and less discrepant with one another following the 
self-image confrontation" (p. 291). One of the primary advantages of feedback 
by videotape is its objectivity, its "cleanness." The confrontee is confronte 
by himself, and, since he cannot charge bias, rationalizations are relatively 
useless. Furthermore, the confrontee sees his behavior in context, he gets 
a view of the molar realities of his interaction which ordinarily escape him. 
Re can more readily see thos,e aspects of his behavior which elicit what Stolle 
(1968) calls "discrepant" feedback, that is, response to his behavior other 
than what he believed he would receive. I find that immediate playback of 
the tape tends to have the greatest impact value, for, as Rogers (1968) notes 
"the closeness in time to the behavior that has just happened makes it 
difficult to disown what has occurred" (p. 38). In time, videotape feedback 
should become one of the most potent sources of confrontation in both 
individual and group therapy and in laboratory-training experiences. 
(2) The natural "bias" of the confronter. 
A second factor to be noted in the confrontation process is the possible 
"bias" of the confronter. If the confronter merely by the fact that he is not 
the other, by the fact that he stands "outside" the other, is in a meta-
physical position to know the others in ways that are not available to the 
426 
I /latter, it is also true that his "separateness" is a source of bias. The 
information which he feeds to the other is processed through the subjective 
filtering systems (e.g. the philosophical, value, and natural psychological 
systems) of the confronter and takes on the latter's "color." Though this 
bias can be minimized (and this depends in large part on how close the con-
fronter is to his own experiencing), it cannot be avoided altogether. 
!fnerefore, both confronter and confrontee should be aware of this phenomenon, 
for it is another source of possible error in the confrontational process. 
Even when the stimulus-act does not consist of information, interpretations, 
or direct challenges on the part of the confronter but rather in the emotional 
impact which he has on the confrontee, the confrontation may still be quite 
biased. The confronter's emotions are real, but they are not necessarily 
realistic. He may "confront" by expressing anger toward someone who really 
did nothing to provoke it (that is, he may be projecting the anger he feels 
toward himself). In such cases his emotions are "biased" (in some sense of 
the word) and thus the confrontee cannot be expected to respond as if he had 
actively provoked these emotions. In general, confronter bias should be 
controlled by group members other than the confrontee, for the latter should 
be as open as possible to constructive confrontation. But this very openness 
makes him less sensitive to sources of confrontational "error." The others, 
therefore, are in a better position to pick up elements of bias and de.:il \,•i th 
them openly. 
(3) The relationship between the confronter and the confrontee. 
Both the long-range and the ad hoc aspects of this relationship affect 




hate, or be indifferent or neutral toward each other, or the relationship 
be a confused or muddied one, marked by an admixture of feelings, 
conscious and semi-conscious, strong and weak, positive and negative. More-
1over, such feelings may be mutual or one-sided. But even though the confronte 
loves the confrontee, at the moment of confrontation he might be acting from 
some lesser motive such as pique, jealousy, momentary irritation, etc. On the 
other han-d, a confronter who generally dislikes another might rise· above his 
feelings and engage in an act of concerned, growthful confrontation. In the 
contract group the participants are asked to be as aware as possible of their 
\relationship to those they confront including the quality of the relationship 
I 
j at the moment of confrontation. If the confronter has really done nothing 
l I to establish a relationship between himself and the confrontee or if he has 
I even rejected overtures of friendship on the part of the confrontee, this is 
I e·1idently going to affect the dynamics of confrontation. There is some 
research evidence that corroborates what seems to be a "common sense" obser-
vation: the behavior of liked persons is seen in a more favorable light than 
:::e behavior of disliked persons even when this perception is not accurate 
I 
(Berkowitz, 1956, 1957; Horowitz, Lyons, & Perlmutter, 1951; Sherif, White, I 
& Harvey, 1955). The responsible participn.nt will first of all be aware of th, 
quality of his relationships and then try to rectify whatever bias might e;;.L t i 
l 
' 
in his perceptions. An ideal atmosphere for confrontation is one in which the 
quality of the relationships is "highly visible." This means a group culture 
in which members know where they stand in relationship to one another because 
these relationships have been dealt with "in community." It is evident, then, 
that confrontations that take place early in the group will oft.::n center 
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around clarifying relationships ("We have really never spoken to each other, 
so I'm not sure where I stand"). The more "real" relationships within the 
I
, group are, that is the more frank,_open, and motivated by concern they are, 
the greater the chance of eliminating some of the natural "bias" factors 
mentioned above. 
(4) The motivation of the conf rontee. 
An analysis of the motivation underlying confrontation has two distinct 
dimensions: (a} the purpose or function of an act of confrontation in itself 
and (b) the motivation of the confronter. Ideally a high degree of correlatio 
I will exist between these two dimensions, that is, the confronter will choose 
to confront because of the growth-functions he sees inherent in an act of 
responsible confrontati_on. These two dimensions, however, are separable, 
and the confronter can choose to confront out of motives that are less than 
ideal. 
(a) The purpose of ~act of confrontation. In general, confrontation 
is just one more modality of interpersonal contact and as such stems, ideally, 
from a desire on the. par,t of the confronter to involve himself more deeply 
with the confrontee. The term confrontation when used in the context of 
international politics connotes a stand-off, a refusal to yield, an impasse, 
an irreducible separateness on the part of the nations involved. However, 
confrontation, as used in the context of growth experiences, has the opposite 
connotation: an act of constructive confrontation is an attempt on the part 
of one person to involve himself with another, it is a way of expressing his 
concern, a way of showing the confrontee that he is "for" him. Confrontation 
is a way of 11being with" rather than "being againstn the other, even though 
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the confronter might disagree strongly with the confrontee. In the contract 
;roup, then, the rule is simple: do not confront if you do not intend to 
involve yourself with the other. The person who confronts in such a way that 
he either does not want or fails to exhibit concern or a willingne$ to become 
1 involved with the confrontee is actually an intruder. Since the intruder 
~erely wants to get "inside" the other for some reason or another without 
fostering any kind of mutuality, it is hypothesized here that such intrusive 
presence is inimical to interpersonal growth and is to be avoided in sensitivit 
groups. 
The direct purpose of an .act of confrontation is not to change the 
.behavior of the other but to create a situation in which it becomes possible 
I 
for him to change his behavior. Confrontation is an invitation to the other 
to engage in self-examination. The confronter, then, invites the confrontee 
"into community" to reflect on his behavior--whether the "community" be a dyad 
or a larger group. The purpose of confrontation is not to restrict the other 
but to free him. The confrontee, then, is given an opportunity--in an 
atmosphere of trust and security--to step back from his behavior in order to 
see it in a different light and from a different viewpoint, that is, as it 
strikes others. It is possible, then, that he will be_ challenged to consider 
perhaps more fruitful or at least less destructive modes of .behavior or to 
take a longer look at the human "possibilities" that are in and around him, 
lbut he will grow only if he chooses from these possibilities. Another way of 
I I sayi,ng this is that one of the purposes of confrontation is to bring the 
I confrontee into more direct contact with his own expc; . ·ncing. Gendlin (1962) 





of alienated man. Rather, through therapy or some other growth experience, 
he can become psychologically "open,'·' that is, he can learn to trust his own 
!experience and use it as a direct referent and source of wisdom. Rogers (1964) 
develops the same theme: 
Most importantly [in therapy], he can begin with much difficulty 
at first, to sense and to feel what is going on within him, what 
he is feeling, what he is experiencing, how he is reacting. He 
uses his experiencing as a direct referent to which he can turn 
in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his 
behavior ••.• As his experiencing becomes more and more open to 
him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his 
feelings, then significant changes begin to occur in his approach 
to values (p. 20). 
Confrontation, the~, becomes a way of inviting the other to become himself 
more fully. 
Another way of looking at confrontation is to see it as an instrument 
whiCh might help the other reduce the amount of "cognitive dissonance" 
I (Festinger, 1957) in his life. One way of reducing such dissonance is to 
I 
i tailor reality to one's own inner needs, and there is an extensive (though 
hardly unchallenged) literature suggesting that such "tailoring" is quite 
Confrontation offers the possibility of realistic resolutio 1 cormnon among men. 
l ~ 0 , , dissonant cognitions. For instance, as Newcomb (1 q5·3) points out, there 
is a very strong tendency to assume that one's highest ranked associates on 
1 a scale of preference return the compliment, however unwarranted such an 
I I assumption might be. Furthermore, the ability to judge the attraction of 
j others toward oneself does not become more accurate with increasing acq uo.ir: -





I may try to ignore whatever cues he emits which would indicate disinter-
On the other hand, 1 could try to make sure where I re:illy stand with 
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him, realizing that positive regard is not always reciprocated. Concerned 
mutual confrontation, then, though it sometimes risks being painful, is a 
powerful tool for the reduction_of dissonance. In the contract group the 
participants are asked to share this kind of openness with one another, 
establishing a group culture that is as dissonance-free as possible. Responsi-
ble confrontation goes far in making reality the measure of one's thinking 
instead of one's thinking the measure of reality. 
(b) The motives of the confronter. Ideally the confronter engages in 
confrontation for the reasons listed above: he involves himself witn the 
confrontee so that they might grow together. However, he may engage in 
confrontation for more idiosyncratic and less growthful reasons: to relieve 
his boredom, to ward off confrontation from himself ("the best defense is a 
good offense"), to punish the confrontee or the entire group, to take flight 
by engaging the group in "game" behavior, to relieve his own frustration and 
anxiety, to fulfill a need to dominate, etc. Moreover, his motivation might 
be mixed, that is, he might confront for a variety of reasons, both good and 
bad. Although it would be an exercise in futility if the confronter himself 
or the group as a whole were to try to unravel the confronter's entire 
Motivational skein, still it is useful for the particpants to realize that 
confrontational behavior, like roost human behavior, is multi-determined, 
multi-motivated. However, if, as far as th0 confronter is able to determine, 
his personal motives are in general agreement with the purpose of confrontatio 
in the group, then he need not worry about ancillary motives. However, if he 
I 
or the group suspects that an~~llary motives are quite important or even I . 
\II 
predominate, then "high visibility" dc.mtmds that he qualify his conf:_ontat~_;"n j ,!1 
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("I may well be biased in my remarks because John and I have never gotten 
along") or, if he fails to do so, that his remarks be challenged by the other 
participants. 
--·-
(5) The manner of confrontation. 
Confrontation implies some kind of separateness, some kind of "gap" 
between confronter and confrontee which the former, for one reason or another, 
desires or feels impelled to close. His reasons for doing so, as we have seen, 
can either enhanc~ or vitiate the act of confrontation. However, good 
motivation is not enough, for even the well-motivated confronter may do so 
in such a way as to thwart the desirable effects of confrontation. 
Punishment as a dimension of confrontation. This question is a thorny 
responsible, seems to have a punitive dimension; some people confront in order 
·to punish and succeed in doing so, but, on the other hand, an act of confron-
tation not intended to be punitive might have quite punitive effects. This 
is problematic because research has not yet given us clear-cut answers with 
respect to the growth-value of punishment in human interactional situations. 
Research s.o far has shown that punishment, depending on the conditions under 
which it is administered, can have both positive and negative effects 
1 (see Bandura, 1962; Church, 1963; Hilgard & Bower, 1966: pp. 83-85; 113-114; 
1133-139; 488-490; Solomon, 1964). Studies indicate that punishment might I be ineffective if it is delayed too long (thus losing its association with 
i the "punishable'' act), that it can serve as a cue for sclecU.11.g an .::ipproprL1te 
I I response (provided that the subject is awnre of alternative responses). that 
t~--~-------------------------------------------------------------
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mild punishment might merely suppress a response temporarily rather than 
eliminating it (though during the time of suppression the subject has an 
opportunity to learn alternative responses), that punishment that produces 
only emotional excitement tends to fixate the punished response, and that it 
is important that punishment be given in the presence of the discriminative 
cues for the response. If the evidence on punishment is not all in, and if 
what we have leads to different conclusions, it is quite difficult to map out 
an intelligent plan for the use of punishment in psychotherapy and other growth 
experiences. To my knowledge, there has been no systematic attempt to do so. 
Most of the research on punishment so far has been carried out on 
animals or on molecular aspects of human behavior, so that the problem of 
application to more molar aspects of human behavior is necessarily an 
unresolved one: "This series of experiments by Estes, with their interpre-
tations, show how, within the experimental and theoretical framework of 
Skinner's system, it is possible to experiment upon problems genuinely 
relevant to the practical control of learning situations. The challenging 
difficulty is finding appropriate ways to test the implications in ~ soc Lt lo 
I context" (Hilgard and Bower, 1966, p. 139, emphasis added). Perhaps sensitiv-
ity-training groups and other forms of laboratory experience will provide a 
realistic "social context" for such research, but the fact is that this has 




in social behavior: 
At times, there is some difficulty in distinguishing between 
reward power and coercive power. Is the withholding of a reward 
really equivalent to a punishment? Is the withdrawal of punish-
ment equivalent to a reward? The answer must be a psychological 
one--it depends upon the situation as it exists for P [a person]. 
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But ordinarily we would answer these questions in the affirmative; 
for P, receiving a reward is a positive valence as is the relief 
of suffering. There is some evidence (Dittes & Kelley, 1956) 
that conformity to group norms in order to gain acceptance (reward 
power) should be distinguiS:ed from conformity as a means of 
forestalling rejection (coerciv~ power). 
The distinction between these two types of power is important 
because the dynamics are different. The concept of sanctions 
sometimes lumps the two together despite their opposite effects. 
While reward power may eventually result in independent systems, 
the effects of coercive power will continue to be dependent. 
Reward power will tend to increase the attraction of P to 0 
[some social agent]; coercive power will decrease this attraction 
(Raven & French, 1958) . The valence of the region of behavior 
will become more negative, acquiring some negative valence from 
the threatened punishment. The negative valence of punishment 
would also spread to other regions of the life space. Lewin 
(1935) has pointed out this distinction between the effects of 
rewards and punishments. In the case of threatened punishment, 
there will be a resultant force on P to leave the field entirely. 
Thus, to achieve conformity, 0 must notonly place a strong 
negative valence in certain regions through threat of P'-mishment, 
but 0 must also introduce restraining forces, or other strong 
valences, so as to prevent P from withdrawing completely from O's 
range of coercive power. Otherwise, the probability of receiving 
the punishment, if P does not conform, will be too low to be 
effective (pp. 614-615). 
:foile much of what is said here is thought-provoking and in some way applicabl 
; ~ot only to sensitivity-groups in general but specifically to the act of 
confrontation in the context of such groups, still it is quite theoretical 
and in need of confirmation by research. 
In vew of the shaky research foundation upon which the social value of 
Punishment rests, one might imagine that it would be excluded from such 
interactions as confrontations in growth groups. Not only has this not been 
the case, but there is a rather interesting body of evidence which would 
indicate that punitive--and sometimes extremely punitive-confrontation has 
quite a salubrious effect on the confrontee. Grinker anJ his asSL'clates (1957 
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attempted to evoke anxiety in hospitalized patients by means of a stressful 
interview, but, to their chagrin, the patients tended to look upon the 
interview as helpful no matter how threatening the interpretations made to 
him (Hawthorne effects?). Heller, Davis, and Myers (1966) studied the 
activity-passivity and the friendliness-hostility dimensions of interviewing 
patients. The most noteworthy point of the experiment was that the only clear 
advantage of interviewer friendliness was that this condition was overwhelm-
I ingly preferred by the subjects. Despite this preference, however, there was 
I no indication that verbal behavior during the interview changed in any way 
as a result of friendliness. In fact, there was some evidence that the 
subjects may have felt more pressure to discuss some possibly threatening 
topics. (e.g. sex) with hostile interviewers. Kushner and Sanalu (1966) 
found that punishment therapy may be best used when there are other factors, 
such as social pressure, WO'X'king on the patient to reduce undesirable 
behavior. They suggest that in aversion therapy the level of punishment 
should be clearly noxious, but not so intense so as to immobilize the organism 
These considerations, it would seem, could well apply to confrontation. 
More striking than these considerations, however, is the apparent 
success of groups in which rather punitive confrontation forms the central 
core of the therapeutic or growth process. Bach (1966) works in the context 
of the group Marathon in which group-pressure "is a major vehicle which can 
move people effectively and quickly from impression making and manipulative 
behavior toward honest, responsible, spontaneous levelling with one another" 
(p. 995). The Marathon situation may be called totally confrontational: 
"It takes devotion mixed with CONSTRUCTIVE AGGRESSION to get people to t.:ike 
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off image-masks and put on honest faces. It takes patience and energy to 
break down resistances against change wh~ch all well-entrenched behavioral 
patterns ••• will put up as part of a person's phoney 'self-esteem. ' •••• Tired 
.--
people tend to be truthful! They do not have the energy to play 'games" 
(p. 998). Bach admits that, at times, .the confrontation can be quite brutal: 
"In the 'feedback' reactions to the expression, no holds are barred! Candid 
'levelling' is expected from everyone, which means participants explicitly 
share and do ~hide or mask their here-and-now, on the spot reactions to 
one another' Tact is 'out' and brutal £.'rankness is 'in'"(p. 1001). An even 
more brutal approach is taken at Daytop=Village; Drakeford (1967) describes 
;•. 
an "encounter" at Daytop: ~. 
Three nights a week the whole population of Daytop musters for a 
ninety-minute session of encounte~. Thia unique even, de.scribed 
as 'the principal formal medium fqr effecting value and behavioral 
changes,' commences with a aatherf.ag in the asseml;>ly room. The 
leader stands to read the namea of the participants in each group 
and designates their meeting plac~s. It ia the prerogative of any 
member of the community to fill out a slip indicating his desire 
to be in a group with a certain o~p.er individual. There may have 
been some difficulty of relationsh~p and he wants to tell this 
other person what is 'on his chest .• ' 
I tried to look nonchalant and unconcerned as I sat in the dining 
room with my assigned group. A man led off with a blast of . 
abuse ••• hia superior who had offe~de4 hJa by hia attitude in a 
work relationship. T• aay that the ltateiaenta of the offended one 
were candid would be a gross 1.nlderstatemant. In a couple of 
minutes the protester was pouring:out a torrent of abuse ••• (p. 72). 
Maslow (1967) was pulled up short by wh~t he witnessed at Daytop Village. He 
found himself re-evaluating his position on the value of confrontation and 
asking himself questions he bad not asked before: 
I have a lot of impressions and thoughts rushing in on me ••• 
Let me say it this way: Do you think that this straight honesty, 
this bluntness that even sounds cruel at times, provides a basis 
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for safety, affection, and respect? It hurts, it must hurt, ••• 
It seems possible that this brutal honesty·, rather than being an 
insult, implies a kind of respect. You can take it as you find 
it, as it really is. And this can be a basis for respect and 
friendship (p. 30). 
A similar type of therapeutic process called the Synanon Game is played at 
Synanon three times a week. Patton (1967) describes the game: 
The Synanon game has been described as 'intense group inter-
action '--which it is. It has also been called 'attack therapy,' 
which tells no.thing at all about the actual game experience. 
One sociologist describe the game as 'verbal street fighting,' a 
threatening analogy, though not an entirely inaccurate one, in 
spite of the limited backgrounds of most Synanon residents in 
streetfighting, verbal or other. For Synanon people the game is 
a group situation where one can spill out his fears and hostility, 
· where he can expect to hear the kinds of truths he cannot see in 
himself, where he can tell others what he really thinks of them 
without retribution, where he can solve the confusions and conflicts 
of his working day and his inter-personal relationships, where he 
can be as spontaneous, creative, rigid, angry, loud or passive 
as he chooses with no authority or rules save one, the proscription 
against physical violence or the threat of it •••• Its weapons are 
the language of truth and accuracy, which always hit a moving 
target; both have no place in the Synanon game--itself ever 
chang:l.µg and becoming (p. 5) • 
No attempt is made here to imply that the populations of such centers as 
Daytop Village and Synanon are comparable to those which engage in sensitivity-
training laboratories nor is it suggested that "brutality therapy" become a 
way of life in such labor4tories. Rather the point is this: severely 
punishing, even brutal, confrontation in each of the contexts described above 
apparently ''works," and somehow this fact must be integrated into a theory of 
confrontation. The point is this: the use of punishment in the control of 
behavior is a very complex question. One simply cannot say: · "I am going to 
' 
punish John by this act of confrontation, but it is· for his own good," unless 
one has some basic understanding of both the effects of punishment in general 
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and of the "how" of the inflicting of punishment in particular: As Solomon 
(1964) notes: 
[T]he effects of punishment are partly determined by those events 
that directly precede it and .. those that directly follow it. A 
punishment is not just a punishment. It is an event in a temporal 
and spatial flow of stimulation and behavior, and its effects will 
be produced by its temporal and spatial point of insertion in that 
flow (p. 242) • 
Thus, to predict in even the grossest way the action of punishment 
on a response, one hs to know how that particular response was orig-
inally inserted in the subject'Tfi"response repertoire (p. 243). 
Campbell and Dunnette (1968) apply some of Solomon's theorizing to laboratory 
trai~ing: 
Based on his and others' research, Solomon theorized that learning 
as a consequence of punishment occurs in a two-stage process: 
First, a conditioned emotional reaction must be established to 
temporarily suppress the unwanted behavior. Second, and most 
important, responses incompatible with the punished response must 
then be reinforced and established; only in this way can one guard 
against the rapid extinction of the conditioned emotional reaction 
and the correspond·ing reappearance of the unwanted behavior. In 
the context of the T group, this means that'punishment' in the form 
of anxiety arousal must be accompanied by the reinforcement and 
shaping of responses incompatible with those responsible for 
originally inducing the anxiety. In a sense this is what the T 
group tries to do; however, it seems r~asonable to ask whether or 
not the usual T group is sufficiently structured to assure the 
sophistic,ated control of stimuli and reinforcement configurations 
necessary in the two-stage process suggested by Solomon. Given the 
variablity of contingencies that this lack of structure probably 
produces, some possible alternative outcomes aiaht be either that 
simply no learning occurs or that some of the negative side effects 
are incurred (p. 78). 
It is hypothesized :here that a contract, especially one which deals specifi-
cally with confrontation as a possibly punitive stimulus, might help to 
control some of the contingencies of which Campbell and Dunnette speak. 
Finally, all of this is said not to discourage the use of confrontation 
even though it almost inevitably.has punitive aide effects but to make the 
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confronter realize that he can expect at times quite negative responses to 
what he might consider most "benevolent" acts of necessarily punitive 
confrontation. 
Confrontation and domination. If confrontation can be used to punish, 
it can also be used to control and dominate. If A confronts B because A thinks 
that he is right and B is wrong, he should be careful of his motivation. AB 
Gibb (1968} notes, when people are fearful, they tend to control. If there 
is an atmosphere of trust in the group, tendencies to confront in order to 
control should diminish. However, if such confrontation continues to be a 
part of any participant's interactional style, this should become a matter for 
group reflection. 
Confrontation in ~ context ~ acceptance and empathy. Research is 
beginning to show that therapists wh:o supply ample amounts of empathy, 
positive regard, and genuineness are more likely to •occasion deeper levels 
of self-exploration in their clients than therapists lacking in these 
qualities (Berenson, Mitchell, & Moravec, 1968; Holder, Carkhuff, & Berenson, 
1967; Piaget, Berenson, & Carkhuff', 1~67; Rogers, 1967; Truax, 1966; Truax 
<~ 
& Carkhuff, 1965). Therefore, if one of the most important functions of 
,· 
confrontation is to invite the other to responsible self-examination "in-
community," then it seems that confrontation would be most effective if 
carried out under the conditions mentioned above, that is, under conditions 
of empathy and positive regard. Good therapists confront more than poor 
therapists (Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968), but they also provide the 
conditions that sustain confrontation. The results of this research are in 
keeping with the theory underlying Stern's (1966) "sacramental·~ approach to 
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i psycho therapy:· he sees a person's present as an experience which was to be 
i 
I 
l transformed and if necessary transcended through concerned and appreciative 
I confrontation. A study by Torrance (1966) suggests that confrontation will 
be more effective if it is post;ive and constructive rather than negative 
or merely evaluative. Somehow, these facts, too, must contribute to a total 
theory of confrontation. 
The manner of confrontation: reconciling diverse elements. My own 
experience with confrontation in different kinds of growth groups has been 
mixed. I have seen confrontations which fulfilled the caricature of 
sensitivity-training ("a place where people tell one another off") do a good 
deal of harm (e.g. apparently push someone into a short-lived psychotic 
episode--though some claillled that it was a beneficial episode) and yet I have 
also seen bitter confrontations produce not only realistic self-exploration 
and growthf ul behavioral changes but even increased intimacy between confronter 
and confrotttee. On the other hand, I have witnessed non-punitive, ''high 
regard" confrontations both succeed and fail. It seems that we must say that 
confrontation is a growth-experience 'variable with great potential although 
it is not entirely clear under what conditions ~his potential is released. 
Proportion as.!. key to 1rowthful encounter. The question here is: how 
can one strip confrontation of its tendencies to attack and destroy without 
stripping it of its impact? At attempt will be made here to formulate certain 
hypotheses about the manner in which confrontation must take place if it is to 
be a growthful rather than a neutral or even destructive epxerience. These 
remarks take on the nature of hypotheses because they are based on evidence 
that is principally observational and have not been confirmed by experimenta-
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tion. The evidence so far suggests that the "proportional" nature of confron-
tation is most important, that is, c~frontation, if it is to be effective, 
must be proportioned to a number of confronter, confrontee, and situational 
variables. Another way of saying this is that the interaction of confronta-
tion variables is as important as the variables themselves. It is assumed 
here that it is the socially intelligent person who can perceive the importanc 
of these interactions and act upon them. In fact, this is one definition of 
social intelligence. 
The strength. of any confrontation arises principally from two variables: 
the sensitivity or closeness-to-core of the subject matter of the confronta-
tion (e.g., under ordinary circumstances the area of sex would be a more 
sensitive one, closer to the core of the confrontee, than, say, personal 
neatness) and the vehemence with which the confrontation is delivered (e.g. 
the Daytop Village approach would score very high on a scale of vehemence). 
These variables are additive, so that vehement confrontation in a highly 
sensitive area would represent the strongest kind of confrontation. If 
confrontation is to be responsible,:its strength must be proportioned to a 
number of variables among which are (a) the quality of the relationship 
between confronter and ~onfrontee, (b) the current psychological state of 
the confrontee, (c) the possible disorganization which the confrontee will 
undergo as a result of the confrontation, (d) the limits of the confrontee's 
capabilities, (e) certain group conditions, and (f) the contract, either 
implicit or expressed, which governs the group experience. 
(a) The quality of the relationship between confronter and confrontee. 
The confronter must ask himself: "What can the relationship between the 
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other and me bear?" To use metaphorical language, the more "solid," the 
"healthier," the more "substantial" the relationship is, the more powerful 
the confrontation may be.(other conditions being equal). If the confronter 
.~--
has done little to build a solid relationship between himself and the 
confrontee, then he cannot expect to engage in strong confrontational encounte , 
for it has nothing on which to stand. However, if a participant has tried to 
build a relationshi.p and has received no response, then he would be justified 
in engaging in comparatively strong confrontation, especially with respect 
to the lack of communication on the part of the confrontee, for mutual 
involvement is one of the expressed goals of the group. In general, then, 
the confronter must realistically assess the quality of the relationship 
between himself and the other--his degree of acceptance and concern for the 
other, the d~gree of support of which he is capable and which he is willing 
to provide th.e other, etc.--and then proportion his confrontation to these 
variables. 
(b) .!h!, current psychological state of the confrontee. The strength 
of the confrontati.on must be proportioned to the current ability of the 
confrontee to support and act upon the confrontation. This means a number of 
things. If, for instance, t~ confrontee is already laboring under a good 
deal of anxiety, h.:Ls iDJmediate need lilight be for encouragement and support, 
and the confronter should ask himself whether it would be fruitful to confront 
him at this time (timing is always an important concern) or in this area of 
sensitivity or with this degree of vehemence. No participant is expected to 
he free of anxiety, but the level of anxiety should stimulate rather than 
paralyze. Confrontation should also be proportioned to the other's ability 
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to change, and, to some extent, his desire to change. One of the purposes 
of confrontation is to try to show the other than he does have the personal 
and/or community resources necessary to change an unproductive or destructive 
style of life. But if the confrontee is relatively eager to change, then he 
can ordinarily tolerate much stronger confrontation than a person who is not 
convinced that he can or should change. If the confronter is interested in 
the other, he will not mount a strong frontal attack when he knows that it 
has little or no chance of being effective. The confronter who, knowing 
that the confrontee has little or no interest in change, still hits him with 
an extremely strong confronta.tion, is dealing in a form of "shock" therapy 
("kick the TV and see what happens"). I have seen such tactics "work," but 
it seems to be a last resort and effective only in the hands of the extremely 
socially intelligent. 
Some people, without being masochistic, are looking for "strong 
medicine" in terms of confrontation and are quite ready to respond favorably 
to it. I would hypothesize that this is especially true for those who 
voluntarily attend sensitivity-training laboratories (especially if they have 
a basic idea of what such a laboratory entails). It should be true to an 
even greater extent of those who join a conttact group. Others, again 
without being masochistic, welcoueeven the punitive aspect of confrontational 
process, for, if I may use an analogy from religious experience, they see in 
it an element of cleansing or expiation. They "pay the price, 11 as it were, 
of re-integrating themselves DlOre fully "into community." On the other hand, 
it is possible that a person might seek confrontation precisely to prove 




groups is relatively rare and usually easy to discover, for then, for that 
person, confrontation becomes an end in itself and is divorced from subsequent 
behavioral change. 
.--
(c) The risk of disorganization. Effective confrontation will usually 
induce some degree of "disorganization in the other: 
The therapeutic risk will ••• depend upon the amount of dis-
organization both the therapist and the client can handle •••• 
The closer the decision affects the inner core of a person, 
the greater the fear of the life and death choice. A construc-
tive therapeutic confrontat·ion frequently does result in 
death of a sort: the death of illusion, hence, an illusory 
death •••• After an initial experience of death to the illusory 
self, the void which is temporarily created has a chance to fill 
up With the person's real being •••• The therapist, by active 
confrontation, precipitates an awareness of crisis; he did not 
precipitate the crisis (Douds, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 
1967, pp. 171, 173, 195). 
Confrontation is usually in some way directed toward the defense mechanisms 
of the confrontee. This questioning of defenses, although ultimately 
growthful, does entail disorganization. 
Almost every individual has an established self-image protected by 
a number of defense mechanisms. Such mechanisms. have become resis-
tant to change because of their repeated association with the rein-
forcing properties of anxiety reduction; that is, they protect the 
self-image from threat. Thus, in the T group when an individual's 
usual mode of interacting is thwarted and his defense mechanisms 
are made a direct topi.c of conversation, considerable anxiety 
results. Such anxiety then conatitues a force for new learning 
because, if the group experience is a sudc,essful one, new methods 
of anxiety reduction will be learned. If the T group is successful, 
these methods will be more in line with the goals of the training 
and will have more utility for the individual in coping with his 
environment than his old methods which may indeed have been 
dysfunctional. Thus, anxiety serves the purpose of shaking up or 
jarring loose the participant from his preconceived notions and 
habitual forms of interacting so that feedback may have its 
maximum effect. Without such "unfreezing,' feedback may be 
ineffectual ••• (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 76). 
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The strength of the confrontation must-be proportioned to the degree of 
disorganization foreseen and the ability of the confrontee in the context of 
the group to handle this disorganization. Confrontation means in some.way 
challenging the unrealities of the "world" of the other, which, though unreal, 
feels "solid" to him. Maslow (196 7), however, after his experience at Day top 
Village, suggested or hypothesized that in therapy in general we have looked 
1 upon the client as too delicate, too fragile, too incapable of handling 
, strong confrontation and its disorganizing effects, and so we have been 
afraid to use this tool. Douds and his associates (1967) suggest that we 
fail to confront because we are afraid of the consequences for ourselves, for 
he who confronts opens himself to confrontation: "Much of the time it is the 
fear of exposure that is at the base of the therapist's avoidance" (p. 176) • 
The "disorganization" that Douds and his associates speak of sounds a good 
deal like Beier's (1966} ''beneficial uncertainty" which is a step toward 
growth rather than toward dissolution. 
(d} The limits of the confrontee's capabilities. '!be contract group 
should be "diagnostic" in the best sense of the word,that is, the participants 
should get a "feel" for one another's areas of potentiality and of deficit. 
While the participants should allow one another a wide latitude for growth, 
they should also come to a realistic understanding of one another's limits. 
Confrontation should be proportioned to these limits. Certainly the object 
of confrontation is to help the confrontee to move beyond his present limits, 
but even concerned confrontation cannot create'potentiality where it does 
not exist. lt may well be that the confrontee is not capable of interpersonal 
styles that are the preferred styles of the confronter, and it is a mistake 
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to use confrontation in a an attempt to get the confrontee to· assume a style 
of relating that is not consonant with his capabilities. I have seen indivi-
duals and even groups spend unreasonable amounts of time trying to get the 
confrontee to assume an interpersonal style more similar to their own. This 
is a waste of time and also a way of avoiding 9ne's own problems. 
(e) Group conditions. Confrontation must be proportioned to certain 
group variables, that is, the group must create a climate in which confronts-
tion is viable. For instance, if the participants have achieved a certain 
degree of mutual trust and support, then relat~vely strong confrontation can 
be handled even if the confronter himself fails to provide proportional 
support, for the other members will supply for his deficiency. Confrontation 
is also much more possible in a group which has developed an "open" culture, 
that is, a group that has refused to tolerate the."tacit understandings" which 
tend to constrict or eliminate effective communication. In a group in which 
the participants show that they are willing both to confront and to be 
::nfronted, confrontation soon becomes a constructive dimension of the 
group culture. In a word, confrontation must be proportioned to the culture 
of the group • 
(f) Contract, implicit .2!. expressed. It was suggested earlier that 
every group operates on some contract, whether exJressed or implied. The 
trouble with implicit contracts in sensitivity-training situations is that 
they may or may not effectively provide for confrontation, and, even if they 
do, the conditions that regulate its use always remain vague. It seems only 
reasonable to assume that making confrontation one of the specific provisions 
of an overt group contract goes far in preparing the group for this variable. 
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One way of conceptualizing this is to say that through the contract (and 
other variables) receive a high degree of "legitimacy." French and Raven 
(1960), in discussing coercive power (and there is an element of "coercion" 
in confrontation), suggest that "the more legitimate the coercion the less it 
will produce resistance and decreased attraction" (p. 622). The hypothesis 
is that contractual "legitimation" of confrontation will increase its frequencyit 
responsibility, acceptability, and effectiveness. It will also allow 
stronger degrees of confrontation to be used. The group, then, becomes a 
laboratory in which the participants, through their successes and failures, 
learn how to make responsible confrontation part of their interpersonal styles 
of life. 
The success of such therapeutic communities as Daytop Village and 
Synanon and of Bach's Marathon groups rests, in part, on the fact that the 
participants contract more or less explicitly to confrontation. They know 
what they are getting into but their desire for change outweighs the pain 
they foresee. At one time I was tempted to call such experiences "supportless" 
groups, but this, I believe, is inaccurate. They ban from the beginning 
more "effete" or unsubstantial kinds of support and even, to a large extent, 
the approaches to support outlined in the previous chapter. Support arises 
rather from the fact that severe confrontation takes place in a total institu-
tional setting (even Bach's groups are "in residence" for the entire time of 
the Marathon), that there are no observers but just participants (leaders and 
clients together), that everyone realizes that there is work to be done and 
gets down to doing it "in community," that everyone present is striving for 
interpersonal growth. Motivation, too, is quite high in such groups. Bach, 
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for instance, chooses only those who can demonstrate a sincere willingness to 
change. It cannot be assumed that the rank and file of those who participate 
in sensitivity-training laboratories or even contract-group programs possess 
.---
the same degree of motivation as Synanists or Marathon participants. 
(6) The effect confrontation has on the confrontee. 
There is no absolute way to predict the precise effect that any 
particular act of confrontation will have on the confrontee. His immediate 
emotional response might be one of elation, depression, or indifference 
regardless of whether the confrontation is responsible or irresponsible. The 
"high visibility" of the contract group would suggest that the confrontee 
reveal to the confronter and the group in general what impact, positive or 
negative, that th.e confrontation has had upon him ("I guess for the moment I 
really do not know what to say, because frankly you really took me by surprise, 
"My immediate reaction ·is elation over the fact that you are concerned enough 
about me to confront me," ''You've made me so angry that I have to get my wits 
about me before I could possibly make a rational response"). If someone says 
to John, "John, your contributions here have been both marginal and minimal 
and I really feel your absence in our interaction," John may be relieved, 
appreciative, anxious, shocked, or angry, but if he reveals his emotional 
response, he will go far in preventing unproductive ambiguity, confusion, 
wicertainty, or "stickiness" from arising in the group. Once the confrontee 
has gotten his emotional reaction "into community" so that it can be dealt with 
productively there, then he will be much freer to channel his energies into 
the open and constructive reaction to confrontation called for by the contract. 
Precisely how a person "should" react or rather respond to confrontation is a 
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subject that concerns us next. 
GROWTHFUL RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATION. 
Up to now we have been dealing with what the confronter should do in 
order to make confrontation a responsible interactional process. We now turn 
to the confrontee and what he should do in response to objectively growthful 
confrontation. Most of us naturally tend to react to confrontation, automa-
tically, as it were, and emotionally, but few of us develop the art of 
responding to confrontation. The contract group is a laboratory in which this 
art is to be learned. The most common reactions to confrontation are various 
forms of defensiveness ("My family has always been this way," "But I'm like 
this only in this group'') and counterattack ("You haven't put out much in 
the group yourself"). Pilisuk (1962) showed that subjects tended to retain 
favorable estimates of their own performance in the face of adverse criticism, 
and it made little difference whether the criticism came from a friend or a 
stranger. However, if the subject thought that the criticism came from a 
friend, he used different forms of rationalization to explain away the 
friend's behavior. Harvey, Kelley, and Shapiro (1957) found that criticisms 
were distorted by confrontees when they were thought to come from friends; 
confrontees also tended to devalue friends who engaged in such criticism. In 
a word, it is not easy to respond nondefensively to confrontation. However, 
it is assumed here that awareness of just this fact is a step toward taking 
on a more positive attitude toward confrontation. Kirtner (1955) found that 
the client who sees his problems as .involving his relationships with others 
and who feels that he has contributed to these problems and wants to change 
is likely to be successful in a therapeutic encounter, while the client who 
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externalizes his problems, feeling little self-responsibility, is much more 
likely to be a failure. Motivation, then, is crucial to the confrontational 
process. If the participant wants to change, he will want to be confronted 
and be willing to endure its unpleasant dimensions. The ideal is that the 
confrontee enter actively into the confrontational process, that he become 
an agent in a dialogic process rather than just a "patient" suffering through 
something that is "for his own good." Now to a clarification of such 
confrontee "agency. 11 
Accepting the invitation to self-examination. If growth-provoking 
confrontation is, in one sense, an invitation to self-examination as a prelude 
to possible behavioral change, then actual self-examination on the issues in 
question is the "proper" response to confrontation. Research in psychotherapy 
is beginning to show that that successful outcome is related to the client's 
ability or willingness to explore his behavior. Wagstaff, Rice, and Butler 
(1960) found that successful patients tended to explore themselves more, while 
those who failed engaged in little self-exploration and in general manifested 
little emotional involvement. Braaten (1961) found that therapeutic success 
was related to exploration of the "private self." Truax (1961) found 
significantly more depth of expe'ltencing in therapeutic successes than in 
therapeutic failures from a schizophrenic population. Similar results have 
been reported by Truax and Carkhuff (1963), Holder, Carkhuff, and Berenson 
(1967), Piaget, Berenson, and Carkhuff (1967), and Tomlinson and Hart (1962) 
among others. Pratt (1966) calls this striving on the part of individuals 
or groups to understand themselves and their conditions and to take part in 
changing themselves and their contractual surroundings their "reflexivity 
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quotient." As Pratt implies, the kind of self-exploration desired is one 
geared to the examination of behavior and focused on behavioral change. Too 
many people equate self-examination with a kind of amateur psychoanalytic 
self-exploration. The person who sees himself only through a maze (or haze) 
of "interpretations" can too easily become convinced that responsiblity for 
himself lies either outside himself or in hidden layers of his personality 
which are relatively impossible to fathom. 
Getting ~ "feel" for how ~ is experienced El_ others. The participant 
cannot respond to confrontation unless he is willing to venture outside 
himself. One of the most effective ways for him to learn is to drop his 
defensiveness, at least partially and temporarily, and try to understand the 
way in which he is experienced by the others in the group. Ideally, the 
conf rontee-admittedly under somewhat adverse conditions--tries to become as 
"accurately empathetic" as he can during the confrontational encounter, that 
is, he tries to get inside the "world" bf the confronter and actually "feel" 
how he is being experienced by the other. 
Self-confrontation. The contract calls for self-exploration-in-communit 
as the response to confrontation, but such self-exploration may be either self 
initiated or undertaken in response to a challenge by another. If the questio 
is looked at a bit abstractedly, a certain gradation appears: it is "good" 
for a participant to respond appropriately to unsollicited confrontation, but 
it may even be "better" if he actively seeks it out, that is, if he manifests 
to the other members that he is open to meaningful hypotheses about himself 
and his behavior. It might even be "best" if the participant were to confront 
himself ("It strikes me that l have been coming across rather punitively in 
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our interactions here; I'm dissatisfied with my behavior and would like to 
deal with it"), for such self-confrontation-in-community indicates a very 
high degree of responsibility or "agency" on his part. The self-confronter 
I~--
takes the initiative, but he realizes that he needs the "community" both 
for support and for a corrective "outside" view of himself. The person who 
does nothing more than respond appropriately to confrontation seems to imply 
that motivation for change must come principally from others; it is they who 
make him want what is essential to his own growth. Learning how to confront 
oneself, then, is one of the goals of the group. There are, however, 
counter-feits of self-confrontation: some participants "get" themselves first 
so that the other members will not "get" them in areas more sensitive and more 
in need of attention. They want to avoid certain issues, so they take the 
initiative in less sensitive areas. Since many groups fall for this ploy, it 
would seem that a healthy confrontation culture would call for a combination 
of self-initiated and other initiated confrontations. 
Differential response to different modes of confrontation. There is 
absolutely no reason why group participants .•.should respond univocally to 
different kinds of confrontation. It may well be that any given participant 
will respond quite differentially to the various forms of confrontation that 
arise in the group. For instance, a person's ability to respond to highly 
intellectualized or rational. verbal confrontation might differ drastically fro 
his ability to the confrontation implicit in the others' emotional approaches 
to him. Such a person might be quite frightened by manifestations of affectio • 
The contract asks such a person to try to respond to such a confrontation as 
he would to more intellectualized or strictly verbal forms of confrontation: 
~-- ~- --- ------------------
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.1 feel your concern and your warmth and frankly they frighten me, they make 
~want to turn you off and run away, but. that's precisely why I think I 
,,:;:)uld take a good look at what's going on inside me and between you and me." 
.. ~-
5ince it is usually much more difficult to deal with a "feeling" rather than 
a "rational" confrontation, the confrontee has to take gre~ter pains to be 
honest with himself and others, the group partic:t:>ants have to provide the 
support necessary to sustain such confrontation. Very often it is only the 
confron tee who knows what kind of stimulus-acts "pull him up short," and the 
responsibility is his to reveal this to the group so that he may reap the 
benefits of confrontation. 
An openness ~ temporary disorganization. The confrontee should be 
ready to accept (in some sense of the term) the disorganization induced by 
effective confrontation. Confrontation almost always demands some kind of 
reorganization of perceptions, attitudes, and feelings, and such reorganization 
is impossible without some kind of uprooting. However, if the participant is 
prepared for this disorganization, then his chances of responding rather than 
merely reacting to confron~ation are greatly increased. If, in addition to 
this, the group culture itself and the participants individually provide 
support proportioned to the degree of organization. the possibility of 
successful confrontational interaction is further enhanced. Confrontation 
Without support is disastrous; support without confrontation is anemic. 
Over-response. A person is not supposed to soak up confrontation like 
a sponge. This might be as bad or even worse than being closed to confronta-
tion, for it implies a lack of agency and of contact with one's own exper-
iencing which are essential to change: "Other people can give us feedback, 
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and we can sense when their reporting is accurate, if their view resonates 
with an organismic sensing within us of.what we have been doing, and 
consequently we can change our course of action"(A.11. Rogers, 1968, p. 37). 
,, .. -
llliile it is true that those who are relatively socially adjusted do not 
count on continual social reinforcement in order to operate effectively on 
an interpersonal ~vel, it is also true that passive absorption or any and 
every confrontation cannot be termed responstJ>le openness to confrontation. 
If this takes place in a group, a getting at the roots of such masochism 
~sychoanalytically defined or not) would not be out of place. In a word, 
over-response to confrontation•should be challenged and if possible unmasked. 
Confrontation and conflict. Even though the "correct" response to 
confrontation is self-examination in view of possible behavioral change, this 
does not eliminate conflict and differences of opinion. Once the confrontee 
has assimilated the point of view of the confronter and has examined himself 
on the issues proposed, then together they might examine both areas of 
agreement and areas of conflict. Conflict differs from defensiveness, attack, 
hostility, and aggression, It may be intense, but it is constructive rather 
than argumentative. it is a challenge for those who participate in it to 
accept one another's "otherneaa. 11 Hoffman, Harburg, and Maier (1962) offer 
some evidence suggesting that conflict can increase the number of alternatives 
which group members generate. It is quite likely that the same can be said 
of interpersonal contacts. When conflict is merely a front for a defensive 
refusal to examine oneself or just a disguise for counter-attack, it is usuall 
unproductive. The group participants themselves--and this is especially true 
during confrontational interactions--should monitor the conflicts that arise 
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in order to keep them honest. 
Responding to irresponsible confrontation. There ar~ those who take 
advantage of the relative non-defensive climate of the group in order to ride 
.--
roughshod over the other participants. If the confrontation is irresponsible-
if it is nothing more than attack, if its primary aim is punishment rather 
than involvement--then the leader and ·the group as a whole should intervene 
and confront the confronter. Little is gained if the confrontee merely 
becomes angry and fights it out with his aggressor. However, if the confronte 
can ignore the irresponsibilties of the other, he can often sift out elements 
of truth that otherwise might never have come up: "I really thought that 
John's primary purpose was to attack and punish me and that he exaggerated 
quite a bit, but as I look at myself I am beginning to realize that his basic 
point is true: I am fundamentally a very selfish person and I do try to 
disguise this at times_by 'do-good' tactics." Honesty, whenever and wherever 
it can be found, is a valuable commodity. 
AREAS OF CONFRONTATION 
Behavior rather than motivation. The direct object of confrontation 
should be a person's overt behavior rather than its conjectural foundations, 
that is, what-is should be the primary objact of confrontation rather than 
what-may-be. The closer confrontation comes to motivation the more 
hypothetical it becomes and thus the more abstract. For instance, one way 
of conceptualizing neurosis is in terms of a set of "central strategies": 
A conceptualization of the problem of neurosis in terms of 
information storage and retrieval is based on the fundamental 
idea that what is learned in a neurosis is a set of central 
strategies .(or a program) which guide the individual's 
adaptation to his environment. Neuroses are not symptoms 
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(responses) but are strategies of a particular kind which lead 
to certain observable (tics, compulsive acts, etc.) and certain 
less observable, phenomena (fears, feelings of depression, etc.). 
The whole problem of symptom substitution is thus seen as an 
instance of response substitution or response equipotentiality, 
concepts which are supported-by abundant laboratory evidence 
(Breger & McGaugh, 1965, p. 355). 
A person might emit all sorts of behavioral cues which reveal his "program," 
but the fact still remains that his behavior is quite real while the "program" 
is a construct. If the construct is the object of confrontation, it should 
be confronted as construct and primarily through the behavio~al cues through 
which it is revealed. 
Strength ~well .!!. weakness. Since the purpose of the contract group . 
is not unmasking but rather interpersonal growth, it would be meaningless if 
the participants were to confront one another only in areas of interpersonal 
deficit without touching on one another's constructive resources. To do so 
would be to fall into the error of the'iow-functioning" therapists studied 
by Berenson, Mitchell, and Laney (1968) and by Berenson, Mitchell, and 
~oravec (1968): "low-functioning" therapist tend to confront weaknesses rathe 
than resources. "You say little in the group" differs quite a bit from ''You 
don't say much, but when you do speak you always contact someone and without 
I 
cliches." It is still a question of confrontation, but now it is directed 
toward unused or little-used potential. If a participant always deals with 
deficits rather than the resources of others, this is "diagnostic" in itself 
and should become a subject of discussion in the group. 
Self-underestimation. Self-underestimation is possibly a form of 
flight and as such should be confronted. Some informal research which 
Dr. Barbara Powell and I did with sensitivity groups while we were at 
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Galesburg State Research Hospital indicated that there is a rather high 
correlation between self-estimate measures on group process variables 
(administered before regular group sessions began) and actual performance in 
.--
the group. In other words, participants seem to place a limit on their own 
own desire or ability to participate and their performance becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Therefore, if participants are to move beyond their 
own self-estimated limi.ts, they must be confronted with the fact that they 
tend to underestimate their ability to participate in the give-and-take of 
group interaction. This is a specific form of "confrontation of strength." 
Behavior in the group: confrontation and contract. It is relatively 
easy to delineate what kind of behavior should be confronted in the contract-
group: (l) any behavior that violates any of the provisions of the contract 
and (2) the different forms of flight from contract-fulfillment (these will 
be considered separately in the next chapter). In groups in which there is 
only an implicit contract, areas of confrontation cannot be as clearly 
delineated. Also the "high visibility" demanded in the contract group points 
:.') certain areas .of confrontation, that is, the "bidden" aspects of the 
group culture: "taci.t understandings," hidden agenda, hidden goals, etc. 
Differential intragroup relatiottships. The contract does not demand 
that the participants involve themselves with one another in any univocal 
way. Each participant becomes in different ways and to different degrees 
with his fellows. However, much can be learned by confronting the participant 
with these differences in involvement. For instance, if A involves himself 
deeply wit~ B but only superficially with C, this says something about A, B, 
and C. 
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Behavior outside the group. Behavior outside the group is relevant 
only to the degree that it can be made a here-and-now concern for the · 
participants in general. As a rule "story" is relevant, while "history" is 
.~-
not. Once a person reveals extra-group behavior, it, too, can become an 
object of confrontation. However, the group should not deal exclusively 
: with the "out-there" behavior of the participants. This leads to loss of 
immediacy, loss of interest, and· eventually to the stagnation or the death 
of the group. The way a person behaves "out there," however, affects his 
"in-here" relationships, but the "out there" and the "in here" should be 
dealt with concomitantly. 
SUMMARY: SUGGESTED "RULES" FOR CONFRONTATION. 
In sunnnary, the following rules may help to make confrontation in the 
group a constructive process: 
(1) Confront in order to manifest your concern for the other. 
(2) Make confrontation a way of becoming involved with the other. 
(3) Before confronting, become aware of your bias either for or against the 
conf rontee. Do not refrain from confrontation because you are for him or 
. 
use confrontation as a means of punishment, revenge, or domination because you 
are against him. 
(4) Before confronting the other, try to understand the relationship that 
exists between you and him and try to proportion your confrontation to what 
the relationship will bear. 
(5) Before confronting, try to take into consideration the possible punitive 
side effects of your confrontation. 
(6) The strength or vehemence of your confrontation and the areas of 
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sensitivity you deal with should be proportioned to the needs, sensitivities, 
and capabilities of the confrontee. 
(7) Confront behavior primarily; be slow to confront motivation. 
(8) Confront clearly: indicate what is fact, what is feeling, and what is 
hypothesis. Do not state interpretations as facts. Do not engage in constant 
and/or long-winded interpretations of the behavior of the others. 
(_9) Remember that much of your behavior in the group can have confrontational 
effects (e.g •. , not talking to others, your emotional attitudes, etc.). 
(10) Be willing to confront yourself honestly in the group. 
No set of rules will provide assurance that the confrontation will 
always be a growthful process in the sensitivity-training group. But groups 
can learn much from both the use and abuse of confrontation. 
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Chapter X 
A Stance ~gainst Flight 
Introduction 
. ...-
It is not easy to engage in the kinds of interaction outlined in the 
previous chapters. Thus, human nature being what it is, there is a natural 
tendency for group participants to find ways either to resist or to flee the 
work at hand. Even though participants engage in sensitivity-training 
experiences because they want to, it can still be expected that they will 
resist the process, because it is anxiety-arousing and demanding. Not only 
are the common defense mechanisms such a~ projection, rationalization, reaction 
formation, insulation, etc. used, but they are used in ways which are peculiar 
to the group situation. The group situation threatens the participants with 
. 
both self-knowledge and intimacy, and the defenses of the participants rise 
to the challenge. 
Flight tendenciaa seem to appear whenever the human organism is 
threatened by the often painful processes associated with intrapsychic and 
:.nterpersonal growth. It is not surprising, then, to find flight a constant 
problem in both psychotherapy and other kinds of growth situations. Gibb 
(1964), for instance, note• that "a person may ••• engage in frenetic off-
target work in an effort to find himself or to keep from finding himself 
(p. 282). Whitman (1964} suggests that group participants defend themselves 
against involvement by overintellectualization, overaffective behavior, and 
selected inattention. In Grinker's transactional therapy, the patient is not 
permitted to become anonymous, to intellectualize, or to talk persistently 
about others. Mowrer (1950), Dollard and Miller (1950), and Rotter (1954) all 
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see the maladjusted person as one who fails to learn adjustive or growthful 
behavior automatically because he per~istently engages in avoidance behavior 
which keeps him from situations in which he could learn more adaptive and 
growthful behavior. Although such avoidance behavior is not really satisfying 
(flight never really is) and is punished in the long run, it is immediately 
satisfying and, therefore, persists. Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) define 
failure in therapy in terms of various forms of flight: "Failure to benefit 
from therapy occurs (1) when a patient succeeds consistently in maintaining a 
habitual maladaptive solution in the group, thus remaining uncomfortable but 
affectively untouched by the situation; (2) when a patient resorts to physical 
or psychological flight, thus insulating himself from the affective forces of 
the group; or (3) when a patient reacts to threat with the breakdown of 
previously established solutions and the substitution of disorganized, 
inadequate behavior" (p. 180). Whatever the immediate rewards of flight 
)ehavior, it is ultimately self-destructive. 
Flight can be conceptualized in various ways~for instance, along overt-






Figure 10.1. Flight behavior. 
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At point A (inild-overt) in quadrant I we might find some such remark as ''We 
i don't have to overdo it here," or "It's better to let this thing develop 
gradually," at point B (severe-overt) in quadrant II actual physical flight, 
.~·-
at point C (mild-covert) in quadrant III a passing joke that breaks the 
tension of the interaction, and at point D (severe-covert) in quadrant IV 
disruptive aggressive and punitive behavior on the part of some group member. 
Flight from growth is easily conceptualized in the contract group: it 
refers to failures to engage in the contractual behaviors outlined and in 
substituting a~ or anti-contractual behavior. Therefore, we have already 
dealt with a number of different kinds of flight--for instance, engaging in 
"history" rather than "story" in the modality of self-disclosure. It is our 
purpose here, not to repeat What has been said above, but briefly to classify 
and clarify the major modes of flight used in groups in the hope that such 
exposure of flight modalities will reduce flight behavior in actual group 
interaction. Nor are all possible flight modalities detailed here, for, given 
the ingeniousness of the human spirit in both devising modes of flight and 
disgusing them, this would be an endless task. 
This chapter, then, is an attempt to "spit in the soup" of the group 
member in flight. The members of the contract group are asked to become aware 
of the principal kinds of flight behavior and to take a stance against flight 
by confronting themselves and one another when it arises. This refusal to 
withdraw from the enterprise is extremely important, for flight in the group 
only mirrors the flight behavior in the participant's day-to-day life. 
Since not only individuals but also entire groups may engage in flight, 
the following is divided into two sections: the individual in flight and 
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, the group in flight. 
The Individual in Flight 
Cynicism, initial and otherwise. '!be participant who comes to the group 
.~·-
experience with a closed mind and whose principal defense is a cynical attitude 
toward what is happening 'in 't:he group will find it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to engage in the group interaction. Watson and his associates 
(1961) found that those who come to a laboratory experience ready to give 
themselves to it showed positive and results afterwards, while those who 
expected the laboratory to be irrelevant found it irrelevant. Perhaps the 
most incapacitating failure of the cynic is that he refuses to initiate any-
thing in the group. To initiate is to show interest and he cannot be caught 
showing interest in an enterprise that is in some way below him. He waits 
until someone else initiates something and then he sits in judgment on what is 
happening. In fact, his usual posture is one of silent judgment on the pro-
ceedings of the group. This makes him all but unvulnerable, for he can 
naintain the same posture even when he becomes the object of confrontation. At 
times he may bearrapt along by the action of the group, and when the group 
situation calls for sincerity, he is sincere. But he returns almost immediatel 
to his former posture and hangs albatross-like around the neck of the group. 
Silence. It seems logical to begin with silence~ Some have tried to 
rationalize silence by claiming that there is no evidence that the silent 
person is not benefiting from the group experience; others say that the silent 
member is a "point of rest" in the group or that he is "dynamic" in the sense 
that the group must deal with him. There are a number of errors here. The 
silent person may well be learning something in the group, but he certainly is 
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not growing if growth means interpersonal growth, for it is ludicrous to 
assume that interpersonal growth takes place without interpersonal exchange • 
• Growth means, in part, that the person become an "agent" instead of a 11patient" 
.---
in his interpersonal contacts. If the silent member is considere "dynamic" 
in that he contributes to the dynamics of the group~his silence is a felt 
"force" or he mobilizes the energies of the group, for they must deal with 
hiro--then his silence is implicitly or explicitly manipulative and deleterious 
to interpersonal growth. The silent member frequently arouses the concern of 
the group ("Why is he silent?", "What is happening inside?"), creates feelings 
of guilt ("We have been neglecting him"), or provokes anger (''Why does he 
choose to remain an outsider?", "~y does he sit there in judgment of the rest 
of us?"). That is, silence does manipulate, whether this is the intention of 
the silent member or not. Furthermore, in the contract group, silence and 
contract-fulfillment are simply antithetical. By definition the silent member 
is not growing in the contract-group insofar aa contract fulfillment can bo 
considered a sign of growth. It has already been mentioned how one sensitivit -
group member felt "hurt" by the silent members: she did not know where they 
stood in the group and this constricted her ability to interact with them. 
Smith (1957) found that group productivity was negatively affected by the 
presence of two silent members in five-person groups, for the silent members 
were perceived as unpredictable. 
Slavson (1966) sees silence in group psychotherapy as a form of conununi-
cation even though it is also a form of resistance. The reasons for silence, 
he says, are either characterological (e.g., the person never says much, he 
has developed habits of silence) or neurotic (e.g., the result of anxiety 
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and/or guilt). An individual may also be "selectively" silent, that is, he 
might be silent because he is not interested in the topic of discussion in 
t~at it has no relevance to his current needs or preoccupations or the topic 
··'-
might constitute an area of threat for him. In the contract group, however, 
such selective silences violate certain provisions of the contract, for the 
participants are asked to deal openly with their boredom and, at least in a 
general way, with their areas of threat. Slavson calls an attempt on the part 
of a member to impose silence on the group because the interaction threatens 
him "endogenic" silence; if, on the other hand, the members of a group "turn 
off" an overassertive member, this is "imposed" silence. In the contract-
group, however, anxiety arising from threat should be handled as openly as 
possible, and the overassertive member should be confronted and not merely 
silenced. In a word, imposing silence on another or others usually indicates 
some sort of flight. Finally, Slavson talks about "iatrogenic" silence, that 
is, silence that ensues in the group when the leader is abrupt or becomes 
angry. In the contract group, the leader is a leader-member and his behavior, 
too, is open to confrontation. The group that responds to leader-behavior 
by falling silent is in flight. 
Sometimes the entire group becomes silent, but naturally so. The meanin~ 
of such silence varies, but by no means is it always a sign of flight. If 
such silences occur with any frequency or if they occur at dramatic moments 
in the life of the group, their practical meaning for the group should be 
investigated. 
Silence-as-flight, although it admits of degrees, tends to limit growth. 




the participant in any kind of interpersonal growth experience: 
Therapeutic benfit is limited for the consistently silent patient. 
He can experience affect associated with crucial personal conflicts 
in the group, can observe the conseq~ences of others' yielding 
maladaptive solutions similar to1lis own, and can achieve insight 
through being exposed to relevant group information. Direct inter-
pretations and feedback are less available to him and less likely 
to be accurate and usable. He cannot directly experience the 
actual testing of the reality of his fears or the necessity for 
maintaining habitual maladaptive solutions (p. 180}. 
' Although quality of participation is, absolutely speaking, more important than 
I quantity, there comes a point where lack of quantity is deleterious to the 
overall quality of an individual's participation. This marriage of quanti~y 
and quality of participation is something that must be learned in the actual 
give-and-take of group interaction. 
Interpretation and the pursuit of insight. Interpretation and insight 
go together, for supposedly the former leads to the latter. The value of both 
interpretation and insight in therapeutic practice is currently being 
challenged form a number of quarters. Whatever the outcome of the struggle 
between "insight" and "action" therapists (London, 1964), the point is that in 
all growth experiences, including sensitivity-training situations, the use 
of interpretation and the pursuit of insight too often constitute flight 
behavior. Our culture tends to make us think that the only kind of real 
knowing is "scientific" knowing. In growth-groups, then, the participants 
think that they are doing the "scientific" thing when they attempt to tease 
out the conjectural foundations of their own behavior and that of their fellows 
The person in the group who makes interpretation one of the principal compo-
nents of his style of interaction is either misled or in flight. It is not 
just that the "understanding" of behavior becomes an end in itself, but 
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there even comes a point where interpretation and insight no longer refer to 
actual behavior and become merely inte.rnally consistent logical systems with 
their own axioms and postulates • 
. --
Rogers and Truax (1967) maintain that accurate empathy is a far cry from 
the interpretation-insight dyad under attack here: 
An accurate empathic grasp of the patient's conflicts and problems 
is perhaps most sharply contrasted with the more usual diagnostic 
formulation of the patient's experiences. This diagnostic under-
standing which is so different but so common involves the "I 
understand what is wrong with you" or "I understand the dynamics 
which make you act that way" approach. These evaluative under-
standings are external and even impersonal. While they may at times 
be very useful in developing external understanding, they are in 
sharp contrast to an accurate and sensitive grasp of events and 
experiences and their personal meaning to the client. The external 
and evaluative understanding tends to focus the client's being on 
externals or upon intellectualizations which remove him from an 
ongoing contact with the deeper elements of his self (p. 105). 
Insight cultures are often flight cultures because they keep the group from 
coming to grips with the affective behavioral dimensions of interpersonal 
living. Frank (1961) reflects on the problems inherent in an overintellectual 
ized approach to therapy. At least in American psychotherapy 
[t]he scientific ideal reinforces the democratic one by valuing 
lack of dogmatism. It also values objectivity and intellectual 
comprehension and these features may not be entirely advantageous 
for psychotherapy. They tend to result in an overevaluation of its 
cognitive aspects. From the patient's standpoint, 'insight' in the 
sense of the ability to verbalize self-understanding may be mistaken 
for genuine attitude change. From the therapist's standpoint, the 
scientific attitude may lead to undue stress on the niceties of 
interpretation and avoidance of frankly emotion-arousing techniques 
such as group rituals and dramatic activities, even though there is 
universal agreement that in order to succeed psychotherapy must 
involve the patient's emotions (pp. 219-220). 
It is not that insight is considered meaningless. Rather it may be that 
insight-through-action might be more interesting and ultimately more productiv 
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than a more intellectualized and abstractive form of insight. As Goroff (1967) 
notes, "the development of 'insight' ·comes not from interpretations, but from 
experiencing ••• changes in ••. beha!1-or" (p. 432). The participants in the 
contract group are asked to do just that: change their behavior, attempt to 
/ be with one another in different, non-cliche ways. The sharing of resulting 
emotional reactions and insights is a far cry from the sterile insight-
searching that goes on too frequently both in and out of therapy. Douds and 
associates (1967), too, severely criticize the insight-game: 
At best, insight inundates affect with ideas and drowns it in a 
whirlpool of words. At worst, the person is left with the feeling 
of being splintered into a thousand pieces, in contact with the 
fact that he has no identity of his own, only fitting in relation 
to specific people and situations. Feeling alone, without action, 
leads to no change. Thus, the alienated person who seeks only 
insight slowly decays while having the illusion of making progress 
(p. 177). 
Our fear of feelings and emdtions moves us to try to substitute logic 
for them. It is a poor substitute. .There are two ways in which the interpre-
tation-insight game may be played. First, a participant may play the role of 
interpreter: he feels free to discuss the dynamics underlying his own 
behavior and that of others. Another way of playing the game, however, is 
to demand that the other come up with "proper" interpretations of and insights 
into his own behavior. The favorite ploy of the person who plays the game is 
the question "why." His immediate response to disclosure is not support but 
1
'why. 11 If the respondent plays his game, he usually has to venture into 
intellectualized conjecture which is usually quite boring and does not lead 
either to fruitful insight or behavioral change. However, it does prevent 
group members from interacting affectively with one another, and this might 
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just well be the whole purpose of the game. 
Although the pursuit of interpretation and insight might be the problem 
of only a member or two, it can become a group problem, that is, a "culture" 
of interpretation and insight can develop within the group. If intellectual-
ized interpretation and insight go unchallenged early in the life of the 
group, the participants tend to enter into a "tacit understanding" to 
encourage or at least to tolerate such activities. Once the "decision" has 
been made, it is difficult to unmake. The leader-member should challenge 
such "tacit understandings" from the beginning. 
This is not to say that every interpretation and that all pursuit of 
insight constitute flight behavior. Interpretation is valuable to the degree 
that it has some impact on the person whose behavior is being analyzed. 
Interpretation must produce some kind of "focus" that leads to behavioral 
change. Wiener (1967) suggests that "it is not the quantity of information 
that is important for action, but the quantity of information which can 
penetrate into a connnunication and storage apparatus sufficiently to serve 
as a trigger for action" (p. 127). The pithy, conjectural, "impact" 
interpretation usually produces intensive interaction in the group, while the 
extended interpretation almost inevitably ends in monologue and lecture. As 
May (1958) notes, the more detailed we become in our analysis of forces and 
drives, the more abstract we become and the more removed from living human 
beings. An "interpretation culture" contributes vastly to the entropy of 
group process. Such a·culture is overly intellectual and analytic, living 
together in dialogue, on the other hand, is emotional and synthetic. 
Humor. Humor is a two-edged sword. For instance, it can be used to 
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ease the punitive side effects of confrontation and thus facilitate inter-
action, but it can also be used as a weapon to destroy attempts to deepen 
the level of the interaction or to broach sensitive topics. When humor is 
..... -
used to dissipate tension, it does just that, but it does so without getting 
at the issues underlying the tension. Whenever either an individual or a 
group adopts humor as a consistent component of interactional style (e.g. the 
group spends five or ten minutes in banter at the beginning of a session, or 
a member becomes humorous whenever a particularly sensitive issue is brought 
up), such behavior should be challenged. 
The questioner. It is amazing how many participants seem to handle 
emotional interactions by means of questions. For instance, participant A 
reveals himself at a fairly deep level and expresses a good deal of emotion 
in doing so. Participant B, unable to handle either the revelation or the 
emotion, begins to ask A questions instead of supporting him or engaging in 
counter self-sharing. Questions can be effective if they get at the guts 
of the interaction and also reveal something about the questioner in the 
process (e.g. that he is concerned, anxious, etc.). Berne (1966) uses 
interrogation primarily to help document points tha~ promise to be clinically 
decisive ("Did you really steal tlte money?"). Questions put to the patient's 
Adult, Berne says, are thought provoking and in this respect resemble con-
frontations. But, on the negative side, questions can be an attempt to 
intellectualize emotions expressed in the group or even an expression of 
hostility, a way of "picking at" the other. Some people ask questions because 
they think that they should say something or interact in some way, and 
questions constitute the safest way of doing this. Whenever questions, 
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especially "why" questions, become the instruments of an ineffective inter-
pretation-insight culture, they indicate flight and the question-culture 
should be challenged. 
.--
Rationalizations. Rationalization is part of the warp and woof of 
every defense mechanism. In sensitivity groups an almost infinite variety 
of rationalizations are available to the participant who finds that he is 
not giving himself to the group experience. As the proverb goes, he who 
cannot dance says that the yard is stony. It is possible to mention here 
only a few of the more commonly used rationalizations. One is the "distant 
fields" syndrome: the participant says t.o himself if not to others that he 
would be doing well if he were only in "that other" £roup. It is the peculiar 
combination of personalities in this group that prevents him from getting on 
with the work. Once that he has convinced himself that the obstacle is his 
environment (including the trainer) rather than himself, he proportions is 
participation to his "discovery." Sometimes it takes the form: "Even I 
cannot cope with this group." 
Others project their own inadequacies on the laboratory experience 
itself: "This is a contrived situation, quite unreal; it does not facilitate 
real interpersonal contact." The fact is that no one claimed that the group 
situation was not contrived; the laboratory is both real and unreal, but the 
person who becomes preoccupied with its unrealities is in flight. It is too 
easy to blame these· unrealities-for one's own failures, just as it is so easy 
for the person who is either afraid of .failure or who feels he has failed to 
become cynical about the powers of the group. 
A rather silent member of a group once suggested a rather interesting 
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he should not punish but apologize, for he has violated his contractual 
obligations in a number of ways. In the contract group, the participant who 
does nothing about his boredom deserves it • 
... -
Over-involvement. Some people flee centrifugally, away from the inter-
action, while others (probably fewer in number) flee centripetally, into the 
action. The latter over-involve themselves with the group and cannot tolerate 
what seems to be under-involvement on the·part of others. Being-in-the-group 
becomes their identity (perhaps because t~ey have little sense of identity 
outside the group) and what they experience inside the group is more real 
for them than what they experience outside the group. But the group is a 
means of enhancing one's. interpersonal living: not a substitute for it. 
Perhaps the over-involvement of some can be explained by the construct of 
reaction-formation: those who feel most uncomfortable and alienated from the 
group (or from others i.11 general) must seem to be its most ardent supporters. 
Those who make a cult ot growth..-group experiences both inside and outside 
the group do lllUCh to alienate both fellow participants and the general 
population. Over-involvement, however, i.s not the usual participant problem, 
and those who tend to flee centrifugally should be slow to accuse their 
fellow participants of too much involvement. 
Dealing in generalities. One of the most common failings of partici~ · 
pants is a "generality" approach to the interaction. When speaking, they use 
"you" and "one" and "people" instead of.· "I," they state and restate general 
principals without applying them to themselves, or to others and they address 
themselves to the group at large instea~ of contacting individual participants 
But being specific does make a difference in the sense of immediacy in the 
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group. There is a world of difference between the statement: "You get 
scared to bring up what is really bothering you," and "I am really afraid to 
talk about the things that bother me here." It. does make a difference when 
participants talk. ahout specific incidents and people inside the group instead 
of speaking generally about the group culture. It does make a difference when 
a participant directs a high percentage of his remarks to individuals in the 
group instead of speaking generally to the whole group. When a participant 
addresses the whole group through the innnediacy of his contact with another 
individual, the entire interaction becomes less abstractive and more engaging. 
In experimenting with. groups, I have arbitrarily banned the use of "people" 
and of "you" and "one," refused to let others make general statements, and 
demanded th.at the participantsaddress themselves to particular individuals 
instead of the entire group. The resulting culture, while somewhat artificial, 
at least initially, dramatizes the lack of inunediacy that preceded it. Rid 
the group of the generaliti.es that plagt.ie it and you rid it of one of the most 
connnon sources of boredom. 
Low tolerance for conflict and emotion. Inevitably there are some 
participants who have a low tolerance for conflict and/or strong emotion. 
When conflict and emotion run high, these participants react in one of two 
ways (or both ways at different times): they either withdraw from the 
interaction or they try to stop what is taking place. In conflict or 
confrontational situations they may become mediators, saviors, or "red-
crossers." They defend the confrontee, chide the confronter, and in general 
pour oil on the water~ of conflict. Nor is it just negative emotion which 
they find intolerable. Often strong positive emotions are just as threatening 
--~ 
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and these, too, must be tempered by hwnor, changing the subject, and other 
ploys. This does not mean that no one should ever intervene in conflict 
situations; some conflict situations are unprofitable and forms of flight 
,.·-
in themselves and deserve to be challenged. It does mean, however, that one 
should try to be aware of and perhaps declare his motivation when he does 
intervene in conflictual or other emotional situations ("intervene" is used 
here in distinction from "participate"). The participant who can declare his 
discomfort during even responsible conflict without trying to sabotage 
the interaction has taken the first step toward handling his low tolerance 
for emotion. 
No space 12. ~· One of the functions of growth experiences is to 
reveal to the participant the possiblities for growthful change. He can 
resist this revelation in a variety of ways. He may deny that any change or 
at least the changes proposed would be beneficial or even possible. That is, 
he may present himself as having no "room" in which to "move." He sees 
himself as hemmed in by his heredity, environment, and history. Too often his 
response to confrontation is: "I can't do anything about it; that's the way 
I am." The problem here is not that the participant refuses to move in the 
directions suggested by others but that he refuses even to entertain the 
possibility. He might refuse to do so in the name of personal freedom and 
integrity or out of a sense of being the victim of forces outside his control, 
but responsible confrontation is not an attack upon a person's integrity nor 
a call to do the impossible. The person comes to the group not to be re-made 
but to entertain possibilities for change. If he resists this, he is 
A 
resisting the very raison d'entre of the group. If a participant finds that 
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his interactional style is heavily loaded with statments of defense and/or 
attack, he might well entertain the hypothesis that he is unwilling to examine 
even the possiblity of change. 
The Group in Flight 
.--
Obviously some of the resistances and flight modalities outlined above 
could apply not only to individuals but to the group as a whole. This is 
especially true if the group establishes a "culture" in which one or another 
flight modality, e.g., intellectualized interpretation, is either tolerated 
or even encouraged. Certain other behaviors, however, pertain more to the 
resistance or the flight of the group as such, though here again any particula 
behavior might characterize an individual rather than the group. Some of 
these behaviors are outlined below. 
Extended contract talk. In contract-group experiences it is essential 
that participants have a solid understanding of the principal provisions of 
the contract. In other kinds of growth-group experiences, especially 
experiences characterized by goallessness or "planned ambiguity," it is 
necessary for the participants to work out some kind of contract among them-
selves. In both groups, then, early meetings are characterized by "contract 
talk" which includes a discussion of goals and the group structures necessary 
to achieve these goals. However, when the group persists in "contract talk," 
when it keeps formulating and reformulating its goals, when it keeps restruc-
turing the contract, then it is quite likely that the group is allowing talk 
about the contract to take the place of fulfilling the contract. It is much 
easier to discuss a contract (expressed or implied) than to engage in it. 
This does not mean that a group should not discuss the contract or reformulate 
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its goals from time to time. This reformulation, however, should be quite 
concrete, that is, goals should not be discussed in themselves but in terms 
of the individuals, interactions, and incidents of the group itself. If this 
.. --
is done, occasional "contract talk" will become just another modality through 
which the participants contact one another. 
Analysis of past interactions. Detailed analysis of past interactions 
in the group is both a caricature of "processing" and a seemingly popular 
form of flight. For instance, the group in an afternoon meeting discusses 
in detail the dynamics of the morning meeting. This takes place under the 
guise of "working things out" and "getting things straight," but the hidden 
purpose is frequently to gain a respite from intimate interaction. The 
group analyzes not to put things in perspective but to put the interaction at 
a distance. Sometimes these "historical" analyses take place during the 
same meeting, that is, the participants interact for a while and then the 
interchange degenerates into a "This happened and then that happened: or a 
"No, B got angry and then A got angry" situation in which the here-and-now is 
abandoned for a safer there-and-then. In worthwhile "processing," the 
participants become critics of the group culture and of their own interactions 
with a view to improving both. "Historical" analyses, on the other hand, 
usually become ends in themselves; the group treads water, as it were, in 
order to avoid involvement. It is interacting to see what happens after the 
group concludes an "historical" analysis of its interaction: frequently it 
merely drops silent for a while, which is some indication of the relevance 
of the analysis. 
Serious a-contractual conversations. Sometimes groups flee the expresse 
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or implied contract by engaging in ''worthwhile discussions" which really have 
/ no relation to the goals of the group. I sat in on a sensitivity group once 
I 
I 
and listened for a while to a rather high-level discussion of some of the 
most important social issues of the. day. Had a total stranger come into the 
group without knowing its general purpose, I am sure that he would have 
thought that it was a social-action group that was taking itself seriously. 
Such conversation would have been most appropriate at another time in another 
place, but in the training group it was merely an expression of discomfort 
and anxiety and a flight from the real purpose of the group. Usually, such 
serious discussions take place early in the life the the group, for most 
people assume that when they are talking intellectually about serious issues, 
they are in close contact wi.th their fellow discussants. Such conversations 
are difficult to challenge, too, for it seems ignoble to interrupt something 
that is so worthwhile in i.taelf. I tend to interrupt the conversation and 
have the group "process" what i.t is doing. Soon the participants realize 
that they are avoidhg the real issues at hand. The point is that such 
conversations should be interrupted immediately so that "serious intellectual 
discussions" do not become part of the group culture. 
Turn-taking~ dependence ~exercises. Some of the exercises which 
are commonly introduced into human relations laboratori.es involve "turn-
taking" or "going around." For instance, early in the life the the group, 
each member might be asked to give his first impressions of every other 
member. Turn-taking provides a structure which both forces each member to 
participate and provides a certain amount of "institutionalized" safety. As 
the group moves forward, however, there should be less and less reliance on 
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is the case, then these m~mbers are in flight. No structure which signifi-
cantly reduces the involvement of a number of members (or serves as an excuse 
for their non-involvement) should be tolerated; if "dealing with one" has this 
... -
effect, then it is not being handled properly. It is possible to "deal with 
one" in a way which does not cut down on the involvement of the participants. 
First of all, no participant should be allowed to excuse himself from the 
interaction simply because another participant is to a greater or lesser 
extent the focal point of the discussion. Secondly, "dealing with one" does 
not exclude interactions between participants other than the focal participant. 
Too often it is assumed that if the group is "dealing with one," the only 
permissible interactions are those between the focal participant and someone 
else. This is artificial and stultifying. Thirdly, the focal participant, 
himself realizing that there is a tendency on the part of some to withdraw 
from the interaction in a "dealing with one" situat:bn, should take the 
initiative in bringing silent members back into the discussion. The problem 
is that most focal participants become somewhat passive and merely allow 
themselves to be dealt with. Another danger inherent in a "dealing with one" 
situation is the tendency to focus on there-and-then incidents and concerns 
rather than the here-and-now. This of itself serves the cause of alienation. 
The responsibility for maintaining a here-and-now culture in a "dealing with 
one" situation falls to a great degree on the shoulders of the focal partici-
pant. He cannot escape talking about there-and-then concerns, but it is his 
responsibility to make these concerns relevant to the here-and-now. For 
instance, it may be that the there-and-then limits his ability to involve 
himself with the other participants, that is, his past history affects his 
484 
sharing yourself with me, it gives me the courage to share myself with you." 
It is.also unwarranted to assume that the group can work completely through 
any participant's self-revelation at any one time. Such gradiosity covers a 
... -
multitude of uncertainties and anxieties in groups. The group should feel 
free to return again and again to anything that has been said in the group 
and to look at new facets of self-disclosure in the light of subsequent 
group interaction. 
Interruptions and moods. If the group culture is too "polite," it will 
not allow one participant to interrupt another nor will it allow anyone to 
interrupt a group procedure such as "dealing with one." Perhaps a distinction 
should be made between relevant and irrelevant interruptions or interventions. 
To inte~rupt in order to change the topic is one thing, to intervene because 
one has something important and relevant to say is another. On the one hand, 
the group culture should not encourage boorishness, but, on the other, it 
should promote a freer atmosphere than that found in polite conversations. 
With good purpose one should be able to break into a conversation without 
being made feel that he is an intruder or a bull in a china shop. Although 
it has been thought that the number of interruptions that would occur when 
members of families of schizophrenics interacted would be significantly 
higher than the number of interruptions during the conversations carried on 
by the families of normals. Mishler and Waxler (1966) found that the 
opposite was true. The data suggest that the families of acute schizophrenic 
patients have the fewest interruptions and families of normal children have 
the most. Such data may indicate that "interruptions" are even an essential 
part of good conversational interaction. If the interaction is so fragile tha 
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any interruption can destroy it, then perhaps the participants should work at 
making it more robust rather than pouring energies into protecting it. Some-
times participants claim that through interruptions the "magic of the 
moment" is lost: "We never got back to it." This statement, however, may 
mean: "We did not want to get back-to it"--relief being disguised as altruist 
annoyance. The group does not have its moods and mood can be a facilitating 
factor, but the group should not be too dependent on mood in order to get 
its work done. It is not that there are not "right times" for dealing with 
certain issues, but it is up to the group to create these "right times" 
rather than waiting for them to happen. 
Problem-solution cultures. No matter how applicable a problem-solution 
model might to be such sciences as mathematics and physics, it leaves much to 
be desired when applied to intrapsychic and interpersonal.living. As soon 
as a group participant mentions that he has certain "problems," this evokes 
certain predictable reactions in the other participants: they want to "solve" 
his problems, have him "solve" them himself, or help him'"solve'them. In 
fact, the group usually welcomes talk of problems, because it is much easier 
to deal with problems than to involve oneself with persons. If certain of 
his behaviors can be separated from him and labeled as problematic, then 
one's approach to him can be relatively simple and "clean." 
This seems to be more than just a question of semantics. "Problems" 
and implied "solutions" simply are not persons but ways of setting persons 
at a di.stance. In fact, people are beginning to substitute other tenns for 
the word "problem." For instance, they talk about their "hang-ups." It 
I. 





"problem," but the former term implies that the person who is "hung up" is in 
some way responsible for this behavior and that behavioral change in within 
his power. At least "hang-ups" do not seem to have "solutions." 
.. --
Life is not the compartmentalized or atomistic entity that the problem-
solution paradigm envisions. Life is principally interpersonal living, but 
to cast interpersonal living in terms of "problems" and "solutions" tends to 
make objects out of people. Even though most interpersonal-growth groups, 
at least in the beginning, identify depth of involvement in the group process 
with the revelation of "problems," depth of involvement entails their sharing 
themselves rather than their problems. If the participants insist upon 
sharing problems, this might be because they cannot share themselves. When 
two people find it difficult to involve themselves with each other, they 
seldom sit down and "solve" this "problem" they have with each other. Rather, 
through dialogue they begin to transcend attitudes and behaviors that keep 
them apart. Once they become more available to each other, a new synthesis 
(rather than a "solution") takes place in their relationship. They grow 
in relationship to each other, and growth does not fit in well with a problem-
solution paradigm. 
If a person always talks about himself in terms of his problems, he 
tends to maintain the false hope that if he solves his problems, then things 
will be all right: Utopia is the land of solved problems. Perhaps the use 
of $UCh terms as "problem" and "solution" appears unhealthy or inappropriate 
because such language is symptomatic of overly "mechanistic" attitudes 
toward oneself and one·'s relationship with others. 
Tacit decisions. The tendency of the group to make "tacit decisions" 
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or come to "tacit understandings" has been mentioned above, but it bears 
repeating here in that it is one of the principal ways in which groups as 
such take flight. As Whitaker and Lieberman (1964) note, unchallenged modes 
of behavior tend to pass into the group culture as "laws," and once these 
"laws" are made, they become very difficult to change or abrogate. "Tacit 
understandings" can affect almost any aspect of group life: the content of 
discussions ("We do not talk about sex here"), procedure ("When one person 
is talking, no one should interrupt him and he should be given all the time 
he wants"), depth of interaction ("We really don't want to wash our dirty 
linen here" or "Thre are some things that we should just keep to ourselves"), 
rules ("Coming late or absenting oneself from this group is not an offense"), 
style ("Humor is allowed almost anytime during the interaction"), goals 
("Our purpose is to decrease the discomfort that we feel in being together 
with one another" or "Cooperation with one another is not a group value in 
this situation"). Since flight-by-tacit-decision can take place very early 
in the life of the group, it is up to the leader-member to explain both the 
process involved and the consequences of such "understandings" and to 
challenge them as soon as he sses them being formulated in the group. 
"Tacit decisions" can begin with clearly expressed statements which go 
unchallenged in the group. For instance, in a group which was slated to 
meet once a week for twelve weeks in three-and-a-half hour sessions, one of 
the participants said during the first meeting: "This set-up really doesn't 
allow us much time to get involved with one another; the time is short and 
we don '·t see one another between sessions." One hypothesis might be that 
he was afraid of getting involved with the others and that he really feared 
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that there was too much time. His statement, however, went unchallenged in 
the group and kept coming up like a refrain in subsequent meetings. The 
participants tacitly accepted his analysis of the limitation of the 
... -
possibilities of the group and spent the following weeks trying to live 
with the frustration that this entailed. There are always tendencies to 
blame the group structure (time, length of meeting, lack of specific things 
to say and do, etc.) for group inaction, but to allow these tendencies to 
become concretized in the group culture can mean the suffocation of the 
group. 
Ritual behavior. Alexander (1963) warns against what he calls "standard 
izing the treatment" in psychotherapy, that is, allowing it to degenerate 
into an interaction ritual between therapist and client. The interpersonal-
growth group, too, can easily take on a ritualistic atmosphere devoid of 
eruptions of any kind in which sameness soothes. Although the participants 
become quite comfortable in such a ritual, there is still the illusion that 
something serious and worthwhile is really taking place. In a ritualistic 
group culture, not only do the same issues come up over and over again, but 
they are handled in the same way. For instance, participant X's silence and 
general lack of involvement is dealt with from time to time, but little is 
done between ritualistic confrontations to bring X into the interaction. 
It is almost as if the participants were to say to themselves from time to 
time: "Since nothing in particular is taking place right now, we might as 
well make a group assault on X again." One way to dramatize the ritualiza-
tion of the group is to replay a videotape of, let us say, session three 
together with a tape of session eight. If the same issues are being dealt 
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with in the same way, that is, if it would be impossible for a stranger to 
determine which was the earlier and which the later session, then it may 
well be that the group has ritualized itself as a form of resistance or 
_.--
flight. A ritualized group culture is a sterile thing of which boredom and 
resistance to attending (reluctance to come, coming late, actual absences) 
are the inevitable signs. 
Exceeding contractual limits and.the question of "loyalty." The 
following situation comes up again and again in groups. The meeting is 
scheduled to last from seven until 10 o'clock. Little happens until about 
nine-thirty so that by ten o'clock the group is "in the middle of things." 
Most members take it as a sign of involvement in and loyalty to the group 
to extend the group session until ten-thirty. or eleven o'clock. Not only 
that, but they implicitly or explicitly accuse anyone who wants to leave at 
the contracted time of "disloyalty." Frequently this mode of proceeding is 
established early in the life of the group by means of a "tacit understanding' 
and becomes an important factor in the group culture. The group attempts 
to take flight by substituting sheer quantl.ty of participation (time spent 
together) for quality. In my opinion, meetings should, in general, start 
and. stop in time. "Loyalty" should be demonstrated not by a willingness 
to give oneself to endless discussions (quite often such discussions entail 
"dealing with one" in a way which precludes the involvement of the majority 
of the members) but by a willingess to get down to work from the start. The 
person who "opens up" five minutes before the scheduled end of the meeting 
should continue in the following meeting. If in the following meeting he 
finds that t:1e "golden moment" has passed, it is 100re than likely that he was 
.... 
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only teasing the group in the first place. Or if mood is so important for 
him, then the interactions that take place when the mood is upon him might wel 
have little learning value. His moods are perhaps analogous to drugged states 
in which real learning either does not take place or does nto transfer to 
non-drugged conditions. 
Concluding Remarks 
Flight ~ non-growthful avoidance learning. Avoidance learning has been 
used with varying degrees in treating such problems as alcoholism and 
sexually deviant behavior (Kalish, 1965). The client ·must learn to stay 
away from a certain situation, avoid a certain stimulus, or place a certain 
act in order to prevent some unwanted consequences. for instance, an alcohol 
ic treated with Antabuse might learn that nausea and violent retching are too 
high a price to pay for drinking, so he avoids the stimulus that results in 
such a noxious response. In groups the participants soon learn that, at 
least initially, a certain degree of pain and discomfort is associated with 
involving themselves affectively with one another. They also learn that 
there are certain behaviors (see flight behaviors outlined above) which put 
off, circumvent, or in other ways avoid painful self-actualizing interaction. 
Each time a participant engages in some sort of flight and not only avoids 
painful interacton but even receives some kind of positive response from his 
fellow participants, the flight behavior in question is reinforced and the 
group is on i.ts way toward a flight culture. 
Participation versus involvement. Some members participate quite a 
bit in the group interaction but involve themselves minimally. In reviewing 
videotape of a group session recently, I began scoring the interactions, 
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using (X) to indicate a contractual interaction, (0) a non-contractual 
interaction, and (N) a kind of neutral interaction designed to "keep things 
moving" though not constituting a real contribution in itself. Participation 
"styles" began to emerge. For instance, one participant ended up with a long 
string of (N's). He had participated quite a bit in the interaction but had 
contributed little of himself. He had really assumed the role of "facilita-
tor" without even realizing what he was doing (for he was quite surprised 
later when his fellow participants told him that he was playing the role of 
leader). The participants who have long strings of (O's) and (N's) are 
certainly participating, but they are not involving themselves. rt·would 
be better if these members were to cut down on their participation and 
increase their involvement. 
Fight versus maintaining adequate defenses. Sensitivity-training 
experiences, if carried out responsibly, give the participants a relatively 
safe opportunity to lower some of their defenses in the name of growth. No 
growth experience, however, should demand that the participant divest him~ 
self of hi.a defenses entirely. But maintaining adequate defenses (even in 
the process of lowering them) and resistance-flight are two different 
processes. The more connnon danger is that the participant will not drop his 
defenses enough to allow the experience to have its impact on him. The 
person with crumbling defenses either refuses to participate in such 
experiences because he senses the danger or he reveals his tenuous defense-
sys tem behaviorally early in the life of the group. Selection procedures 
should screen out those with crumbling defenses so that the group culture 
can bring to bear fairly strong pressures on those with more than adequate 
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defenses. 
Flight as entropic. Group interaction tends to entropy unless it is 
fed "information" from "outside" the system, that is, outside the systems 
of defense and convention that enclose the participants. Cliches are 
entropic, a cause and, a sign of the decline of the system. Long-winded, 
intellectualized interpretation-insight systems are entropic. "Story," on 
the other hand, has high "message" or "information" value, for it keeps 
the system "open," reverses the entropic process, and leads to an enclave 
of anti-entropic "organization" (see Wiener, 1967, and Rosenblith, 1967). 
Flight is always identifiable by its entropic effect. No matter how en-
gaging or entertaining it might be at the moment, it has no sustaining effect 
and the "system" that is constituted by the interrelationships between 
members "runs down." If nothing is done, it dies. Again, no contract, 
implicit or explicit, can ban the various forms of flight that take place 
during sensitivity-training laboratories, but if the participants are willing 





The Problem of Agency 
An assumption throughout this book has been that it is the relatively 
active participant who will benefit most from the training experience. The 
group has no miraculous powers: it cannot serve the personal and inter-
personal growth of the participant who actively resists the experience or 
who remains a passive spectator of the group interaction. However, as Bion 
(1961) notes, it is impossible to do nothing in a group, not even by doing 
nothing. A refusal to accept the challenge of agency in a group is a 
refusal to face one's potential. The assumption here is that such refusals 
are deleterious to personal and interpersonal growth. Erikson (1964).speaks 
generally about the agency-passivity dimension of psychic life: 
Patiens, then, would denote a state of being exposed from within 
or from without to superior forces which cannot be overcome 
without prolonged patience or energetic redeeming help; while 
agens connotes an inner state of being unbroken in initiative 
and in acting in the service of a cause which sanctions this 
initiative. You will see immediately that the state of agens 
is what all clients, or patients, in groups or alone, are 
groping for and need our help to achieve (p. 87). 
Indeed, one of the common marks of emotional disturbance is the surrender of 
agency, especially the refusal to be an agent in interpersonal situations. 
Perhaps one of the most important goals of laboratory training in inter-
personal relations is experimenting with one's power-of-agency in inter-
personal living. In order to do this, the individual participant must take 
responsibility for what is happening in the group: "The group (including the 
trainers) is responsible for itself, each of us must exercise his personal 
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and joint responsibility if any degree of 'self-actualization' is to be 
achieved" (Bugental & Tannenbaum, 1965, p. 110). The group will be as good 
as I make it--this seems to be the cold, hard logic of sensitivity-training 
groups. 
Agency, like independence, cannot be conferred; it must be seized: 
In the last analysis independence cannot be conferred; it can 
only be seized .... [W]e can only say that it has become manifest 
in an individual or group when it no longer occurs to that group 
or individual to seek the solution of its problems by an agent 
outside itself. To 'demand one's independence' ••• is of course a 
contradiction in terms (Slater, 1966, p. 150). 
"Initiative," therefore, is an important concept in training groups. In the 
contract group this is made abundantly clear: the member, for all practical 
purposes, contracts to be an initiator, to move out of himself and "contact" 
the group and its individual participants. It is unlikely that the group wilJ 
transform a passive person into a high-initiator, but an increased sense of 
agency is an important goal for every participant. If a person participates 
only by responding when he is contacted in some way, then his participation, 
rated in terms of seconds spent talking, might well be high, but if his 
participation is rated in terms of number of acts initiated (see Mann, 1959, 
p. 244), then his participation will be low. The contract cnlls for partici-
pation by initiation--at least this is an ideal to be pursued. 
It is not suggested here that universal active participation is 
characteristic of face-to-face groups. The evidence indicates that ordinaril~ 
"interaction is unevenly distributed among group members" (Collins & Guetzkow, 
1964, p. 170). There is a characteristic tendency for a few people to 
dominate group interaction and this tendency increases with the size of the 
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group. In training groups, however, tendencies to domination and passivity 
are to be resisted. This is essential if the participants are to work toward 
cohesiveness. The group dynamics literature indicates that cohesiveness, 
defined in terms of inter-member attraction or liking, increases with increase< 
interaction (for a sunnnary see Lott & Lott, 1965). Collins and Guetzkow 
(1964) also cite evidence indicating that the "more interactions initiated 
by a group member, the more interactions will be directed to him bo other 
group members" (p. 170). In other words, group cohesiveness depends on 
intermember activity and intermember activity depends, at least in part, on 
the willingness of the individual participant to assume a.certain degree of 
agency in the interpersonal life of the group. Mann (1959) indicates that 
initiators in groups are usually more intelligent, better adjusted, and more 
extroverted than non-initiators. Since group members usually possess 
different amounts of intelligence, adjustment, and "extroversion," this means 
that the group as a whole will have to strive to keep the interaction 
distributed in such a way as to benefit all members. This is not to say 
that all members must participate equally (nor is mere quantity rather than 
quality of participation being urged), but it does mean that care should be 
taken to give all members an opportunity to become initiators and that the 
relatively passive should be encouraged to initiate inter.action. It is 
hypothesized here that a certain quantity of participation (and initiation) 
is essential to overall quality of participation. Every group sessions starts 
with an emptiness which can be filled only by the initiative of the partici-
pants. Filling this emptiness must be a cooperative effort. 
Bunker (1965), in studying the effects of laboratory training in the 
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participants' day-to-day lives subsequent to the training sessions found no 
differences between participants and controls in effective initiation of 
action, assertiveness, and self-confidence--all factors in the "agency" 
dimension of living. However, what we do not know is how much initiative, 
assertiveness, and self-confidence are displayed by the experimental group 
in the laboratory itself. Nor do we know whether increasing initiative, 
assertiveness, and self-confidence were explicit goals of the laboratory 
experience or not. A laboratory will not magically increase these qualities 
unless it is desinged to do so and unless the participants experiment with 
and exercise their power-of-agency within the group. In the contract group 
the exercise-of-agency is an explicit goal. I would like to see Bunker's 
experiment replicated with an experimental group which hae been explicitly 
encouraged to responsible agency by the laboratory experience itself. 
Research: Issues and Applications 
A number of reviews have covered the research literature on laboratory 
learning from a variety of points of view (Buchanan, 1965; Campbell & 
Dunnette, 1968; House, 1967; Stock, 1964). While most of the research has 
had a direct or indirect managerial or organizational orientation, still it 
raises issues and suggests application to laboratory experiences the goals 
of which are self-actualization and interpersonal growth. Unfortunately, 
despite the phenomental growth and spread of these latter experiences, there 
is little research which deals directly with them. In fact, the research 
that seems most relevant to such groups is that pertainly to psychotherapy 
and to a number of areas of social psychology. However, no one has yet 
synthesized the pertinent aspects of this literature and used it as a 
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starting point for research into interpersonal-growth oriented sensitivity-
training groups. Yet it is only fitting to comment on some of the research 
findings in the general area of laboratory training and discuss their 
relevance to the kind of experience outlined in the past ten chapters. Since 
these comments will not be exhaustive, the reader interested in a more 
comprehensive review of research problems and findings is referred to the 
reviews listed above. 
The lack of !!_unitary phenomenon. The consensus of those who have 
reviewed the literature is that the evidence concerning the value of 
laboratory-training experiences is contradictory, confusing, and inconclu-
sive. Since most of the research deals with the use of laboratory train~ng 
for the purpose of increasing managerial skills and organizational 
effectiveness, the above statement may be put as follows: "Examination of 
the research literature leads to the conclusion that while T-group training 
seems to produce observable changes in behavior, the utility of these changes 
for the performance of individuals in their organizational roles remains 
to be demonstrated" (Campbell & Dunnette, 1968, p. 73). As such, this 
conclusion does not deal with the use of laboratory techniques as means of 
increasing self-actualization processees and interpersonal growth. One of 
the principal causes of the confusing and contradictory evidence obtained 
so far is undoubtedly the fact that "sensitivity-training," the "T-group," 
and "laboratory-training" are very often broad terms which do not indicate 
any kind of unitary phenomenon. Laboratories use a variety of techniques, 
e.g., lectures or lecturettes, exercises, both verbal and nonverbal, and 




styles, some being quite passive while others are quite active; laboratories 
take place in a variety of settings with different kinds of populations, e.g. 
volunteers who attend a residential laboratory, students in courses, non-
volunteers who represent a cross-section of a particular organization, 
volunteers in weekly local groups conducted by non-professionals,etc. 
Perhaps it is the phenomenon itself which is confusing and not the evidence. 
As Campbell and Dunnette (1968) put it: 
Research concerning the relative contributions of specific 
technological features of the T group is also sparse. For 
example, there are no systematic studies examining the influence 
of differences in trainer personality and/or style on the outcome 
achieved by participants. Case reports and anecdotal evidence 
are all that exist (p. 97). 
It is practically impossible at times to replicate studies, for the 
descriptions of what took place in the training situations are either non-
existent or too sparse to be meaningful. The variables of the laboratory 
situation must be described carefully if replication is to become possible. 
In that the contract-group approach delineates goals, leadership style, 
and the kinds of interaction expected of the members, it offers a kind of 
unitary phenomenon for study. If, in addition, a log is kept indicating 
the sequence of such events as exercises, greater control is possible in 
replication studies. This does not mean that research with laboratories 
characterized by goallessness and "planned ambiguity" is impossible (though 
it is probably more difficult). However, the essential communalities of 
such experiences should be carefully described so that research efforts 
center around the same phenomena. A contract approach to self-actualization 
through the small group experience may standardize the experience in a way 
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then so is impossible, then so is research and all that an interested party 
can do is listen to the "witness," both positive and negative, given by 
those who engage in laboratory training. 
Methodological problems and the question of outcome. It is a truism 
to say that enormous methodological problems face the researcher interested 
in macro-aspects of human behavior. Furthermore, once one has read to 
extent research literature dealing with laboratory training, it is easy to 
criticize the efforts which have been made to measure this phenomenon. For 
instance, one glaring defect in these studies (among many in the design 
of research) has been the failure to use control groups (Gassner, Gold, 
& Snadowsky, 1964). One of the serious problems facing the researcher is 
how to measure outcome. In this respect, a kind of dilemma exists: on the 
one hand, traditional psychological tests are not sensitive to the changes 
which take place in training groups, and yet, on the other, ad hoc scales 
and tests are unvalidated. For instance, Dunnette (1962) reports a study 
in which the California Psychological Inventory was used to assess change 
in 70 business students who has engaged in 48 hours of laboratory training·. 
Although the results were termed negative, perhaps it would have been 
more exact to say that they were irrelevant, for there is no reason why 
the GPI should measure the outcome of laboratory training. Haiman (1963) 
found significant shifts in attitude as measured by a composite open-mineJnes 
scale, and indeed, as Campbell and Dunnette (1968) suggest, the whole area 
of attitude change as one of the principal outcomes of laboratory experiences 
is one which has been little studied even though it is an area of grL.,. 
promise. Some of the tests which have l:een used to me:.rnure outcome l;av(· [,een 
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used to measure outcome have been of limted use because of ceiling effects: 
laboratory participants score high on the pretest and thus have little 
"room to move." Better tests in the area of the self-actualization of the 
relatively normal person are needed. After a laboratory experience, a 
participant might feel better and be more satisfied with the quality of his 
interpersonal interaction, but many are wary of such subjective measures. 
In sunnnary it seems relatively well established that the way in 
which an individual sees himself may indeed change during the 
courses of a T group. However, there is no firm evidence 
indicating that such changes are produced by theT-group training 
as compared with other types of training, merely by the passage 
of time, or even by the simple expedient of retaking a self-
descriptive inventory after a period of thinking about one's 
previous responses to the same inventory (Campbell & Dunnette, 
1968, p. 91). 
Furthermore, while it is possible to ask the associates of a person who has 
participated in a laboratory whether he has changed for the better or not 
(Bunker, 1965), such measurement is awkward and of unknown accuracy. More-
over even the positive changes might be unrelated to both the kinds of 
interactions and the goals which characterize the laboratory experience. 
It might even be that the participant merely used the laboratory experience 
as an occasion to engage in some kind of "conversion" experience which is 
relatively unrelated to the goals, operations, interactions, and exercises 
of the laboratory. But if this is the case, are we to say that the labora-
tory has been successful or not? 
Most outcome studies deal with group scores. The problem wiL:i sroup 
i scores, however, is that individual differences are lost and ceiling 
j effectives are frequently operative. During the same laboratory experience, 
I some participants improve their interpersonGl skills while others seem to 
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regress. 
S far research focused on the 'average' effects of T-group or 
laboratory training has been considered. That is, the crucial 
question has been wehter or not training makes a difference for 
the group as a whole. S~ch a generalized interpretation might 
cover up important interactions between individual differences 
and training methods. Given a particular kind of outcome, 
certain kinds of people might benefit from T-group training while 
others may actually be harmed. The same reasoning may be 
applied to the interaction of differences in situational and 
organizational variables with the training experince. However, 
very few studies have investigated interactive effects (Campbell 
& Dunnette, 1968, p. 96). 
What is it that causes some to succeed and some to fail? What does the 
successful person do that the unsuccessful person does not? 
Finally, the question of "baseline" measurements seem to be important 
in outcome studies. In a study by Zand, Steele, and Zalkind (1967) it was 
found that individuals rated as most "involved" in the laboratory experience 
also tended to be rated as the most involved in follow-up activities. At 
first glance, this evidence would seem to bear on the question of "agency" 
discussed above. But since no baseline with respect to involvement has been 
determined, i.t is not clear whether it was or increased agency or merely of 
consistency of behavi.or. There was no baseline against which to measu.tt.~ 
improvement in "involvement" or "agency." 
Perhaps it is time to review the criteria we use to judge the success 
or failure of sensitivity-training experience. If measuremert is to have 
any meaning at all, it is necessary clearly to delineate the specific 
goals of any given laboratory experience, to determine what means are 
associated with achieving these goals, and to devise measures to ._:c· · 
whether these goals have been reached or not. P\!rh.1ps the criteria \viilch 
we have used to measure success or failure have been too gross or have not 
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reflected the real goals of the experience. For instance, managerial-
training laboratories aside, can success be indiat:ed by the very fact that 
the participant believes that he as benefited by the training experience and 
somehow feels enriched for having involved himself rather intimately with 
this set of people at this time? Does the criterion of success always have 
to be (or at lest exclusively be) what constructive changes take place in the 
home situation subsequent to the laboratory experience? Perhaps at this 
stage of laboratory-training development we should be more modest in looking 
for results. But we can be neither modest nor exact unless we get a clearer 
picture of what takes place within the laboratory and of the component 
parts of the goals set for training experiences. 
Research and the goals of laboratory learning. To say that "inter-
personal sensitivity" is the goal of laboratory learning is to say almost 
nothing. Campbell and Dunnettee (1968) discuss the vagueness of such a 
goal: 
The major purpose here is simply to emphasize that irrerpersonal 
sensitivity is not only an elusive, but also a high complex 
phenomenon. Persons involved in a T-group training program 
may indeed become more "sensitive," but the nature and underlying 
strategies of the sensitivities developed may differ widely from 
person to person and from program to program. Unless the various 
components and strategies involved in interpersonal sensitivity 
are taken into account during the design of measuring instruments 
and during the design and implementation of research investigatiow,, 
little new knowledge concerning T-group training effects or the 
likelihood of transferring skills back to the work setting will 
accrue. So far •.. most investigations have not atte:''pted to cope 
with the serious measu:rement and design problems in this area 
(p. 80). 
Later in the same article the authors run up against the very compleixity the\ 
speak of. They suppose that one of the goals of laboratory learning should 
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ability of an individual to predict the values and attitudes of others. 
Then they conclude on this negative note: "In sum, the studies incorporating 
a measure of how well an individual can predict the attitudes and values of 
others before and after T-group training have yielded largely negative 
results'.' (p. 91). Yet it is doubtful that such predictive ability is the 
goal of interpersonal-growth oriented laboratory training. Accurate 
empathy refers to the ability to get some kind of feeling for what is going 
on inside another here and now and is not necessarily related to conceptual 
accuracy or predictive ability. Sensitiv~ty training should produce more 
openness to the attributes, attitudes, opinions, feelings, and reactions of 
others. Accuracy, ·however, is something that depends upon both the one who 
emits the communication and the one who receives it. A person perceives 
another more accurately both if he gets rid of his own barriers to perceiving 
and if the other emits communications more directly and accurately. Accuracy 
depends both on the abili.ty to perceive and the clarity of cues emitted. 
The central point is this: it is difficult to measure attainment of goals 
unless there is agreement on the part of the participant, trainer, and 
researcher that the particular laboratory experience is designed to achieve 
a certain goal and that the participants see it as a goal worth achieving. 
Perhaps it would be better to set more modest goals for laboratory 
experiences. Perhaps the laboratory is a success for any participant who 
experiments with his behavior sufficiently to get some ldnd of feel for 
his interpersonal potentialities and deficiencies. The laboratory, then, 
would be an instrument of exploration rather than a vehicle of inunediate 
change. It would be much easier to determine whether a participant experi-
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ments with.certain kinds of behavior than to determine whether his life style 
has changed. It might well be that it is participant who explores his 
possibilities who ultimately changes. If this is the case, then it is not 
" -
surprising that Harrison (1966) and Schultz and Allen (1966) have found 
that some of the principal effects of laboratory training in terms of behav-
ioral change did not take place until months after the training experience. 
Perhaps there is a period of fermentation or incubation characterized by 
subtle behavioral changes (e.g. changes in interpersonal attitudes). 
The psychotherapy research paradigm. Research in laboratory learning 
could well take some cues from some of the more effective research taking 
place in psychotherapy. First of all, the goals of any particular kind of 
laboratory training should be quite clear and operationalized in terms of 
specific behaviors. In the contract group, engaging in self-disclosure, 
expression of feeling, support, confrontation, and self-exploration as a 
response to confrontation are the specific interactional behaviors that 
define the group goal of interpersonal growth. The immediate goal of the 
contract group is experimentation with these behaviors on the part of the 
participants. The laboratory is a "success" in one sense if the partici-
pants actually do (increasingly) engage in such behaviors, for it is hypo-
thesized that through these behaviors they come in more effective contact 
with themselves and with other. The laboratory becomes "diagnostic" in a 
good sense of that term: the participants come face to face with their 
interpersonal deficits and potentialities. It is hypothesized that if the 
participants do experiment constructively with such behavior in the context 




The laboratory must provide a climate in which the kind of experimenta-
tion described above becomes possible. Certain participant, trainer, 
relationship, and situation variables facilitate such a climate. It is the 
function of research to determine precisely what these variables are. 
(a) Participant behaviors. Friedman (1963) found that a patient who 
enters a therapeutic relationship expecting to be helped in that relationship 
usually does find help in the form of symptom reduction, that is, patient-
expectancy is related to symptom reduction. Similarly, it seems that the 
person who enters a laboratory experience expecting to benefit from it will 
tend to profit from the experience. The person who enters a laboratory close 
minded and cynical is likely to leave the experience the same way (and then 
perhaps blame the experience itself for being ineffective). Truax and 
Carkhuff (1964) have suggested that concreteness or specificity of expression 
is a highly desirable patient variable, that is, they find some evidence 
that it is related to successful outcome. Concreteness also seems to be a 
participant variable which adds to the effectiveness of training sessions. 
The question is: what participant variables are related to positive and 
negative outcomes? 
(b) Trainer variables. Rogers and his associates (1967) discuss the 
differences between "high-functioning" and "low-functioning" therapists, 
outlining the qualities that make for high-functioning, e.g. acceptance and 
warmth, genuineness, accurate empathy, etc. Others (e.g., Berenson & 
Mitchell, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & Laney, 1968; Berenson, Mitchell, & 
Moravec, 1968; Doude, Berenson, Carkhuff, & Pierce, 1967) have added 
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confrontation to the repertory of high-functioning therapists. Patients in 
therapy with high-functioning therapists tend to make progress, while those 
in therapy with low-functioning therapists tend to stay the same or deterior-
ate. Now, given the wide variety of trainer styles in laboratory experiences 
there are probably certain kinds of behavior that help create a climate of 
growth for participants and other kinds of behavior which inhibit such growth. 
It is the function of research to determine precisely what trainers should 
and should not do in order to facilitate growth in the laboratory. In the 
contract group the function of the trainer is spelled out with a good deal 
of clarity: he is to manifest the growth-facilitating behaviors suggested 
by Rogers (1967), he clarifies the contract, he suggests problems that 
might arise because of his role as leader or leader-member, and he models 
the kind of interactional behavior called for by the contract. It is 
hypothesized that if he does these things well, he will help provide a 
climate in which interpersonal growth (defined by the participants' fulfillin 
the contract by experimenting with the kinds of behavior it calls for) is 
facilitated. 
Situation and relationship variables, too, should be studied in labora-
tory settings, especially with respect to the impact they have on outcome. 
Outcomes: success, indifference, disappointment, and dpmage. Though 
Bunker (1965), Boyd and Elliss (1962), and Valiquet (1964) in more or less 
objective studies have showed that laboratory experiences caused increased 
sensitivity, more open communication, and increased flexiblity in role 
behavior, still most of the evidence that exists concerning the outcome 




volunteers believe that they have been helped in some way (although at times 
they have difficulty in specifying in just what ways), though it is also 
true that while the participant ~ight believe that he has changed greatly, 
his associates do not perceive the changes. This may mean that the labora-
tory participant is inept in externalizing the change, that his associates 
are inept in recognizing change, or that change simply has not taken place. 
On the other hand, a certain percentage of participants leave the laboratory 
experience feeling indifferent, disappointed, or even disturbed. Klaw (1965) 
for instance, found one in ten liking themselves less after a training period 
and not knowing what to do about it. It is not uncommon that people change 
after laboratory experiences, but the changes are not always in the expected 
or "right" direction. A study by the Foundation for Research on Human 
Behavior (1960) showed that participants believed that they had changed in 
seven or eight.areas, but it also showed that they thought that half of 
these changes were negative. Boyd and Elliss (1962) studied three groups: 
one laboratory-trained, the second conventionally trained, and the third 
not trained at all. Of 22 reported changes judged to be unfavorable (e.g., 
increase in irritability or loss of tolerance) 20 were attributed to members 
of laboratory-trained groups. Underwood (1965) showed that laboratory 
training produced more observable changes in participants than in controls 
with respect to job behavior, but it also produced a higher percentage of 
unfavorable changes. Even if the participant changes "for the good" during 
the laboratory experience, this does not mean that his life will proceed 
more smoothly than before, for his friends and the organizations to which 
he belongs might not be ready for these changes. For example, Schein and 
.------------------------------------------------------------------------------·-"'~~-
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and Bennis (1965) report three incidents of participants who suffered more 
tension after they returned to the job. It may well be that these 
participants changed "for the better" but the laboratory did not help them 
handle the problem of re-entry into a society that had not changed. In 
fact, some of the unfavorable changes reported above might merely reflect 
resistance to growth on the part of the back-home associates who rated the 
trainees' behavior subseq~ent to the training experience. In sum, the whole 
problem of the transfer of training effects to real-life situations is an 
unsolved one. 
As to the question of whether laboratory experiences are actually 
psychologically harmful or not, House (1967) in a review of the literature 
states: "Instances of reported collapse as a result of participation in T-
Group training are rare and completely undocumented ••• " (p. 29). Seashore 
(1968) corroborates this: "The incident of serious stress and mental 
disturbance during training is difficult to measure, but it is estimated 
to be less than on per ·cent ofparticipants and in almost all cases occurs 
in persons with a history of prior disturbances" (p. 2). Such assurances 
are important because it seems that in the whole mythology of sensitivity 
training almos.t everyone knows a "person who" has suffered tragic emotional 
upset because of some laboratory experience. This does not mean that 
laboratory experiences do not have risks, but then again it is somewhat 
dangerous to fly, to drive, get married, and to set one's goals high, that 
is, there is a certain danger associated with living, especially with living 
a full human life, but men usually do not become preoccupied with these 
dangers. Safeguards should certainly be built into laboratory experiences, 
----------------------------------------·····" 
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but people should not become obsessed by potential dangers. 
The power of the laboratory experience. The evidence we have indicates 
that the laboratory is a powerful force for behavioral change, but it also 
indicates that we have an imperfect understanding of the sources if its 
power and of ways to channel it into constructive change. An enlightened 
and integrated process-outcome research program is essential if laboratory 
programs are to become growthful vehicles of personal and cultural change. 
The Ending of the Group 
While most sensitivity-training laboratories are relatively short (a 
two-week residental laboratory, a semester course, a week-end marathon, etc.) 
this is not always the case. Some people are beginning to integrate a group 
experience into the pattern of their lives. Even in the short-lived 
laboratory, many of the participants get to know one another quite irtlmately 
and, in a sense, do not want to see the group experience come to an end. 
There is often a certain nostalgia associated with the last meeting, but 
usually there is no choice: because of real-life needs, the group must end. 
Perhaps Mills (1964) describes the feeling tone of the last meeting most 
poignantly: "Yearning for a benediction from some source, the group ci ies" 
(p. 79). Those who belong to groups that do not die probably do so for a 
number of reasons, e.g., security, companionship, stimulation, intimacy, 
interpersonal growth, etc. Little can be said about these variables, 
however, since little or no published research refers to such ongoing g:uups. 
Some, I imagine, would feel uneasy about such groups, seeing them as foste;: 
dependency needs, substituting for real interpersonal living, or as a means 
of fleeing the larger social issues of life and the action which these issues 
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demand. Certainly encounter groups could be misused in these and other ways, 
but there is nothing in the structure of these groups which would necessitate 
such misuses. If I were to risk a prediction, I would say that the ongoing-
group phenomenon will increase and that at its best it will both contribute 
significantly to interpersonal growth and stimulate its members to become 
more effective agents 0£ constructive social change within the communities 
and organizations to which they belong. 
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